

Was There a Foreign Hand In the Moro Assassination?

An Interview With Giovanni Galloni

Hon. Giovanni Galloni participated in the Resistance movement against Nazism and Fascism during World War II, and became a leader of the majority party of the Italian post-war period, the Christian Democracy (DC). He was a very close collaborator of former Italian Prime Minister and DC leader, Aldo Moro, who was kidnapped on March 16, 1978 and eventually assassinated.



Galloni is a jurist and university professor, specializing in juridical aspects of agriculture-related issues. He was a Member of Parliament; Minister of Education in the center-left governments of 1987-89; and editor of the DC's daily newspaper, Il Popolo, in 1984-85. In 1991, he was appointed president of the state institution that supervises the entire Italian legal and magistracy system. EIR published an interview with him on Dec 12, 2003, titled "The Theory of Preventive Wars Has Always Been Groundless."

Paoli Raimondi conducted this interview, which has been translated from Italian.

EIR: Recently you gave an interview to the national TV program "Rainews," in which you focussed attention on certain issues related to the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro. You said that the Red Brigades were infiltrated by sections of the American and Israeli intelligence services, but that those intelligence services did not provide their Italian counterparts with the information necessary to intervene.

Galloni: Yes, I had already said these things in 1998, when

I was questioned by the official Commission on Terrorist Massacres of the Italian Parliament, which held hearings on the Moro assassination. I also spoke about it on various other occasions at conferences, seminars, and in interviews with various national and international papers.

EIR: But this time, differently than in the past, your revelations drew extraordinary media coverage and provoked debate throughout the country. Could it be that your statement was used by certain sectors of the Italian institutions to issue an international warning about the possibility of a new "strategy of tension"?¹

Galloni: This is possible, because, on the one hand, Francesco Cossiga, who was Interior Minister at the time, came out very strongly against me, accusing me of inventing everything; but on the other hand, I accused some people of having violated Italian sovereignty. We agree that there are some parts of the Bush Administration that are against certain policies of the present government, and particularly against the center-left opposition and its policies; I hope the center-left

1. The events of the 1970s show how a "global strategy of tension" functioned, and still functions. At that time, orchestrated terrorist actions were used by covert intelligence networks to justify constitutional changes, restrictions of civil liberties, and other political decisions intended to usher in a dictatorial process. At that time, the majority of the Italian population and political institutions did not fall into the trap, and defended the Constitution—unlike what happened in Greece some years before, where sectors of the army took over, with the pretext that democracy was threatened.


With 9/11, a gigantic "strategy of tension" has exploded in the United States and globally, as Dick Cheney's neo-con networks have launched an assault against the Constitution. This strategic situation brings into focus the importance of the earlier Italian experience. See also the LaRouche in 2004 campaign Special Report, "The Synarchist Resurgence Behind the Madrid Train Bombing of March 11, 2004," available at www.larouhepac.com.

wins the coming elections in April 2006 and is able to form a new government.

Originally, the Moro issue was not the main focus of the interview. Actually, it focussed on recent developments in which American authorities kidnapped a person of Islamic religion in Milan, who was allegedly under investigation for possible involvement in terrorism; this action was in clear violation of Italian independence and sovereignty. The Italian government has demanded an explanation from the American Ambassador, who has only provided answers whose contents have not yet been made public. This subject reminded me of another situation that was somewhat similar: something Aldo Moro said to me about 6-8 weeks before he was kidnapped. The two of us, he as president and I as vice-secretary of the Christian Democracy party (DC), spoke about the continuous attacks of the Red Brigades, who used kidnappings, assassinations of magistrates, “knee-capping” of political leaders, etc., and the difficulties our intelligence services had in finding the terrorist hideouts where the attacks originated.

Moro uttered a statement which surprised me a little bit. He said, our countermoves would be more efficient if the American and Israeli intelligence services, which have more information than we do, shared their information and knowledge with us, because then we could more easily discover and dismantle the terrorist hideouts. I did not insist on knowing how he found out about these things; I was a bit perplexed, because if Moro said such things, then he definitely must have had specific sources. Moro was not a person to say such things without any basis.

This is not the first time I have dealt with these things. I mentioned them for the first time on July 22, 1998, when I was questioned by the Special Parliamentary Commission on Massacres, chaired by Sen. [Giovanni] Pellegrino. On that occasion, I reported on what Moro had said. So I was surprised that Senator Pellegrino, reacting to my recent interview, asked why I had not reported this before, during the hearings of the Parliamentary Commission. I told him that if he reads the transcript of the meeting he chaired, he'll find my statements on that discussion with Moro. Maybe the terminology was a bit different, because now I am speaking not only of information but also of infiltration of the Red Brigades by the intelligence services. . . . But as we know, intelligence services do not have any other means to get information except by infiltrating these groups. I am surprised that someone could be surprised by my statements. My statements are not too late



Aldo Moro (left), Italy's former Prime Minister, was kidnapped and assassinated by the Red Brigades in 1978. Several weeks before the kidnapping, he told Galloni that the American and Israeli intelligence services had information about the terrorists that they were not sharing with the Italian government. On the right is Communist Party chairman Enrico Berlinguer, with whom Moro was in a dialogue about how to govern Italy in the national interest. Berlinguer wanted to distance himself from Moscow—but Galloni's CIA interlocutors didn't believe it.

in coming. I do not have any way to further investigate these matters, and it is not my task to do so; I have given some indications, but other authorities should be in charge, and have the task to investigate further.

Contradictions in the Official Story

After my recent statements, there was some follow-up. First of all, Hon. Falco Accame, former president of the Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and president of the National Association of Armed Forces Victims, contacted me. For many years, Accame has been investigating on behalf of the five policemen who were escorting Moro, who were killed during the kidnapping of March 16, 1978. Accame just sent me an impressive amount of material he has collected, which I gave to the Carabinieri of the ROS department [Special Operations Unit], who are still investigating Moro's assassination, under the authority of the Italian magistracy. Apart from these contacts and the documents received from Accame though, there were inconsistencies in the declarations of the so-called repentant terrorists during the four “Moro trials.”

There are many obvious contradictions. These terrorists, even when they made their statements so that their sentences would be reduced, never made clear who really participated in the Moro kidnapping of March 16. These Red Brigaders have often contradicted themselves, because they reported that their members did not have serious military and firearms training; but persons with expert training definitely took part in the March 16 attack, because to be able to hit and kill five

policemen who were very close to Moro without wounding Moro himself, can only be done by highly trained professionals. None of the Red Brigades terrorists had such capabilities.

Secondly, although the magistrates did not further investigate this, a high-level member of the Italian intelligence services was apparently on the scene on March 16, with the excuse that he was visiting some friends. He was there at 9:00 that morning, and said he was there because he had been invited to lunch; but as far as I know, nobody gets invited to lunch at 9:00 A.M. He was on the scene and followed the event and knew about it.

There are other suspicious aspects which Aldo Moro's brother looked into; he is a magistrate and also wrote a book in which he challenged the story that Moro was kept in the prison indicated by the terrorists during the trials. He uses very strong arguments to reject this version of the story, saying that if his brother had been kept in a very small room for over 50 days, then the corpse would not have been found in such good condition. Aldo Moro was used to walking over two miles each day. Additionally, sand was found in Moro's trousers; the same type of sand was also found on the tires of the car in which Moro was found. According to Moro's brother, the terrorists never revealed the real location of the prison.

Another aspect: The center of all the terrorist operations in the Moro kidnapping turned out to be in Florence, where there was a house used for meetings of the Red Brigades' leaders. So far, nobody has identified the house or its owner. In this house, there was certainly a person who was in command of the entire operation and who has never been identified. The terrorist Moretti, who received orders from this individual, never gave the name to the investigators. DC leader Flaminio Piccoli made some allusions to these questions during hearings of the Commission on Massacres. Piccoli said that the "brains" of the Red Brigades was in Florence and this person must have had high-level capabilities. Who is this person? We do not know him yet.

Then, again from the Commission on Massacres chaired by Senator Pellegrino, it turns out there were contacts between the Mossad and the Red Brigades. This emerged in the hearings of March 18, 1999. It also came out in the interrogations of repentant terrorist Fabrizio Peci, who said that the Red Brigades had contacts with the Mossad from the very beginning.

Operation Gladio and the Moro Case

So there were grounds for what Moro told me. But the most astonishing things were provided by Falco Accame. He showed me this letter I have in my hands, which is an order from the Defense Ministry, General Directorate for Military Personnel of the Navy. According to Accame, Giulio Andreotti did not tell the full truth about Gladio.² What Andreotti

2. Operation Gladio was the Italian name for Stay Behind, an underground network of military people and civilians created by NATO immediately after

said was true, and it's true that Gladio was created throughout Europe after 1951, but it was created for internal aims. I was provided with evidence about the origin of Gladio during my trips to the United States: Gladio was based on the Pentagon's fear that the Soviet Union could start World War III, and since the Soviets had strategic superiority in Europe, they could occupy Europe in about one month, the way Hitler did. Gladio was therefore to be the instrument used to organize resistance in case of Soviet military occupation. Originally, Gladio drew on elements from the Catholic-inspired partisan movement, but also took people directly from the fascist organizations. However, this type of Gladio organization was practically inoperational.

In reality, there was also a second Gladio involved in operations abroad and more directly in contact with the CIA. This second Gladio was formed by three columns: the first one included elements of the Army, particularly from the Folgore division and the fascist Decima Mas of Valerio Borghese, who also was involved in an attempted coup d'état; the second was called the Wolves, with elements of the Navy, which had a point of reference in the Ministry of the Navy here in Rome; the third formation, called the Doves, consisted of civilians.

One of these individuals, who was a member of the Wolves, Antonino Arconte, number G-71, was called to the operational center in the city of La Spezia on March 2, 1978, and was told to leave for Beirut with a letter, a copy of which I have here with me. In this letter, Arconte "was authorized to obtain information of the third degree or higher, if useful for operations to contact Middle East terrorist groups with the aim of obtaining collaboration and information useful for freeing Aldo Moro." In Beirut, he was to make contact with Col. Stefano Giovannone, who was responsible for the Italian intelligence services in the region. This was at the very beginning of March, while the kidnapping of Moro took place on March 16; this man left for Beirut, where he arrived about six days before the terrorist assault against Moro, and delivered this document to a person named Ferraro, who gave it to Giovannone.

All this was before the kidnapping, so it is evident that the kidnapping had been already planned and that this section of the intelligence services was already informed of the coming event. Why did they not inform Moro, his security, and the

World War II, with the aim to prepare for resistance and guerrilla warfare in case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Stay Behind networks existed in all European countries, and were coordinated by secret service sections that responded, not to the elected governments and Constitutions, but to parallel intelligence forces under the command of NATO or sections of the CIA. But these Gladio networks turned into political operations for internal and external "insurgency and counterinsurgency" on behalf of specific political groups and interests involved in coups d'état, assassinations of political leaders, and a variety of other dirty tricks that had nothing to do with the Soviet threat. These networks became instruments of what was known as the "strategy of tension."

Italian intelligence services? Not the “Italian” ones that took orders from the CIA, but the true Italian, patriotic services.

Arconte did not destroy the paper, but later, to protect his life, he gave it to a notary. Now, either this is a fake document—and if this is demonstrated, then those responsible must be convicted—or it is not fake, and then we must start all the investigations into the Moro kidnapping over again, from the very beginning. Because the statements Moro made to me in 1978 had a real basis.

We also do not know where Moro’s bag ended up. It contained highly classified documents, and was taken by the terrorists. Moro always had three bags: one with his medicine, one with his university papers, and a third with very sensitive and classified documents which he always had with him. The terrorists said there was nothing important in this third bag and that they destroyed it.

These are some of the issues and problems that arose after my recent interview. I have already told the Carabinieri about these questions.

EIR: What about Francesco Cossiga?

Galloni: Francesco Cossiga made very direct accusations against me. He claimed that I invented everything; that Moro was against me, and that Moro would never have said such things to me. To the contrary, I can say that at that time Moro intended to name me head of the DC Secretariat to replace [Benigno] Zaccagnini. I was very close to Moro’s political line, because others in his faction tended to isolate themselves, while I tried to establish dialogue and cooperation with other factions of the party. I got this ferocious reaction from Cossiga, who also said many things which were not true and groundless. . . .

EIR: Let us come back to the new “strategy of tension.”

Galloni: In my view, the conditions for a repeat of the strategy of tension are no longer present. The strategy of tension, as I realized during my visits in the U.S.A., was implemented as a function of the danger that the Italian Communists could enter the Italian government. I remember what representatives of the Pentagon told me very clearly, and which was also very clearly repeated in three subsequent discussions I had at the State Department—the first with the Italian desk, then with the European desk, and finally with the Western World desk. Everyone repeated their total opposition to the entry of the Communists into the Italian government, for ideological reasons. They completely rejected this possibility, as they had done in France. In the end, they were less disturbed with France, because there was a very large Socialist party in France that could limit the Communist influence; but they said they were very disturbed by similar developments in Italy.

They told me very serious things: “We are troubled, because this is a question of life and death for us.” I remember these words; this expression remained in my head. “Because once the Communists are in the government, they will move

to prevent the installation of military bases. And without these bases in Italy, we lack the means to react in the event of a Soviet land offensive.” For us, they said, it is a question of life or death. This made me shiver, because I then made the direct connection between the strategy of tension and this problem, which was managed then, as today, by the Pentagon. The way that the operation in Iraq is totally managed by the Pentagon today; it was the same then, in regard to the possibility of World War III.

I then became aware that the entire strategy of tension was aimed in this direction, a direction that the Soviet Union also foresaw. This was a strategy of tension that was born of the necessity, in the event that there were a government with Communist participation in Italy, to turn Italy into a new Greece: that is, a coup d’état. The strategy of tension was functional for a coup d’état.

When I was Deputy in the Chamber of Deputies and I saw all the papers related to the failed coup by Valerio Borghese, I realized that it was a serious operation and not a joke. The putschists even had a written declaration to read to the public after the occupation of the television headquarters. I read it: It said, among other things, that we finally put an end to this system of political parties, etc. When I had contacts with the Washington CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies], I realized that all the coups d’état carried out in South and Central America, etc., had been prepared first with a policy of a strategy of tension, to create tensions and fear in public opinion; a true military takeover came later. In Italy, the atmosphere was different, because the Italian people reacted better to this strategy of tension. With this strategy of tension, they succeeded in establishing contacts with extreme right and extreme left groups.

EIR: I was speaking of a new “strategy of tension,” which is not related to the Soviet question. Let me explain: In the U.S. Administration there is presently a group of so-called neo-cons around Dick Cheney in particular, who say, “With us or against us.” And all the other countries, including Italy, are told to get in line with their policy, now and in the future. We know—and there are ongoing investigations on this—that false stories and lies were fabricated ad hoc to justify the military attack against Iraq—

Galloni: Yes, I agree.

EIR: —such as the story of the uranium from Niger supposedly used for an Iraqi nuclear bomb. Rome—not coincidentally—played a role in this story. There is currently a big debate and an investigation into these matters in the United States. Recently there was also what we might call a “white coup” led by Cheney, to destroy the Constitution and the special role of “checks and balances” played by the U.S. Senate; the coup was defeated. There are also indications that a new imperial strategy is being implemented by these neo-con groups through wars and destabilization operations—

Galloni: I am presently not in a position to say if behind all this, there is also a maneuver, here in Italy for example, to save the Berlusconi government, which is actually in serious difficulty, if for these American interests it is essential to keep the Berlusconi government alive. It could be that a new strategy of tension in Italy could have these aims.

EIR: I believe that today there is a growing necessity to understand the “strategy of tension” of the past decades, to explain it more thoroughly, because it has not been fully understood, as the Moro assassination has not been yet fully understood and explained.

Galloni: I understood it very well. Because the hostility of certain American sectors against Moro’s policy was in this context. When I would go to the U.S.A., I would say that the discussions with the Communists were being carried out in agreement with Enrico Berlinguer, who wanted to distance himself from Moscow. They told me that this was an illusion. “Moscow also says the same thing, because it wants to facilitate the entry of the Communists into the government.” I said that my impression was the contrary: that Moscow was strongly against Berlinguer’s policy. Those American forces were convinced that it was Moscow that was actually pushing Berlinguer to act as a sort of submarine, to get into the Italian government and stop the military bases.

This was the great difference that came out in the three meetings I mentioned before. There I realized that from the standpoint of *thinking*, they were really weak. I have to admit that from an organizational standpoint they were greatly superior. I had these three meetings, and each of the people knew exactly what I had discussed with the others, down to the last word. And then all the discussions had to be summarized for a briefing to the President. We in Italy cannot imagine being organized in this manner. I admired their organizational capability, but not their intelligence. They were not able to carry out intelligent reasoning. In the end, they always said, “No, no, no.”

And after a few years, they had the same attitude toward Andreotti. I saw some people close to Ray Cline, who was working with the CIA or something similar, who came to me in 1985 and told me that they had the sense that Andreotti was moving to the other side, Moscow’s side. At that time, Andreotti was beginning a dialogue with Gorbachov. They abruptly took the same attitude against Andreotti as they had taken with Moro earlier. In my view, the organization of the trial against Andreotti, which originated from the American mafia, with false statements, etc., was started for that reason, around 1985-86.

I remember very well that when I was a government minister, there was a government meeting in which we discussed removing our ambassador in Moscow, who did not follow our policy but openly represented the American line. He continuously gave us reports saying that Gorbachov was still following the old Soviet line.

EIR: Today, this intellectual smallness in the present Administration—

Galloni: It is the same. What the U.S. President has done, inspired by these groups, is clearly wrong. They follow that same line. We have to shake up America starting from the universities, from the intellectual layers.

EIR: That is what *EIR* and the LaRouche movement are doing.

Galloni: This is what my son Nino³ tells me, and I fully agree with this effort. This is the direction to pursue. It is very difficult, but it is the only way.

EIR: On the present strategy of a “clash of civilizations,” of preventive wars—

Galloni: It is a clear manifestation of intellectual smallness, because there is no clash of civilizations. The real problem is to gradually lead the Arab world and Islamic religion to overcome fundamentalist tendencies, and for this we need dialogue, not animosity.

EIR: Next year, an important election will take place here in Italy, which will be decisive both in terms of programmatic content and in terms of the new alliances that will be responsible for formulating and implementing the programs.

Galloni: We must go back to a proportional electoral system, similar to what Alcide De Gasperi conceived. He suggested that before elections, parties should decide on their alliances, within the proportional system. Ten years ago, we made a mistake in moving from a proportional to a majority system. It is true that the way the proportional system was used during the period of [Bettino] Craxi’s leadership provoked a crisis in the Italian political system. This came after the death of Moro, whose idea was to reach what he called “full democracy,” which Italy never experienced. Until then, one could not imagine a government led by those who were in the opposition; that is, a government led by the Communists. This was not possible; both Palmiro Togliatti and Stalin knew it. [Pietro] Nenni told me that when he went to Moscow to receive a peace prize, he was told that on the eve of the elections of April 18, 1948, Stalin personally told Togliatti: Don’t be so crazy as to believe you can win the elections in Italy, because I will not fight World War III over Italy. You have some freedom and power in the trade unions and other institutions, and you should be satisfied with that. Togliatti answered that he had no such intentions.

Moro wanted to reach a “full democracy,” in which “alter-

3. Dr. Nino Galloni is an economist who has served in several Italian government ministries, and is currently the auditor of INPDAP, the main institute coordinating pension funds for public-sector retirees. An interview with him appeared in *EIR*, Feb. 18, 2005. A staunch advocate of Lyndon LaRouche’s proposal for a New Bretton Woods system, he has been a participant in numerous *EIR* conferences and seminars.

nation” was possible; a situation possible only with a deep change in both the DC and the Communist Party [PCI]. The DC, with Zaccagnini, would become more and more open to social questions, and the PCI would break with Moscow. Moro wanted to have a step-by-step process without dramatic breaks on either side. And he once told me that we should do everything to win the elections, but in the event that we lost, we should be ready to accept the results in a democratic way. It is not true that Moro wanted to have an “historical compromise”; you cannot find one sentence of his in this direction. Once Moro was killed, Fanfani also told me that the project was no longer possible, and that the only possibility was a deal with the Socialists. At that point, Craxi no longer accepted a simple center-left coalition, but said that he first wanted to see the results of the election, and then he would make the decision about which coalition he wanted to build. Italy has followed this sort of opportunism right down to the present time. The Socialists claimed the rights of the majority, like the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister), even if they had just 10% of the vote. The Socialist [Giuliano] Amato, on behalf of Craxi, even presented this concept at one of the CSIS conferences in which I took part. They wanted to become the determining factor with just 10%. The Americans laughed at this. This attitude has ruined democracy in Italy.

EIR: Italy in the international arena: What treaties and alliances should be promoted?

Galloni: I am for a great commitment to Europe, to make it able to represent a point of autonomy. India and China are asking us to strengthen Europe in order to create a better strategic equilibrium. Not in an anti-American way, but friendship with America in a new dialectical relationship. It is the strategy implicit in Article 11 of the Italian Constitution, which nobody has really analyzed in depth yet.⁴

Article 11 represents a real modern revolution, because it implies that to abolish war as a means of settling international disputes is not simply a question of discussing just or unjust wars, as has been done in the past. Abolishing war means creating international communities: the UN, Europe, etc., such that all the problems that arise among states must be resolved by these communities. These communities must have their own army, as every country has its own police force, to repress potential conflicts. That is, no war anymore, but police actions. This is the strategy. We will certainly need decades to reach this objective.

4. Article 11 reads: “Italy repudiates war as an instrument offending the liberty of peoples and as a means for settling disputes; it agrees to limitations of sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal system of peace and justice between nations, provided the principle of reciprocity is guaranteed; it promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends.”