

Henry Jackson: ‘Scooping’ Up After the British Empire

by Edward Spannaus

Much attention has been lavished by opponents of the Iraq War on the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a gathering point for hard-core neo-conservatives and promoters of an American empire, founded in 1997. Far less attention has been paid to the fact that PNAC closed its doors last year, and that its key operatives had already hooked up with modern day British “Round Table” imperialists in a new organization.

To rub it in the face of Americans, that henceforth they must openly be the subordinate power in a sought-after Anglo-American Empire, the founders named this new incarnation of Cecil Rhodes’ Round Table, the Henry Jackson Society.¹

The manifesto of the Henry Jackson Society is called “The British Moment.” Its statement of principles is a frank declaration of war on the sovereign nation-state, especially on the United States, as a sovereign republic dedicated to the promotion of the general welfare and a community of sovereign nations.

The absolute equality of all states—a fundamental principle of the Westphalian system—is thrown out the window by the Henry Jacksonites, who declare that “only modern liberal democratic states are truly legitimate, and any international organization which admits undemocratic nations on an equal basis is fundamentally flawed.” It demands a “forward strategy” for a British-led Europe and the U.S., combining “carrot capacities” and the ‘sticks’ of the military domain.”

It is indeed fitting, that these proponents of Anglo-Dutch-

American empire should name themselves after “Scoop” Jackson, who was himself a witting tool of those Anglo-American networks who have been out to destroy the United States for the past century, and, more broadly, since the American Revolution itself.

Staying Whose Course?


Not surprisingly, Scoop Jackson’s idol was Winston Churchill, whose post-war imperial designs were directly challenged by President Franklin Roosevelt before his death. Jackson also made an annual pilgrimage to London, with his key staffers.

After Jackson’s death, his long-time advisor Dorothy Fosdick compiled and edited a collection of Jackson’s speeches, entitled “Staying the Course: Henry M. Jackson and National Security.” Fosdick reported that she had selected the title, because one of Jackson’s favorite quotations was Churchill’s “Will America stay the course?”

One of the speeches featured in the “Staying the Course” volume, is a June 1959 address to the Military Government Association. Jackson opened that speech by lamenting the fact that, as he saw it, few Americans had any real understanding of the Soviet drive for world domination, and that the United States was being outdistanced by the Soviet Union militarily, industrially, scientifically, politically, and psychologically. Few Americans have any idea of what their duty is, Jackson complained, offering the following advice:

We could learn from the British experience in the nineteenth century. Then every man understood the importance to England of free trade, of freedom of the seas, of a strong navy, and of an able civil service to operate the vast empire. Most young men trained from child-

1. See “The Henry Jackson Society: Would-Be Fascist World Rule,” *EIR*, Aug. 18, 2006. Among the PNAC founders or collaborators who are now listed as “International Patrons” of the Henry Jackson Society, are Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Bruce Jackson, Clifford May, Joshua Muravchik, Richard Perle, and James Woolsey.



EIRNS

Like today's neo-cons, his political heirs, Henry "Scoop" Jackson began as a leftist and New Dealer, later changing his stripes to become a fierce Cold Warrior, in deadly opposition to the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt.

hood to contribute to the purposes England had to fulfill. As a result, the British people sustained a prodigious national effort.

Jackson, the Wilsonian

After I had written the first draft of this article, a friend suggested looking at Jackson from the closely related notions of "Wellsian democracy" and Wilsonianism. This was a most useful proposal, one which sheds additional light on the pre- and post-FDR corruption of the Democratic Party.

What appear superficially to be the paradoxes in Woodrow Wilson's policy and practice—the use of "war to end all wars"; the use of military intervention to end "militarism"; the brutal suppression of dissent at home under the guise of "preserving freedom"; the promotion of "democracy" abroad, so long as it cohered with Anglo-American interests; and, above all, the American promotion of a "New World Order"—are all found as well within H.G. Wells's "Open Conspiracy" to establish an Atlanticist one-world government. (See, for example, Michele Steinberg, "H.G. Wells Plots the World Empire," *EIR*, March 24, 2006.)

Indeed, a book which is regarded as one of the authoritative academic studies of Wilson, Thomas J. Knock's *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*, opens with a quote from *The Shape of Things to Come* by H. G. Wells, in which Wells wrote:

For a brief interval Wilson stood alone for all mankind. Or at least he seemed to stand for mankind. And in that brief interval there was a very extraordinary and significant wave of response to him throughout the earth. . . . [H]umanity leapt to accept and glorify Wilson. . . . He was transfigured in the eyes of men. . . . [H]e

became a Messiah. . . . That response was one of the most illuminating events of the early twentieth century. Manifestly the World-State had been conceived then. . . .²

In addition to his efforts to bring into being an Anglo-American-dominated world order, Wilson is also properly described as the first Cold Warrior. For all his rhetoric of "progressive internationalism," non-intervention, and self-determination, it was Wilson's Administration that launched the Cold War, the first phase of which lasted from the announcement of the non-recognition of the Soviet Union in March 1920 (soon extended to a trade and commerce "quarantine" as well), until Franklin D. Roosevelt's recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933. The resumption of the Wilsonian Cold War began with Roosevelt's death and the Truman-Churchill repudiation of FDR's policies in 1945-46.³

Wilson's early policies of non-recognition and propaganda toward the November 1917 Russian Revolution were aimed at trying to keep Russia in the war. Then, under British pressure, Wilson the "non-interventionist" sent the U.S. military to intervene in Russia in 1918, after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk—for the official reason of protecting allied military supplies, but actually to try to revive the Eastern Front. The second U.S. intervention was allegedly to protect the evacuation of the Tsarist-allied Czechoslovak Legion from Russia—but again, it had the aim of enabling the Czechs to continue to fight against Germany.

The flagrant hypocrisy of Wilson's foreign policy is only exceeded by his vicious racism and his suppression of the opposition to the war at home. *EIR* has written often of Wilson's revival of the Ku Klux Klan, and his reinstatement of segregation in the Federal bureaucracy.

During the First World War, even the expression of anti-British sentiments became a crime, with Irish-Americans and German-Americans being viciously targeted. The U.S. Post Office banned the mailing of leftist or anti-war material.

And today's jingoists with their "Freedom Fries" have nothing on those of Wilson's era, who renamed German measles and sauerkraut as "Liberty measles" and "Liberty cabbage." Not to mention banishing Brahms and Beethoven from concert halls, and the banning and burning of works of German literature from schools and libraries.⁴

The Wilson era was also the era of the Palmer Raids, in which thousands of radicals, labor organizers, anarchists, and others were rounded up, jailed, and often deported. Beatings and lynchings of anti-war activists and labor organizers were

2. Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 1.

3. For a most useful elaboration of this point, see Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, *The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations*, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002.)

4. Knock, pp. 133-137.



Truman Library



Library of Congress

The resumption of the Wilsonian Cold War began with Roosevelt's death and the Truman-Churchill repudiation of FDR's policies in 1945-46. Churchill and Truman are shown in the photo on the left, during the infamous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton Missouri, March 5, 1946. Jackson regarded Woodrow Wilson (right), not Franklin Roosevelt, as his true predecessor.

commonplace. Completely nonviolent opponents of the war, like Socialist leader Eugene Debs, were given long prison terms, and the House of Representatives refused to seat the German-American representative from Wisconsin, Victor Berger, because of his socialist and anti-war views; Berger was later sentenced to prison.

For the most part, Henry Jackson was not in a position to follow Wilson's lead with respect to domestic civil liberties—the most notable exception being Jackson's backing of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II—and as a "pro-labor Democrat," it would have indeed been difficult for him to do so; but his foreign policy was pure Wilsonianism, overlaid with a scholarly veneer provided by the RAND Corporation and its coterie of kept academics. Jackson came of political age in the period of Harry S Truman, who regarded Wilson, not Franklin Roosevelt, as his true predecessor, as Truman abandoned FDR's policies in favor of a permanent Cold War alliance with that great "democracy," Great Britain.

Today's discredited, but unrepentant neo-cons still perpetuate this treasonous, Wellsian-Wilsonian cancer within our political system.

It is urgent that a deeper understanding of what Henry Jackson represented, be attained by the Democratic Party—whence this pestilence sprang—but also by Republicans, whose ranks have been infected by the so-called neo-cons since 1980-81, when most of the "Jackson Democrats" left the Democratic Party to become, as one of them, Paul Wolfowitz, put it: "Henry Jackson Republicans."

Jackson and Nitze's NSC-68

A mediocrity endowed with intense ambition and drive, Henry Martin Jackson entered Congress in 1941, at the age of 28; he remained in the House through 1952, when he was elected to the Senate where he remained until his death in 1983.⁵ In college, Jackson had been a member of the Fabian Socialist League for Industrial Democracy (LID); his political persona, then and later, was that of an ardent New Dealer. He was, being from Washington State, a strong supporter of

5. This account of Jackson's career draws heavily on the 500-plus page biography of Henry Jackson written in 2000 by a slavish Jackson supporter, University of Vermont professor Robert G. Kaufman: *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).

public power—having no choice in the matter, considering the importance of Federal power projects for industry in the state.

Jackson enthusiastically supported the relocation and internment of Japanese citizens on the West Coast during World War II. Although many politicians supported this at the time, Jackson was particularly hostile to the Japanese, which some explain by his romantic attachment to China, attributed, rightly or wrongly, to his reading of Pearl Buck's novels.

In his early years in Congress, Jackson was a strong supporter of Truman on foreign policy, and likewise, a fervent opponent of FDR's close ally, Henry Wallace. Jackson eagerly backed the Truman Doctrine, under which the U.S. took the place of Britain in providing military and financial aid to Greece and Turkey. Likewise, he backed the Marshall Plan, which performed a useful role in the reconstruction of Europe, but was also used to drive a wedge between Western and Eastern Europe. (The Truman Administration collaborated with Britain to insert conditions which would make it impossible for the Soviets to accept Marshall Plan aid for the countries within their sphere of influence.⁶) Jackson also supported Truman's recognition of Israel, over the opposition of the State Department "Arabists." In 1949, he was made a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, from which he promoted the development of the H-bomb, which most members of the Committee opposed.

Jackson was an avid admirer of Paul Nitze and Nitze's militarist Cold War doctrine, which was embodied in NSC-68—issued in April 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War—which became the guiding doctrine of Jackson's office and aggressive Cold Warriors for decades.

Investment banker Nitze replaced George Kennan as the head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in 1949, while Dean Acheson replaced retired Army Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of State. As Prof. Cliff Kiracofe has shown (see *EIR*, March 17, 2006), the Nitze-Acheson approach of military confrontation with the Soviet Union, embodied in NSC-68, was a profound shift from the *political containment* doctrine of Kennan and Marshall.

NSC-68 had been commissioned by Truman, circumventing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its contention was that the United States had to undertake a vast buildup in conventional and nuclear arms to defend the world against expansionist Soviet Communism, and to prevent Russia from dominating the Eurasian landmass. Confronting the Soviet Union was a necessary step in establishing a *Pax Americana*: As NSC-68 put it, "to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish." (This malapropism refers not to the nationalist "American System" of political economy which flourished in the United States of the 19th Century, and which patriotic Americans counterposed to the free-trade "British

System," but to the financial oligarchy's dream of a U.S.-Anglo-Dutch-dominated global empire.)

To counter what it characterized as the Kremlin's "assault on free institutions," NSC-68 proposed its own attack on *America's* free institutions: heightened internal-security measures, an "overt psychological warfare" campaign, more intelligence activity, cutbacks in domestic spending for non-defense programs, and higher taxes.

Even Harry Truman wasn't totally convinced of the need for the quadrupling of military spending which NSC-68 recommended, so he circulated the report to the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau's assessment was that NSC-68 "oversimplified issues and grossly overemphasized military considerations," and explained: "The neat dichotomy between 'slavery' and 'freedom' is not a realistic description either of the military situation today or of the alternatives as they appear to present themselves to large areas of the world. . . . The gravest error of NSC-68 is that it underplays the role of economic and social change as a factor in 'the underlying conflict.'"⁷

Nevertheless, Jackson joined Nitze, Acheson, Robert Lovett, and others in pressuring Truman, who was reluctant to undertake a huge increase in defense spending. The Committee on the Present Danger was founded in 1950 to promote the recommendations of NSC-68, and it launched a three-month scare campaign, in TV spots run every Sunday night on NBC, and then on the Mutual Broadcasting System, which warned of the "present danger" from the Soviet Union, and demanded a huge military buildup. (See Michele Steinberg, "Desperate Neo-Cons Launch Third 'Committee on the Present Danger,'" *EIR*, July 2, 2004.)

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided the pretext to implement much of NSC-68, and for a three-fold increase in defense spending.

Adversary of Eisenhower

In 1952, Jackson was elected to the Senate, and when the Democrats took control of the Senate in 1954, he obtained seats on the Armed Services Committee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Interior Committee, and he retained his seat on the Government Operations Committee.

Also at this time, Dorothy Fosdick joined Jackson's staff and became his chief foreign policy advisor. The daughter of the liberal-pacifist Rev. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, pastor of the Rockefeller-endowed Riverside Church in New York City, she reportedly abandoned her father's views and adopted the militant Cold War outlook of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, a deeply pessimistic foreign policy "realist." Before coming to Jackson's staff, Fosdick had worked in the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, mostly under Nitze; she mimicked his views, and became a card-carrying Truman Cold Warrior and a proponent of NSC-68. She seems to have operated as Jackson's controller, running his office and his

6. Anne R. Pierce, *Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003) p. 185.

7. Quoted in Mark Perry, *Four Stars* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989) p. 21.



President Dwight Eisenhower, a military hero, cut the bloated Truman defense budget, enraging Truman Democrats like Jackson. Real national defense, Ike insisted, required a “strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war.” He later warned America against the “military-industrial complex.”

staff, and wielding great influence over key staffers such as Richard Perle, later in the 1970s.

A 1997 *New York Times* obituary of Fosdick reported: “At a time when Senator Jackson was a Senate legend for the quality of his staff, Dr. Fosdick was in command of the ‘bunker,’ so called partly because of the cramped staff quarters and partly because Senator Jackson and his staff were so often at odds with the prevailing political winds of detente.”

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in 1953, did not buy into the massive military buildup which proponents of NSC-68 were demanding. Eisenhower believed that his policy of Massive Retaliation, based upon strategic superiority, would permit restraints on spending for conventional forces, and he was always deeply concerned about the severe impact that massive defense spending would have on the U.S. economy and living standards.

Upon taking office, Ike cut Truman’s defense budget, and he continued to do so throughout his first term. He repeatedly attacked the fear-mongering which was coming largely from the Truman Democrats, and he rejected so-called “strategic analyses” and the hype, as he put it, of “a single critical ‘dan-

ger date’ and . . . single form of enemy action.” Real national defense, Ike insisted, required a “strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war.”

“I refused to turn the United States into an armed camp,” Eisenhower later wrote in his memoirs.⁸ He told colleagues privately, that “an attempt to be completely secure could only lead to a garrison state, and even then could not succeed.”⁹

Jackson took the opposite approach, becoming a virulent critic of Eisenhower’s military and defense policies, accusing Ike of risking war by spending too little on defense. Throughout 1956, an election year, Jackson repeatedly attacked Eisenhower’s cuts in the defense budget, warning that the Soviets were accelerating their missile program while the United States was falling behind. When the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, Jackson called for a “national week of shame and danger.”

Moreover, in 1956, Jackson made a trip through the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Jackson dismissed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as a Soviet tool, who was eager to use his U.S.S.R. backing to take over the Suez Canal, in order to then control the oil-rich Middle East, destroy Israel, and dominate all of Africa. Just as Dick Cheney et al. today rant about “appeasement” of the terrorists, Jackson compared what he termed the “appeasement” of Nasser to that of Hitler. Already a big backer of Israel, Jackson now promoted Israel as a bulwark against the Arab nationalist Nasser.

The Gaither Committee Report

A seminal document justifying Jackson’s Cold War drive, and the push by Jackson and the Cold War Democrats for an accelerated military buildup, was the top-secret 1957 report of the “Gaither Committee.” This was another end-run around President Eisenhower by the imperial, “Military-Industrial Complex” faction. After World War II, lawyer H. Rowan Gaither, the committee’s director, had been asked by the RAND Corporation to engineer RAND’s transformation from an Army Air Force-sponsored branch of Douglas Aircraft Corporation, to an independent, non-profit institution. After arranging for Ford Foundation funding, Gaither was appointed to RAND’s Board of Trustees in 1947; for most of the period from 1948 through 1961, Gaither served as chairman of the RAND Board. In 1953, to top it off, he was also appointed president of the Ford Foundation.

RAND was dominated by mathematicians and proponents of “systems analysis” and “game theory.” A RAND Annual Report in 1950, enthused about its mathematics division, boasting that, in “the analysis of systems for strategic bombardment, air defense, air supply, or psychological warfare, pertinent information developed or adapted through sur-

8. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: 1953-56* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964) p. 454.

9. Quoted in Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983) p. 146.



EIRNS/Stuart Lewis

DOD/Helene Stikkel

Left to right: Albert “Dr. Strangelove: Wohlstetter was a RAND statistician and “mathematical logician,” with no military experience or knowledge of strategy. He and his protégés Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz promoted the quackery of the “Revolution in Military Affairs,” later adopted by Donald Rumsfeld.

vey, study or research by RAND is integrated into models, largely by means of mathematical methods and techniques. . . . In this general area of research . . . the guiding philosophy is supplied by the von Neumann-Morgenstern mathematical theory of games.”¹⁰

Exemplary of this pseudo-scientific quackery was Albert “Dr. Strangelove” Wohlstetter, RAND’s leading proponent of “vulnerability” studies. A statistician and “mathematical logician,” Wohlstetter had no military experience, and no familiarity with military strategy; the closest he had come to World War II, was as a consultant to the Planning Committee of the War Production Board. His wife Roberta had joined RAND around 1948, where her work was guided by Andrew Marshall—the principal architect of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (Donald Rumsfeld’s “Transformation”), who still haunts the corridors of the Pentagon to this day.

In 1951, Roberta Wohlstetter brought her husband into RAND, where his first major project—an application of game theory—was a study of the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to a Soviet surprise attack.

The Wohlstetter SAC vulnerability study, embodied in the 1953 RAND Report R-244, and expanded the next year as Report R-266, was considered by the Randoids as the model of systems analysis. As astute observers have noted,

10. On this subject, see Lyndon LaRouche, “The Blunder in U.S. National Security Policy,” Oct. 11, 1995, http://www.larouche.org/lar/1995/blunder_3.html; “Our Economics Policy: Animation and Economics,” *EIR*, Nov. 12, 2004.

this type of “ivory tower” study abstracts nuclear warfare from political reality and national strategic policy. It tends to breathlessly present fanciful but dire “worse-case” scenarios as the urgent reality, and thus justifies a massive military expenditures and the establishment of imperial policies abroad, and a “garrison state” at home.¹¹

After the Soviet test of an H-bomb in 1953, and the recognition of the potential for its delivery by an ICBM rather than by a manned long-range bomber, Wohlstetter and the Randoids produced a new study, R-290, “Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s.” But circulation of the top-secret R-290 was limited, largely to top layers of the Pentagon. Something had to be done to disseminate its frightful conclusions and recommendations to broader policy-making circles. The opportunity to do this, was presented by Eisenhower’s creation of the Gaither Committee in the Spring of 1957.

Originally recommended to Ike by Nelson Rockefeller as a comprehensive study of civil defense, the Gaither project was hijacked by Wohlstetter and other Randoids, such as Herman Kahn, into producing a treatise on the so-called “missile gap” and a call for the rapid buildup of an offensive missile force—in short, a nuclear arms race.

This was despite the fact that Robert Sprague, who took over the Committee after Gaither was hospitalized, knew full

11. See Clifford A. Kiracofe, “U.S. Imperialism: The National Security State,” *EIR*, March 17, 2006.

well that there was no such “missile gap,” and that the fears of a Soviet surprise attack were being dangerously and grossly exaggerated. Sprague had been personally briefed by SAC commander Curtis LeMay on U.S. surveillance programs such as the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union—which ensured that the United States would know of preparations for a missile launch, and the actual launch itself, well before Soviet missiles passed the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in Alaska. This shot to hell the prevailing “surprise attack” assumption of the RAND/Wohlstetter studies, but Sprague kept this knowledge to himself, willfully leaving the rest of the Committee in ignorance.

Thus, the final report of the Gaither Committee warned in stark terms, of an accelerating threat from the Soviet Union, “which may become critical in 1959 or 1960.” It said that the Soviets have “probably surpassed us” in the development of ICBMs. Lifting recommendations whole hog from Wohlstetter’s R-290, it raised the alarm about the vulnerability of the SAC bomber force, and recommended measures to be taken to reduce this.

And, reminiscent of today’s recent battles around the November 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD capabilities, the final report of the Gaither Committee eliminated caveats and qualifications; no nuance was permitted, and its underlying assumptions were not made explicit.

The report tracked much of the language and recommendations of NSC-68—not surprisingly, since Paul Nitze was the principal author of both documents. However, because of his Democratic Party affiliation and his known antagonism to the Eisenhower Administration, Nitze worked behind the scenes, and his role was kept quiet. But he was the perfect choice—as author Fred Kaplan put it: “When it came to writing official, top-secret reports that combined sophisticated analysis with a flair for scaring the daylights out of anyone reading them, Paul H. Nitze had no match.”¹²

When briefed on the report’s findings, Eisenhower was attentive, but unimpressed; he disdained the hype contained in Sprague’s presentation to him. Ike’s calmness was shaped by the fact that he personally had access to secret intelligence, including that derived from U-2 surveillance, and thus he was far less worried about a surprise attack. More importantly, unlike the Randoids and their mathematical models, Ike knew



White House photo



EIRNS/Stuart Lewis

The Nitze-Acheson approach of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was a profound shift away from the earlier political containment doctrine. It called for a vast buildup against Soviet Communism and establishment of a “Pax Americana.” “When it came to writing official, top-secret reports that combined sophisticated analysis with a flair for scaring the daylights out of anyone reading them, Paul H. Nitze (right) had no match,” said one author.

that was take place in a real political and strategic context; he didn’t believe that they start suddenly “out of the blue,” with no advance indications.

After a few weeks of what the Gaitherites regarded as apathy and indifference on the part of the Eisenhower Administration, a dinner meeting was convened in early December 1957 for key members of the Committee, along with Nitze and some top news media executives. The subject of the meeting, was how to get the message out to the public and create a sense of urgency.

Within days, a flood of leaks to the press began, led by the *New York Times*, with the most comprehensive account of the secret Gaither Report appearing in the *Washington Post*. On cue, Jackson, Stuart Symington, and other leading Democrats took to the Senate and House floors to demand that Eisenhower release the report to the public.

Adding to the clamor, Wohlstetter went public with his theory of SAC vulnerability in a speech to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, in May of 1958, followed by an article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” in *Foreign Affairs*. To correct this vulnerability, Wohlstetter argued, would require measures which “are hard, do involve sacrifice . . . and, above all . . . entail a new image of ourselves in a world of persistent danger.”

Wohlstetter’s public warnings fed into the building hyste-

12. Eisenhower, *op. cit.*

ria around the alleged “missile gap” being hyped by Jackson and the Truman Democrats. This fiction had already started with Air Force Intelligence’s declaration of a “bomber gap” in the mid-1950s—a conclusion which was sharply disputed by CIA analysts, and which was miraculously transmogrified into a “missile gap” after the Soviets launched Sputnik in October 1957.

Eisenhower of course knew better, seeing the call for a huge defense buildup as the product of fear, “seeing danger behind every tree or bush.” It was this fear, Ike later wrote, that “saw disastrous bomber gaps in our defense establishment, and though that illusionary gap never existed, spent useless millions to fix it.” Ike continued: “Finally convinced of the falsity of their allegations, the prophets of doom changed to missiles—the gap here, they cried, was far worse and more fearsome than the earlier one. Again, they were proved wrong; but proof of past error cannot still a present, senseless fear.”¹³

Jackson’s Attack on Eisenhower’s NSC

In 1959, in yet another move against Eisenhower, Jackson launched a comprehensive study of the Executive branch’s policy-making process. First, he consulted with Samuel Huntington (author of “The Clash of Civilizations?” first published in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993), Roberta Wohlstetter, and others. He then had his subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee formally undertake the study. His staff—J. Kenneth Mansfield, Dorothy Fosdick, and Robert Tufts of Oberlin—were directed by Jackson to consult a group of “experts,” who then testified in public hearings; these included Robert Lovett, Robert Sprague (co-chairman of the Gaither Committee), Allen Dulles, Nelson Rockefeller, and Maxwell Taylor.

The final Jackson report was a libelous attack on the Eisenhower Administration and the functioning of its National Security Council. It charged that Ike’s NSC was plagued with bureaucratic conflicts, prone to easy compromises, and failure to examine and question well-established strategies. In fact, those who have studied NSC documents from that period, report that, quite the contrary, Eisenhower’s NSC functioned well; that it fostered serious debate, facilitated long-term planning, and played an effective advisory role for the Eisenhower Administration.¹⁴

The Kennedy Administration

During the Army-McCarthy hearings, Jackson had struck up a friendship with Bobby Kennedy, which provided his entrée into the Kennedy family circles. In 1960, he came close to becoming JFK’s running mate, but Papa Joe Kennedy said

that Jack needed Lyndon Johnson on the ticket to win, because LBJ would bring the support of the Southern states.¹⁵

As the consolation prize, Jackson was given the chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee. He campaigned around the country for Kennedy as a “New Deal/Fair Deal” Democrat, promoting an activist domestic policy, and a more aggressive anti-Soviet foreign policy, including harping on the nonexistent “missile gap.” (The Randoids played on Kennedy, issuing secret memoranda to his camp containing the same “missile gap” hype and demands that they had unsuccessfully tried to foist on Eisenhower.)

The 1960 election campaign, with Jackson as DNC chairman, was the last time that the Democrats would run as the more hawkish of the two parties—as the party had been for the entire post-FDR period. From that point on, Jackson increasingly was at odds with the Democratic Party, although, unlike so many of his associates, he never outright quit.

Jackson’s first major disagreement with JFK came when Jackson pushed for Paul Nitze to be appointed as either Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State. Instead, Nitze got the third-tier position of Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs.

Subsequently, Jackson opposed Kennedy on a number of key issues, which presaged his post-1968 break with northern Democrats. These included:

- The United Nations: In March 1962, Jackson gave a highly publicized speech at the National Press Club attacking the UN as a forum more advantageous to the Soviets than to the United States. The speech was drafted by Dorothy Fosdick in collaboration with Robert Tufts. It was acclaimed by the right wing, and roundly attacked by both northern Democrats and liberal Republicans.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis: Jackson agreed with Acheson, Nitze, Lovett, and others who wanted, at a mini-

15. There may have been another factor here: rumors about Jackson’s personal life. In 1961, at age 49, Jackson did decide to get married and become a “family man.” Biographer Kaufmann notes that for as long as Jackson’s mother lived (until 1957), she was the most important woman in his life. At home, in Washington State, he lived with his mother and his two sisters. In Washington, D.C., he socialized very little.

Some sources have suggested that Jackson was subjected to homosexual blackmail by Israeli operatives. Whether that was the case or not, there certainly was notice taken of Jackson’s unusual personal life. During the Democratic Convention, Jim Bishop wrote a suggestive column about Jackson, noting his intense ambition, and describing him as follows: “The vital statistics are unimpressive. The Senator is 48. He is a bachelor. He has two sisters at home who are spinsters. . . . Once, long ago, he had a girl. No one knows her name or what became of her. . . . He goes on dates now and then, but he handles them gracelessly and with embarrassment.”

In 1972, Nixon dirty-trickster Donald Segretti sent out a letter on Ed Muskie’s stationary saying that Jackson had been arrested twice in D.C. as a homosexual, once on May 5, 1955, and then on Oct. 17, 1957, but that because of his position, no charges were brought against him. Segretti later disavowed the letter.

13. Kaplan, p. 138.

14. David L. Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998).



During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Jackson agreed with Acheson, Nitze, and others who wanted, at a minimum, a U.S. air strike to take out the Soviet missiles on the island, and perhaps even an invasion. This photo shows President Kennedy (left) meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (right) at the White House on Oct. 18, 1962, at the height of the crisis.

National Archives

mum, a U.S. air strike to take out the Soviet missiles, and perhaps even an invasion.

- **The Test Ban Treaty:** JFK gave a famous speech on June 10, 1963 at American University, to build support for the proposed treaty, which was signed a few months later. Kennedy anticipated a rough fight in the Senate, with a coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans opposing it. Calculating that the treaty would pass anyway, Jackson decided not to oppose it outright, but to weaken it through a series of amendments, or formal “reservations,” involving what he called “safeguards.” When the Administration agreed to his conditions, Jackson supported the treaty, which passed the Senate by 80 to 19 in September 1963.

Vietnam was not a significant point of contention with either Jack Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson. Jackson supported the U.S. military buildup during the Kennedy period, but of course did not support Kennedy’s plan to reduce the U.S. commitment by the end of his first term. A rabid advocate of the infamous “domino” theory, Jackson opposed the 1962 plan for the neutralization of Laos. He totally supported Johnson’s escalation of the war following the assassination of President Kennedy, thereby putting himself in conflict with the majority of Democrats who came to oppose the war. Jackson voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and backed the bombing of North Vietnam, but he considered it too limited. Jackson wanted an all-out strategic bombing campaign targeting North Vietnam’s infrastructure. Early on, he pressed for

the blocking and mining of Haiphong Harbor—which Nixon later did, in 1972.

Nixon’s ‘Favorite Democrat’—But Not for Long

Jackson’s biographer Robert Kaufman describes Jackson as the last of the “Cold War Liberals.” He wrote that the 1968 upheavals around the Democratic Convention in Chicago “spelled the demise of Cold War liberalism’s ascendancy in the Democratic Party for a generation,” adding that, by the time Nixon took office in 1969, Henry Jackson had become Nixon’s “favorite Democrat in the Senate.”

After Nixon was elected President in November 1968, he offered Jackson the choice of becoming either Defense Secretary or Secretary of State. Jackson declined, telling Nixon that he could do more good in the Senate, trying to bring along Democrats to support an expanded ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system. But Jackson’s real concern was that, were he to serve in a Republican Administration, it would destroy his chances of becoming President—as he had been told, in the strongest of terms, by a number of his Democratic colleagues in the Senate.

In the 1970 midterm elections, Nixon personally denied any support to Jackson’s Republican challenger in Washington State. Thus, as was the case with Joe Lieberman in the 2006 U.S. Senate race in Connecticut, the Republican National Committee declared that no party funds would go to Jackson’s Republican opponent, and in fact, Jackson received

at least \$250,000 from top GOP donors—the equivalent of a couple of million dollars today.

Jackson's honeymoon with Nixon began to fall apart after 1970, as Jackson became a leading opponent of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente with the Soviet Union. In 1972, Jackson fought the Nixon Administration on both the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement and the ABM Treaty, and extracted various concessions such as the "Jackson Amendment"—cooked up by Fred Iklé and Richard Perle—which required parity in intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and throw-weights.

(Jackson's carrying forward of the hard Churchillian Cold War line was one side of British post-war policy; what Jackson was purportedly combatting—arms-control agreements and the ABM treaties—were just another side of the British policy of keeping the United States subordinate to its own one-world-government schemes. See "Andropov's Blunder Still Haunts the Earth," in this issue.)

Wohlstetter's Outpost

Coalescing around Jackson's office in the 1970s was an extensive network of academics, think-tankers, former staffers, and the like. This network included Dorothy Fosdick, Richard Perle, and Charles Horner (an early neo-con, now with the Hudson Institute), who kept Jackson in close contact

with experts on Russia (such as Richard Pipes), China, and Japan, and the Middle East (Bernard Lewis). In addition, every year, Jackson and his staffers would go to London to meet with prominent Sovietologist scholars there.

Jackson's ties to the Nitze and the Randoids, which went back to the 1950s, were further cemented around Nixon's effort in 1969-70 to expand the ABM system from two to twelve sites—known as the Safeguard ABM system—which Jackson supported, but which was opposed by most leading Democrats and a number of moderate Republicans. During this fight, Jackson's Senate office effectively became the Capitol Hill branch of the RAND Corporation.

Wohlstetter, now teaching at the University of Chicago while still maintaining his affiliation with RAND, assigned a number of his protégés—including Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle—to go to Washington to work in a new organization created by Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson to support the Safeguard ABM system, which they called the "Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy." Perle became its executive director. Armed with charts, documents, and research papers prepared by Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz, and his team, Jackson led the fight in the Senate for the Safeguard ABM system. The Senate approved the Safeguard system by one vote.

By that time, Perle had gone to work on Jackson's staff.

Scoop Jackson: The Greenie

Despite his promotion of public power projects (a requirement, given Washington State's dependence on cheap energy from the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams), Jackson modelled himself on Teddy Roosevelt, and was a major promoter of the environmentalist hoax which has decimated the U.S. economy over the past four decades. He became chairman of the Senate Interior Committee in 1963, right after the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson's lying *Silent Spring* propaganda piece. Jackson's "accomplishments" are listed as:

- Land and Conservation Act of 1964
- Wilderness Act of 1964 (in 1957, he had cosponsored a forerunner, the Wilderness Preservation System Bill)
- National Seashore Bills
- Water Resources Planning Act of 1965
- Redwood National Park
- North Cascades National Park
- Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968
- Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968

In 1969, Jackson was the first politician to win the Sierra Club's John Muir Award; in 1970, he was given the Bernard Baruch Conservation Award. NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, is described by Jackson's biographer as his "crowning achievement." Jackson and his staff reportedly drafted the Act's provision calling for Environmental Impact Statements for all major Federal projects—which were used by environmentalists to block nuclear power plants and all sorts of Federal projects.

Although claiming to be pro-nuclear, in the wake of the 1973-74 oil hoax, Jackson championed the development of "alternative" energy sources such as solar and geothermal, like his political heirs today. He was also a prime promoter of the disastrous and deadly fuel efficiency standards for the auto industry.

Jackson played a pivotal role in preventing the continuation of large-scale water conveyance projects, which were the hallmark of the FDR era. Jackson saw to the insertion in various 1960s legislation, the prohibition of any Federal agency studying inter-basin water transfers, without specific approval of Congress. Jackson played a critical role in killing the North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA) project—to divert Arctic-river flow southward, and other inter-basin transfers.

Wolfowitz went to Yale to teach for two years (where one of his students was Lewis Libby, Cheney’s former chief of staff, now on trial for perjury). When, in 1972, under pressure from Jackson, Nixon purged the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to make sure it wasn’t led by people who actually favored arms control and disarmament, former RAND strategist Fred Iklé was put in charge of the agency. Iklé brought in a new Wohlstetter-recommended team, including Wolfowitz, which operated as a network of “conservative insurgents”—already known at that time as “the cabal”—to target Soviet diplomatic moves and arms-control agreements. Jackson’s office became their command center.¹⁶



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Sen. J. William Fulbright (D), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was Jackson’s principal nemesis in the Senate in the 1960s and early 1970s. Fulbright (left, shown here with Sen. Eugene McCarthy in 1966) called Jackson “the Congressional spokesman for the military-industrial complex.”

A Presidential Campaign

After 1968, the anti-war and “New Politics” factions—significantly infected with anti-labor and anti-industry ideology—were becoming ascendant in the Democratic Party. “Increasingly,” Kaufman writes of Jackson, “Cold War liberals identified him as their one great hope to recapture the Democratic Party and the presidency.”

Jackson hired commentator Ben Wattenberg as an advisor in his 1972 Presidential campaign, which was a complete flop. Wattenberg advised Jackson to emphasize social issues (such as “law and order” in response to the ghetto riots and anti-war demonstrations), opposition to busing, opposition to “elitism,” and defense of patriotism and “American values”—and to play down economic and foreign policy issues. Jackson attacked the leading Democratic contender George McGovern as “the chief travelling salesman” of the New Left establishment, accusing McGovern of echoing the New Left in what Jackson catalogued as its calls for massive defense cuts, forced busing, amnesty for draft-dodgers and deserters, silence on law and order, attacking the FBI, and denouncing U.S. policy in Vietnam as “barbaric” and “immoral.” But to no avail. Jackson’s campaign went nowhere, and the Democrats went on to nominate George McGovern.

The “stop McGovern” forces met the day after his nomination to try to prevent a GOP sweep of Congress, anticipating that McGovern would go down in defeat. As part of this effort, Jackson was an initiator of the Committee for the Re-election of a Democratic Congress, which Bob “Prince of Thieves” Strauss chaired. After this, Strauss attributed his December 1972 election as DNC chair to Scoop Jackson.

Also in December 1972, Wattenberg initiated the formation of one of the early neo-conservative gathering points, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), thereby providing Jackson with a vehicle for his next campaign for President in 1976.

Within the Senate, Jackson’s principal nemesis in the 1960s and early 1970s was J. William Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. By all accounts, they detested each other. Fulbright’s 1966 *Arrogance of Power* specifically denounced the imperial outlook embodied in NSC-68, as well as the Vietnam War. Fulbright called Jackson “the Congressional spokesman for the military-industrial complex.” Israel was another point of dispute with Fulbright, in light of Jackson’s fervent backing for Israel and for its land seizures during the 1967 war and its aftermath.

As to why Jackson was such a strong supporter of Israel, Ben Wattenberg acknowledged in an interview for PBS, that the first reason was that many big financial contributors were Jews: “That was one reason and everyone understood that.” Second, said Wattenberg, was the idea of Israel being a democracy, and third was Jackson’s experience at Buchenwald. (In 1945, Congressman Jackson paid an official visit to Buchenwald, a few days after the death camp was liberated.)¹⁷

Jackson also clashed with Nixon and Kissinger over Israel, despite the similarity of their outlooks. Jackson viewed Soviet influence in the Middle East as the major threat to U.S. geopolitical interest in the region, and thus he had no interest whatsoever in an Israeli settlement with the Palestinians or its

16. Bill Keller, “The Sunshine Warrior,” *New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 22, 2002.

17. Simon Marks, Feature Story USA Corp. interview with Wattenberg, June 6, 2005, pp. 11-12.

Arab neighbors. Jackson opposed any land-for-peace arrangement, or any pressure on Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders, as envisioned in the Rogers Plan. As his biographer wrote: "Jackson's devotion to Israel made Nixon and Kissinger's look tepid."

Jackson combined his support for Israel and his antagonism to detente, in what became known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, first introduced in 1972, and reintroduced in 1973, as an amendment to Nixon's trade bill. Jackson-Vanik, put together by Perle and Fosdick—and still in effect today!—conditioned U.S. trade concessions or most-favored nation (MFN) status, on freedom of emigration. Its main target was the Soviet Union, as regarded Jewish emigration to Israel. On this, as on other issues, the impetus did *not* come either from Israel or from the U.S. Jewish community, which didn't want a showdown with the Nixon Administration, but rather, from Jackson's own camp. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger recruited Detroit's Max Fisher and other leading Jewish figures to help them make their case against Jackson-Vanik.

Emergence of the Neo-Cons

After Nixon was forced to resign following the Watergate scandal, Jackson's closest ally in the Ford Administration was James Schlesinger, the former head of RAND's Strategic Studies division; this unsavory alliance was reportedly a major reason for Ford's firing of Schlesinger in the famous 1975 Halloween Massacre. Jackson then threatened to oppose the confirmation of Schlesinger's replacement, Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld would later join the Randoids, serving as RAND's chairman from 1981-86). Scoop eventually relented, and he was delighted to find that Rumsfeld was, in some ways, even more hawkish than Schlesinger.

In 1975, for what Richard Perle considered opportunistic reasons related to Scoop's Presidential ambitions, Jackson broke with Ford over the Vietnam War, arguing that the Indochina conflict was draining crucial resources from the more important strategic forces in Europe and the Middle East.

It was during this period that the so-called neo-conservative movement, clustered around Jackson's office and that of the notorious Anglophile Daniel Patrick Moynihan (and also circling around Norman Podhoretz's *Commentary* magazine), began to coalesce. In 1976, almost all of the neo-cons backed Jackson's second unsuccessful Presidential campaign.

The other key neo-con gathering point at this time, was then-CIA Director George H.W. Bush's convening of "Team B" to conduct an alternative analysis of the Soviet Union. The core of Team B were all personalities with close ties to Jackson's office: Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, Paul Wolfowitz, Seymour Weiss, and of course Team B's inspiration, Albert Wohlstetter.

After the November 1976 Presidential elections, this same crowd came together in the "second coming" of the Commit-

tee on the Present Danger, organized by Nitze and Eugene Rostow. The CPD was initially composed of 60% Democrats and 40% Republicans. Key figures were Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elmo Zumwalt, Max Kampelman, David Packard, Lane Kirkland, Richard Pipes, Richard Allen, and Norman Podhoretz.

The Carter Years

Jackson's Presidential ambitions crashed with the 1976 primaries. He did well in the early polls, winning in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. He predicted a landslide in New York, but got only 38%, and it was downhill after that, until he was compelled to drop out of the race. At the July 1976 Democratic Convention, which nominated Georgia Gov. Jimmy Carter, the Jackson/neo-con crowd defeated the New Politics faction on the foreign policy platform, and some of his backers, such as Midge Decter and Elliott Abrams (who by this time had gone to work for Moynihan), regarded Carter as more of a hawk than Jerry Ford.

Jackson was interviewed by Carter as one of seven possible running mates. It was reportedly Jackson's post-election advice to President-elect Carter that persuaded him to create a new Department of Energy, and to name Jackson's old ally, Randoid James Schlesinger, to head it.

Although Zbigniew Brzezinski, who became Carter's National Security Advisor, claimed that Carter (under his influ-

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
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Jimmy Carter Library

Jackson reportedly persuaded President-elect Jimmy Carter (left) to create a new Department of Energy, and to name fellow Randoid, and old ally from the Ford Administration, James Schlesinger (right), to head it.

ence) took a harder line against the Soviets than either Jackson or the neo-cons ever admitted, and that he personally found the Jackson tradition “quite congenial,” the Jackson crowd was almost totally frozen out of the Carter Administration. During the transition period, the Committee for a Democratic Majority (chaired by Jackson and Moynihan) submitted a list of 53 candidates for national security positions in the incoming Carter Administration. All were rejected except two, who were given minor positions.

Carter’s emphasis on human rights was not the same as Jackson’s. As Project Democracy’s Joshua Muravchik put it: Jackson Democrats saw the human rights issue as “a way of maintaining the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union at a time when the American people were losing their stomach for containment.” Carter and the “McGovern Democrats,” said Muravchik, “had in mind primarily the victims of rightist governments.”

Perle, in an interview with Jackson biographer Kaufman, said that “Scoop thought it was important to distinguish between the denial of human rights in authoritarian right-wing dictatorships and the denial of rights by the Soviet Union.” This sophistry was expressed by Jackson as well, when he complained about “the American policy on human rights that finds it convenient to criticize the petty dictatorships . . . but inconvenient to speak out about the Soviet system that inspires repression around the world.” Among the “petty dictatorships” about which Jackson thought the Carter Administration should shut up, he listed Chile, the Philippines, Argentina, and Guatemala.

Jackson fought the Carter Administration on almost every aspect of foreign policy and defense. Jackson opposed Carter’s intention to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, he vigorously fought for the deployment of the neutron bomb, and he rebuffed efforts by Carter’s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and others to repeal Jackson-Vanik. The biggest fight was over SALT II, which was presaged by Jackson’s opposition to the nomination of Paul Warnke as chief arms negotiator; the CPD was also mobilized, and Nitze testified against Warnke. When Carter solicited Jackson’s views in early 1977 on the SALT talks, Jackson responded with a memo he co-authored with Richard Perle criticizing what they considered past mistakes in U.S. SALT negotiations, and providing a stringent listing of do’s and don’ts for the SALT talks.

During the ratification debate in the Senate, following the May 1979 U.S.-Soviet SALT II agreement, Jackson and the CPD mobilized against it. Their efforts, combined with Republican opposition, and the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, succeeded in defeating the treaty. Although things seemed to be going the Administration’s way during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, Jackson upstaged them, by dominating the Armed Services Committee hearings. His star witnesses were Paul Nitze, U.S. arms negotiator Edward Rowney, and Richard Pipes, with Rowney being prepped intensively for his testimony by Jackson staffers Fosdick, Perle, and Frank Gaffney.

Regarding Carter’s Middle East policy, Jackson was unenthusiastic about the Camp David accords, and he rejected any attempt to involve the Soviets in efforts to stabilize the region. As noted, he opposed pressuring Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders, and he viewed a Palestinian state as a strategic nightmare for Israel. He labeled the PLO officials who would run a Palestinian state as “terrorists” and “Soviet agents,” and he portrayed the PLO as part of a global, Soviet-sponsored terrorist drive.

Jackson initially was uncomfortable with the Likudnik crowd around Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin; as Perle put it, Jackson preferred discussing security and defensible borders rather than biblical entitlements.¹⁸ He got along

18. Jackson’s support for Israel was geopolitical, not the Messianic sort of Zionism based on a notion of Biblical justice with which Woodrow Wilson was imbued, under the tutelage of Louis Brandeis, a non-observant Jew who

much better with Benjamin Netanyahu, who invited him to Israel to attend the Jonathan Institute's Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism in the Summer of 1979. Jackson received a hero's welcome, and he was awarded an honorary degree from Hebrew University. In his keynote speech to the Jonathan Institute conference, Jackson called upon the "democracies" to unite against those he labelled the primary supporters of international terrorism, "the Soviet Bloc and the radical Arab states."

The 1980 Campaign: The Turning Point

By 1980, Jackson was desperate to see "anyone but Carter" get the Democratic nomination. He encouraged Ted Kennedy to run, and took steps to support him. Max Kampelman acted as liaison between the Jackson and Kennedy camps, and arranged for a meeting with Kennedy for leading CDM and CPD luminaries—Gene Rostow, Zumwalt, Nitze, Pipes, and Lane Kirkland. Senator Kennedy even had Perle and Rostow draft some speeches for him, but he couldn't bring himself to put forward their lunatic foreign and defense policies.

Meanwhile, Kampelman and Mondale made a last ditch attempt to reconcile the Jackson Democrats and Carter. At Mondale's behest, Carter invited a group of CDM leaders to the White House; these included Kirkpatrick, Podhoretz, Decter, Wattenberg, Abrams, Kampelman, Zumwalt, Austin Ranney, and Penn Kemble. The meeting was a disaster. Kirkpatrick, the first of this crowd to defect to the Reagan campaign two months later, characterized the session as the last straw for the neo-conservatives. Abrams said the reaction of all of those at the meeting was that Carter was "hopeless."

Under these circumstances, Richard Allen, who served as President Reagan's National Security Advisor, 1981-82, was able to play a key role in recruiting many of the Jacksonites, in addition to Kirkpatrick, to the Reagan camp. Perle left in 1980 to form a business partnership with John Lehman (later, of the 9/11 Commission). With Jackson's blessing, they later both took positions in the Reagan Administration.

The Reagan team offered Jackson himself a Cabinet post if he would endorse Reagan. Jackson declined, telling them he would always remain a Democrat. Privately, he expected the Democrats to retain their Congressional majority, and he figured he could wield much more influence as a senior member of the Senate, than as a Democrat in a Republican Administration. When the Democrats lost control of the Senate, Jackson had a change of heart, and was now ready to accept a Cabinet position in the Reagan Administration, but he'd missed his chance. Reagan, who did appoint Jackson to

his foreign policy and defense transition team, thought that Jackson could be of more use to him in the Senate as a Democrat, by getting bipartisan support for Reagan's defense buildup and foreign policy initiatives.

One thing that the Jackson camp did prevail upon the Reagan team to do, was to select Gen. Al Haig rather than George Shultz as Secretary of State, believing that Haig was more staunchly pro-Israel. Jackson was also worried about having two Bechtel executives—Casper Weinberger and Shultz—in the Cabinet, because of Bechtel's extensive dealings in the Arab world. But, as biographer Kaufman notes, Jackson was dead wrong about Shultz, who replaced Haig in 1982, and turned out to be one of the most pro-Israel Secretaries of State ever.

Jackson died in 1983. Kaufman noted in his conclusion that (as of 2000), there were still a few Democrats who had not written off the Jackson tradition within the Democratic Party. Among these, Kaufman praised Democratic Leadership Council chairman Sen. Joseph Lieberman in hopeful, glowing terms: "Thoughtful, informed, principled, and respected on both sides of the aisle, Lieberman may some day emerge as Jackson's true heir in the U.S. Senate."

Top 'Jackson Democrats' in The Reagan Administration

The most prominent among the "Jackson Democrats" who infiltrated the Reagan Administration in 1981, were:

- Jeane Kirkpatrick:** U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
- Josh Muravchik:** Deputy to UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick
- Richard Perle:** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Frank Gaffney:** in Perle's office
- Douglas Feith:** in Perle's office
- Elliott Abrams:** Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights
- Paul Wolfowitz:** Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
- Richard Pipes:** National Security Council Director of Soviet Affairs
- John Lehman:** Secretary of the Navy
- Edward Rowney:** Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) negotiator
- Max Kampelman:** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) negotiator

was the leader of American Zionism at that time.

"Jackson spoke a different language than the Likud people," Richard Perle told Kaufman. "Scoop talked about security, not biblical entitlements or historical destiny, as Begin did. His point was defensible borders." Kaufman, p. 376.