||This article appears in the July 11, 2014 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
The British Empire's Cold War
vs. the U.S.-Russia Alliance
by Stuart Rosenblatt
[PDF version of this article]
The current U.S./NATO/British imperial offensive against Russia, exemplified by the coup carried out against the nation of Ukraine by the Western powers, in collaboration with avowed Nazis, has its roots in the British orchestration of the Cold War. The danger of a British-instigated thermonuclear World War III erupting over Ukraine, or any of a number of other flashpoints, makes it urgent that the fraud of U.S.-British alliance against Russia, China, and the rest of Eurasia be exposed, and stopped.
In fact, the United States and Russia have historically been allies, beginning with Russia's support of the American Revolution against the British Empire, and continuing throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, most recently with the U.S.-Soviet alliance that defeated Hitler in World War II. The British Empire desperately sought allies after its Nazi puppet, Adolf Hitler, turned on it and attacked Britain and France at the outset of the war.
However, once it was clear, no later than mid-1943, that the Allied effort would defeat the Nazi armies, the British began a massive redeployment of its intelligence and propaganda capabilities to target the Soviet Union. Their aim was to rupture the U.S.-Russia alliance, and recruit the United States as a military and political collaborator in an immediate post-war attack on the Soviet Union, including the use of the new atomic bomb.
This paper will tell the first part of the story of that treacherous shift in British policy, using the empire's own documents as a resource (the second and final part, on the actual launching of the Cold War, will appear next week). By exposing the British role in initiating the Cold War, and the hot wars of the post-World War II period, we intend to free the world from the current replay of the Cold War, which is leading rapidly to World War III. Our aim is to stop the drive for world war and crush the British imperial gambit once and for all.
Not Cold War; Endless War
There never was a Cold War per se; there was merely a continuation of the ongoing war of the British Empire against Russia, the United States, and much of civilization. When the United States dropped the atomic bombs on a prostrate Japan, the British upped the ante to nuclear war against the Soviet Union, at the earliest possible time. Their intention was to destroy the USSR, not to engage in a protracted chess match dubbed the Cold War. The Cold War was merely the temporary result of the Soviet Union having developed its own nuclear arsenal in 1949, and its thermonuclear bomb in 1953, to check the Anglo-American onslaught.
Both the evil Lord Bertrand Russell and rabid imperialist Winston Churchill were staunch advocates of pre-emptive nuclear war against the Soviet Union. In late 1945, Russell threatened to use the bomb if the USSR did not submit to his plan for world dictatorship, which started with total control over which nations were permitted the possession of nuclear arsenals. Once the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Churchill stumped for its early use against the Soviet Union. In a letter to Charles Moran, a close friend, in 1946, Churchill wrote, "America knows that 52% of Russia's motor industry is in Moscow, and could be wiped out in a single bomb. It might mean wiping out 3 million people, but they think nothing of that."
Churchill was the grandson of a duke and the son of a baron. His father, Lord Randolph Churchill, was Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. His mother, the seductive Jenny Jerome of New York, whored her way through most of the aristocracy to ensure Winston's many promotions, and restored the family's place in "society." Churchill was directly responsible for the worst British criminal actions of the 20th Century. Racist to the core, he was determined to save and expand the British Empire.
As World War II was coming to a close, the British knew they had little time to act. Following the war, the British Empire would be bankrupt and spread thin around the globe. The United States would emerge as a dominant industrial and political juggernaut. The Soviet Union would be badly damaged industrially, and would lose a large portion of its manpower, but had vast resources and a strong (even if detestable) government to drive a recovery. They would present a formidable enemy. It would be better to conquer them immediately at war's end, rather than wait for them to recover. But, to do this, the British had to incorporate the United States directly into the British Empire. It would necessarily follow that the U.S. could be mobilized for war against the Soviet Union.
This was the task: to transform the United States into a satrap of the British Empire. At war's end, the United States was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union, and was collaborating with the Soviets to plan out the new United Nations. Leading U.S. policymakers were demanding the dismantling of the colonial empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands and others, as FDR had envisioned. Americans were praising Russia, and condemning the British. A Gallup poll after the war found 60% of Americans were anti-British!
Britain's Secret War Against the Soviet Union
As the war raged across the battlefields of Europe and Asia, a political war was being fought out among the three wartime Allies, the United States, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union, as to the makeup of the postwar world. President Franklin Roosevelt, much of the U.S. military, and the majority of Americans saw the British Empire as their implacable enemy, and this animosity caused much consternation in the British camp. FDR made it clear to Churchill that that the war was not being fought to save the British Empire.
In August 1941, at the Placentia Bay conference, FDR surprised Churchill by issuing the Atlantic Charter, guaranteeing all nations the right to self-determination. This reflected the powerful anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States, and was correctly seen by Churchill and his cabal as a direct attack on the British Empire.
FDR also demanded that Britain dismantle its preferential trade system within the Commonwealth, whereby Great Britain received cheap raw materials and other supplies from its colonies in exchange for finished goods. Roosevelt's non-stop attacks on the British colonial system infuriated the Prime Minister. In 1942, Churchill declared, in response to a U.S. demand to dismantle the empire, that "he had not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."
The British monarchy and foreign policy establishment, despite their temporary alliance with the Soviets to defeat the Hitler's Germany, began to mobilize in earnest in 1943. They assembled a cabal which included the Foreign Office, MI6, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Operations Executive.
Bletchley Park was a center of British intelligence operations run by MI6. Here the government Code and Cipher School was intercepting German intelligence codes. It ran the Ultra program that intercepted Nazi signals and broke the famous Enigma Code, and its role was central to the Allied defeat of the Nazis.
Until 1943, Bletchley did not read Soviet communications; then, early that year, orders were given to begin interception. The order came from MI6 chief Sir Stewart Menzies, who, like Churchill, was a scion of an aristocratic family, and from the highest levels of the British wartime establishment. The chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, wrote a memo spelling out the policy:
"Since Stalingrad [August 1942-February 2, 1943, where the Red Army repulsed Hitler's invading armyed.] our immediate strategic objectives had changed. Until then it had been in our interest to do all we could to take pressure off Russia. Now that the tide had turned, it was in our interest to let Germany and Russia bleed each other white. We would find it easier to effect a landing in Europe, and Russia, however sentimental the British people might be about her, was likely to be a troublesome customer at the end of the war."
Among the items surveilled were Soviet communiqués to Stalin-controlled anti-fascist partisan groupings and anti-Nazi resistance organizations inside Europe. The British were determined to lengthen the war and keep the Russians fighting the Germans, and would do whatever it took to sabotage Russian operations.
In August 1943, the Chiefs of Staff established a Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Sub-Committee, chaired by Gladwyn Jebb. The purpose of the group was to map out plans for the post-war deployment of the British military. Jebb reported their uncompromising view that the only potential enemy after the defeat of the Nazis was the Soviet Union. "Jebb described PHP members as 'would-be drinkers of Russian blood.' "
Guns Aimed at Russia
By the end of 1943, the wheels were in motion for a British turn against Russia, and the plot was hardly a secret. British spy Donald Maclean was passing on the details of British anti-Soviet planning to the Russian government, which, in turn, fed them to Soviet news agencies, which began attacking "nests of Fascist opposition in the West." These exposés led a deputy under-secretary in the Foreign Office, Geoffrey Wilson, to conclude that "the suspicion and even hostility of the Service Departments towards Russia are now becoming a matter of common gossip."
After the successful Allied landing at Normandy in June 1944, top British officials, under Churchill's command, intensified their turn against Russia, starting with the military. On July 27, 1944, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Viscount Alanbrooke met with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and later confided in his diary,
"Should Germany be dismembered or gradually be converted to an ally to meet the Russian threat of twenty years hence? I suggested the latter.... Germany is no longer the dominating power in EuropeRussia is. She has vast resources and cannot fail to become the main threat in fifteen years from now. Therefore, foster Germany, gradually build her up, and bring her into a federation of Western Europe." Senior Foreign Office official Sir Orme Sargent reported that "the chiefs of staff and certain high placed officers were speaking of the Soviet Union as enemy number one, and even of securing German assistance here."
In the Summer of 1944, the head of the British Military Mission in Washington, Gen. F.H.N. Davidson, former Director of Military Intelligence, met with a senior advisor to President Roosevelt, and asked him "whether the United States could be counted on to march with Britain in the 'next war' with Russia." The White House was appalled, and expressed its firm disapproval. Under FDR, the British had it backwards: The Russians were our ally and the British were the enemy.
MI6 was in lockstep with the imperial army. In late Summer that year, MI6 chief Menzies created the infamous Section 9 of the agency, which was tasked to track international Communist activities, a counter-espionage unit. The unit, one of the most important at MI6, was headed up by the Soviet/British master spy Harold "Kim" Philby. Whatever MI6 discovered was also leaked to Joseph Stalin, confirming the Soviet leader's suspicions that the main target of British operations, even during the war, was Russia, not Germany.
In October 1944, Churchill went behind Roosevelt's back, and met directly with Stalin to establish a postwar order. In this famous "percentage deal," Stalin would get 90% control of Romania and Bulgaria, in return for Stalin's recognition of Britain having 90% control in Greece. There would be joint Soviet and British/American control over Hungary and Yugoslavia. Italy was conveniently left out of the deal. Churchill unilaterally decided that the West would control the fate of Italy, one of the three Axis powers, with no role for the Soviet Union. Stalin was incensed by Churchill's duplicity, and repaid him by refusing the U.S. and Britain a say in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Churchill's perfidy stoked the enmity among the "Allies."
At the same time, MI6 began recruiting refugees from the Eastern Front in order to turn them against the Russians. They picked up captured Soviet soldiers who had been liberated from German POW camps as Hitler's army retreated, and began the systematic recruitment of Nazi collaborators and Waffen SS members from the Baltic area. With no regard for the war crimes that had been committed by these troops, they began assembling intelligence on the Soviet armies moving into Western Europe.
By the end of 1944, MI6 was contacting anti-communist, pro-Nazi exile groups from throughout Eastern Europe. These included the Intermarium organization and the Promethean League, which would be instrumental in recruiting leading Ukrainian pro-Hitler mass murderers such as Michael Lebed and Stepan Bandera. Some of these pro-Nazi, anti-Russian killers would be redeployed into the Soviet Union after the war to subvert that government. Others would be recruited into the ranks of British MI6 and Allen Dulles's CIA, to orchestrate spying, intelligence-gathering, and covert operations.
The single biggest problem remained the Roosevelt-led United States. The British complemented their growing attacks on the Russians with deployments inside the United States to corrupt and destroy opposition to an Anglo-American anti-Soviet alliance. Churchill and Menzies maintained a massive spy apparatus inside the United States.
Roosevelt's Death: The Shift in British Policy
Franklin Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945 was a watershed in the campaign to control and take over the United States in the postwar period. It was the absence of Roosevelt from this moment on, that led almost inexorably to the crisis engulfing mankind today. Unlike Roosevelt, President Harry Truman was putty in the hands of the British and their American cohorts. He was surrounded by Anglophile controllers. Like Barack Obama today, he was a puppet of the Anglo-American establishment. He was a vicious "little man," with no abilities, save perhaps his superior skills at poker playing. He also had a conceited belief that he was an "expert" in history and military strategy. His expertise was rivaled only by that of Richard Nixon, decades later.
Within two weeks after the Allied victory over the Nazis, on May 7, 1945, the British Army and the Joint Intelligence Committee were planning for war with Russia, under orders from Churchill. Churchill told the military to plan a campaign that "would drive the Soviet Union back to its prewar borders before the United States and Britain had a chance to demobilize." However, the top brass concluded that the best they could hope to achieve was to drive the Soviets back to the line that the Germans had reached. Before the atomic bomb was developed, the British were planning for a conventional war.
Churchill and the Conservatives were defeated in the general election of July 1945, and Churchill was removed from office. It was assumed that the takeover by the Labour Party would lead to a change in post-war policy. However, it must be remembered that Britain is not a republic. In the British system, governments serve at the pleasure of the monarchy, and the Cabinet is vetted by the Crown. Despite token opposition, the anti-Soviet drive of the oligarchy would continue.
The new Prime Minister Clement Attlee opposed many of the policies of the oligarchy, but the new Secretary of the Foreign Office, Ernest Bevin, was a vicious anti-Soviet operative. With Bevin leading the way, and under the sway of the anti-Soviet permanent bureaucracy of the Foreign Office, the policies of Churchill would be continued, and then some.
MI6, the Foreign Office, and the military had been moving in lockstep against the Soviet Union from the beginning of 1945.
Hugh Trevor-Roper, the historian who had been recruited to MI6 during the war, wrote that
"the [MI6] professionals, who were 'lunatic in their anti-communism,' sometimes regarded the war as 'a dangerous interruption of the Service.' The younger officers were invited to the Chief's [Menzies'] office, where they heard Menzies declare 'we are in a rapidly changing world, politically and economically.... Basically, it is becoming clear that Germany will slowly become our ally and the Russians our enemy.' In anticipation, the summer months were spent reading books and papers on Marxism, communism and the Soviet Union. 'A real war had just ended,' and something which became known as a 'Cold War' was beginning,' recalled MI6 official Desmond Bristow."
A close friend of Philby, Bristow was instrumental in running deception operations against the Germans in World War II. He orchestrated the leak of the famous "disinformation" reports about the location of the Allied landing at Normandy, in 1944. He was the last person to lunch with Philby before the latter's defection, and wrote the book A Game of Moles, the first public exposé of British double/triple agents in World War II.
In July 1945, the war strategy against Russia was outlined in two critical documents: the Foreign Office report, "Stocktaking after VE Day," and "The Security of the British Empire," written by the Joint Planning Staff of the British military. The first report was penned by Sir Orme Sargent, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. Taken together, these papers laid out the turn in British strategic thinking only days after the Nazi surrender.
There were two main points. First, that the Soviet Union was to be identified as the new enemy, and second, that Great Britain alone could not confront the Soviets. They would have to recruit the United States to be their "marcher lord" in a war with the USSR.
Sargent was a protégé and collaborator of Sir Alexander Cadogan, his predecessor as Permanent Under-Secretary. Both men hailed from the imperial tradition in the Foreign Office. As reported by associates, the senior officials of the Foreign Office, "always had a condescending, paternalistic approach to any co-operation with the Americans."
In his report, Sargent said the British would have to overcome the powerful anti-imperial impulse of the Americans, and their desire to negotiate the shape of the new order directly with the Soviets through a strong United Nations organization. Sargent wrote that "in the minds of our big partners, especially in that of the United States, there is a feeling that Great Britain is now a secondary Power and can be treated as such, and that in the long run all will be well if theythe United States and the Soviet Unionas the two supreme World Powers of the future, understand one another. It is this misconception which it must be our policy to combat."
Sargent was optimistic that British cunning could outsmart the Americans, but a critic, Sir Ronald Campbell, recently returned from a three-year stint as chargé d'affaires in the British Embassy in Washington, did not share his outlook. "Discrimination, Exclusiveness, Monopoly, Imperialist Economy, all these words will be trotted out against us and gain spontaneous and often unthinking response from the US public. Is this point worthy of mention in your Stocktaking after VE Day? It is important in estimating the prospects of Anglo-American co-operation."
Sargent all but dismissed the role of the UN. As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the UN was a Roosevelt innovation, and not a concern of the Empire. Sargent was planning for the conflict with Russia and the recruitment of the United States to do the dirty work. He outlined the key areas of concern.
The British, and presumably the Americans, must deal with the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, the economic rehabilitation of the destroyed European and British economies, and the appropriate "administering of Germany." He focused his attention on Europe, but made it clear that the entire planet had to be addressed, especially the Near East and Middle East. If the Empire was to be preserved, Britain must retain friendly relations with Italy, Turkey, and Greece, as these were the gateways to both the Middle East and Africa. This analysis underlay all British operations over the next two years. Sargent was especially worried that if there were no U.S. intervention in Europe, then Europe would fall to the Soviets, followed by Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, potentially Egypt, India, and the whole empirei.e., he initiated the "Domino Theory."
He also acknowledged, for the first time, the financial crisis gripping the Empire in the aftermath of the war. Just as today, the economic crisis was a crucial factor in the equation. "Having lost a quarter of her wealth, 7,300 million pounds, and assumed a debt to other countries of 3,555 million pounds, it is not unlikely that this 'may have been the focus' of some consideration." This economic crisis demanded that the British negotiate a new loan from the United States and resolve Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942, wherein "Britain was required to dismember the Commonwealth preferential system of trade agreed at the Ottawa Conference of 1931."
Sargent underscored the need to recruit the U.S. into the imperial camp.
"With the contempt and cynicism which came from years of diplomatic service to what had been one of the foremost powers in the world," wrote historian Peter David Poole, "Sargent proposed to counter any such tendency [of British inferiorityed.] by imposing a British foreign policy on the Americans: 'We must have a policy of our own and try to persuade the United States to make it their own. This ought not to be too difficult.' "
How would this be done?
"Sargent apparently expected a free hand for Britain to intervene, 'in the countries which the Soviet government was intent on controlling, whilst the interest and prestige of the United States was engaged in solving the economic problems of Europe. However, once the Americans have been induced to use their economic power in the reconstruction of Europe, the Deputy Undersecretary believed they would find it 'difficult to disinterest themselves in the political development of the countries whom they are saving materially.' "
"The process of inducing the United States to support a British resistance to Russian penetration of Europe will be a tricky one, and we must contrive to demonstrate to the American public that our challenge is based on upholding the liberal idea in Europe and not upon selfish appreciations as to our position as a Great Power."
It has been this figure of speech, "the liberal idea," meaning "democracy," "freedom," "free trade," etc., that has been at the center of all brainwashing dogmas foisted on the United States ever since. Whether by Dean Acheson or Robert Kagan, this has been the mantra that has been used to convince us to defend the evil British Empire.
The Atom Bomb Changes the Equation
Everything changed on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945, when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. The war had only been extended after VE Day for the purpose of achieving success in the Manhattan Project, and using the already prostrate Japanese as guinea pigs for the experiment. The nuclear bombing of two Japanese cities was opposed by all military leaders in the United States, from Eisenhower and MacArthur on down, but executed by the Anglophile madmen Henry Stimson, James Byrnes, Harry Truman, and their accomplices. It was militarily unnecessary. Japan had agreed to surrender in March 1945, on the same terms that were ultimately adopted in September.
The purpose of this war crime was to terrorize the world, especially the Soviet Union, to submit to the jackboot of the British imperialists and their American junior partners. For the next few years they would hold a nuclear gun to the head of the Soviets, and they aimed to achieve the maximum result.
The leading mouthpiece on the British side for the assault on the Soviet Union was anti-communist blusterer Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary. Bevin was a longtime leader of the Transport and General Workers Union, who had butted heads with communist agitators on many occasions. He waged a non-stop campaign against Stalin, comparing the Soviet leader to Hitler in 1945, even before the war had ended.
During the Summer of 1945, the empire faction was very obsessed with the U.S.-Soviet entente. In July, Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to Washington, sent a report that U.S.-Soviet ties were on the rise. He further said that Russia was in direct negotiations with the U.S., mediated by FDR ally Harry Hopkins, over the future of Poland, which the British assumed to be under their own control.
At the same time, the Soviets were requesting military bases in Turkey and unfettered access to the eastern Mediterranean. This was a legitimate request aimed at ensuring that a repeat of German attacks on their southern flank would not occur again; the Soviets also wanted to engage in trade throughout the Africa-Middle East region. Since the reign of Catherine the Great, the Russians had sought access to the Mediterranean, and they decided that the loss of 27 million lives in the War was a reasonable price to pay.
Bevin and the Foreign Office were livid. They were concerned with preserving "The Empire," and the center of the empire lay in the Middle East, the gateway to the oil fields, the guardian of the Suez Canal and Egypt, and the passage to India. It was also the entrée to Africa, the source of raw materials needed to revive the shattered British economy. The Bevin-led empire faction drew a line in the sand in the Middle East, and also in the Balkan Peninsula, which protected access to Southwest Asia.
The British reacted to the Soviet initiative. They decided that Bulgaria was now in their "sphere of influence," along with Turkey and Greece. They also demanded that the disposition of the Italian colonies in Africa exclude the Soviet Union, and allow the British to control at least Cyrenaica, in eastern Libya. The Foreign Office, as spokesman for the Empire, decided to confront the Soviet Union at every point, charging "Soviet expansionism," while failing to mention their own.
Attlee waged a bitter fight against the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. He refused to attack the Soviet Union, and said "there is no enemy now to fight." He supported the fledgling United Nations as the venue to resolve differences. He said the advent of air power negated the strategic importance of the Middle East, and called for making it a "neutral zone" for all nations to utilize. He further called for disengagement from Greece and Turkey in early 1946, to defuse the growing threat of conflict with the Soviets.
He even questioned the fundamental assumption that the Soviet Union was out for world domination. He opposed a military doctrine of confrontation, for both strategic and financial reasons. He agreed that Egypt was a British satellite, but thought that the Soviet Union should be invited to share the monitoring of the Suez Canal, which served their needs as much as those of Britain.
Ironically, despite the torrent of lies coming from the empire group, the Soviet Union had no intention to expand further. Exhausted by the war, and having lost 27 million men in the conflict, the Soviets wanted spheres of influence to prevent yet another war, but had no appetite for adventure. According to Soviet reports at the time, "Her material losses surpassed the overall national wealth of England or Germany and constituted approximately 1/3 of the national wealth of the United States. According to the Ivan Maisky-Maxim Litvinov Report, the Russians sought 'several decades of peace,' in which to recover."
Two Russian historians, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, summarized Stalin's geopolitical objectives. "At no point did Stalin's demands and ambitions in 1945-46 exceed the maximum zone of responsibility discussed by Litvinov and Maisky. In fact, in some cases, Stalin's moves in the international arena were more modest in scope. During 1946, Stalin 'kept restraining revolutionaries not only in Iran, but also in Greece' and other places where he did not want to provoke premature confrontation with the British and Americans."
No matter: Beginning Jan. 1, 1946, the British imperial faction waged a relentless campaign to force a confrontation.
In January, Christopher Warner, head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, issued the intelligence justifications to launch the confrontation against Russia, and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Cabinet initiated its own operation. Warner conspired with Frank Roberts, a top diplomat posted in Moscow, to send inflammatory accounts of the situation in the Soviet Union back to Whitehall.
"Roberts concluded, 'we are faced with a Soviet policy designed to advance Soviet interests at every possible opportunity, regardless of those of its allies, and it now seems regardless even of treaty obligations.' He then outlined 'an alarming situation in which Soviet security has become hard to distinguish from Soviet imperialism and it is becoming uncertain whether there is, in fact, any limit to Soviet expansion.' "
Roberts coordinated his work with George Kennan, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in Moscow, and this collaboration led to Kennan issuing his famous "Long Telegram." Sent to Washington on Feb. 22, 1946, the Long Telegram, a wild attack on the Soviets, led to the promulgation of the "Containment Doctrine" against Stalin. While not calling for military confrontation with the USSR, the Telegram was nevertheless used by those around Truman who wished to stoke the fires against Moscow. The fuse was lit to shift a working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union into an increasingly adversarial contest.
In the new "atmosphere," Warner acted quickly to create a committee to coordinate a publicity and action offensive against the Soviet Union. In April 1946, Warner created the Committee on Policy Towards Russia, or the Russia Committee. In its first meetings in April and May, Warner and company attacked all analyses that contradicted their Russian imperialist/expansionist assertion. They dismissed outright any Russian claims of suffering large losses, having no stomach for immediate wars, rebuilding their destroyed country, etc. Warner called for a "defensive-offensive" policy ranging from intervention into elections on the continent to propaganda campaigns against Russian militarism through the BBC and other media.
Warner's efforts expanded rapidly and were coordinated with similar operations run by MI6 and the military.
Additional Works Consulted
Geoffrey Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003)
Anne Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War (London: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 165-83: John Kent, "The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49"; and Raymond Smith, "Ernest Bevin, British Officials, and British Soviet Policy, 1945-47"; pp. 33-52.
Robert Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece; The Coming of the Cold War 1942-47 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991)
Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986)
 Stuart Rosenblatt, "Our Luck Stopped Here: How Trumanism Overturned Roosevelt's World," EIR, Aug. 16, 2002, p. 21.
 See Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It; Greenwood Press, 1946.
 Anthony Cave Brown, The Secret Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Churchill's Spymaster; Penguin Group, London, 1988, p. 483.
 Stephen Dorrill, MI6, Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service; New York; The Free Press, 2000, p. 12.
 Ibid., p. 13.
 Ibid., p. 14.
 See Rachel Douglas, "British Imperial Strategists Push EU To Confront Russia," EIR, March 7, 2008; and "British Imperial Project in Ukraine: Violent Coup, Fascist Axioms, Neo-Nazis," by an EIR Research Team, EIR, May 16, 2014.
 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction, British Military Planning for Post War Strategic Defense 1942-47; Sherwood Press, London; 1988, p. 242.
 Op. cit., Dorrill, p. 18.
 Peter David Poole, "British Foreign Policy, the United States, and Europe, 1945-50," Dissertation submitted to the University of Birmingham, England; 2011, p. 7.
 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
 Ibid., p. 52.
 Ibid., p. 51.
 Ibid., p. 36.
 See Max Corvo, OSS in Italy, 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1989). Also: EIR interviews with Max Corvo by Jeffrey Steinberg, unpublished.
 Op. cit., Dorrill, p. 39.
 Ibid., pp. 40-41.