

Strategy of Tension: The Case of Italy

by Claudio Celani

Part 3

The Synarchist strategy of tension ripped Italy apart beginning in the 1960s, as Parts 1 and 2 of this series have shown. The combination of neo-Nazi, banking, and terrorist networks active in the Italian case, is paradigmatic of the Synarchist capability, which resurfaced in Europe with the Madrid bombings of March 2004.

Enter Gladio

During his captivity, former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was “interrogated” by the Red Brigades, who aimed at achieving a confession of Christian Democratic party (DC) involvement in “capitalist corruption” and “imperialist exploitation.” Tapes of the interrogations were made, and the Red Brigades announced that they would publish the interrogations, to advance the cause of the “anti-imperialist struggle.” But they didn’t. Today, the tapes have not yet been found.

Moro wrote also a “memorandum,” which partially surfaced only after the terrorists had been arrested, and only in photocopied or typewritten form. Moro’s handwritten origi-

nals have never been found. Similarly, the originals of the many letters he wrote to his party colleagues and his family were never found. According to one interpretation, this is because Moro had started to reveal the existence of the NATO secret “stay behind” organization, called Gladio.

Parts of the memorandum, in a typewritten version, were found in October 1978, when the newly appointed special anti-terrorism Carabinieri team under Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa¹ discovered a Red Brigades hideout in Milan. (In that apartment, on the via Montenevoso, Dalla Chiesa’s men found also 15 letters written by Moro, other than those which the terrorists had delivered to politicians and to members of Moro’s family during Moro’s captivity.²) However, the larger bulk of the memorandum was found much later in the same apartment, in 1990, in a badly concealed hole in the wall, discovered by carpenters who were renovating the premises. This time, 53 photocopied pages of Moro’s original handwritten memo, plus 114 pages of letters and last wills, never delivered, were found, together with weapons, ammunition, and a bag full of money.

The via Montenevoso papers constitute one of the many unsolved mysteries of the Moro case. It is evident that the papers were brought into the apartment, both in 1978 and in 1990, from the outside, and surely not by the Red Brigades terrorists. In fact, in 1978, Dalla Chiesa’s men searched the flat for three hours, before the prosecutor could get there, and in the absence of the residents (the terrorists), who strangely enough renounced their right to be present at the search. Once the magistrate came, the apartment was turned upside down, so that it would have been impossible not to find the hole, covered by a thin wooden panel, nailed to the wall under the window.

All this adds a further element to the picture of a structure, external to the Red Brigades, which ran the Moro operation, which took possession of Moro’s papers—and still has them.

1. Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, on Aug 30, 1978, was appointed Italian anti-terrorism czar with the power of coordinating all police bodies. Dalla Chiesa, who had already performed well in capturing the first-generation Red Brigades’ leaders in 1974 (except for Mario Moretti), was himself a member of the P2. Testifying before the Parliamentary Investigating Committee on the P2, he justified his membership by saying that he had joined it in order to investigate it. Dalla Chiesa captured all Red Brigaders involved in the Moro operation, and became the repository of many secrets involving both infiltration of the terrorist group and the whereabouts of Moro’s papers. He was killed on Sept. 3, 1982, in Palermo, by a Mafia commando. A few hours after his death, investigators found Dalla Chiesa’s safe open and empty.

2. Moro wrote those letters under pressure, as the terrorists pursued their strategy of dismantling the political unity he had so arduously built. However, Moro was well aware of that purpose, and he would have never written them, had he not thought he could somehow control the process. Moro’s letters were addressed to Interior Minister Cossiga, party secretary Zaccagnini, and others, including his friend Pope Paul VI, to convince them to “negotiate” for his liberation. The “Experts Committee” established by Cossiga, under P2 member Franco Ferracuti, imposed the line that Moro’s personality had been annihilated by the “Stockholm syndrome,” and therefore his letters should be simply disregarded. Moro’s letters to his family found in 1990 demonstrate that Ferracuti’s analysis was wrong.



Aldo Moro, killed by the Red Brigades in October 1978. After 25 years of cover-up, and the assassination of many investigators, the truth about the higher-level controllers of the operation is slowly coming out.

Only in the papers which this entity decided to release in 1990, can Moro's mention of a secret NATO structure be found. In 1990, however, the Berlin Wall had come down, and the existence of Gladio had already been made known by Giulio Andreotti, who was then Prime Minister. Had this revelation come out in 1978, the impact would have been devastating.

It is clear that the same network which already in 1978 had Moro's papers in its possession, decided to release those found in the Montenevoso apartment. This network is still today in possession of the original papers, including those contained in a bag that Moro always carried with him, which, according to Moro's secretary Sereno Freato, pertained to evidence that shortly before Moro's kidnapping, the U.S. State Department under Henry Kissinger had tried to eliminate Moro politically, through the Lockheed scandal.³

The involvement of the Gladio organization in Moro's

3. The U.S. Lockheed corporation had bribed Italian officials to get the Italian military to buy Starfighter and C-130 aircraft. While allegations against a former Defense Minister, Tanassi, proved to be true, those against Tanassi's predecessor Gui, a Moro ally, were false. In addition, the allegation that Moro, under the nickname "Antelope Cobbler," was the mastermind of the bribes, in order to finance his political faction, proved to be false. Those allegations had originated in the office of Henry Kissinger's assistant at the State Department, Loewenstein, as papers contained in Moro's bag documented.

kidnapping, however, had already come out at an early stage. The day of the kidnapping, March 16, 1978, at 9 a.m., a member of the Gladio military structure, Col. Camillo Guglielmi of the SISMI military secret service, was on the via Fani, and therefore he was present at the shootout and kidnapping. Guglielmi's presence was later revealed by another member of Gladio, and was not denied by Guglielmi himself; he simply justified it by saying that he had been invited for lunch by a colleague living nearby—at 9 a.m. The same source reported that Guglielmi was part of a group inside SISMI, called "Ufficio R," under two members of the Propaganda-2 freemasonic lodge, Pietro Musumeci and Giuseppe Belmonte, who, two years later, in 1980, were caught in a cover-up of the Bologna train station bombing. Musumeci and Belmonte, as we shall see, were sentenced by the Bologna court, together with P2 puppet-master Licio Gelli.

'The External Entity'

The involvement of an external entity above the Red Brigades had been exposed already in 1978 by a journalist with ties to intelligence circles, Mino Pecorelli, whose destiny is intertwined with that of General Dalla Chiesa. Pecorelli ran a magazine called *Osservatorio Politico*, which, on March 28, 1978, wrote: "Let us prepare for the worst. The authors of the via Fani massacre and of Aldo Moro's kidnapping are professionals, trained in top-level war schools." On May 2, Pecorelli wrote: "The directing brain which organized Moro's capture has nothing to do with the traditional Red Brigades. The via Fani commando expresses in an unusual, but effective way, the new Italian political strategy." Pecorelli wrote that both in Washington and in Moscow, certain forces wanted to prevent the association of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) with the government: "Once again, the logic of Yalta has passed over the heads of minor powers. It is Yalta which decided via Fani."

Pecorelli had revealed the existence of a plan to kidnap Moro already ten years earlier, on Nov. 19, 1967, in an article in the magazine *Il Nuovo Mondo d'Oggi*, of which he was the editor. Under the title "I Should Kill Aldo Moro," Pecorelli reported that in 1964, at the time of Moro's first government with the Socialist Party (PSI), a certain political-economic group had assigned Lt. Col. Roberto Potestà the task of preparing a ranger commando to eliminate Moro's bodyguards, kidnap Moro to a secret place, kill him, and blame the assassination on left-wing elements. The similarity of that plan with what actually occurred in 1978 is striking.

Over the following years, Pecorelli repeatedly sent signals that Moro was targeted for assassination. In September 1975, he wrote: "A member of the delegation accompanying President Ford on a visit to Rome told us: 'I see black. There is a Jacqueline in the future of your country.' " And on March 15, 1978, on the eve of the via Fani events, Pecorelli wrote: "On the Ides of March 1978, the Andreotti government is going to be sworn in before State President Giovanni Leone. Should we expect a Brutus?"

After Moro's death, on Oct. 17, 1978, Pecorelli wrote: "The police minister knew everything, even where [Moro] was kept, in the Ghetto area. Why did he not say anything? He could not make any decision, because he would have to ask the higher-ups. This raises the question: How high? Maybe up to the Lodge of Christ in Paradise?" The reference is obviously to a freemasonic lodge, even in the name Christ (Rome's Piazza del Gesù was the address of the central office of freemasonry).

Minister Francesco Cossiga, Pecorelli wrote, had been informed by a Carabinieri general that Moro's prison had been located, and he needed the OK for a raid. Cossiga said that he had to consult on that, and ultimately denied the request, on the pretext that he did not want to risk Moro's life during the raid. "The name of the general is Amen," wrote Pecorelli, meaning obviously Dalla Chiesa, whose name in Italian means "from the Church."

On Jan. 16, 1979, Pecorelli announced more revelations on the Moro case, but he was never able to publish them, because he was shot two months later.

The Restoration

Legend has it that with the assassination of Aldo Moro, the Red Brigades failed to achieve their goal, which was to build a "revolutionary" consensus around them. The truth is that the stringpullers behind the Red Brigades did reach their aim, which was to finish off Moro and his policy, once and forever.

The policy of national unity laboriously built by Moro started to crumble already on the day of his kidnapping, and after the momentum supplied by the hard line against terrorism, it quickly collapsed in the following 12 months. Moro was the only figure who could keep the Christian Democratic party together in a dialogue with the Communist Party, guaranteeing no compromise on principles; at the same time, Moro was the only figure whom the PCI leaders fully trusted, in a collaboration in which the PCI had to make considerable concessions, without apparent advantages. Without Moro, the right wing in the DC considerably raised the difficulty for the PCI, in a context stressed by austerity measures imposed on Italy by the International Monetary Fund. This strengthened the extremist, Jacobin faction in the PCI, which had always been against collaboration with the DC, so that in January 1979, when Parliament was called upon to vote on Italy's entrance into the European Monetary System, the PCI voted against it, and left the majority coalition, thus marking the end of the period of "national solidarity." The Andreotti government resigned on Jan. 31, 1979.

This opened the way to a "Restoration" government, preceded by very turbulent months. Initially, attempts to form a new government with a different majority failed, so that State President Pertini was forced to call for early elections. In order to influence the election result, the synarchists deployed left-wing and right-wing terrorism, in a bloody escalation. Already on Jan. 24, the Red Brigades had assassinated trade



Then-Italian President Francesco Cossiga with President George H.W. Bush in 1989. Cossiga became Prime Minister in 1980, after the collapse of Aldo Moro's strategy of "national solidarity." Cossiga's first government coincided with the height of the power of a vast intelligence network of Propaganda-2 freemasons—including P2 head Licio Gelli, Cossiga's personal friend.

unionist Guido Rossa, a PCI member; on Jan. 29, another terrorist commando had killed Milan prosecutor Emilio Alessandrini, a veteran of the investigations into the neo-fascist networks involved in the Piazza Fontana massacre of 1969. Until June 3, the election date, such acts of terrorism escalated. This destabilization phase saw not only "red" terrorists in action, but also a reorganized neo-fascist network.⁴

The election results showed the effects of the terrorist

4. On Feb. 16, two terrorist commandos killed two people in Milan. On Feb. 26, in Turin, in a shootout with police, two terrorists died. On March 9, in Palermo, the Mafia killed local DC leader Michele Reina. On March 13, in Bergamo, terrorists killed Carabinieri agent Giuseppe Guerrieri. The next day, they "legged" (shot in the legs) an official of automaker FIAT, Giuliano Farina. Also in Turin, on March 19, terrorists killed a passer-by in a failed attack against a police car. On March 20, journalist Mino Pecorelli was assassinated (see above). On April 1, in Thiene (Vicenza), three terrorists died in the premature explosion of a bomb during the preparation of an attack. On April 19, in Milan, terrorists killed police agent Andrea Compagna, while in Rome a neo-fascist assassinated a communist student, Ciro Principessa. On May 3, in Rome, a Red Brigades commando assaulted the office of the local DC chapter, killing two policemen.

campaign: Frightened voters abandoned the PCI, which dropped from 34.4% to 30%. The DC and PSI confirmed their 1976 percentiles, and minor centrist parties slightly increased their votes, so that on paper, a tiny center-left majority was again possible. However, three attempts to form a government failed before, on Aug. 2, with a real *coup de theatre*, none other than Francesco Cossiga was appointed. Cossiga had resigned, in recognition of his responsibility for his failure as police minister during Moro's kidnapping. Now, it was as if Cossiga was rewarded, by entrusting him with the leadership of a government supported by forces hostile to Moro's policy. Cossiga convinced the Socialists not to vote against his government, which lasted eight months. It was replaced, on April 5, by a second Cossiga Cabinet, this time with the Socialists on board, who were rewarded with nine ministerial posts.

In the meantime, on Feb. 15-20, 1980, at the national congress of the DC, the anti-Moro faction formalized the end of the Moro policy, by voting up a preamble to the party program, establishing that the Christian Democracy excluded any possibility of future collaboration with the PCI. This was exactly what Henry Kissinger had demanded from Moro in 1976. The author of the preamble was Carlo Donat Cattin, who became deputy secretary general. Donat Cattin, a former trade unionist, had a deep, dark secret: His son Marco was a member of the Red Brigades. This means that Donat Cattin was susceptible to blackmail, including through his secretary Ilio Giasolli, a member of the P2.⁵

With the establishment of Cossiga's government, his friend Licio Gelli's secret network, the P2, was at the height of its power. P2 members were still in command of both secret services, SISDE and SISMI, as well as of the state coordination body, CESIS; Federico Umberto D'Amato, P2 member and an old buddy of James Jesus Angleton—formerly CIA Chief of Counter-Intelligence—was still at his place in the Interior Ministry; in Cossiga's first Cabinet, two ministers and three deputy ministers were P2 members. In Cossiga's second Cabinet, the P2 presence increased to three ministers and five deputy ministers. Cossiga also promoted P2 members Gen. Orazio Giannini as head of the Guardia di Finanza (financial police) and Adm. Giovanni Torrisi as head of the General Staff of Defense. The larger P2 network, as far as it is publicly known, was impressive. Gelli's secret organization included the following numbers of high military officers: Army 50; Navy 29; Carabinieri 32; Air Force 9; Guardia di Finanza 37. Furthermore, it included: 22 police

5. Donat Cattin's son Marco was the head of the Prima Linea commando (a group allied to the Red Brigades), which had assassinated prosecutor Emilio Alessandrini one year earlier in Milan. Alessandrini had shortly before been assigned to follow up an *Espresso*, a paper of denunciation, presented by the European Labor Party (POE, the LaRouche organization in Italy), exposing sociologist Francesco Alberoni as the intellectual father of the founding nucleus of the Red Brigades, at the University of Trento. In a meeting with this author, Alessandrini explained that he found the *Espresso*'s arguments politically convincing, but that he would need juridical evidence in order to move on the charges.



Henry Kissinger, who had tried to eliminate Aldo Moro politically through the Lockheed scandal, was reputed to be a member of the Montecarlo Lodge of freemasons, whose members included P2's Gelli. What would Moro's "lost" papers have to say about Henry?

officials; 14 judges and prosecutors; 9 diplomats; 53 ministry officials; 49 bankers and bank officials; 83 industrialists; 124 professionals; 8 managers of state holdings; 12 corporate managers; 59 members of Parliament and party officials; 4 media publishers; 8 newspaper editors; 22 journalists; 3 writers; and 10 officials of public television RAI.

Cossiga himself later claimed in an interview that he first met P2 head Gelli in this period. Whether this is true or just a cover for an older relationship, Cossiga and Gelli claim mutual friendship to this day.

The 'Plan for Democratic Rebirth'

The P2 strategy unfolded according to two documents which were drafted between Autumn 1975 and Winter 1976: the "Memorandum on the Italian Political Situation" and the "Plan for Democratic Rebirth." The "Memorandum" expresses pessimism on the capacity of the Christian Democratic party to keep functioning as a "dam" against Communism. "At this point," says the Memorandum, "the solution of a 'militarocracy,' the Italian way, could not appear as unthinkable as an alternative to the Communist regime."

The "Rebirth" plan was a plan of action to infiltrate, control, and corrupt all state institutions. It envisions the opportunity of collecting and allocating 30-40 billion lire (about 150 million euro) to control newspapers, political parties, and trade unions; selected politicians are indicated as candidates to be supported in gaining positions of power in their parties; P2 journalists should be infiltrated into all dailies and the national television; "RAI should be dissolved in the name of freedom of information." In particular, a reform of the DC was discussed, thinking that 10 billion lire would be enough to "buy" the party.

The "primary objective and indispensable precondition of the operation" of the plan, "is the establishment of a club (of a Rotary-like nature for the diversity of its components) where the best level of industry and financial sector leaders,

members of the liberal professions, public officials and magistrates, as well as very few, selected politicians are represented . . . men who would constitute a real committee of trustees respecting those politicians who will take on the honor of implementing the plan.” The plan indicated also a series of electoral, judicial, and constitutional reforms to be implemented, in order to make the country more “governable.” In particular, the whole political landscape was to be changed: Traditional parties should disappear and be replaced by “two political movements, one of a liberal-labor inspiration and one of liberal-moderate, or conservative inspiration,” to be achieved through “successively being dismantled and then rebuilt, several times.”

The substance of Gelli’s plan was to subordinate national political life to an oligarchy with no formal political accountability, represented by the secret P2 lodge. Here, and not in state institutions, decisions would be taken. This would not mean that Gelli could pull a string and everything would move into place. But once the power of such a system was established, Italy could be steered in the direction wanted by the P2’s Anglo-American controllers. The P2’s main instrument to condition Italian political life was the strategy of tension; sometimes, to remind its own members who was boss. This was sometimes necessary when international conditions changed, and new policies were in place.

Reorganization of Neo-Fascist Terrorism

At the end of the 1970s, after the historical leaders of Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale had either been arrested or escaped abroad, the figure of Paolo Signorelli emerged as the chief neo-fascist ideologue. Signorelli is described by Bologna prosecutors as the immediate superior of Giancarlo Rognoni, one of the three neo-fascists sentenced and then acquitted for the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing. At the same time, Signorelli was described as an intimate of Licio Gelli by neo-fascist witnesses.

A Rome prosecutor who was investigating the reorganization of right-wing terrorist networks, Vittorio Occorsio, and who was state attorney at the trial against Ordine Nuovo, was killed on July 10, 1976. His work was continued by Mario Amato from late 1977 to the Spring of 1980. Amato came across a Secret Service dossier revealing the reorganization of Ordine Nuovo. Those members of ON who had not fled to Spain had gone underground, and had begun to adopt the tactics and rhetoric of left-wing terrorists. Even more startling, they made attempts to link up with leftist groups, in a common effort to destroy the state.

Amato also found evidence of Signorelli’s involvement in reorganizing the movement. The group now had a semi-legal wing called the Third Position, and a terrorist wing called, among other things, Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR). In 1979, Amato twice had Signorelli arrested in connection with terrorist attacks in Rome, but Signorelli was released both times after questioning.

Amato’s main obstacle in the investigation was his super-

ior, the head prosecutor of the Rome judiciary, Giovanni De Matteo, a member of P2. All dossiers on right-wing terrorism landed on his desk, but died there.

Then, in Spring 1980, Amato had a breakthrough: A neo-fascist named Massimi, who was in jail for several crimes, told Amato that he had been present at a meeting at Signorelli’s home on Dec. 9, 1979, when the murder of a suspected traitor was planned. Besides Signorelli and five other fascists, Prof. Aldo Semerari of Rome University, a noted criminal psychologist who was a close friend of De Matteo, was present. Semerari was also a P2 member.

Not knowing the secret connections between Semerari and De Matteo, Amato presented his information to De Matteo, urgently pleading that it should be forwarded to the proper authorities. But after De Matteo had been sitting on the dossier for a week, Amato learned indirectly that its content had been leaked to Signorelli and Semerari. Amato filed a complaint to the Superior Council of the Judiciary, without, however, revealing one of the things Massimi had revealed: that Amato himself was next on the fascist hit list. Ten days after his appearance before the Council, on June 23, 1980, Amato was shot in the head while waiting at a bus stop. He had neither security nor an armored car, despite the fact that he had repeatedly asked for protection.

Amato’s work, however, was crucial for the Bologna prosecutors, who had the task of investigating those responsible for the bomb that exploded on Aug. 2, 1980, in the Bologna train station.

The Bologna Train Station Massacre

On Aug. 2, 1980, at 10:25 a.m., a powerful bomb exploded in the Bologna train station, killing 85 and injuring more than 200. Twenty-four years later, the court handed down a life-long prison sentence for three neo-fascists, Sergio Picciafucoco, Valerio Fioravanti, and Francesca Mambro, and minor sentences for Licio Gelli, Francesco Pazienza, and SISMI officials Gen. Giuseppe Musumeci and Col. Pietro Belmonte, for being involved in the cover-up.

However, the question as to why that massacre was perpetrated has not yet found a satisfactory answer—at least if one does not accept the explanation that it was done by a neo-fascist cell gone crazy. From the standpoint of the “strategy of tension,” the purpose of such a large terrorist attack should have been to produce a situation similar to the state of emergency which the Rumor government was supposed to declare after the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing. Also, this time there was no urgency of shifting an undesired government policy, as such a shift had already occurred. It is not excluded, however, that for the P2 synarchist controllers, even a government considered an asset should be appropriately “conditioned.” But why an unprecedented massacre, the largest so far, in Bologna, the stronghold of local PCI power?

The international picture was less “stabilized” than the domestic one. With the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the West had lost an important ally in the Persian Gulf, and Is-



The Bologna train station bombing in 1980, an act of terror comparable to the 2004 Madrid bombings, has never been satisfactorily explained. The cover-up has been perpetrated notably by P2 officials and the SISMI intelligence service.

lamic fundamentalism was on the march. In the Mediterranean, Libya was in a confrontation with the U.S. Administration. Some, including ministers of the Cossiga government itself, have posited a connection between the Bologna bombing and another episode, the explosion of a civilian airplane of Itavia Airlines, over Ustica Island, near Sicily, which had occurred a few weeks earlier, on June 27. In that incident, 81 people lost their lives. Many years later, prosecutor Rosario Priore established that the Itavia DC-9 was hit by a rocket during an air battle involving American, French, Italian, and Libyan aircraft. Most probably, the rocket was shot by U.S. jets against a Libyan MiG which, in order to escape radar detection, was flying in the DC-9's shadow. It was believed that Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi was on the Libyan jet, coming from Yugoslavia. The Itavia jet had taken off from Bologna.

However, the connection between Ustica and the Bologna massacre has not been demonstrated. What has been demonstrated, is the massive cover-up in both cases. The investigations of the Ustica incident have been hindered by cover-ups involving the highest Air Force authorities, and the elimination of countless witnesses in mysterious circumstances; among these were pilots Ivo Nutarelli and Ivo Naldini, who died in the Ramstein, Germany, air show on Aug. 28, 1988, in a dramatic midair collision which caused 70 civilian deaths and injured 400.

The Bologna case has seen a cover-up involving the P2 and SISMI officials, who succeeded in slowing down investigations, and forcing prosecutor Aldo Gentile to recuse him-

self. Paradoxically, those carrying out the cover-ups were nailed with sound juridical evidence, stronger than the circumstantial evidence used, for instance, to sentence Mambro and Fioravanti.

A few days after the massacre, on Aug. 5, the magazine *L'Espresso* published an interview with Col. Amos Spiazzi, the leader of the Rosa dei Venti conspiracy (see Part 1), who revealed that, as a SISMI agent, he had discovered that the neo-fascists were preparing a major terrorist action. The interview, it was announced, had been given before the Bologna massacre. Spiazzi then dropped a nickname, "Ciccio," as his source from neo-fascist circles.


"Ciccio" was Francesco Mangiameli, a member of the Third Position and at the same time, a participant in several terrorist actions with NAR leader Valerio Fioravanti. Spiazzi's interview is today interpreted as a successful effort to set Mangiameli up for assassination, in order to eliminate evidence of connections between the terrorists and intelligence circles.

Right on schedule, on Sept. 9, 1980, Mangiameli was assassinated by a commando led by Valerio Fioravanti. Mangiameli's comrades in Palermo issued a leaflet accusing Fioravanti of the assassination and of the Bologna terror action. Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello, the two other leaders of Third Position, knew they were next on Fioravanti's hit list, and hastily escaped abroad, finding refuge in London.

When in 1981, police arrested Fioravanti, Mambro, and Sergio Picciafuoco, their alibis for Aug. 2, 1980 collapsed. Picciafuoco's presence on the premises of the Bologna train station when the bomb exploded, could be proven, because he was even medicated for a light injury.

Prosecutors established that the weeks immediately preceding the Bologna massacre, had been spent together by Picciafuoco, Fioravanti, and Mangiameli, hosted by Mangiameli in Sicily. Furthermore, Fioravanti and Mambro supplied contradictory alibis, and were additionally contradicted by witnesses.

However, while prosecutors were moving after the NAR and Third Position neo-fascists, the P2-controlled SISMI structure tried to lead them in the wrong direction. On Sept. 1, 1980, the Repubblica press agency in Rome published an article criticizing the direction of the Bologna investigations. On Sept. 15, the magazine *Panorama* repeated the same critiques and suggested that an international connection be investigated. Both articles had been organized by Francesco Pazienza, who had become the real head of SISMI. According to Italian prosecutors, Francesco Pazienza, a businessman who had collaborated with French intelligence circles in the past, at the end of the 1970s was promoted by U.S. circles as the man who should replace Gelli as the head of the P2. Pazienza, by his own admission, reported to Michael Ledeen at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Simultaneously, Licio Gelli, in person, intervened in the weeks immediately preceding the Bologna massacre, with a SISDE official in Bologna "suggesting" to him that the



Michael Ledeen, the self-proclaimed “universal fascist” of the American Enterprise Institute, was reported to be the controller of P2’s Francesco Pazienza. It was Pazienza who spread the word, following the Bologna bombing, that the place to look for the culprits was not among the domestic neo-fascists, but rather abroad—e.g. in Lebanon. Investigations on that track eventually led to a dead-end.

international connection, and not the domestic neo-fascist one, was the right one.

The P2 strategy was sophisticated, because the international connection contained elements of truth; for instance, SISDE head Giulio Grassini, a P2 member, wrote a report on Oct. 2, indicating that the Italian terrorists had trained in Lebanon, together with German neo-Nazi groups, whose leader was Karl-Heinz Hoffmann. This report was credible, because eight weeks after the Bologna bombing, on Sept. 26, a member of Hoffmann’s group had blown himself up at the Oktoberfest in Munich, killing 12 others and wounding 215. A week later in Paris, a bomb in front of a synagogue had killed 4 persons and wounded 13. The action was claimed by the European National Fascists.

In this way, the idea that the Bologna massacre was part of a European-wide offensive of right-wing terrorism, “Euro-fascism,” was credible. The alleged source for the Lebanese connection, however, Palestinian leader Abu Ayad, was contradicted by the spokesman of the Falange. But the SISMI insisted on the connection, and on Jan. 23, 1981, supplied another report which identified the leader of the Italian neo-fascist group which had trained in Lebanon. Prosecutor Aldo Gentile travelled twice to Lebanon, without achieving any results, because his information was too vague.

It was not until 1985 that Colonel Giovannone, the head of the SISMI station in Lebanon, admitted that SISMI was perfectly aware that allegations of a “Lebanese connection” were inconsistent.

The P2 Tries To Set LaRouche Up

In November 1981, when the Lebanese connection had evaporated, the P2 started another cover-up. A neo-fascist arrested in Switzerland for common crimes, Elio Ciolini, demanded to be extradited to Italy, because he had information on the Bologna massacre. Initially, Ciolini reported to a Carabinieri official about an international terrorist cell, headed by Stefano delle Chiaie, responsible for several terrorist atrocities such as Piazza Fontana, Italicus, and Bologna, under the supervision of a secret freemasonic lodge, based in Montecarlo. Members of the Montecarlo Lodge were Licio Gelli, banker Roberto Calvi, Giulio Andreotti, but also FIAT owner Gianni Agnelli and Henry Kissinger.

The “Montecarlo connection” kept prosecutors busy until 1984, yielding only a loss of time and of image for the investigation.

Again, prosecutors were confronted with a mixture of true and false information. Ciolini had worked with delle Chiaie in Argentina, and his statements on delle Chiaie’s presence in Italy and France in June-July 1980 could be confirmed. But ultimately, it was discovered that Ciolini’s story had been prepared for him by a SISMI official!

Gen. Nino Lugaresi, who was appointed head of SISMI after P2 was discovered, declared in 1985: “Ciolini is one of the most brilliant members of Gelli’s staff . . . for the most part Ciolini’s entire activity seemed to me a successful cover-up activity, implemented to paralyze the investigations on the Bologna massacre.” And Lugaresi added: “Only the existence of some sort of connection between the authors of the massacre and the authors of the cover-up can explain such a behavior.”

Ciolini tried again, in 1990, to construct another false connection. This time, before prosecutor Grassi, he claimed that the mastermind of the Bologna massacre was “American neo-fascist Lyndon LaRoche [sic],” and that he learned about this during a stay at the Harriman Foundation, in the United States. This time, prosecutor Grassi did not bother to check Ciolini’s statements, and incriminated him right away.

This attempt, however, coinciding with the legal setup by a Virginia court against LaRouche and his associates in the United States,⁶ indicates that Ciolini—and his P2 controllers—are connected to the synarchist networks recently identified by LaRouche.

To be continued.

6. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., “The Night They Came To Kill Me,” *EIR*, March 12, 2004. See also *Railroad! U.S.A. vs. Lyndon LaRouche, et al.* (Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations: Washington, D.C., 1989).