

PART 2

The Triple Entente: Sealed with Iranian Blood

by Dean Andromidas

Part 1, “When Americans Fought for Iran’s Sovereignty,” which appeared in last week’s *EIR*, told the story of the American financial advisory mission to Persia led by W. Morgan Shuster in 1911. The group’s efforts to reorganize Persia’s finances so as to facilitate its economic development, under the authority of the recently organized Constitutional Government, became the focus of attack by the powers of the Triple Entente, led by Great Britain and including France and Russia. This led to a British-backed Russian invasion in 1911 to force Shuster’s ouster and crush the constitutional revolution. The events that transpired in Iran were intimately related to the strategic tensions caused by the anti-German Triple Entente, tensions that would ultimately lead to World War I. Indeed, many of the leading personalities who created the Triple Entente were involved in driving Shuster out of Persia, something he references in his memoir, *The Strangling of Persia*.¹

An appreciation of how the British Empire’s global policy was the driving force behind crushing Shuster and Persia’s constitutionalists will help to emphasize the crucial priority of confronting today’s Liberal Anglo-Dutch financial empire, if the United States hopes to create a fruitful relationship with today’s Iran.


1. W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia: A Story of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue* (New York: The Century Company, 1912); available at <http://www.archive.org/details/stranglingofpers00shusuoft>, and as a reprint from Mage Publishers of Washington, D.C., 2005.

An Alliance for War and Empire

President Abraham Lincoln’s defeat of the British-supported Confederacy made possible the unprecedented expansion of the industrial potential of the United States, including the completion of the first Transcontinental Railroad, which transformed the United States into a Pacific power, and therefore, a world power. Lincoln’s spectacularly successful implementation of the American System of political economy, premised on the rapid development of infrastructure, industry, and scientific-technological progress, behind protective tariff barriers, captured the imagination of statesmen and policymakers the world over. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck adopted this system for his policy of unifying Germany,² and transformed that country into the most powerful industrial economy in Europe. The same inspiration caused Russia’s most eminent statesman, Count Sergei Witte, to build the first transcontinental railroad across Eurasia, the Trans-Siberian, while Japan threw off the shackles of a feudal economy under the Meiji Restoration, to embark on the road of becoming Asia’s industrial powerhouse.

Seeing these developments threatening the very

2. Helga Zepp-LaRouche, “The American Roots of Germany’s Industrial Revolution,” *EIR*, Sept. 12, 2008. http://www.larouche.org/eiw/public/2008/2008_30-39/2008-37/pdf/38-55_3536.pdf



The Anglo-Russian Convention (1907) divided Persia between the British and Russian empires. This was one component of the Triple Entente, by means of which the British paved the road to World War I.

Iranian Historical Photograph Gallery, www.fouman.com

foundations of their empire, the British sought to crush this new policy. When Edward, Prince of Wales, ascended the throne in 1901 to become King of the United Kingdom and the Emperor of the Indian Empire, he began to implement a policy for world government drafted by Alfred Lord Milner and Cecil Rhodes, the success of which required the destruction of the American System. The British saw the danger where the American influence was greatest, in Germany and Russia, both of which had entertained the most friendly relations with the United States since the American Revolution. Their industrialization held out the promise of political reforms that would bind them even closer to the American republic.

Britain had secured the ouster of Bismarck as Germany's Chancellor in 1890. While Bismarck's departure predates relevant events in Persia, his absence had a profound effect on later international developments that crushed Persia's constitutional revolution. Bismarck's ouster deprived Germany and the world of the

only European statesman who could outwit the British. Bismarck saw Russia in much the same light as he saw the United States: as a potential political and economic ally, and therefore, in general, he sought good relations. After Bismarck's ouster, over the question of the renewal of German-Russian ties after a period of estrangement, Kaiser Wilhelm II and his advisors saw Russia at best as a target for manipulation to further their own schemes, or at worst a potential enemy. In Bismarck, the Kaiser lost his most astute advisor. Bismarck's absence was a loss for world peace and a boon for Great Britain.

Meanwhile, the ouster of Bismarck's Russian counterpart, Prime Minister Witte, in 1906, left the inept Tsar Nicholas II the object of intrigues by his evil and incompetent court flunkies. As with Bismarck, a key tenet of Witte's diplomacy was the maintenance of good relations with the United States; he also tried to create a European union among Russia, Germany, and France, aimed at continental economic development instead of



National Archives

The ouster of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (above) in 1890, and then of Russian Prime Minister Sergei Witte (right) in 1906, were British coups to knock out the only two statesmen who could have blocked their drive for war in Europe. Both men were advocates of “American System” economic policies—a mortal threat to the British Empire.



yield her dominating position in the world to the mighty empires which are rising beyond the seas. . . .”

He went on to explain his proposal to the Kaiser:

“Your Majesty, picture a Europe which does not waste most of its blood and treasure on competition between individual countries, which does not maintain millions of soldiers for internecine wars, which is not an armed camp with each country pitted against its neighbor, a Europe which is, in brief, one body politic . . . it would be much richer, and more vigorous, and more cultured; and Europe, instead of withering under the burden of strife, would become truly the mistress of the world. To achieve this ideal we must seek to create a solid union of Russia, Germany, and France. Once these countries are firmly united, all the other states of the European Continent will, no doubt, join the central alliance and thus form an all embracing continental confederation, which will

internecine warfare. Both men avoided entangling alliances, while seeking cooperation to prevent wars.

free Europe from the burden of internecine competition and establish its domination over the world for many years to come.”³

Count Witte and the Kaiser

In 1897, Kaiser Wilhelm II proposed to Witte something Bismarck would never have countenanced: an economic war against the United States, by uniting all of Europe, including Britain, behind a high tariff wall. Witte answered that an economic war against the United States would not succeed, because all European nations would not agree to it, and, as for Russia, “we would be loath to embrace His Majesty’s viewpoint, for the reason that ever since the American Revolutionary War we had been on the best of terms with the United States of America and that we did not intend to quarrel with that country.”

Witte then began to expound his own views, as he describes in his memoirs: “After referring to the unbreakable tie which exists between political prestige and economic power, I declared to His Majesty that, among the countries of the World, Europe seemed to me like a decrepit old woman. Unless radical change is brought about, I went on, Europe would soon have to

With statesmen of Witte’s genius, such a continental confederation would seek its natural partner in the world’s other leading transcontinental power, the United States. The British answer to this threat was to engineer the Triple Entente with France and Russia, against Germany, which would bring political forces inimical to the United States to the fore in each of these countries.

Not a formal alliance, it comprised the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France (1904) and the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907). The former was made possible through the ouster in 1898 of French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux, who was the French statesman most open to Witte’s concept of a European confederation; he was replaced by the Anglophile and Germanophobe Théophile Delcassé. The Entente Cordiale’s aim was to secure Anglo-French interests in Africa,

3. *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, trans. Abraham Yarmolinsky (New York: Doubleday, 1921; Russian edition first published in 1912).

Asia, and the Pacific. In North Africa, the French conceded British preeminence in Egypt, while Britain supported France's designs for a protectorate in Morocco. Berlin rightly saw the Entente as directed against Germany—not only in Africa, but more importantly, in Europe. The result was the Moroccan crisis of 1905, which almost led to war when both the German and French armies were mobilized. That crisis was resolved primarily due to the behind-the-scenes intervention of Witte; but it drove France even more tightly into the arms of Britain.

'Philandering with England'

Since France already had an alliance with Russia, Delcassé played a crucial role in bringing Russia into Britain's Triple Entente. But this was no easy task, since Russia and Britain had been bitter rivals in Central Asia, where their empires collided at Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Russia had to be weakened, which was made possible by the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, whereby Britain put Japan on the road to war against Russia. The sidelining of Witte in 1903 brought to power the most reactionary element in Russia, which more than willingly fell into Britain's trap, going to war with Japan in 1904, and suffering a catastrophic defeat in 1905. This defeat occurred in the midst of a revolution in Russia, which broke out in January 1905. Count Witte was recalled, and led the successful peace talks at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, returning to Russia to be named Prime Minister. After that, he implemented political reforms in the face of stiff opposition from the reactionaries, who were also supporters of an Anglo-Russian entente. Witte was ousted in 1906, and replaced by Pyotr Stolypin, whose reactionary regime reversed all of Witte's reforms and, in 1907, signed the Anglo-Russian Convention that divided Persia between the two empires.⁴

This convention was nominally aimed at resolving Anglo-Russian disputes in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, detailing how the two empires would regulate their relations in these three states (see Part 1). This Convention, along with the Entente Cordiale between France and Great Britain, and the Franco-Russian alliance, committed the three allies to support one another in potential conflicts almost anywhere around the

globe—notably the Balkans, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, North Africa, and Europe. It also laid the basis for the dividing up of the Ottoman Empire, where Constantinople and the Dardanelles would go to Russia, and the Arab regions would be divided between Britain and France. These would later be defined in the secret treaties during and after World War I, the most infamous being the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain. Above all, these alliances were aimed against Germany; only a pretext was required to ignite a world war.

Witte, who saw formal alliances as potentially deadly entrapments, opposed the Anglo-Russian Convention. In his memoirs, he recalls that on his return from Portsmouth in 1905, during a stopover in Paris, such an entente was proposed by the Russian diplomat Stanislaw Poklewski-Koziell, who was not only a minister in the Russian Embassy in London, but also a personal friend of King Edward VII. In 1911, he would be on the scene in Tehran as one of Morgan Shuster's primary adversaries. While in Paris, Witte also met the Anglophile Russian Ambassador to Paris, Alexander Izvolsky, who made an even more forceful proposition for an Anglo-Russian entente. Two years later, Izvolsky would become foreign minister, and would sign the Anglo-Russian Convention.

In Witte's view, an entente would damage Russia's relations with Germany and complicate relations with France, by entangling it with Anglo-French schemes. By demarcating British and Russian spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, it would undermine Russian freedom of action. It would turn Russia into the policeman of Persia.

Witte wrote in his memoirs:

"In September 1907, Russia and Great Britain concluded a treaty relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The agreement inaugurated the policy of philandering with England. Since we did not give up our traditional flirting with Germany, the situation became rather ambiguous. At present we are trying to adjust ourselves to it by assuring Germany that, of course, we love her best and that we are flirting England merely for appearance's sake, while to England we say the reverse. I believe we shall soon have to pay for our duplicity.

"The rapprochement with England, the ally of France, who is our own ally, has resulted in the formation of a triple Entente, as opposed to the triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The history of the Entente is as follows: On my way from Portsmouth,

4. For a more detailed review of the Anglo-Russian Convention, see Rachel and Allen Douglas, "Dealing with Russia: As in 1907, Wrong Again," *EIR*, Feb. 17, 2006.

I stopped in Paris and met there, among other people, Kozell Poklevski, first secretary to our Embassy in London. He brought me an invitation from King Edward to pay him a visit, but I could not accept it without my Monarch's express permission, which I failed to obtain. At the same our ambassador in Paris, Izvolsky, submitted to me a project of an arrangement with Great Britain, substantially identical with the one which was later actually concluded. I asked Kozell Poklevski to inform the King that should I, on my return to Russia, assume the governmental power, I would use all my influence to establish friendly relations with Great Britain. I added, however, that I was decidedly opposed to the idea of concluding the treaty sketched to me by Izvolsky, for the reason that it was best for us not to tie ourselves down by treaties. I feared that an agreement with Great Britain would arouse the jealousy of Germany. As a result, we would perhaps be forced into making an agreement with that country, too, and be cheated in the end. It was owing to my opposition that the agreement was not concluded before 1907.

"The agreement was a triumph of British diplomacy. It dealt chiefly with Persia. The northern part of that country, which includes its most fertile and thickly populated sections, had, from times immemorial, been within our sphere of influence. With the conquests of the Southern parts of the Caucasus, formerly provinces of Persia and Turkey, the Northern part of Persia was naturally destined, so to speak, to become a part of the Russian Empire. To prepare that eventuality, we sacrificed a great deal of our blood and treasure. The agreement set all these sacrifices at naught. According to it, Southern Persia was to be under the economic influence of Great Britain, while the North was left to us. As for Persia's central government, it was to be controlled by Russia and Great Britain, acting jointly. Since Tehran, the seat of the Central Government, is situated in the North, this meant British influence in the North as well as in the South.

"Russia has no annexationist designs upon Afghanistan. We are merely interested in preserving its status quo as a buffer state between Russia and British India. True, the agreement provided for the preservation of this status quo, but it stipulated that the country should be under exclusive influence and protection of Great Britain, so that we were not even allowed to have our diplomatic representative there. This meant that all our negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan were

to be conducted through the British Authorities. Under these circumstances the buffer became something in the nature of a loaded gun pointed at us. In Tibet, the contracting parties obligated themselves not to introduce any mission or troops. We also renounced all claims to the Southern Persian ports.

"The agreement was concluded without regard to the claims of other Powers upon Persia. As early as 1904, the German Government, in the person of Von Buelow, complained to me that we were hindering the freedom of importing German goods to Persia. In 1911, we concluded an agreement with Germany to connect the railroads of Northern Persia with the German Baghdad line and also to give her a free hand in Northern Persia with regard to her imports. In sum, what have we achieved? By signing the agreement with Great Britain we made it impossible for us to annex Persia politically, and by entering into an agreement with Germany we lost Persia economically, for economic competition with Germany under equal conditions means certain defeat for us. In a word, Persia has slipped out of our hands. At present [1912], we can play there merely the part of policeman, until the native Government grows strong enough to restore order."

Russia: Villain or Victim?

Just as the British and the Russians used loans as a means of gaining control of Persia, so the British used loans to manipulate Russia into the Anglo-Russian Convention and Triple Entente. The aim was to turn Russia into Britain's marcher lord against Germany, as well as doing the dirty work of crushing the Persian constitutional revolution, which had turned to American advisors to help it build its nation. In the end, the Russian Empire itself would be the victim of the policy, as it would soon disappear after 1917. The American author Herbert Feis, in his work *Europe: The World's Banker, 1870-1914*, masterfully develops how this process unfolded.⁵

While Russia was itself an imperial power, it was fully dependent on foreign capital to build its railroads, its industrial infrastructure, its army, and to finance its government budget. While the sources would be capital markets of Berlin, Paris, and London, and would shift among the various cities as political alliances shifted,


5. Herbert Feis, *Europe: The World's Banker: 1870-1914* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1930).

these same markets comprised what Lyndon LaRouche has called an “Anglo-Dutch Liberal financial system,” which was more powerful than the nations in which they were domiciled. Upon close examination, one finds London to be dominant, as the case of the Rothschilds shows.

Until the end of the 1880s, Berlin had been Russia’s principal source of credit, but the ouster of Bismarck in 1890 virtually choked off loans from Germany. Meanwhile, anti-German, Anglophile circles in France were more than willing to offer loans, as a means of gaining Russia as an ally against Germany.

Thus began an entente that married an insatiable Russian appetite for capital, with the insatiable desire of the war faction in France, and later Britain, to destroy Germany. By 1914, France held no less than 80% of Russian foreign debt and fully one-third of all foreign investments in Russia.

Seeing Russia as its great rival in Asia, the British had not provided credit to Russia; but with the emergence of the Triple Entente, this changed. In the Russo-Japanese War, the capital markets of Paris had financed Russia’s failed war effort, while London had financed Japan’s victory. Even before the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed in 1905, ending the war, Britain made overtures to cash-strapped Russia, which had been weakened by the war with Japan and its 1905 Revolution, prodding it to float a loan in London, while also broaching the question of an Anglo-Russian entente. Witte, who negotiated both the Portsmouth Treaty and this loan consortium, was more than willing to take London’s money, but not its invitation for a formal alliance. In fact, Witte had tried to organize a New York-London-Berlin-Paris consortium, to negate the inevitable political strings attached to such a loan. But the withdrawal of J.P Morgan of New York and Berlin, forced Russia into dependence on the Franco-British Entente Cordiale. As shown above, Witte clearly opposed the Anglo-Russian Convention; but by 1906, Russia needed money, which London was willing to give—at the price of an alliance. In April 1906, a new loan agreement was negotiated, but it was not finalized until the ouster of



British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey candidly told Parliament that in dividing up Persia with the Russians, Britain got the better deal.

Witte in May of the same year.

As Feis wrote, “It marked the encouraging advancement of a project of understanding which embodied in the Anglo Russian agreement of 1907. It signified the evolution into intimacy of the Triple Entente.”⁶ After the 1906 loan, British capital began to pour into Russian banks, industries, oil fields, and mines, such that by 1914, one-quarter of foreign investment in Russia and 14% of its foreign debt was controlled by London.

This created an interesting irony: While Russia was taking aggressive and brutal steps to swallow the Persian economy, as Feis writes, Britain,

without the deployment of one British dragoon, was taking over the rich Baku oil fields, to the point that, by 1914, London controlled three-quarters of the Russian oil trade and half of the country’s oil production.

After British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey secured the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August 1907, there was much commentary at the time, both in Britain and the United States, that Russia had gotten the better end of the deal. Lord George Curzon complained in Parliament that the Russian sphere was the more valuable part of Persia. Defending the convention, Grey declared that it was “strategic,” not “economic.” In a comment that only confirmed Witte’s assessment, Grey said, “On paper it was an equal bargain. The part of Persia by which India could be approached was made secure from Russian penetration. The part of Persia by which Russia could be approached was made secure from British penetration.” Nonetheless, he argued: “In practice we gave up nothing. We did not wish to pursue a forward policy in Persia. Nor could a British advance in Persia have been the same menace to Russia that a Russian advance in Persia might have been to India.”⁷

As already noted, the ouster of Witte in May 1906, brought to power in Russia men fully committed to the designs of Edward VII, all of whom were to play a role

6. *Ibid.*

7. Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

in destroying Persia's Constitutional Government and sabotaging Shuster's intervention.

A brief sketch of the dramatis personae is presented here:

Pyotr Stolypin was the reactionary who reversed every reform put forward by Witte, and implemented a reign of terror until his own assassination in September 1911. Foreign affairs were put in the hands of **Alexander Izvolsky**, a dyed-in-the-wool Anglophile, until he was replaced as foreign minister by the even more evil **Sergei Sazonov**, Stolypin's brother-in-law, in September 1910.

A former minister in London, Sazonov, as foreign minister, has been credited as being one of the principal contributors to triggering World War I, by his decision for an early and provocative mobilization of the Russian Army. Here is what Witte wrote of Sazonov:

"In his youth Sazonov is said to have been intimate with Zhelyabov, the assassin of Alexander II. At one time, he wrote for the radical press, but when the revolution came, he found it profitable to join the extreme reactionaries...." Sazonov "became especially intimate" with the infamous Grigori Rasputin, Witte wrote, adding, "When visiting St. Petersburg, Rasputin stayed with Sazonov, who gradually assumed the role of a circus sideshow manager demonstrating an outlandish prodigy to an avid public. High-born ladies would come to see him at Sazonov's house. Naturally, Sazonov became a personage of importance himself, for Rasputin wielded, and probably still wields, an enormous influence at the Court."



State Radishchev Art Museum, Saratov

Russia's reactionary Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin (1906-11) reversed every reform that his predecessor, Count Witte, had implemented. Painting by Ilya Repin.



Russian Ambassador in Tehran Nicholas Hartwig and his wife, with Russian Cossack Colonel Liakhof (right). Hartwig and a British official threatened Persia with Russian military intervention, which began in June 1911.

Following the assassination of Stolypin on Sept. 11, 1911 by a "revolutionary" who was also a secret service agent, Sazonov was replaced by **Vladimir Kokovtzev**, another opponent of Witte, who was no better than his predecessor.

Then there was **Nicolas Genrikhovich Hartwig**, who served as Russian Ambassador in Tehran between 1906 and 1908, where he implemented the first phase of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Hartwig was a rabid slavophile, who served as Russian Ambassador to Serbia 1909-14. It was his policy that brought Serbia into direct conflict with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and he is considered to have been one of the key provocateurs who ignited World

War I. It will be recalled (from Part 1) that Hartwig, while Ambassador to Serbia, helped to coordinate the return of Mohammad Ali Shah to overthrow the Persian government and the Majlis (national assembly), and the ouster of Morgan Shuster in 1911.

Stanislaw Poklewski-Kozell, cited by Witte above, was said to have been personal friends with Edward VII, and apparently a man of some financial means, who supported Izvolsky financially. In 1911, he was Russian minister in Tehran, where he coordinated operations against Shuster.


On the British side, in 1905, **Sir Edward Grey**, who was at the center of the Milner imperialist group, became Foreign Secretary. The ambassador in St. Petersburg was **Sir Arthur Nicolson**, who served there from 1906 to 1910, and was one

of the chief architects of, and a signatory to, the Anglo-Russian Convention. In 1910, he was promoted to Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, where he supervised the policy that ousted Shuster. Sir Arthur's son **Harold Nicolson**, who was born in Tehran when his father served as minister at the British legation in 1886, also joined the diplomatic service, serving between 1925 and 1927 in Tehran, where he was involved in placing the Cossack officer Reza Khan on the throne, thus creating the Pahlavi dynasty.

Last but not least was **Cecil Spring Rice**, who served in Tehran between 1906 and 1908, to implement the policy on the ground, with Hartwig and later Koziell-Poklevski. Prior to serving in Tehran, Sir Cecil served in Washington, where he established a close relationship with Theodore Roosevelt; later he was British Ambassador to Washington, between 1913 and 1918.

These, then, were among the principal personages lined up for a world war that would destroy Germany and bring the United States under British domination. Where did the United States stand? The assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, as LaRouche has pointed out, was a turning point. He was the last "American System" President until Franklin D. Roosevelt. McKinley was replaced by his Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt, a thorough-going Anglophile. Then came Woodrow Wilson, the Ku Klux Klan lover who brought America into World War I on the British side—"the war to end all wars."

Nevertheless, the United States, by and large, stayed aloof from the affairs discussed in this article, maintaining its traditional policy of avoiding "entanglements" in European affairs until world war broke out. It was this, and the continued "underground" existence of American System factions in U.S. policymaking circles, that allowed the Shuster mission to Persia to take place, with the encouragement of members of the Administration of President William Howard Taft, even though the Shuster mission was ostensibly "private."



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Addendum: A Reminder from John Quincy Adams

Many Americans at the time, such as Shuster, fully believed in what John Quincy Adams had told Congress on July 4, 1821: that the United States "has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart. She has seen that probably for centuries to come, all the contests of that Aeldama, the European World, will be contests between inveterate power, and emerging right. Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause, by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example."

These words have been interpreted as a call for neutrality by a country that did not possess the military strength to challenge the empires of Europe. But nothing could be further from the truth, because the issue was a fundamental principle that, if not adhered to, would put the United States in great danger of self-destruction.

Adams continued: "She [the United States] well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself, beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force. The frontlet upon her brows would no longer beam with the ineffable splendor of freedom and independence; but in its stead would soon be substituted an imperial diadem, flashing in false and tarnished lustre the murky radiance of dominion and power. She might become the dictatress of the world: she would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit."

In contrast, Adams concludes, "Her march is the march of mind. She has a spear and a shield; but the motto upon her shield is Freedom, Independence, Peace."

The Obama Administration, coming after the "exporting democracy" catastrophe of the Bush-Cheney years, would serve the American people well by taking Adams' advice.