

Terrorism and Italy's Strategy of Tension

by Paolo Raimondi

The recent developments in the United States around the role played by Lewis Libby, Karl Rove, and Vice President Dick Cheney in "outing" Valerie Plame, the wife of Ambassador Joe Wilson, to punish him for having denounced as false, in early 2002, the claim that Iraq was importing uranium from Niger, are also provoking reverberations in Italy. Indeed, the press reported that individuals supposedly close to the Italian military secret service, SISMI, helped in the fabrication of a false dossier on these matters. Also, the presence of U.S. neo-conservative operative Michael Ledeen, with now-indicted Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin and others, in Rome on December 2001, at the time the false dossier was concocted, has drawn the attention of Italian politicians and political analysts.

We discussed these matters and others, related to the notorious past and present "strategy of tension,"¹ with Adm. Falco Accame (ret.), who at the time of the kidnapping and assassination of Italian statesman Aldo Moro by the terrorist Red Brigades in 1978, was president of the Defense Commission of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Admiral Accame spent a lot of his military career in the Italian Navy, including in the United States; he was a teacher at the School of War in the city of Livorno, and now is very active as president of Ana-Vafaf, the association which safeguards the interests of the families of those in the Armed Forces killed or injured by the terrorists. He authored a number of books and studies on



Adm. Falco Accame (ret.)

terrorism and on the strategy of tension. The latest one has just been published under the title *Moro si poteva salvare* (Moro could have been saved) by the Massari publishing house.

The 'Yellow Cake' Affair

"On the so-called Niger 'yellow cake' affair," Admiral Accame commented, "I hope this is not something that some of our intelligence services did to earn some medal, because it seems that this story came from an Italian source. It has been reported also in many papers, including the *Los Angeles Times* of March 15, 2003, that the document came from Rome and could have been sold by some swindler. The CIA considered that Saddam would not have threatened the U.S. if Iraq weren't attacked, while ideologues like Cheney and Rumsfeld thought the contrary, and supposed they could influence the situation through intelligence operations. A member of the Niger Embassy in Rome sold a false document from the Italian intelligence services. Then the British and American intelligence services gave the document to the UN inspectors. Bush then quoted the document in his speech. On March 7, 2003, we found out that it was all false, thanks to the report prepared by Mohammad ElBaradei, director of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], for the UN Security Council. This fact has been the subject of many Parliamentary questions in Italy; by deputies and senators such as Del Mastro delle Vedove, Folena, Pisa, Boato, Peterlini, Cento, and others. On July 17, 2003, Undersecretary of State Borselli incomprehensibly answered a question presented by deputy Marco Boato, related to this Niger-SISMI affair, admitting only that the Italian intelligence services had contacts regarding the dossier with the intelligence services of an allied country."

The most interesting parliamentary question on Niger uranium was introduced by Sen. Oskar Peterlini on Sept. 24, 2003, who quoted California Rep. Henry Waxman's letter to the Congress, asking if Cheney had demanded that the CIA investigate the Niger "yellow cake" issue.

Briefed on the activities of *EIR* and of the LaRouche movement to expose these frauds, as part of a campaign to impeach Cheney and to stop the neo-con new global strategy of tension, Accame commented: "The question is how to turn a small fire into a big one. This is a strategic move, to transform something which appears small into a very important event. I believe that the parliamentary questions have raised many important issues here. If we read all the questions that have been presented, even in the Italian Parliament, we realize that this question was so important that it led to somebody launching a preventive war. It had an enormous impact. A similar development and campaign [of LaRouche] go beyond the normal course of politics."

Leads on the Moro Assassination

During a long conversation, Admiral Accame touched on some important aspects of the history of Italy and of NATO

1. With the "strategy of tension" in Italy in the 1970s, orchestrated terrorist actions were used by covert intelligence networks to justify constitutional changes, restrictions of civil liberties, and other political decisions intended to usher in a dictatorial process. See the LaRouche in 2004 campaign Special Report, "The Synarchist Resurgence Behind the Madrid Train Bombing of March 11, 2004," available at www.larouchepac.com.

during the hot phases of the post-war period, which still need to be investigated, such as the Moro assassination. Indeed, recently former Christian Democracy leader Hon. Giovanni Galloni spoke of American and Israeli infiltration into the Red Brigades around the time of the kidnapping and assassination of Moro.² These intelligence services did not collaborate with their Italian counterparts. Galloni's statements have raised new discussions and doubts, and reopened old wounds, because there is still a very urgent and strong demand to know the truth behind what happened at that time.

One thing which emerged very clearly in the later investigations, was the involvement of networks connected to what was known as Gladio or "Stay Behind" operations. During the early Cold War period, these networks were trained to prepare for guerrilla warfare in regions of Western Europe in case of a Soviet invasion. Later, some of them were used for political destabilizations in the West, on behalf of certain Western political interests—the so-called "parallel Gladio."

On these matters, Admiral Accame has spent much time and energy in search of the truth, and his investigation has revealed some dramatic aspects. "Regarding the Moro case, Gladio may have had a marginal role from an operational standpoint, but an extremely important role in terms of the

knowledge of Moro's history, and in particular the kidnapping on the Via Fani. Indeed, Antonino Arconte, a member of this Gladio, was apparently sent on a mission by the Defense Ministry-Navy Department, in collaboration with Consubin, the command structure of the underwater commandos centered in the harbor of La Spezia, to deliver a message in Beirut—a copy of which is published in Arconte's book. In this message, our head of intelligence in the region, Col. Stefano Giovannone, was asked to take initiatives with the PLO and the PFLP to open a channel to be able to communicate with the Red Brigades in order to help free Aldo Moro. The order to deliver this message was given on March 2, 1978, fourteen days *before* the Moro kidnapping! This implies that somebody inside the state institutions had knowledge of the likely attack. . . . Moro was to be kidnapped and then freed, because he was to be turned into a pawn against the government structures, after a number of interrogations carried out by the Red Brigades. . . . I checked this story personally, I believe it is credible, and I officially demanded that new investigations on these allegations be opened."

On Gladio, Accame said he shared the evaluation of Senator Pellegrino, president of the Investigating Commission on Massacres, who wrote a few years ago: "I cannot say if a parallel Gladio existed. I can say with certainty that the Gladio I learned about is not sufficient to explain all of this underground world. On the contrary, the more we continue our

2. See interview, "Was There a Foreign Hand in the Moro Assassination?" *EIR*, Aug. 26, 2005.

Moro Assassination Needs More Investigation

The Italian government has been called on to respond to several parliamentary interrogations on the case of Antonino Arconte, a former military intelligence agent, who claims that he has evidence showing that intelligence circles had foreknowledge of the planned kidnapping of Italian statesman Aldo Moro in 1978.

The parliamentary interrogations, promoted by, among others, former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, demand that a serious investigation be carried out to determine whether Arconte's allegations are true, or false. In either case, the implications are enormous.

Many serious experts look skeptically at Arconte's revelations, citing the following reasons:

1. No intelligence service in the world would transmit such orders, as reported by Arconte, in a written form, let alone with the prescription: "Destroy after reading," as Arconte reports; furthermore, the paper with the order would remain with its recipient, and not with Arconte;

2. The SISMI station chief in Beirut was Col. Stefano

Giovannone, the most trusted collaborator of Moro's in the intelligence community. The first thing Giovannone would do upon receipt of such an order, would be to pick up the phone and call up Moro. The kidnapping plan would be disrupted.

3. Arconte claims that Moro's kidnapping was organized by the KGB, with the participation of international terrorist Carlos; Arconte, fearing for his life, went to hide in the United States, and there he decided to come out with the truth only in 1998, as a sort of "life insurance."

4. Arconte's revelations occur in the midst of a campaign, carried out by right-wing political forces in Italy, with the help of neo-con "experts" from the U.S.A., blaming only the "KGB connection" behind Moro's kidnapping and assassination. The same sources, produce "evidence" that the story according to which Henry Kissinger was behind the Moro assassination, was a KGB disinformation operation.

Thus, as prominent personalities interviewed by *EIR* have insisted, it is all the more urgent that the government respond on the case, and that a new investigation on the Moro case be opened; if Arconte's story is false, then it should be found out who is pushing Arconte and for what reasons.—*Claudio Celani*

investigations, the more the role of Gladio appeared to be minor. We now have the impression, or almost a certainty, that we do not know much about this underground world. From this, we come to the two hypotheses I mentioned: Either there was an underground level of Gladio we have not been able to discover, or Gladio had been conceived as having a big head and a thin body, with the task of activating other operational structures. I do not want to violate the secrecy of ongoing official investigations, but I can say that from the standpoint of a legal investigation, an incredible hypothesis is emerging: that is, that when [Giulio] Andreotti spoke about Gladio for the first time, he actually wanted to sort of throw a bone to public opinion, to cover for something more hidden and probably also older than Gladio.”

Indeed, deeper investigations proved the existence of a military Gladio, a parallel Gladio also deployed for special operations outside Italian territory. Accame added: “Concerning the structure, there is an accurate description in Arconte’s testimony. This Gladio structure involved about 200 people, separated into a military section and a civilian one. The civilians were called Doves and the military members were divided into Hawks and Wolves, names used as the symbols for the air, land, and sea forces. They were divided into *Centuries* (Century here comes from the Roman numeral) and the *Centuries* were divided into *Decuries*, like the army of the Roman Empire.”

The admiral indicated the existence of reports proving the involvement of such a military Gladio in Italy, connected with NATO and CIA special operations in Italy, Tunisia, and Libya. “We can add that these operations, called insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in English, are codified, for example, in the Field Manual prepared for the Vietnam War in 1970. On the Internet, you can now find the new version of the Field Manual, valid for the 2004-06 period. This Field Manual was the basic book for the insurgency and counterinsurgency operations such as the one the Gladio Centuries had conducted in the case of Ben Ali in Tunisia, and other operations which were part of the strategy of tension in Italy. This consisted of provoking insurgency by using undercover individuals to create important disturbances in order to bring about the intervention of state forces for counterinsurgency operations; but at that point, the situation became militarized and civil rights were curtailed. This is what happened with Italian terrorism. And it is now being repeated with international terrorism; international terrorism serves to create an alarm, to allow for stronger security measures and the reduction of freedoms, to give more powers to certain intelligence services, and thus provide them with new instruments. The strategy made use of this absolute evil, terrorism, to create new conditions for a secure state. In the Field Manual 30722, which I mentioned before, the section on Counterinsurgency operations valid from October 2004 until October 2006, prepared by the Headquarters of the U.S. Army, defines insurgency as follows: ‘An organized movement aimed at the over-

throw of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.’ ”

To better understand the problems related to Gladio and the strategy of tension, Accame suggested one should read a book written by former Defence Minister Antonio Taviani, who was one of the main Italian political leaders in the ’60s and ’70s. Taviani wrote: “Gladio? I created it. It was created by an initiative I took in 1956 when I was Defense Minister.” Regarding the second, parallel Gladio, Taviani spoke of “a right-wing galaxy, with the possible involvement of the CIA, but not organically connected to the Armed Forces.”

Accame has for years studied the strategy of tension, operations which have been kept under complete secrecy, and for which it is almost impossible to find any documentation. But the admiral is in possession of one highly interesting document: “It is a bizarre story. This document was found by the two military judges of the Rome Court who went to search a building of a very secret Department of the Secret Services, the Institute of Italo-Arab Relations. There, they found a document, which I also have, called ‘Operation Dauphin.’ It is a very important document, because it is the only one about the Gladio activities which was not destroyed.

“The reason it wasn’t destroyed is almost comical: A secret document cannot be known about, but its existence is mentioned in a protocol; a covert document is so secret that it must not be listed on paper anywhere, because it is not supposed to exist. This document was not listed anywhere, and therefore it was not taken into consideration during an inspection. This 100-page document regards a typical insurgency and counterinsurgency operation in May 1966 in the area of Monfalcone, near the border with Yugoslavia. It contains both the orders as well as the results of the operations. Some of the activities included street riots and provocations against the trade unions; there is a list of all the operations, even of throwing low-explosive military training bombs against the PCI [Communist Party] and DC [Christian Democracy] offices in Trieste, as a training operation. The papers reported then on these facts. The scenario was the following: In that period, the regions were being created, and the right wing was afraid that they would be taken over by the left. The aim was to prevent it. The exercise aimed at creating chaos, to provoke a demand for more order, so that the Armed Forces and others would intervene. We have all the documentation on this exercise; both as the operations progressed, and the final analyses. This material could be published.”

The Rome regional TV network, Teleambiente, recently broadcast an hour-long interview with Admiral Accame on these topics. A video of the interview is going to be broadcast by several local and regional TV networks throughout Italy. Teleambiente journalist Pino Vecchio opens the interview with a reference to Lyndon LaRouche, who, when he spoke some time ago with the same TV network, denounced the role played by Henry Kissinger in targetting and threatening Aldo Moro, shortly before the so-called Red Brigades kidnapping.