

The First Chapter of the Trust

The Lockhart Plot

by Allen and Rachel Douglas

Editor's note:

This article originates with Executive Intelligence Review's ongoing investigation into the collaboration of oligarchs in the East and the West, known as "the Trust." The episode it recounts, the so-called Lockhart Plot of 1918, has been a subject of mystery, of obfuscation, and cover-stories ever since it happened. We believe that this is the most fruitful, comprehensive examination of the story in all those 70 years. It is also timely, since it concerns the birth of the Soviet secret police, whose status as the dominant power in the Soviet state has just been reinforced in the September-October 1988 leadership changes.

The article is bound to provoke new controversy in intelligence circles, which we and the authors welcome, because the matters involved are of cardinal importance for many nations' security today. One British intelligence specialist, briefed on this article's finding that famed British superspy Sidney Reilly was working for the Soviets already in 1918, exclaimed, "It would be extraordinary! . . . If you move that particular counter, to turn Reilly into a double agent from an early stage, then an awful lot of other things begin to look rather funny, I think. . . . One would have to add [British Intelligence Russian affairs chief] Captain Boyce onto the plot. . . . It, it, it, it, just doesn't make sense!"

Seventy years ago, in the summer of 1918, the events took place in Soviet Russia, that have gone down in history as "the Lockhart Plot." The aftershocks of that episode—in which Western intelligence operatives, associated with the celebrated British secret agent Sidney Reilly, are supposed to have tried to overthrow the young Bolshevik regime—have continued as tremors in historiography, both in and outside the U.S.S.R., all the way down to the present. Yet many students of the period, and of the Soviet and Western agencies involved, will agree that the dust has still not settled from the Lockhart affair.

It is not just a matter for the history books, because this case centers on the relationship between the Soviet secret services and political circles in the West, which is still of great strategic importance today.

The present article treats some of the unsolved mysteries of 1918, and some not so mysterious aspects that have been systematically submerged, especially in Soviet historiog-

raphy, because they bear on questions of strategic evaluation that are very much alive today. For two of the most important intelligence files of the twentieth century, "The Trust" and "Kim Philby," the Lockhart Plot is crucial prehistory.

The Trust, the penetration/deception operation run by the OGPU's counterintelligence section (*Kontrarazvedyvatelny otdel*, or KRO) from 1921 to 1927, regrouped many of the people who had been involved in the Lockhart affair, half a decade before.¹ These included: Sidney Reilly, Boris Savinkov, SIS Russian affairs chief Commander Ernest Boyce, A. A. Yakushev, Opperput, Reilly's associate Aleksandr Grammatikov, 1918 Petrograd Cheka-Criminel chief V.G. Orlov, and others. This carry-over of personnel, before we even come to the question of methods and procedures, already argues for dating the first chapter of the Trust saga not in 1921, but in the summer of 1918, with the Lockhart Plot.

There is also continuity of personnel from the Lockhart Plot into the Cambridge/Oxford-spawned spy rings of Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt, Donald Maclean, et al. Already in the late 1930s, former Soviet military intelligence chief for Western Europe Walter Krivitsky remarked about Sidney Reilly, a central protagonist in the Lockhart Plot: "You know the agent Reilly. It was his information which enabled us to penetrate the British network."² If there are indications, beyond Krivitsky's assertion, that the Trust of the 1920s fed straight into the Philby ring, then proper British counterintelligence must also begin not with the Cambridge communist circles of the 1930s, but with the personalities and operating methods of the Lockhart Plot/Trust period, 1918 to 1927.³

Understanding the roots of the Trust is of great importance today, because its methods are still operational. The Trust deception was organized around a theme that is all too familiar now, during the fad of *glasnost*: The alleged anti-Soviet opposition, which in reality was almost entirely a fabrication of the Soviet intelligence services, preached that there was something new, something bold growing up in Russia, which was quite antithetical to communism and must be supported from the outside.⁴ Moscow's international propaganda and diplomatic campaign, on the virtues of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, echoes the line spread by the Trust six decades ago.⁵

It is not simply a question of clever Soviet deception. Many of the Western intelligence staffers and Russian emigre figures involved with the Trust during the 1920s were not victims of Soviet trickery, but witting participants in the affair, who exhibited enthusiasm for the message they helped their Cheka (Soviet secret police) counterparts spread, about the exciting new order emerging in Bolshevik Russia. This goes to the heart of the matter: aid and abetment of Bolshevism from abroad, and the special relationship between a powerful faction of the intelligence community and political elite in the West, especially Britain, and the Bolshevik regime. Indeed, one British author recently concluded that “there is no evidence to suggest that, except in very detailed areas, matters would have been very different had the moles loyally served the Crown rather than Stalin,” and that the confluence of interests between certain circles in Britain and the Bolsheviks was so great that “it becomes difficult to condemn Stalin’s Englishmen and women as evil and sinister subversives. Indeed, subversion itself becomes a questionable term.”⁶ This special relationship is the “purloined letter” of the Philby case, as it was of the Trust—and, as this article will show, of the Lockhart Plot before that.

Shared aims

In the Lockhart Plot, the appearance is that British Secret Intelligence Service personalities were trying to overthrow the Soviet regime in its infancy, but their efforts came to naught due to penetration of the conspiracy by the Cheka. Careful perusal of published accounts and archival material, however, points to a conclusion that the SIS men, particularly Robert Bruce Lockhart, Boyce, Reilly, Savinkov, and Captain George Hill, were not tricked by a wily Cheka, but were witting collaborators of a faction in the young Soviet intelligence service—which British SIS, through Hill’s work, had actually helped to found.

They shared an immediate purpose with that Soviet faction, namely to break the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and get Russia back into World War I. The British were also concerned to establish long-term capabilities in Soviet Russia, building wherever possible on the pre-war assets of British SIS inside various Russian institutions and political parties. To a powerful faction within the British elite (and not only there—it had co-thinkers in Venice, in Germany, and elsewhere), the Bolsheviks in power represented a long-sought weapon, a battering-ram to smash sovereign nations and help clear the way for a new world order, a New Age.

As for Sidney Reilly, there is excellent reason to think that he was a Soviet agent—as was charged by American intelligence officials at the time—from this point on.

From 1918 until 1965, the story of the Lockhart Plot, promulgated in Soviet sources and basically accepted in the West, was that a group of Western intelligence operatives, of whom Reilly was the most active, plotted to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.⁷ With funding from special emissary Lockhart, these agents tried in August 1918 to bribe the commanders of the Bolsheviks’ praetorian guard, the Latvian rifle troops assigned to Kremlin security. Sometime in

September, the Letts were to have arrested the Soviet government, including Lenin, while an uprising of “White Guardists” and disaffected socialists overthrew the regime. But, the version went, the loyalty of Latvian guard commander Eduard Berzin and leaks from a French journalist betrayed the plot to Feliks Dzerzhinsky’s Cheka. Then, on August 30, 1918, the murder of Petrograd Cheka chief Uritsky and a nearly successful assassination attempt on Lenin forced a premature end of the plot, as the Cheka detained Lockhart and other key planners.

Two revolutions in the historiography of the Lockhart Plot and of Reilly occurred in the past 25 years. In 1965, the Soviets announced that the Letts with whom Lockhart and Reilly were dealing had been Chekists all along.⁸ The Latvian officer Shmidken, previously identified as Lockhart’s agent, was revealed to be a Chekist named Jan Buikis.⁹ Dzerzhinsky had assigned him and Jan Sprogis to mingle with ex-officers’ organizations. They established contact with Reilly through the British naval attache in Petrograd, F.N.A. Cromie, and secured an introduction to Lockhart, then carried out Dzerzhinsky’s scheme of sending Berzin to Lockhart and Reilly. This revised history came full circle, back to the boast blurted out by Cheka deputy chief Yakov Peters in *Izvestia* of September 5, 1918, that “the VChK resorted to the arrangement of a fictitious plot” (words subsequently denounced by Soviet sources as a case of misreporting). From the moment of Berzin’s meeting with Lockhart, as one Soviet author put it, “the Lockhart Plot was as if covered by a glass dome” by the Cheka.¹⁰

In 1971, Professor Richard Debo drew out the implication of this revelation, namely that the Lockhart Plot was a provocation, run by the Cheka from the outset.¹¹ In 1985, American authors William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley used new discoveries from the U.S. National Archives to highlight Reilly’s role in the provocation, writing that Reilly “operated for both the British and the VChK.”¹²

A second upheaval in historiography was the 1987 book by Robin Bruce Lockhart, the son of Robert Bruce Lockhart, *Reilly: The First Man*. Whereas his 1967 *Reilly: Ace of Spies*, widely popularized in paperback and in a TV version, had portrayed Reilly as a White knight tilting against the Reds for mastery of Russia, Robin Bruce Lockhart now wrote that Reilly, at least from the time of his 1925 return to Russia under the auspices of the Trust, was a leading figure in the Soviet secret service.

Robin Bruce Lockhart did not, however, take Reilly’s Cheka history back to 1918. He even singled out for attack, “the theory . . . that the ‘Lockhart Plot’ was a set-up planned jointly by Dzerzhinsky and Reilly,” and the idea “that Reilly was a double agent, working for the Soviets from the early days of the Revolution. . . .”¹³ As we shall see, to lift the veil from over Reilly’s 1918 activities, forces the question of collaboration by other British intelligence figures, close to Reilly, with the Cheka. Lockhart, the son of one of them, evidently did not wish to explore this.

But if some British circles are sensitive about these matters, the Soviets are nearly hysterical; for 70 years, some

of the chief figures of the Lockhart Plot—such as Vladimir G. Orlov, Aleksandr Grammatikov, and Captain George Hill—have been non-persons in Soviet accounts.

The setting

The stage was set for the Lockhart Plot, by the March 3, 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, between the German government and the shaky young Soviet regime. It took Russia out of World War I, allowing Germany to transfer troops from the Eastern front to the Western. The German Army gained access to the vast grain and raw materials resources of the Ukraine.

Lenin argued that, repugnant though the territorial concessions to Germany might be, Soviet Russia had to secure the *peredyshka* (breathing spell) in order to consolidate Soviet power. To continue the war, he said, would mean the certain end of the Bolshevik Revolution. Among the Bolshevik leaders who bitterly opposed Lenin's policy were the leader of the Left Communists, Nikolai Bukharin; secret police chief Feliks Dzerzhinsky; and Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky, soon to be commander-in-chief of the Red Army, whose theory of "permanent revolution" went out the window with the Brest peace.¹⁴ Lenin's threat to resign from the party, if the treaty were not concluded and ratified, forced it through.

The Brest Treaty was a disaster for the British government, headed at this time by Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Hoping to avert such a development, Lloyd George's War Cabinet, at the behest of its powerful member Lord Alfred Milner, had dispatched Robert Bruce Lockhart to Russia in January 1918, to establish contact with Lenin's government.¹⁵ The assignment given Lockhart, in his own words, was "to do as much harm to the Germans as possible, to put a spoke in the wheels of the separate peace negotiation and to stiffen by whatever means . . . the Bolshevik resistance to German demands."¹⁶

By the time the treaty was finalized, military developments lent new urgency to Lockhart's mission. During the first months of 1918, even before Brest-Litovsk, German troops already began to transfer to the Western front. On March 21, 1918, German forces in France under Gen. Erich Ludendorff, reinforced by 35 divisions drawn from the former Eastern front, launched one of the greatest military offensives in history. The British Fifth Army, which bore the brunt of the assault, suffered over 120,000 casualties. On April 25, British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour summarized the situation: "The British War Cabinet have now further considered the general military problem before the Allies, and have reached the conclusion that it is essential to treat Europe and Asia . . . as a single front. The transfer of German divisions from east to west is still continuing and, under present conditions, can be further continued, and it is imperative to stop this movement if it can possibly be done. Germany can now draw food and raw materials from Asia. . . . It thus becomes of the greatest urgency to re-establish an Allied front in Russia. . . . The Allies must, of course, avoid taking sides in Russian politics, and, if the

Bolshevist government will cooperate in resisting Germany, it seems necessary to act with them as the de facto Russian Government. Trotsky, at least, has for some time shown signs of recognizing that cooperation with the Allies is the only hope of freeing Russia from the Germans. . . ."¹⁷

In the four months after Brest-Litovsk, the Germans drove the Allies back to within 40 miles of Paris, inflicting over one million casualties. A British War Office policy memorandum written in late June, captured the desperation for a second front: "Unless Allied intervention is undertaken in Siberia forthwith we have no chance of being ultimately victorious, and shall incur serious risk of defeat in the meantime."¹⁸

Inside Russia, British special emissary Lockhart was in constant contact with Trotsky, who had never reconciled himself to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. With hopes pinned on Trotsky, Lockhart had been confident that a "holy war" would be declared by the Bolsheviks against German imperialism. Typical was Lockhart's wire to his government on March 5, two days *after* the treaty had been signed (but not yet ratified): "I had a long interview with Trotsky this morning. He informed me that in a few days the Government will go to Moscow to prepare for the Congress [of Soviets] on the 12th. At the Congress holy war will probably be declared or rather such action will be taken as will make a declaration of war on Germany's part inevitable."¹⁹

Although set back by the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the Special Congress of Soviets on March 15, neither Lockhart nor the "holy war" faction of the Bolsheviks gave up on getting Russia back into the war. Their parallel and joint efforts became known to history as the Lockhart Plot.

Lockhart, Reilly, and Hill

The British personnel in Soviet Russia during 1918 had experience in Russian affairs and in cultivating multiple options in a complex Russian political situation. Besides government emissary Lockhart, British intelligence agents on the scene included Sidney G. Reilly and Capt. George A. Hill.

Lockhart's first posting to Russia was in 1911, as British vice-consul in Moscow. In 1915-17, he was the acting British consul-general in Moscow. He prepared the famous January 1917 visit of Lord Milner to Russia. Lockhart was openly sympathetic to politicians who proposed to topple the Tsar, like Moscow Mayor Chelnokov and Prince Georgi Lvov, head of the League of Municipalities (Zemstvo Union). Lord Milner met these two, just days after each had given a speech in favor of revolution; in the charged political atmosphere of that time, the meeting was understood as an endorsement of their call.²⁰ After the February Revolution, Lockhart commented about the new leaders of Russia, "Prince Lvoff, the Prime Minister, was my intimate friend. With most of the others, I had been in close contact for the past two years."²¹ Lockhart's intimacy with the opponents of the Tsar was notorious; even a Soviet KGB author has written

that Lockhart, during the war, “worked against Britain’s ally, Russia.”²²

Sent back to Russia by Milner in January 1918, Lockhart plunged into his new duties with vigor. He frequently met not only Trotsky, but Lenin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin, and other top Bolsheviks. His dispatches to London revealed enthusiasm for the new regime.

Sidney Reilly, born Sidney Georgevich Rosenblum near Odessa, knew Russia from extensive work there before the war, which apparently included service in the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, simultaneous with his SIS duties.²³

While Lockhart played for advantage among the Bolshevik factions, Reilly appeared to arrive on a different track. After Brest-Litovsk, he was sent to Russia in May 1918 with the brief, “to expedite the fall of the Soviet government.”²⁴ But Reilly slipped into intimate contact with the upper echelons of the Bolshevik leadership, as easily as Lockhart had done. For him, this presented no problems, since his own views on Bolshevism, expressed later in a letter to Lockhart, were favorable: “[Bolshevism] is bound by a process of evolution to conquer the world, as Christianity and the ideas of the French Revolution have done before it, and . . . nothing . . . can stem its ever-rising tide. . . . [T]he much decried and so little understood ‘Soviets’ which are the outward expression of Bolshevism . . . are the nearest approach, I know of, to a real democracy based upon true social justice and that they may be destined to lead the world to the highest idea of statesmanship—Internationalism.”²⁵

Reilly’s passport was provided by the unofficial Soviet representative in London, Maxim Litvinov.²⁶

When Reilly arrived in Moscow on May 7, 1918, his first move was to look up Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, one of Lenin’s closest collaborators and the head of the Administration Office of the Council of People’s Commissars, i.e. the Soviet government. Bonch-Bruyevich was hardly inexperienced in security matters; from December 4, 1917 he had directed the Petrograd Soviet’s special Committee for Combatting Pogroms. One of the committee’s functions was to foil anti-Soviet conspiracies, on which it worked parallel with the rapidly developing Cheka, until March 1918.²⁷

By approximately May, the two strands of British policy—Lockhart’s friendly cultivation of the Bolsheviks and Reilly’s supposed mission to overthrow them—came together. That is the month in which Lockhart, despairing of enticing the Bolsheviks to rejoin the war, is usually reported to have begun plots to overthrow his erstwhile close friends. By May 17, he was in contact with Boris Savinkov, whose anti-Soviet Union for the Defense of Motherland and Freedom (Soyuz zashchity rodiny i svobody—SZRiS) had been broken up shortly before. The Cheka soon began to take note of his activities.²⁸

A third British intelligence man in Moscow at that time, Captain George Hill, left memoirs that shed some light on the multiple levels of British policy toward and relations with the Bolsheviks. Hill is the man almost entirely erased from Soviet accounts of the period.

A collaborator of both Reilly and Lockhart, Hill was to become an extraordinarily important figure in British-Soviet relations, both in 1918 and during World War II. Son of a merchant who operated in Russia and the Levant, Hill as a boy had not only mastered many languages, but gotten a thorough acquaintance with revolutionary circles in Russia. The young Hill smuggled literature from the Bolshevik Maxim Gorky to England. The Hill family also maintained contact with the Okhrana.²⁹

George Hill was in Russia on assignment from the British War Office, to run operations against the Germans and, by any means necessary, to bring Russia back into the war. Since the Bolshevik coup, he had been helping the Central Railway Control Board run the Soviet rail system.³⁰ Hill described his assignment and activities in 1918 as follows: “The British Government had not made up its mind what attitude to adopt towards the Bolsheviks. By my own department I was instructed to keep in touch with them, bearing in mind that they might come in on the Allied side. I therefore took an early opportunity of calling on M. Trotsky at the War Office. Trotsky knew all about the work I had been doing and received me well.”³¹

Red Army chief Trotsky offered this British Intelligence agent more than a polite reception. As Hill recorded, “After our first talk he appointed me ‘Inspector of Aviation,’ and I was given extensive powers in that department. . . . I was to give Trotsky advice on the formation of a new air force. Two or three times a week I would spend half an hour with him. . . .”³²

Besides building a Soviet air force, Hill took on other projects: “. . . I helped the Bolshevik military headquarters to organize an Intelligence Section. . . . Secondly, I organized a Bolshevik counterespionage section to spy on the German secret service and Missions in Petrograd and Moscow. . . . We deciphered German codes, opened their letters and read most of their correspondence without even being suspected.”³³

Thus, the skilled agent of the world’s acknowledged foremost intelligence service of the time, British SIS, told how he helped to construct intelligence agencies for the fledgling Bolshevik regime. At the same time, Reilly, Hill, and Lockhart were all in the closest contact with the anti-Bolshevik opposition, both in the monarchist and “bourgeois” circles, as well as the socialist opposition tied to Boris Savinkov. Hill recorded that he “had many dealings” with Savinkov.³⁴ Soon, Savinkov’s British-backed and funded forces would stage a rising against the Bolsheviks, a rising triggered by the assassination of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach.

The Mirbach assassination

Soviet accounts of 1918, especially the Cheka histories, chronicle a string of plots to overthrow Soviet power. The high points were the uprisings by Savinkov’s SZRiS in May, the Left SR (Socialist Revolutionary Party) uprising of July 1918 in the wake of the assassination of Count Mirbach, and the Lockhart Plot in August.³⁵ The Mirbach assassination

requires special examination as an opening chapter of the Lockhart because its prominent loose ends point toward the main open question about the latter—connivance between Reilly and Hill on the one side, and elements of Dzerzhinsky's Cheka on the other.

In most accounts published in the West, the July 6 assassination of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Wilhelm Mirbach, is portrayed as a project that was altogether separate from the Lockhart Plot proper, which unfolded in August and reached its denouement on August 30, with the assassination of Petrograd Cheka chief Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin. This is because Mirbach was assassinated by the Left SRs, in the wake of a June 24 decision by the Left SR Central Committee, to kill "prominent members of German imperialism."³⁶ *Not* responsible for the Mirbach assassination, the story goes, were the agencies that *were* the main movers of the Lockhart Plot: the Cheka and British SIS.

But weren't they? There are a host of unanswered questions about the Mirbach assassination. Cross-checking witnesses' accounts and certain details that Soviet sources made special efforts to suppress, drags in Dzerzhinsky's Cheka as far more than an incidental player, and tends to implicate British SIS as well. While reviewing these, it should be kept in mind that the British SIS, the Left SRs, the Right SRs, and those Bolsheviks opposed to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, like Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky, shared the goal of bringing Russia back into the war. This result, as the Left SR Central Committee said explicitly, could be anticipated from the assassination of Mirbach.³⁷

At approximately 2:45 p.m. on July 6, two Left SR members who were employees of the Cheka called at the German Embassy.³⁸ Yakov Blyumkin and Nikolai Andreyev requested to see Count Mirbach "on a matter directly concerning Mr. Ambassador," the case of a distant cousin of his, Robert Mirbach, who was in Cheka custody.³⁹ Having refused to discuss the matter with Count Mirbach's designated representative, Dr. Riezler, and the embassy translator, Lt. Mueller, the two Chekists were allowed to meet the ambassador. After some minutes of conversation, they drew their revolvers and began firing. Mirbach was shot in the back of the head as he attempted to flee the room. The hit squad threw a bomb to cover their escape through a window, scaled the Embassy's fence, and made off in a waiting car.

The night of Mirbach's assassination, Left SR forces seized several key buildings in the city. On the same day, Savinkov's forces launched uprisings in Yaroslavl and other cities on the upper Volga. Dzerzhinsky, after visiting the German Embassy, sought to question Blyumkin, who was reported to be hiding at the headquarters of the Cheka Combat Detachment, commanded by a Left SR, D.I. Popov. There Dzerzhinsky was arrested by Left SRs, who also detained his deputy, Martyn Latsis. Trotsky appointed Yakov Peters as acting chief of the Cheka, while Lenin deployed the Bolshevik military commander, Podvoisky, to force the Left SRs to surrender. Under heavy artillery fire

on the morning of July 7, Left SR headquarters was seized and the uprising was suppressed.

Who Was Yakov Blyumkin?

Nobody doubts that the Left SRs assassinated Mirbach. Blyumkin and Andreyev were Left SRs. Cheka Deputy Chairman Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, a Left SR leader, put the Cheka seal on the pass by which they gained entry to the German Embassy. Mariya Spiridonova, head of the Left SR Party, claimed responsibility for the assassination, which she said was carried out by Blyumkin on party orders. Afterwards, Aleksandrovich, Popov, and a number of other Left SRs were shot, while Spiridonova and others were sentenced to three years at forced labor. Blyumkin and Andreyev, however, escaped, despite Blyumkin's having broken his leg when he jumped out the Embassy window after the assassination.

Blyumkin is surrounded by mystery: Was he a loyal Left SR working under cover as a Chekist, or were his activities approved by his Bolshevik superiors at the Cheka? Why did Dzerzhinsky and other non-SR Cheka officials allow Blyumkin extraordinary privileges, even after compromising behavior on the part of Blyumkin?

In a deposition taken during the investigation of the Mirbach assassination, Cheka Collegium member Latsis described the circumstances of Blyumkin's entry into the Cheka: "Blyumkin began to work at the Commission [Cheka] in the first days of June. He was assigned by the CCPLSR to the post of chief of 'German espionage,' i.e. the section of the counterrevolutionary department for monitoring the protection of the Embassy and possible criminal activity of the Embassy."⁴⁰ Although Blyumkin's unit, known as the "Secret Section"⁴¹, was directly under the Counterrevolutionary Department of the Cheka, headed by Latsis, the latter maintained that he really had little to do with Blyumkin: "I did not allow Blyumkin into my department. The only case on which he sat was the case of the Austrian Mirbach. He plunged totally into this case, sitting up for whole nights over the interrogation transcripts of the witnesses. . . . I disliked Blyumkin and after the first complaints against him by his coworkers decided to dismiss him from work. A week before July 6, Blyumkin was already off the roster of my department, since the section was disbanded by resolution of the Commission, and Blyumkin was left without specific duties."⁴²

Latsis attempted to distance himself from Blyumkin. But the one matter, on which he acknowledged having allowed Blyumkin to work, was none other than the case of Robert Mirbach, the German ambassador's cousin.

The Left SR decision for the assassination of "prominent members of German imperialism" was taken on June 24. Given that there were Bolshevik penetration agents in the Left SR, it is likely that it was no secret to Latsis.⁴³ He certainly knew that Ambassador Mirbach had received numerous assassination threats, which the Cheka was supposed to be investigating. Then, at the 5th Congress of Soviets, in session at the Bolshoi Theater beginning July 4, the Left

SR leaders included virtual death threats against Count Mirbach in their anti-German tirades, while Mirbach was present in a box for the diplomatic corps. And Blyumkin had been loudly boasting about his own powers as an assassin.

For that public bragging, Blyumkin was relieved of all his Cheka duties, approximately one week before the assassination. Yet, Latsis reported that at 11 a.m. on July 6, the morning of the day of the shooting, "The [Robert] Mirbach file had been taken from me by Blyumkin . . . for conducting some kind of inquiries."⁴⁴ Thus, Latsis gave this active file, on the relative of the much-threatened German ambassador, to a person who had been fired from his department, who was a member of a party that had made some of the threats, and whom he did not like or trust to start with. At the German Embassy, the file was the means by which Blyumkin gained access to Mirbach in person.⁴⁵

Dzerzhinsky ignores warnings

Testimony taken from and about Feliks Dzerzhinsky, with respect to Blyumkin and on earlier threats to Mirbach, was even more compromising than that of Latsis; so much so, that the Cheka's *Red Book* of 1920 censored the chief's testimony!⁴⁶

The German Embassy translator, Lt. Mueller, testified that already in late May or early June, an informant of the Germany Embassy, one Ginch, reported that an assassination attempt was being prepared on Count Mirbach. Dr. Riezler notified the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, which in turn told the Cheka. At the Cheka, "no significance was attributed to these statements."⁴⁷ Finally, after more specific information on assassination plots was received from Ginch, Mueller testified, "I and Ginch went to the Metropol for talks with Cheka Chairman Dzerzhinsky, who reacted with mistrust to the statement of Ginch, although he [Ginch] directly told him that members of the Commission [Cheka] were mixed up in this affair."⁴⁸

Riezler asked Lev M. Karakhan, at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to pay special attention to the rumors of an assassination attempt on Mirbach. Said Mueller, "This seemed even more urgent in the eyes of Embassy officials, because 10 days earlier, the same Ginch appeared and stated definitely, that an attempt could occur between the 5th and 6th of July."⁴⁹

After Riezler's insistent appeals, Dzerzhinsky ordered a raid on the apartment named by the German Embassy informants. Its inhabitant, British citizen F.M. Wiber, stated that he was "not involved in politics," whereupon those detained were set free.⁵⁰ Dzerzhinsky then informed Riezler that the whole affair was the result of "mistrust, artificially inspired by someone."⁵¹

"Dr. Riezler," Dzerzhinsky continued, "finally agreed to introduce me to his main informants. A couple of days before the attentat, . . . I met with him [the informant]. . . . I began to question the informant, and from the first answers, I saw that my doubts were confirmed. . . . After this meeting I informed the German Embassy through Karakhan, that I considered the arrest of Ginch and [fellow informant] Ben-

derskaya necessary, but I received no answer. Both were arrested only on Saturday, after the murder of Count Mirbach."⁵² Thus, Dzerzhinsky's only response to an informant who provided details of the assassination plot, down to the day it would happen and that members of his own Cheka were involved, was to arrest him!

Dzerzhinsky had also received specific complaints against Blyumkin. "Some days, maybe a week before the assassination," he testified, "I received information from Raskolnikov and Mandelshtam (he works with Lunacharsky in Petrograd), that this fellow was permitting himself in conversations to say such things as this: People's lives are in my hands, I sign a paper—and in two hours a human life does not exist. Here . . . sits citizen Puslovsky, a poet, a great cultural value, and I sign his death warrant, . . . etc."⁵³ Said Dzerzhinsky, "I conveyed this information to Aleksandrovich, so that he would get from the CC [Central Committee of the Left SRs] an explanation and information on Blyumkin, for him to be prosecuted. The same day, at a meeting of the Commission, it was decided on my recommendation to disband our counterintelligence and leave Blyumkin without duties for the time being."⁵⁴

But the dismissal claimed by Latsis and Dzerzhinsky was never implemented! Latsis went on record, that he gave Blyumkin a most sensitive file, fully a week after he was supposed to have been relieved of all duties at the Cheka. And Blyumkin's own testimony on the matter reveals that he, for one, did not consider himself to have been fired by Latsis or Dzerzhinsky: "On July 6, I asked Comrade Latsis for the Robert Mirbach file, supposedly to examine it. That day I worked, as usual, at the Cheka."⁵⁵

Blyumkin also testified: "Furthermore, all my work at the V.Ch.K. on the struggle with German espionage, obviously, in view of its significance, took place under the constant observation of Chairman of the Commission Comrade Dzerzhinsky and Comrade Latsis. On all my measures, such as internal reconnoitering in the Embassy, I constantly consulted with the Presidium of the Commission, with Comrade Karakhan at the Commissariat for International Affairs, and with Chairman of Plenbezh Comrade Unshlikht."⁵⁶

When Dzerzhinsky and Karakhan arrived at the German Embassy minutes after the assassination, Lt. Mueller greeted him, "What do you say now, Mr. Dzerzhinsky?"⁵⁷

Blyumkin's return

Blyumkin, broken leg and all, vanished into thin air. According to his 1919 testimony, he made his way to the Ukraine, lay low while writing a book about the July events, and participated in SR combat squads, fighting against the Germans. On April 2, 1919, the same Latsis who had so "disliked" Blyumkin, was appointed Cheka chief for the Ukraine. Less than two weeks later, Blyumkin showed up at Ukrainian Cheka headquarters and, as he said it, "put myself at the disposal of Comrade Latsis. . . ."⁵⁸

On May 16, 1919, Blyumkin was pardoned by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) on grounds that he had not endorsed the SR uprising

against the Soviet government, only the assassination of Mirbach.⁵⁹ Soon afterward, he was readmitted to the Cheka and assigned to sensitive counterintelligence duties.⁶⁰ During the Civil War, he became a top aide to Trotsky, who said about Blyumkin, "He had a very extraordinary past. He was a member of the Left SR Party and he participated in the insurrections against the Bolsheviks. He was the man who killed the German Minister, Mirbach, and the Bolsheviks officially had to prosecute him. He disappeared and then came back, and . . . after the denunciation of the Brėst-Litovsk peace he appeared again before us and said: 'I am now a Bolshevik. You can test me.' . . . I employed him in my military secretariat and throughout when I needed a courageous man, Blyumkin was at my disposal."⁶¹

In 1929, after a secret visit to the outlawed Trotsky in Turkey, Blyumkin was shot at the insistence of Stalin.⁶²

Blyumkin and Captain Hill

While Blyumkin clearly had protectors in the Cheka, his path also intersected that of Trotsky's aide for aviation and intelligence matters, Captain George Hill. Hill was in close contact with the Cheka, met with Dzerzhinsky several times, and spoke of his "agents" in the Cheka.⁶³

Present at the July 4-6 Congress of Soviets, Hill described himself as "wild with joy," over Left SR leader Spiridonova's tirade against Brest-Litovsk and the Germans.⁶⁴ He was *au courant* with the events that were to unfold the same day as the Mirbach assassination: "Savinkov had determined to raise a counter-revolution at Yaroslavl . . . and I was kept informed of all his plans."⁶⁵

But Hill had a special relationship with Blyumkin's section of the Cheka. Hill, as noted above, "organized a Bolshevik counterespionage section to spy on the German secret service and Missions in Petrograd and Moscow. . . ." Blyumkin headed precisely this section—described by his superior, Latsis, as "German espionage" and by Dzerzhinsky as "counterintelligence on espionage"⁶⁶—with specific responsibilities for the German mission, about which he would brag that he had floor plans.⁶⁷ Incidentally, of all the places in Moscow where Blyumkin could have lived, he turned out to have room 221 at the Hotel Elite, right next door to Robert Bruce Lockhart, in the same hotel where George Hill lived.⁶⁸

George Leggett, historian of the Cheka, identified Blyumkin as head of the counterespionage unit of the Cheka whose "specific task was to effect intelligence penetration of the German Embassy. In this sphere the Vecheka cooperated with the British; Captain George Hill of the British Military Mission . . . had already gained Trotsky's confidence . . ."⁶⁹ Yet Hill maintained, all his life, that he never worked with Yakov Blyumkin!⁷⁰

It is not surprising, that Hill would stick tenaciously to his hardly credible denial. As shown above, the evidence points strongly to Blyumkin's having worked on the Mirbach assassination with Cheka knowledge and approval, as was widely suspected at the time.⁷¹ If Hill admitted collaboration with Blyumkin, it would implicate him not only in the

Mirbach assassination, but in connivance with the Cheka at a time when he was supposed already to be working with Reilly on plots to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Hill's main Bolshevik contact, Trotsky, was regarded at the German Embassy as an "Entente agent" and closely "tied to the SRs."⁷² It was Trotsky who first informed Cheka official Peters of the assassination, and who appointed Peters to take over for the captured Dzerzhinsky.⁷³

Hill's friend Sidney Reilly was on the scene for the July 6 events, as well. At the Bolshoi Theater with Lockhart, when news of the Left SR revolt had just been received, Reilly concealed some documents and swallowed others.⁷⁴ He was also in contact with the Left SR D.I. Popov, commander of the Cheka Combat Detachment that rebelled that night.⁷⁵

The Lockhart plot

The Mirbach assassination did not provoke Germany to declare war on Russia, as its instigators had hoped. During July and August, the two countries drew closer. On August 15, German General Hindenburg having dropped his opposition to deeper ties with the Bolsheviks, treaties supplemental to Brest-Litovsk were negotiated. On August 27, a German-Soviet trade deal was signed. For the "holy war" faction of the Bolsheviks and for the SIS men, whose job it was to bring Russia back into the war, the outlook was gloomy.

But Russia's commitment to the peace with Germany still hung, in the late summer as it had at Brest-Litovsk, on one man—Lenin.

According to the accounts of Lockhart, Reilly, George Hill and the Soviets, the purpose of the Lockhart Plot was to overthrow the Bolshevik government. During July and August, Reilly raced around Moscow making coup preparations. Robert Bruce Lockhart put as much as 1.2 million rubles at Reilly's disposal. In mid-August, Lockhart met the Latvian Rifles commander, Col. Eduard Berzin; subsequent contacts with Berzin were handled by Reilly.

As Reilly recounted it, the plot was scheduled for the first week of September, when the Bolshevik leadership would be all together at a Soviet Central Executive Committee meeting, but was preempted on August 30 by the assassination of Petrograd Cheka chief Uritsky and Dora Kaplan's attempt on Lenin.⁷⁶ According to the accepted analysis, these nearly simultaneous attentats against key Soviet leaders had nothing whatsoever to do with each other, being the acts of two "lone assassins," whose timing was coincidental.⁷⁷ Reilly's almost-successful plan to change the course of history had been spoiled by the free-lance assassins who targeted Lenin and Uritsky.

If, however, the so-called Lockhart Plot was a classic provocation, on the part of Dzerzhinsky (as Debo showed) and of Reilly (as American intelligence officers at the time believed), then the question is raised, of just how accidental the early termination of the coup scheme was. The actual results, from the August 30 attentats and from the arrests carried out on the pretext of rounding up Lockhart's agents,

strongly suggest that the plot was *not* prematurely sprung and that it never even existed in the form described by Reilly. British SIS made no attempt to overthrow the Bolshevik government; rather, in collaboration with a faction in the Soviet intelligence services, they attempted to eliminate one *particular* Bolshevik—Lenin, the man responsible for Brest-Litovsk—while strengthening the regime overall (and certain personalities within it, e.g. Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky).⁷⁸ A large force of genuine opposition to the Bolsheviks was eliminated, having been drawn out by Reilly's activities, the better to be crushed. The potential for anti-Bolshevik actions in Moscow, which was formidable because as many as 38,000 former Tsarist military officers lived in the capital, was reduced. Latsis reported that the Cheka began to arrest participants in a "white guard counterrevolutionary plot" in advance, on the night of August 24.⁷⁹ After August 30, the American intelligence network run by Xenophon D. Kalamatiano was exposed and destroyed.

The attentats on Lenin and Uritsky

At 11:15 a.m. on Aug. 30, Petrograd Cheka chief Moisei Uritsky was assassinated at the Hall of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs in Petrograd, by a 22-year-old ex-military cadet, Leonid Kanegisser. The assassin ran into the English Club on Millionnaya Street, to hide and to change his clothes preparatory to escape.⁸⁰

The Soviets officially charged, "The English have murdered Comrade Uritsky because he brought together the threads of an English conspiracy in Petrograd."⁸¹ Indeed, Uritsky had been hot on the track of certain British activities. On June 21, following the assassination of Bolshevik Commissar for Press Affairs Volodarsky, Uritsky in a speech to the Petrograd Soviet "made a violent attack on England in which he accused the English of organizing the dead Commissar's murder."⁸² Uritsky had informed the Dutch Ambassador, a close friend of Captain F.N.A. Cromie, the British naval attache in Petrograd and a collaborator of Lockhart, that he "knew exactly what was going on in the [British] consulate."⁸³ The Bolsheviks told the Dutch minister that they had documents "proving conclusively," that the British were involved in the Uritsky murder.⁸⁴

Less than twelve hours later, Lenin was shot twice by the Socialist Revolutionary Dora (Fanny) Kaplan, as he left a workers' meeting in the outskirts of Moscow. Arrested by the Cheka, Kaplan would state only that she was close to Chernov's tendency in the SR Party and was for an alliance of Russia with the Allies against Germany.⁸⁵ "What revolver I shot from I won't say. Who gave me the revolver I won't say. . . . Where I got my money I won't answer."⁸⁶ Clearly, this was no "lone assassin."

But Kaplan and Kanegisser were spared the Cheka's horribly effective torture procedures for extracting confessions. Any Bolshevik investigator who genuinely wished to root out the presumptive plots behind the assassination attempts was deprived of his witnesses: both gunmen were summarily shot, on Cheka orders, within days of the attentats. They revealed nothing, said the Cheka.⁸⁷

Some evidence did emerge. The revolver used by Kaplan was apparently supplied by the friend of George Hill and Sidney Reilly, Boris Savinkov.⁸⁸ Savinkov himself bragged of having organized the attempt on Lenin.⁸⁹ When the attentats "prematurely" exploded the Lockhart Plot, Sidney Reilly hid in the flat of one of his agents, a Vera Petrovna, who happened to be a close friend of Dora Kaplan!⁹⁰

Cheka executive Latsis was emphatic in his evaluation in 1920: "Relying on English money, he [Savinkov] organized the murder of Comrade Volodarsky and then of Comrade Uritsky and Lenin."⁹¹ This charge was almost never repeated, either in Western or in Soviet sources.

Savinkov, of course, had been an assassinations specialist since the turn of the century, in the infamous "Combat Organization" of the SR Party. He was also very closely connected with British intelligence throughout his career.

While preparing to assassinate Grand Duke Sergei in 1904, Savinkov lived disguised as an English merchant or, in one account, an English intelligence agent. For two years after that murder, he traveled in Russia on a valid British passport.⁹² In 1917, on English insistence, Savinkov was made political commissar of the Southwest Front, from which position he helped prepare the "Kornilov Plot," the August 1917 episode that signaled the doom of the Kerensky regime and paved the way for the Bolshevik coup of October.

Savinkov's men

In 1918, Savinkov maintained close contact with British intelligence, as Reilly, Hill and Robert Bruce Lockhart all verify. The treasurer of Savinkov's SZRiS, Aleksandr Vilenkin, had been a lawyer for the English consulate, during Lockhart's tenure as acting consul-general, during the war.⁹³ Most of the funds Vilenkin brought in for Savinkov's work were of British origin.⁹⁴ Savinkov himself, on one occasion, hid at an English consulate.⁹⁵

The 1922 trial of the Right SRs brought out more details of the involvement by Savinkov's cohorts in the assassinations of 1918. Uritsky's assassin, Kanegisser, had a cousin named Filonenko, a Right SR who had been an adviser to Savinkov at the time of the Kornilov Plot.⁹⁶ Although the Cheka somehow overlooked the ties of Kanegisser and Filonenko in 1918,⁹⁷ it was stated at the 1922 trial, that Kanegisser was not only the cousin of Savinkov's lieutenant, but was "without a doubt, under his influence."⁹⁸ Still later, an anonymous emigre writer stated that he had been recruited in May 1918, by Kanegisser, to a terrorist group, headed by Filonenko, which "began to shadow Uritsky."⁹⁹ The Cheka also knew that Savinkov had reproached Filonenko for failing to organize terror in Petrograd, only three weeks before the murder of Volodarsky.¹⁰⁰

The charge that the British were behind the attempt on Lenin evokes hysteria in many circles. Yet their motive, to eliminate the one figure blocking Russia's return to the war, was a powerful one. Col. Ernest Boyce, the SIS chief in Russia and therefore Sidney Reilly's superior (and later a key figure in the Trust), moreover, was known to be recruiting assassins "to do away with one or two prominent

members of the Soviet government.”¹⁰¹ When one of Boyce’s Russian agents, whom he approached for this work, blackmailed Boyce after such an approach, Boyce paid up! Lenin’s biographer, Stephan Possony, cryptically noted that he had seen “interview data which suggest that the attentat may have been instigated by a foreign power.”¹⁰²

The upshot

Lenin did not die, so the Bolsheviks did not re-enter the war on the Allied side. But the two figures most strongly identified with the wish to do so, Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky, emerged in greatly strengthened positions, within a Bolshevik government that was strengthened overall, with the crushing of opposition forces that had been drawn out by the activities of Reilly et al. In response to the August 30 events, Dzerzhinsky initiated the Red Terror. The powers of the Cheka were vastly expanded. On September 2, Trotsky was appointed chairman of the newly formed supreme military command, the Revolutionary War Council.¹⁰³

What happened to the British plotters? Their fates were most curious:

1) Despite the furious manhunt for all those involved, Reilly and Hill were not caught. They continued to rendezvous daily at a public restaurant.¹⁰⁴ Reilly made an escape, while Hill, who had been under cover as a Russian since early August, simply donned his uniform again, re-joined the British Mission staff, and walked out of Russia in full public view. (It was not the first time the Cheka had blessed Hill’s comings and goings with non-interference. He learned from a Cheka source in late July, of an arrest warrant issued for him because of the imminent Allied landing in the north.¹⁰⁵ Lockhart recorded Hill’s arrest on August 5, and he was obviously released in short order.¹⁰⁶ In *Go Spy the Land*, Hill mentions neither the arrest nor his release. He does say that Dzerzhinsky “gave me a searching look,” but “did not recognize me,” when they met by chance during August.¹⁰⁷

2) Lockhart was arrested and interrogated, as he recounts in his memoirs, by Deputy Chairman of the Cheka Yakov Peters. Peters, who had spent the ten years prior to the revolution in England, was not unacquainted with the plotters; Hill recalls doing Peters the favor of carrying mail to the Chekist’s wife and child in England.¹⁰⁸ Peters reported to Lockhart, “that the Americans were the worst compromised in this business and that what they had against me [Lockhart] was nothing.”¹⁰⁹ The Soviets exchanged Lockhart for Litvinov, who was detained in retaliation for Lockhart’s arrest, and he returned to England before his trial.

3) Though the Cheka raided Reilly’s headquarters in Moscow, its proprietor, Dagmara Grammatikova, was released. She and the other people closest to Reilly seemed to lead charmed lives. Reilly recounted how “one of my agents was seized shortly after leaving me, was hauled up before the Extraordinary Commission [Cheka] and escaped by a miracle. How he managed to bluff his captors will puzzle me to my dying day. The Tcheka never erred on the side of leniency towards the prisoners.”¹¹⁰

Reilly’s luck would seem to be miraculous indeed. Unless, of course, there is another explanation. And there has been, lying buried or mostly ignored for the past 70 years. It was provided by a leading participant in the events, the American secret service agent Xenophon Dmitrievich Kalamatiano, who did not escape.

Xenophon Dmitrievich Kalamatiano

Kalamatiano was the main American intelligence operative in Russia at the time of the Lockhart Plot. Born in Russia to descendants of Greek settlers around the Black Sea, and married to a woman with excellent connections at the imperial court, Kalamatiano was the representative in Tsarist Russia for some 30 firms selling agricultural implements.

While in the United States in 1914, Kalamatiano was asked by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing to carry out intelligence assignments in Russia. This he did, building up an extensive network of informants, chief of whom was Lt. Col. Aleksandr Friede, who worked in the Military Communications Directorate. Kalamatiano was in contact with Reilly and the French intelligence officers, led by Col. Vertement, who were working with Reilly. The extent of his involvement in or support for Reilly’s “plot” remains unclear; at his trial, Kalamatiano “asserted, that he was not connected with Lockhart. . . .”¹¹¹

Convicted in the “Lockhart” trial, Col. Friede was shot. Kalamatiano was condemned to death, suffered two mock executions, and spent two years in Cheka prisons. He was finally released in 1921 on the demand of Herbert Hoover, who was then heading up U.S. famine relief to Russia. In his official report to the U.S. consul in Riga, Kalamatiano had some very pointed things to say about Sidney Reilly: “The points that interested me particularly, were the position of Reilly and the other sources of information to the VChK. In regard to the latter I am quite certain in my own mind that there was a leakage in our Consulate. In regard to Reilly, I have been able to get some information about him personally from people who knew him previously, in the Far East, then in Petrograd, and then in New York where he had offices in 1916-7. I was told in Moscow that Reilly was a ‘professional.’ On the other hand he showed criminal carelessness in leaving around secret addresses.

“Also, why was Reilly not arrested, when the VChK knew just where to lay their hands on him, and why were people connected with him all released, whereas people connected with me all sentenced, with the exception of one? I should say a further inquiry into his actions should be of interest. The whole thing looks very much like a piece of ‘provocation.’”¹¹²

Back in the United States, the State Department, which was on a pro-Soviet track defined by U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, showed almost no interest in debriefing Kalamatiano further on these extraordinary events. He was given a handshake, some back pay, and a train ticket to Chicago.

In 1921, he took up a post at his alma mater, Culver Military Academy in Culver, Indiana. Though no formal

records exist of the lectures he gave there, handwritten notes on a speech by Kalamatiano about his Russian experiences, taken by a reporter for the school newspaper, were extant as of a few years ago. While his Riga report was for the official record, Kalamatiano was even more scathing about Reilly in this more private setting; the handwritten notes record Kalamatiano saying, in no uncertain terms, that Sidney Reilly had worked as a Soviet agent in the events of the summer of 1918.¹¹³

American Consul Dewitt C. Poole, with whom Kalamatiano worked, shared his evaluation. On the way out of Russia in late September 1918, Poole stopped to brief the British ambassador in Oslo on the summer's events. The British ambassador then wired the Foreign Office in a "personal and most secret" telegram, that Poole had briefed him that there was "strong suspicion" about "an agent named Reilly. . . . It appears that Reilly was in communication with a certain Russian strongly suspected of being an agent-provocateur, to whom he had given an address at which he still remained some days ago . . . Neither Reilly nor the Russian has been arrested, and they are still at large. Hence suspicion."¹¹⁴

Word traveled fast. Robert Bruce Lockhart recorded, "I found that Poole, the American Consul General, took a more serious view of the conspiracy. He was inclined to regard Reilly as an agent provocateur, who had staged this plot for the benefit of the Bolsheviks. . . . I laughed at Poole's fears. . . . Ridiculous as this story was, I found nevertheless that through Poole it had gained some credence in England. When two months later I reached London, I had to go to bail with the Foreign Office for Reilly's bona fides. I did so without the slightest hesitation."¹¹⁵

Vladimir G. Orlov and Sasha Grammatikov

The evidence of British responsibility for the Lenin and Uritsky shootings, which caused the "premature" end of their own plot, is thus supplemented by the well-founded suspicions of Kalamatiano and Poole, that Reilly and his friends ran the ostensible coup project as a provocation. Can it also be shown, that their provocation was blessed by the Cheka? The profile of certain persons, who are missing from Soviet versions of the Lockhart Plot and often mentioned in Western ones as incidental hangers-on of Sidney Reilly, indicates the answer is yes.

As in the Mirbach case, key "anti-Bolshevik" plotters of the late summer were more intimate with the Cheka than is convenient for Moscow to admit, even today. This is the case with Vladimir G. Orlov, the President of the Sixth Criminal Commission in Petrograd (called "Cheka-Criminal" by Reilly, who provided Reilly the Cheka pass that enabled him to move freely in and between Petrograd and Moscow. (In 1970, a Soviet KGB author did admit that Reilly had a Cheka pass in the name of "Relinsky," but said that he obtained it from the Left SR, D.I. Popov; Orlov remained out of the picture.¹¹⁶ It is the case with a long-time friend of both Reilly and Orlov, Aleksandr Grammatikov, whose niece's apartment on Sheremetev Pereulok in

Moscow served as Reilly's headquarters.¹¹⁷ Orlov and Grammatikov are not only missing from Soviet history books, but they were missing from the Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 1918 trial of the Lockhart Plot case; not only absent, like several of the accused, they were not even charged.

Orlov got his job in the Cheka thanks to Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, the same who was Reilly's contact at the Kremlin.¹¹⁸ Before the war and revolution, Orlov had been a Tsarist magistrate in Warsaw, responsible for sensitive cases of espionage, subversion, and revolutionary activity. According to his own account, Orlov spent "eight long months" as the case officer for Feliks Dzerzhinsky. He recalled saying to Dzerzhinsky, as he sentenced him to 20 years in Siberia: "Dzerzhinsky, I have really grown to like you, and I hope that we shall see each other again in more propitious circumstances."¹¹⁹ Six months later, Dzerzhinsky escaped.

As a member of the Cheka, supposedly a White undercover agent, Orlov met up again with his old charge, Dzerzhinsky, in 1918. He later recalled his thoughts: "Should I flee? No, that would be madness, so I remained motionless in front of him. 'Are you Orloff?', the All Powerful of Soviet Russia asked me quietly, without a change of expression. 'Yes, I am Orloff.' Dzerzhinsky held out his hand to me. 'Well, it's nice of you, Orloff, to be on our side now. We need efficient lawyers like yourself; so whenever you need anything please apply to me in Moscow.'¹²⁰

Orlov was not long in taking him up on the offer. When he could not find a hotel room in all Moscow, he turned to Dzerzhinsky. "He [Dzerzhinsky] drew a key from his waistcoat pocket and handed it over to me, saying, 'Here is the key of my room at the National Hotel. You can stay there as long as you like, as I always live here.' And he pointed to a corner, where behind a folding screen stood a camp bed."¹²¹

The "White" penetration agent, Orlov, surfaced in the 1920s in the middle of a Soviet espionage ring in Europe.¹²²

Aleksandr Grammatikov, who introduced Reilly (a friend of his from before the war¹²³ to Orlov, had known Orlov in pre-war Poland.¹²⁴ (A similar background tied Orlov and Savinkov, who were old school friends from Warsaw.¹²⁵) Grammatikov was most likely himself an Okhrana agent.¹²⁶ He provided Reilly's introduction to Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, as well.¹²⁷ Grammatikov's niece Dagmara lent her apartment as the headquarters of the plot, and, according to one account, Grammatikov handled ties for Reilly to the Socialist Revolutionary party.¹²⁸

Grammatikov's own flat was raided, but the Cheka "failed to notice the private telephone wire" of Grammatikov, and let him go, too.¹²⁹ As for Orlov, Reilly said, "I had no news of him since last seeing him. For all I knew his part in the conspiracy had already been discovered. . . ." ¹³⁰ But Orlov, too, escaped unscathed.

In 1925, Grammatikov and Orlov were in Reilly's small group of advisers in Paris and Berlin, as was his old SIS superior from 1918, Ernest Boyce. All three extolled the Trust as a legitimate anti-Soviet underground and counseled Reilly to go back into the Soviet Union as its guest.¹³¹

The case of George Hill

If Sidney Reilly was working for the Soviets, what does that say about Captain George Hill, Robert Bruce Lockhart, and Commander Ernest Boyce? Robert Bruce Lockhart himself pointed out, "If there had been any double-crossing by Reilly, Hill would hardly have failed to detect it."¹³²

Lockhart was right. Anyone who knows anything about the logistics, finances, and support work for intelligence operations, knows that it is a virtual impossibility for one "Lone Ranger"—as Reilly is often conveniently portrayed—to be following his own agenda for a project on the scale of overthrowing the Soviet government, even in that early period. As a senior American intelligence specialist, who has experience in operational matters and who has also examined this particular case closely, put it: "The conclusion I draw is that this has got to go beyond simply Reilly. It has to, because you can't support it on a single provocateur. Just no way in the world. I mean you can't do it! It would be nice if you could be here, there and everywhere like the Scarlet Pimpernel, . . . but, if you read the book, even the Pimpernel had a very extensive support system."

Hill's own memoir portrayed him and Reilly as a team: "At our first meeting we took a liking to each other. I found that he had an amazing grasp of the actualities of the situation and that he was a man of action. Reilly knew of my activities. We were for all practical purposes in two separate departments, but agreed that whenever possible we would cooperate. . . . I was seeing Reilly daily, and he kept me informed of what he was doing and of his plans for a coup d'état against the Bolsheviks. Reilly's plan was bold and masterfully conceived, its purpose being no less than to have the whole of the Bolshevik Executive Committee—including Lenin and Trotsky—arrested by the Letts, their own bodyguard. . . . The plan for the coup d'état, the establishment of a Provisional Government and a hundred and one other things for the change-over were worked out to the minutest detail. I was kept informed of all this so that if anything happened to Reilly it would be possible for me to carry on the work. . . . Reilly had no difficulty in travelling between Moscow and Petrograd, as he had obtained a position with the Cheka and had a Cheka pass."¹³³

So Comrades Reilly and Hill either swim together, or sink together. What else is known about George Hill?

In 1940, the newly formed British Special Operations Executive was setting up a liaison office to the latest incarnation of the Cheka, the NKVD, in Moscow. The British submitted a short list of candidates for the job, for Soviet approval. "To the astonishment of everyone . . . the NKVD expressed a firm preference for Hill as chief of the SOE Mission."¹³⁴ By this time, the acknowledged top Russia-hands of British intelligence were none other than Hill and Robert Bruce Lockhart.¹³⁵

The selection of Hill is often passed off as a mere curiosity, but in the circumstances of the time it was hardly a routine choice! The paranoid Stalin had just butchered thousands Soviet cadre for alleged or imagined crimes, chief among which was having ties to foreign intelligence ser-

vices. Yet Stalin was prepared to welcome back to Moscow, Brigadier George Hill, a kingpin of the notorious Lockhart Plot, that almost strangled Soviet power in its cradle.¹³⁶

Hill had his own explanation of the NKVD's reasoning: "The Russians, who had looked up my record, and found a great deal on their files about my past activities against them, agreed to accept me because I was 'an expert'."¹³⁷

Hill's 1940 return to Moscow is one more reason to think he was lying and hiding his actual role in the events of 1918. As the Reilly story grew more controversial, Hill didn't hesitate to rewrite his public stand on Reilly. His glowing words about the "bold and masterfully conceived" plans of Reilly, whom Hill was seeing "daily," come from *Go Spy the Land*, published in 1932. By 1936, with the publication of Hill's *Dreaded Hour*, he changed his line and wrote of Reilly, "I disapproved of his plans . . . considered them impractical."¹³⁸

Before his death in 1970, Hill revealed to Robin Bruce Lockhart, that "he himself had been told by a NKVD major and also by one of his former 1918 agents . . . that Reilly was alive and had been actively working for the GPU and subsequently for the NKVD. (Hill eventually confessed that he did not tell me earlier because he did not wish to spoil a good story.)"¹³⁹

What the Soviets are hiding

Twenty-four people were brought to trial for the so-called Lockhart Plot. George Hill was not one of them. Even though Hill's own memoirs testify to his hands-on involvement in Reilly's enterprise, and although the latter's activities, from mid-August at the latest, were visible to the Cheka "as if covered by a glass dome," Hill has been almost nowhere to be found in Soviet accounts of the affair.

A review of the Soviet literature on the Lockhart Plot turned up exactly two mentions of George Hill, before 1987. In a 1970 book by the chief of the KGB's Press Section, V.F. Kravchenko, we find the following: "Captain Hill, answering directly to the Chief of Intelligence of the War Ministry, was attached to Trotsky and received from him information necessary to the Allies. Formally, Hill was Trotsky's adviser on aviation matters, which was a good cover for Hill the spy."¹⁴⁰ The second reference was just to "Hill," who together with Reilly gave Russian Orthodox Patriarch Tikhon five million rubles in August 1918, to fund prayers against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.¹⁴¹ If we are to believe the Soviets, they only discovered this from Robin Bruce Lockhart's 1967 *Reilly: Ace of Spies*.

Moscow is obviously not anxious to draw attention to Hill, the British intelligence man who helped to found the GRU and the KRO, the Cheka counterintelligence unit that would later run the Trust! (Some Western historians join the Soviets in pooh-pooing Hill's role, yet the curious fact is, that remarkably little has been released on the early days of the GRU.¹⁴²) The invitation to Hill to return to Moscow during World War II underscores how those early, close Anglo-Soviet intelligence ties remained intact for decades.

Publicizing Hill's role, in either period, tends to expose that fact, more than the Soviets would like.

The pattern of Hill the "non-person" was abruptly broken in 1987, soon after one of the present authors drew attention to Hill's career.¹⁴³ Soviet author Lev Bezymensky resurrected Captain George Hill as a key figure in the Lockhart Plot. Having commented that "Hill's name did not figure in the documents of the Lockhart trial," Bezymensky went on to quote from Hill's memoirs: "I was kept informed . . . so that if anything happened to Reilly it would be possible for me to carry on the work."¹⁴⁴ But *New Times* omitted what Hill says on the very next page of *Go Spy the Land*, namely: "Reilly had no difficulty in travelling between Moscow and Petrograd, as he had obtained a position with the Cheka and had a Cheka pass."¹⁴⁵

Notes

1. OGPU, the acronym for *Obyedinyonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye* (Unified State Political Directorate), was the name of the Soviet secret police from 1923 to 1934. In 1917 to 1922, it was the *Vserossiiskaya Chrezvychainaya Komissiya po borbe s kontrrevolyutsiyey i sabotazhem* (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combat with Counterrevolution and Sabotage), known as the Vecheka, Cheka or VChK. The last two terms are used interchangeably in this article. A Soviet secret service employee is still called a Chekist.
2. Michael Kettle, *Sidney Reilly: The True Story of the World's Greatest Spy*, New York, St. Martin's Press, p. 142.
3. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Reilly: The First Man*, 1987, Penguin Books, argues that Reilly became the first of the Soviet "moles" in British intelligence. Work in progress by others is expected to lead to stunning revelations in the near future, concerning contacts of Anthony Blunt with Anatoli Baikalov. Blunt was the art historian and former Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures, who confessed to having been a Soviet spy since the 1930s. Baikalov, a Russian emigre who worked for the Trust, has been called "one of the most skilled . . . Russian agents in Britain" (Richard Deacon, *The British Connection*, London, 1979, p. 104).
4. Vassili Shoulgine (Shulgin), *La Resurrection de la Russie*, 1927, Paris. The French title of this work—the Resurrection of Russia—which was first published in Russian as *Tri Stolitsy* (Three Capitals), captured the message of the Trust. Shulgin wrote it to describe what was going on in the Soviet Union, after his supposedly clandestine visit there in 1926. His hosts were actually OGPU men.
5. Anatoliy Golitsyn, *New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation*, 1984, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., pp. 47-51, reports how, after Stalin's death, the KGB was reorganized by Aleksandr Shelepin to emphasize the operating methods of the Trust, especially grand strategic deception regarding what is transpiring inside Russia. Did Yuri Andropov, KGB chairman from 1967 to 1982, not continue that policy? The behavior of his heirs, both in the KGB and the political elite more broadly, says that he did.
6. Anthony Glees, *The Secrets of the Service: A Story of Soviet Subversion of Western Intelligence*, 1987, New York, Carroll & Graf, p. 16. Glees also (p. 208) comments on a Foreign Office memo that praised Philby: "This sort of statement has led some authors to believe that Philby did in fact do some good work for MI6 while also working flat out for the Russians." Kim Philby's early 1988 interview in *The Sunday Times* (March 20, 27, April 3, 10, 1988) and some of his obituaries in May resurrected the notion that the former MI6 executive turned KGB general was either a British "triple" agent or, at the least, never really did Britain much injury.
7. Sidney Reilly and Pepita Reilly, *The Adventures of Sidney Reilly, Britain's Master Spy*, London, 1931; R.H. Bruce Lockhart, *British Agent*, New York & London, 1933, pp. 311-322; Kenneth Young, ed., *The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 1915-38*, 1973, New York, Macmillan; Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Reilly: Ace of Spies*, 1967, Stein & Day, 1984, Penguin Books, contain Western accounts of the Lockhart Plot. The entries for the critical period of August 8-30, 1918, however, were excised from the senior Lockhart's *Diaries* before publication, and will not be released until the year 2000, if then. Reilly's memoir was censored; R.H. Bruce Lockhart, in the *Diaries*, records that he arranged for the "omission" from Reilly's book of material Lockhart objected to, particularly regarding himself. M. Ya. Latsis (Sudrabs), *Dva goda bor'by na vnutrennem fronte*, 1920, Moscow, pp. 19-22, is an early Soviet account. P.G. Sofinov, *Ocherki istorii Vserossiiskoi Chrezvychainoi Komisii (1917-1922 gg.)*, 1960, Moscow, pp. 95-106, gives the standard Soviet version, before the historiographical revision of 1965.
8. A.V. Tishkov, *Pervyi chekist*, 1968, Moscow, cites *Pogrannichnik*, 1965, No. 23, pp. 12-14, on "who Shmidken was"; V.F. Kravchenko, "Pervye shagi VChK (Novoe o zagovore Lkarkarta)," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1967, No. 3, pp. 97-102; Vladimir (V.F.) Kravchenko, *Pod imenem Shmidkena*, 1970, Moscow.
9. Kravchenko, 1970, pp. 223-226, relates that in later years of service as a Chekist, Buikis worked in the foreign section of the OGPU, in the same department as the famous Soviet spy, Rudolf Abel.
10. Mikhail Makliarskii, "Zagovor poslov," *Ogonek*, 1967, No. 51, p. 7.
11. Richard Debo, "Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinski Plot?", *Journal of Modern History*, September 1971, pp. 413-439.
12. William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley, *The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power*, 1985, New York, William Morrow and Co., p. 87.
13. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *First Man*, pp. 14-15, 55.
14. Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938*, 1980, Oxford University Press paperback (also: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 77: "Bukharin's real cause was revolutionary war and opposition to the Brest peace treaty." Richard K. Debo, *Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-18*, 1979, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, p. 143, notes that Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky "passionately wished to reject the German conditions."
15. Carroll Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden*, 1981, New York, Books in Focus, situates Milner as the chief figure in the Round Table group in Britain, whose financial mainspring was the gold and diamonds fortune of Cecil Rhodes. Quigley documents that Milner's group gave rise, in Britain, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and, in the U.S., to the Council on Foreign Relations.
16. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 205.
17. James Bunyan, ed., *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia: April-December 1918. Documents and Materials*, 1936, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, p. 73.
18. Richard Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921: Intervention and the War*, 1961, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, p. 129.
19. James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, eds., *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918. Documents and Materials*, 1934, Stanford University Press, p. 537.
20. Milner's revolutionary enthusiasm was not, however, a passing fancy. In his 1923 plea for corporatism, *Questions of the Hour*, Milner praised *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, as a "very well-informed and thoughtful" approach to a "New Order."
21. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 170.
22. Kravchenko, 1970, p. 91.
23. Edward Van Der Rhoer, *Master Spy: A True Story of Allied Espionage in Bolshevik Russia*, 1981, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, pp. 4-5. Van der Rhoer also notes that the Okhrana most likely got Reilly his job with the St. Petersburg firm of Mandrovich and Lubensky, the Russian agent of the Hamburg shipyard Blohm und Voss which had a contract to build a good portion of the Russian Navy. Richard Deacon, *The Russian*

Secret Service, 1972, New York, Taplinger Publishing Co., pp. 141-147, gives more detail on Reilly's work for the Okhrana, and his patronage by the mysterious and powerful Pyotr A. Badmayev, whom Deacon reports was later an adviser to the Cheka. Certainly Reilly had good connections in the Tsarist government. Natalie Grant, "Deception on a Grand Scale," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 51-77, identifies Reilly as the New York-based purchasing agent for the Russian government during part of World War I. Mrs. Grant cites the Records of the Purchasing Commission at the Hoover Institution archives in Stanford, California.

24. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, 1984, p. 79.

25. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *First Man*, p. 115.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

27. George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, 1981, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 11. Robert Bruce Lockhart, in *British Agent*, p. 273, refers to the person Reilly met as clearly being Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, "Lenin's closest friend." Reilly & Reilly, p. 12, refers to Bonch-Bruyevich as "General Bonch Bruyevich." Reilly wrote, "Nobody could be more officious on our behalf than Bruyevich." It seems clear that Reilly met with Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, although "General Bruyevich" could mean his brother, General M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, a former intelligence specialist in the Tsarist Army who went over to the Bolsheviks in March 1917. Right after the October Revolution, Reilly had been in close touch with M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich. M.D. Bonch Bruyevich, *From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander*, 1966, Moscow, Progress Publishers, mentions his post-October Revolution dealings with Reilly. Right after the revolution, M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich headed the important Military Committee, where "one of those frequent foreign callers of mine was Sidney Reilly." Whichever Bonch-Bruyevich was his contact, Reilly was working with a top Bolshevik. George Katkov, *The February Revolution*, 1967, New York, Harper and Row, pp. 128-129 tells how, throughout the war, M.D. Bonch Bruyevich maintained close connections to his Bolshevik brother, almost certainly providing him with classified military data.

28. Debo, 1971, p. 430.

29. George Hill, *Go Spy the Land*, 1932, London, Cassel and Co., p. 16 for smuggling; p. 9-10 for Okhrana ties; p. 12 for his father's masonic and British SIS connections.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-115, recounts how Hill and Col. Joe Boyle transferred their services from the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks, since "We both believed that co-operation with the Bolsheviks was the best means of serving the Allied cause against the Germans in Russia." (p. 94)

31. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

35. Latsis, *op. cit.*; D.L. Golinkov, *Krakh vrazheskogo podpol'ia*, 1971, Moscow; Golinkov, *Krushenie antisovetskogo podpol'ia v SSSR (1917-1925 gg.)*, 1975 (revised third edition, 1980), Moscow; A.V. Tishkov, *Shchit i mech revoliutsii (Iz istorii VChK)*, 1979, Moscow. David Golinkov, *The Secret War Against Soviet Russia*, 1981, Moscow, Progress Publishers, is an English-language Soviet account.

36. George Katkov, "The Assassination of Count Mirbach," 1962, St. Antony's Papers, Number 12, p. 53.

37. *Krasnaia kniga VChK* (Red Book of the Cheka), Moscow, 1920, p. 197 (129), Protocol of the 24 June session of the CC of the Party of the Left SRs. A typewritten manuscript copy of this rare document exists in the Hoover Institution archive and is available on microfilm from the Russian Micro-Project at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Our page references are to the typescript, with the actual book pages in parentheses.

38. The Left SRs resigned from their seats on the Council of People's Commissars, after the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, but stayed on at jobs in individual government institutions, including the Cheka.

39. *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 211 (137).

40. *Ibid.*, p. 313 (196-7). The Commission is the Cheka. The CCPLSR is the Central Committee of the Party of Left SRs.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 308 (194), testimony of Latsis.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 313 (197).

43. Katkov, 1962, p. 87: "But we know for certain that some of the people employed as Left SRs in the Cheka were at that very time acting as agents of the Bolshevik Party."

44. *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 308-9 (194). Since the Mirbach file was found at the scene of the shooting, Latsis could not avoid commenting on this.

45. Freiherr Karl von Bothmer, *Mit Graf Mirbach in Moskau: Tagebuch-Aufzeichnungen und Aktenstuecke vom 19 April bis 24 August 1918*, Tubingen, 1922, p. 78. We thank John Chambless for his translation of this book.

46. *Krasnaia kniga*, part II, p. ii. Several sentences of Dzerzhinsky's testimony were deleted from the Red Book, on the grounds that "he relayed the reports of third persons about Blyumkin," which "cannot be verified." While some of Dzerzhinsky's testimony was restored in a 1958 documentary anthology (see note 53), the entire testimony on Blyumkin by one Zaitsev has never, to our knowledge, resurfaced. Zaitsev's testimony was eliminated by the Red Book editor, "because the witness talks exclusively about the personality of Yakov Blyumkin, and the facts compromising the personality of Blyumkin cannot be verified."

47. *Ibid.*, testimony of Lt. Mueller.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 218 (145-146), emphasis added.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 218 (146).

50. *Ibid.*, p. 295 (188), testimony of Dzerzhinsky.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 296 (189).

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 298 (189), 301 (191).

53. G.A. Belov, et al. (eds.), *Iz istorii Vserossiiskoi Chrezvychainoi Komissii, 1917-1921 gg.*, 1958, Moscow, p. 154. This sentence is from the part of Dzerzhinsky's testimony, omitted in *Krasnaia kniga*.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

55. *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 373 (226), testimony of Blyumkin given in Moscow, May 8, 1919, after he turned himself in.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 370 (225).

57. *Ibid.*, p. 302 (191).

58. *Ibid.*, p. 382 (231).

59. *Ibid.*, p. 387 (234).

60. Katkov, 1962, p. 74.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

62. Leggett, p. 81.

63. Hill, 1932, pp. 213, 239.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

66. Belov et al., p. 154.

67. *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 313 (197), testimony of Latsis: "Now I remember, that Blyumkin about 10 days before the attempt boasted, that he had in his hands the complete plan of Mirbach's private residence."

68. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 298: "A man named Bliumkin, who for months had lived in the room next to me in my hotel, was the chief actor in the ensuing tragedy;" Young, p. 38; *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 373 (227), testimony of Blyumkin, who confirms that he resided at the Elite. Indeed, Blyumkin says that he dropped in at his hotel room to change his clothes, in between having obtained the Robert Mirbach file and his pass at the Cheka on the morning of July 6, and going to meet Andreyev for the assassination.

69. Leggett, p. 293.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 419. This was in a 1967 letter to Leggett. Hill died in 1970.
71. Van Der Rhoer, p. 103: “. . . a great deal of skepticism existed, even in the ranks of the Bolsheviks, about Dzershinski’s true role in that affair.” Von Bothmer, p. 8, reports that both the Left SR and Right SR press said openly, that the assassination was carried out with the knowledge of the government.
72. Von Bothmer, p. 4.
73. Yakov Peters, “Vospominaniia o rabote v VChK v pervyi god revoliutsii,” *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia*, October 1924, Moscow, p. 17, for Trotsky informing Peters.
74. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 86; Kravchenko, 1970, p. 109.
75. Kravchenko, 1970, p. 113: “Popov was in a secret plot with the English and maintained direct contact with Reilly.” Van Der Rhoer, p. 53, places Reilly at Popov’s headquarters at the moment the Left SRs detain Dzerzhinsky, intervening to keep him from being shot, but cites no source.
76. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 91.
77. Leggett, p. 108, is one example: “Although the terrorist acts against Uritskii and Lenin were committed on the same day, there was no connection between them.”
78. Peters, p. 21, describes his impression, while questioning Lockhart, that “the English diplomatic representative thought he was being accused of the murder of Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin]. . . .” Here and elsewhere, the Soviets do link the assassinations to the “plot,” but not to the Cheka role in it!
79. Latsis, pp. 22-23. He says that least 100 people were arrested in this case, and five leaders of “White Guardist” units, composed of former Tsarist officers, were shot. Sidney Reilly boasted about the number of oppositionists in his networks, people who in reality were set up to be smashed: “. . . no less than 60,000 officers . . . were in the conspiracy and were ready to mobilise immediately the signal was given.” (Reilly and Reilly, p. 24).
80. Golinkov, 1975, p. 578.
81. Bunyan, 1936, p. 147, cites *Izvestiia* from Sept. 5, 1918.
82. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 289.
83. William J. Oudendyk, *Ways and By-Ways in Diplomacy*, 1939, London, p. 281.
84. Kettle, p. 42. Kettle remarks (p. 45) that it is “quite probable that the British were somehow involved in Uritsky’s murder.” Ironically, Uritsky was an opponent of Brest-Litovsk; his vociferous attacks on, and meddling in the affairs of, British SIS seem to have canceled the merits of his political sentiments, so far as SIS was concerned.
85. Golinkov, 1975, p. 200.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 200, cites *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia*, 1923, No. 6-7, pp. 282-285.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
88. Boris Savinkov, *Memoirs of a Terrorist*, 1931, New York, p. 351.
89. Boris Savinkov, *Borba s bolshevikami*, 1920, Warsaw, p. 32. Upon his return to Russia in 1924, Savinkov retracted this boast.
90. Reilly and Reilly, pp. 58-59. The woman’s surname is not given.
91. Latsis, p. 23-24.
92. W. Somerset Maugham, “The Terrorist,” *Redbook*, October 1943, p. 60.
93. Latsis, p. 17, identifies Vilenkin’s duties; R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 86, recalls his work as a lawyer for the English.
94. *Krasnaia kniga*, p. 59 (43), section by Latsis.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 59 (43).
96. Golinkov, 1975, pp. 578-579. Some historians have seen the Right SR trial as the first Soviet “show trial,” and we do not propose to take all its findings at face value. We cite it for the fact of Kanegisser’s relationship with Filonenko.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 579: “. . . the extremely suspicious tie of Kanegisser to Filonenko was not exposed in detail. . . . The shooting of . . . F. Kaplan and L. Kanegisser did not remove the question of the inspirers and organizers of these vile crimes.”
98. *Ibid.*, p. 581, testimony of V.I. Ignatyev.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 582, cites *Golos minuvshago na chuzhoi storone*, published by S.P. Mel’gunov and V.A. Miakotin, 1926, collection 1, pp. 147-155.
100. Latsis, p. 24.
101. Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty’s Secret Service*, 1986, Viking, p. 218, quoting George Hill’s “Report on Work Done in Russia,” 26 November, 1918, pp. 17-19, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, 371/3350.
102. Stephan Possony, *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary*, 1964, Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., p. 289.
103. Leggett, p. 84.
104. Reilly and Reilly, p. 66; Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 98, names their meeting place as the Paskeller Cafe; Robin Bruce Lockhart debriefed Hill on these events, before the latter’s death in 1970.
105. Hill, 1932, p. 213.
106. Young, p. 39-40.
107. Hill, 1932, p. 249.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 154-155. Peters was perhaps repaying an old favor. From 1909-1917 he was a key figure in the Latvian Social Democratic Party organization in London. Always close to the Bolsheviks, he set up a Latvian Social Democratic Bolshevik Foreign Bureau in Britain in 1912. In 1910, he and some associates murdered several policemen during the course of an “expropriation” (robbery for party coffers) in East London. Though he was unmistakably identified at his trial in 1911 as one of those involved, the presiding judge intervened to secure the release of Peters and his friends. Peters’ cousin, wanted for bank robberies in several countries as well as for the East London murders, was finally run to ground and killed in the famous 1911 “siege of Sidney Street.” The siege, and perhaps other aspects of the case as well, were personally overseen by the Home Secretary, Winston Churchill. See Donald Rumbelow, *The Houndsditch Murders and the Siege of Sidney Street*, 1973, London. Rumbelow carefully reconstructed all the events involving Peters and associates from police archival sources. He leaves little doubt that the verdict which freed Peters et al., was not decided on evidentiary grounds, but was “rigged,” presumably for political reasons.
109. Young, p. 45.
110. Reilly and Reilly, p. 70.
111. Golinkov, 1980, Vol. I, p. 244.
112. Corson and Crowley, p. 63. Kalamatiano’s evaluation is reprinted in full by Corson and Crowley, pp. 57-63. They unearthed it in the U.S. National Archives: Office of the Commissioner of the United States, Riga, Cable #1165, August 23, 1921, to the Secretary of State, Washington.
113. The file folder which contained these notes has apparently been misplaced sometime in the last several years. The Culver staff have been most helpful in trying to relocate it. Kalamatiano died in 1923 at the age of 41, apparently of blood poisoning suffered in a hunting accident; he had been greatly weakened by two years in the Cheka’s prisons.
114. Kettle, 46.
115. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 320.
116. Kravchenko, 1970, p. 113.
117. A headline in *Pravda* in the days following August 30 named this as the headquarters of the plot.

118. Vladimir Orloff, *Underworld and Soviet*, 1931, New York, The Dial Press, p. 104. This is a little known, but important memoir.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
120. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
122. Natalie Grant, "The 'Zinoviev Letter' Case," 1967, *Soviet Studies*, No. 19.
123. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 59, reports that Reilly, Grammatikov and Boris Suvorin, son of the publisher of *Novoe Vremia*, Aleksei Suvorin, were an inseparable threesome and organized the Wings Aviation Club in St. Petersburg.
124. Reilly and Reilly, p. 23.
125. Orloff, p. 221.
126. Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia*, 1946, San Francisco, Proletarian Publishers, p. 39, a Stalinist tract, identifies Grammatikov as an Okhrana agent. Carter Ellwood, "Lenin and Grammatikov: An Unpublished and Undeserved Testimonial," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 1986 provides additional evidence. Old Okhrana operatives, such as Reilly, Grammatikov, and Orlov, recur throughout the Lockhart Plot and the Trust.
127. Reilly and Reilly, p. 12.
128. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 17, identifies Dagmara as Grammatikov's niece; p. 19, on her apartment as command center of plot. Sayers and Kahn, p. 39, call Grammatikov "Reilly's chief contact with the Social Revolutionary Party." Ellwood reports that Grammatikov had close ties to the SR Party, before the war.
129. Reilly and Reilly, p. 49.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
131. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *Ace*, p. 161.
132. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, p. 320.
133. Hill, 1932, pp. 236-239.
134. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *First Man*, p. 62. Regarding the SOE, even Glees (p. 100), an apologist for Hill, is forced to note the track record of this organization for which Hill served as liaison to the NKVD: "As is commonly known, there were a whole host of incidents, all involving SOE and its interest in the future political map of Europe, which went drastically wrong both before and after Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R. As far as we can tell, all the incidents had the same two things in common: They had to do with the creation, by means of the resistance, of potential political leadership elites in postwar Europe and they produced a situation that was bad for British interests but good, or at any rate, not bad, for the Kremlin."
- It should be noted that Hill, who had been rejected for intelligence work by MI6 (British foreign intelligence), slipped into his job through Section D, a branch of the War Office set up for training saboteurs. Hill joined Section D, later subsumed by the SOE, in late 1939. (Hill's memoirs, see note 137.) Shortly thereafter, Guy Burgess, who had also been rejected for intelligence work because he was a communist sympathizer, joined the same unit and vouched for still another intelligence service reject, Kim Philby, who joined in June 1940. (See Chapman Pincher, *Too Secret, Too Long*, 1984, New York, pp. 159-161.) Thus Hill, the Moscow liaison for the disastrous (to Western interests) SOE organization, began his World War II intelligence work in the same unit, at the same time, as two of the most notorious Soviet spies of the 20th century, Burgess and Philby.
135. Glees, p. 263: "There were, it would appear, about half a dozen leading figures in British Intelligence concerned with Russian affairs. The most senior was probably Robert Bruce Lockhart who had the rank of a Deputy Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office. . . . Next in importance, perhaps, came Brigadier George 'Pop' Hill, a veteran British agent. . . ."
136. George Hill, *Dreaded Hour*, 1936, p. 53, reports that he had been back to Russia at least one other time. After he came out from underground, put on his military uniform and walked out of Russia with the diplomatic delegation in 1918, Hill was sent back later that year, ostensibly to conduct sabotage missions. He stayed in a strange place for a saboteur—in the house of the Deputy Commander of the Petrograd Military District!
137. George Hill, "Reminiscences of Four Years with N.K.V.D.," unpublished manuscript, p. 14. The manuscript is in the Hoover Institution archives.
- While looking up Hill's records, the NKVD no doubt also noted the case of Sergei Nekrasov, "who had been Hill's star agent in 1918." (Robin Bruce Lockhart, 1987, p. 64.) After the collapse of the Lockhart Plot, Nekrasov, recounted Hill in these unpublished memoirs, "had been the head of the White Russian organization which I operated from Constantinople against the reds," from 1919-22. Hill met Nekrasov in Moscow in the 1940s, noting that Nekrasov had apparently "gone over" to the reds. The obvious inference to be drawn, however, is that Nekrasov had not "gone over" to the reds, but, like Reilly and Hill, had been working for them already in 1918 as well.
- The authors would like to thank EIR counterintelligence specialist Scott Thompson for his help with Hoover archival material.
138. Hill, 1936, p. 10.
139. Robin Bruce Lockhart, *First Man*, p. 32.
140. Kravchenko, 1970, p. 107.
141. Golinkov, 1980, Vol. II, p. 26.
142. Andrew, p. 216, maintains, "There is no evidence that, as Hill claimed in his memoirs, he personally helped to found the section." But since Soviet archives are closed and the British official secrets-keepers have the 1918 events, like all other SIS material, under wraps in perpetuity, nobody has advanced evidence to refute Hill's account of what he was doing—and many other aspects of his memoir are confirmed by multiple sources. Compare Leggett, p. 293: "The Vecheka's young counterespionage section was the kernel of the future counterespionage department, the KRO," and p. 301: "Captain George Hill of the British Military Mission in Moscow has described how, in 1918, he assisted Trotsky in organising a military intelligence procurement apparatus for the purpose of reporting identifications and movements of German army units located in occupied Russia and Ukrainian territory. This may have been the start of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service, believed to have been founded in 1918, probably as the Third Section of Trotsky's newly-created Red Army." Trotsky was recruiting Allied specialists of all sorts to help him organize the Soviet military. Leggett (p. 301) notes the paucity of source material on the GRU, "concerning whose origins and activities little has been divulged."
143. Allen Douglas and Scott Thompson, "New attempt to cover up the English side of the Bolsheviks' 'Trust'," *Executive Intelligence Review*, June 5, 1987, p. 41-43; Lev Bezymensky, et al., "The Assassination Attempt," *New Times*, Moscow, No. 33, 34, 36, 37, 1987.
144. *New Times*, No. 37, 1987, p. 28.
145. See note 133.