tion. This operation became more interesting when it was discovered that behind the cover of a British firm called Marimed stood a group of notorious Israeli-controlled arms firms, such as KTI of Haig Galustian in London, and the International Desalinization Company in Tel Aviv of Jacoov Nimrodi, an associate of former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's cabinet and Israeli military attaché in Teheran.

In the following period, no fewer than 20 Iranians were arrested throughout Europe for their involvement in supplying Iran with weapons. In late March, a strange network led by Lausanne-based Ali Zaghian was busted as it was selling large quantities of drugs to buy weapons. Ali Zaghian, who lived for the past two years in Lausanne under the quiet cover of a university professorship, worked under Hojatesselam Rafighdust-Hashemi, the Iranian minister of the Pasdarans (Revolutionary Guard).

Zaghian and several of his agents, students in the same university, were arrested. Investigations revealed that Zaghian worked with Marcus Bruppacher of the SATI company in Zug, whose colleague Andreas Jenni made international headlines in 1981 when one of his chartered planes crashed in Soviet territory, filled with weapons.

According to French investigators, Jenni and Bruppacher are known to work with Hans Albert Kunz of Finenco in Geneva, who is better known for his association with Grand Master Licio Gelli of the illegal "Propaganda-2" Freemasonic lodge, and Nazi banker François Genoud. Out of such networks, the Geneva-based company Gatoil has in recent years been buying and selling Iranian oil to buy weapons.

Gatoil was also mentioned in the case of the Viking.

Leads provided by the arrests allowed the French police to pick up 11 Iranians in Paris and Marseille who were doing a brisk business in large quantities of drugs. Little is known of what happened to them since their arrest, not by the regular police, but by the Gendarmerie Nationale (French military police).

More recently, several Iranians were arrested in Zürich and others in Düsseldorf.

Penalties not worth the risk

The word spread rapidly in the small community of arms smugglers that for once, the United States meant business. Prices have rapidly increased because of the risks, and many dealers have simply desisted from doing business with Iran, even in West Germany. In France, individuals with dubious legal status have been told in no uncertain terms that should they be caught selling weapons to Iran, they would have no chance to ever do business anywhere in Europe.

For other reasons, even the Soviets have decided to stick to their Iraqi customer, whose weapons purchases are largely financed by the Gulf countries, which means a lot of hard currency for the pragmatists in Moscow. Iran's next battle may indeed become, as Hojatessalem Rafsanjani declared on June 13, the "last offensive."

Papandreou installs KGB terror apparatus

by Phocion

The elections for the European Parliament in Greece will have been held by the time this communication reaches its readers. The formal results of that election will have been of only tertiary significance. All important judgments to be communicated respecting the significance of that election for Greece and for Europe, can already be stated.

The two months which preceded the June 17 election were employed by the Papandreou government for the objective of installing a formidable apparatus of electoral fraud and political violence, a project undertaken with the Soviet KGB and its local Greek adjunct, the Greek

Communist Party (KKE). In the course of these two months, the Papandreou government:

1) Conducted a massive purge of the top ranks of all law enforcement agencies and of all the military services.

2) Carried out hundreds of shifts in the commands of the police, gendarmerie, and other law-enforcement organizations in every significant area in Greece.

3) Appointed 16,322 "election judges" of its own choosing and prevented the appointment of other judges who could have been acceptable to the nationalist opposition parties, thus reducing the total number of election judges to 25% fewer than the number required to cover all election districts.

4) Distributed millions of illegal, pre-marked paper ballots, whose existence makes an honest election a technical impossibility.

5) Mobilized a semi-private army for carrying out political violence in the streets against its nationalist and conservative opponents.

6) Prohibited the nationalist opposition parties from having access to the government-run radio and TV contrary to law.

7) Conducted "search and seal" raids against the residences of elected members of parliament who happen to disagree with Papandreou, including those who belong to Prime Minister Papandreou's own PASOK party.

On the basis of these newly acquired capabilities, the Papandreou regime conducted itself in the last two weeks of the election campaign as a true dictatorship. In every major city of the country, large numbers of policemen and gendarmes were deployed to forcibly break up electoral rallies of the conservative opposition New Democracy Party. In many instances during these raids, the Papandreou police administered brutal beatings, in broad daylight, on the persons of already elected and serving members of parliament. At least five MPs of the New Democracy Party, two of whom were ministers of the Greek government a mere three years ago, were thus beaten up with thousands of their constituents watching, in the midst of bloody melées with the Papandreou police.

Members of another conservative political party, the EPEN, which represents the views of a group of military officers now serving life sentences for having led the 1967 military coup d'état, have been prohibited from displaying their party symbol and photographs of their party leaders, and some have been jailed for doing so.

The Papandreou government has also deployed throughout the country youth gangs of 50 to 200 persons, armed with chains, lead pipes, and the like, for the purpose of breaking up opposition meetings and rallies, a policy which has provoked vigorous responses in kind on the part of the rather outspoken nationalist opposition. The government-sponsored youth gangs are composed jointly of members of the Communist Party and PASOK, and in most instances they have enjoyed either the protection or the toleration of nearby police.

Explosive rebirth of nationalism

The vigor with which the Papandreou regime has pursued these overt dictatorial measures is itself a measure of the explosive growth of a reborn nationalist movement during the last six months. Historically, modern Greece never had anything one might call a "conservative" movement. Instead, its place had always been occupied by a vigorous "nationalist" movement, a sort of a "populist right wing" with a certain amount of "blood-and-soil" chauvinism acting as fuel and inspiration which kept the movement within shot of a working electoral majority for over 150 years, until 1981.

Both the mass and activist rank-and-file of this traditional Greek nationalist movement is motivated by ancient patriotic nostalgias attached to symbols of more modern memory. One important such symbol is the armed forces, in which all ablebodied males serve; another such symbol, at times in conflict with the military loyalists, is the institution of the (now exiled) monarchy; a third is the Greek Orthodox Church. These three institutions and their symbolic appeal attract around them large portions of the population, each on the basis of different and often conflicting motivations, to form the broader phenomenon of an "anti-liberal," and "anti-socialist" voting bloc now menacing the regime.

This voting bloc had been in disarray between the spring of 1981 and February-March of this year. The disarray had been the result of a split leadership in the New Democracy Party (an umbrella coalition, actually, more than a party). Yet, by the spring of this year, despite the unabated leadership crisis in NDP, the popular masses of the old nationalist constituencies suddenly started coming together, seemingly on their own. Mass political rallies protesting the disastrous policies of the Papandreou regime began forming in every city and rural area of Greece. By April, the frequency of these rallies had increased to a surprising degree. Toward the end of May, continuous observation of these developments made it evident that Papandreou's 1981 majority had collapsed, and that the single greatest concern fueling the mobilization of the nationalist reaction was Papandreou's pro-Soviet foreign policy.

During April and May, each time Papandreou received new evidence of popular disapproval of his foreign policy, he reacted by taking repressive measures and then going further in his pro-Soviet direction. The high point was his notorious three-and-one-half hour speech on May 14 at the PASOK Party Congress which was a combination of high praise for the U.S.S.R. and vicious castigations of the United States. The PASOK Party Congress resolved on a policy course in consultation with the Soviet Communist Party which was represented at that Congress by Politburo member Vladimir Dolgikh.

On May 18, the Greek justice minister ordered the expulsion of the second-ranking U.S. CIA officer in Athens as a "persona non grata" on grounds that he "interfered in Greek internal affairs." His intervention had amounted to the fact that he had successfully concluded the investigation of the terror-assassination, three months earlier, of U.S. military attaché in Athens, George Tsantes. The Greek authorities, on orders from Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who is also the head of the Greek Central Intelligence Service (KYP), had done all in their power to inhibit the investigation. Meanwhile, the Papandreou government hired the notorious U.S. terrorist-lawyer Leonard Boudin as legal representative of the Greek government's interests in the United States.

Regardless of the outcome of the June 17 election, Greek politics as of that date will enter a dramatic confrontationist era. The Papandreou-Communist coalition will continue to decline regardless of its formidable power to commit political violence and vote fraud. The important fight will be within the ranks of the broad and undefined "nationalist" voting bloc. The New Democracy Party, while its problems at the top remain unresolved, will continue to lose votes to the "extreme right fringes" of Col. G. Papadopoulos's EPEN party, and others. At some early point, the formidable retired officers' groupings which are the organizational backbone of this movement, will have to settle accounts with their now "friendly" rivals among the monarchists. Of the three institutional mainstays of Greek "nationalism," the armed forces, active and retired, are mostly republican in outlook. They will have to strengthen this orientation in order to be able to neutralize the "blood and soil" influences of monarchy and Church.