Executive Intelligence Review
This article appears in the January 7, 2000 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.


`Who Needs Brains,
When We Have Muscles!'

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The following was released by LaRouche's Committee for a New Bretton Woods.

December 18, 1999

A citizen has called my attention to a ranting piece of bar-room-style "tough talk" about missile defense, which was published in the December 1999 [Vol. 147, No. 6] edition of The American Legion Magazine. The author of that rant is identified as James H. Anderson, Ph.D., listed as a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. You should be happy to know, that neither that author, nor the Heritage Foundation he represents, will be a candidate for any of the military or intelligence appointments to be made by this present candidate for next President of the U.S.A. Meanwhile, readers of that magazine should be warned against the dangerous nonsense which author Anderson has attempted to foist upon their opinions.

Author Anderson represents the same Heritage Foundation which played a leading role in wrecking President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). That Foundation is a leading front-organization for a section of British intelligence which operates under private cover, the Mont Pelerin Society. That latter is the same organization which gave the world the Lady Margaret Thatcher whose policies, continued by Prime Minister Tony Blair, led to a series of disastrous train-crashes, such as that recently at greater London's Paddington Station. Heritage Foundation policies would have a similar, train-wreck-style of impact upon U.S. national security. Now, as during 1982-1983, the Foundation's willfully misleading proposals concerning strategic ballistic-missile defense, are contributions to pork-barrel politics, not national security.

To identify the specific incompetence of the Heritage Foundation's views on military strategy, I refer to the lesson which competent modern U.S. commanders had learned from their studies of the Dec. 5, 1757 victory of Prussia's Frederick II, over a numerically much superior Austrian force, at Leuthen. The example of Leuthen was used in U.S. senior officers' earlier studies at Leavenworth and elsewhere, at a time when the famous Graf von Schlieffen's Cannae: The Principle of the Flank was mandatory study. The essential features of that battle, point to what I identify here, as the specific incompetence of the Foundation on matters of strategic defense, both back during 1982-1983, and still today.

That battle at Leuthen was especially notable for those U.S. officers, on two grounds. The lesser importance of this case, especially for U.S. senior officers, was that fact that Napoleon Bonaparte later fought a battle at the same place, with conspicuously inferior competence to that of Frederick earlier. It was important that the bad effects of Jomini-induced, Romantic's misguided admiration of Napoleon's practices, be thus overcome among U.S. West Point graduates. For those who are competent in such matters, leading French scientist and Major-General Lazare Carnot, not Napoleon Bonaparte, was the great French strategic thinker from the period 1792-1815. However, the primary lesson to be learned from Frederick's battle at Leuthen, is that the secret of the military principle of the flank, lies within the mind of the commander, rather than either the geopolitician's cultish emphasis upon the terrain, or upon the simple-minded soldier's childish awe of currently existing military technology as such.

To get quickly to the core of the point to be made concerning Leuthen. The Austrian commander, Charles of Lorraine, moved upon the battleground with something less than double the forces under Frederick the Great's command. Charles' plan was modelled almost exactly on that used by Hannibal, over the Romans, at Cannae. However, Frederick routed Charles' forces with two successive, crushing, Prussian flanking operations, both executed within the same day.

That victory was immediately a result of Frederick's personal genius; but, the possibility that Frederick's troops could execute the daring tactics he directed, represented a high quality built into the officer corps under him, who were able to move their forces suddenly, in a scampering operation which led them to assemble at the relevant points for outflanking the would-be Austrian flankers. In all respects, Frederick's conduct on that day presents us a military case which exactly parallels the quality of mind shown by the scientist who discovers and validates a newly-discovered universal physical principle. As the great scientific discoverer applies his cognitive powers to the terrain of his subject-matter, so the great commander adduces the potential implications of both the available forces, and the terrain on which the opposing forces are being brought to bear.

It would be a wild exaggeration to accuse Charles of Lorraine of being as brutishly incompetent in military affairs as the blustering Heritage Foundation of 1982-1983 of today. Charles' schooling, unlike that of the Heritage gang, was exceptionally good: just not good enough to match a genius like Frederick. Although Charles was well-schooled, Frederick out-flanked Charles' forces by inventing a tactic which had not yet been introduced into the Austrian commander's schoolbook. Essentially, Charles had learned the model of Cannae, but it was Frederick who knew the principle involved.

Those who know of my factional commitments to Leibniz's defenders, such as Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Kaestner's student Carl Gauss, against the Enlightenment tradition dominating Frederick's Berlin Academy, will not accuse me of being an admirer of Frederick II's personality; but, only a fool would permit a personal prejudice to blind him to the fact of the quality of genius which Frederick exhibited at Leuthen.

Those implications of Leuthen, as I summarize them again here, were the issue which Dr. Edward Teller and I, in parallel, faced in the fight against the Heritage Foundation's blustering bunglers, on the issue of the SDI, back during 1982-1983, the same baboonish blustering--all fang, no culture--which Anderson displays in the December edition of The American Legion Magazine.

Heritage's political porkers against science

Although the Foundation's initial open assault against me personally, appeared, under Mont Pelerin Society direction, in May 1978, the attacks upon me by Heritage's former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) chief, Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham, surfaced during a speaking-tour he conducted during the Summer and Fall of 1982. Beginning October of the same year, Graham broadened his attacks, then focussing heavily against Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's Dr. Edward Teller. In this, although Teller disliked me since an earlier quarrel over a matter of science policy, he and I shared similar views, if in parallel, on the subject of strategic ballistic-missile defense; thus, Teller and I came to attract the same adversaries.

The gist of Graham's ranting and raving against me and Teller, was that Graham would not allow science to meddle in the definitions of ballistic-missile defense. Graham insisted that we rely upon existing technologies already sitting on the shelves of existing defense contractors. In other words, simply stated, the issue was one of a war of science versus political pork.

Graham was true to that licentious principle of the Mont Pelerin Society's Bernard Mandeville: "Private vices, Public benefits": blind faith in pure greed and other evil, as a modern Faust's best hope for miraculous gain of riches. What Graham was defending, was not the United States, but the "shareholder value" of the relevant defense contractors. That was the same issue of "shareholder value" underlying the current initiators of the Tactical Missile Defense (TMD) posture among the Stone-Age faction within the U.S. Congress today.

From the standpoint of military history, the issue was, and still is, the principle of the flank, as illustrated by the Dec. 5, 1757 battle at Leuthen. It is a principle more richly illustrated by the case of Lazare Carnot's 1792-1794 victory over the invaders of France, and by the way in which a military mind kindred to Carnot's, Wilhelm Graf Schaumburg-Lippe's protégé, Gerhard Scharnhorst, led the military forces of Germany to victory over Napoleon, in the Liberation War of 1813.

From the standpoint of modern physical science, the principle of the flank, as applied earlier by commanders such as Alexander the Great and Hannibal, as by General Douglas MacArthur during World War II, is a principle situated within the province of my professional speciality, the science of physical economy. It was from this standpoint, that I devised what President Reagan promulgated, on March 23, 1983, as the doctrine which he then identified as "a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)." There is no self-contradiction in this historical view of the matter. Just as the lawful composition of the universe existed long before man's development of science, so the principle of the flank existed long before the late Fifteenth Century's first emergence of modern national economy. However, it was not until after the Fifteenth Century's first appearance of the modern sovereign nation-state--in Louis XI's France and Henry VII's England--and the subsequent development of the science of physical economy, first by Gottfried Leibniz, and then the application of Leibniz's principle by Carnot, that this ancient principle of military practice could become more adequately understood.

To repeat a crucially relevant point, which today's devotees of "globalization" refuse to understand. There can be no comprehension of the issues of modern warfare, except from the standpoint of the modern nation-state. That modern nation-state and modern economy first emerged late during the Fifteenth Century, with the successive appearance of the first modern nation-states, the France of King Louis XI, and Louis' model as established under England's Henry VII. No nation-state ever existed, within knowledge of the history of the entire Mediterranean region, earlier than Fifteenth-Century France under Louis XI. To imagine that wars among modern nations are a simple continuation of warfare from the times of the ancient Babylonians, Romans, or feudalism, is the mark of the Romantic fool, not a serious thinker.

France under Louis and England under Henry, were the first states in which the authority and responsibility of sovereign government were premised upon the principle known variously as "the general welfare," or "commonwealth." This notion of the general welfare meant, the overriding obligation of the state to ensure the promotion of the general welfare, both for all of the living and their posterity. It was the emergence of this new form of modern sovereign nation-state, based on the republican principle of the general welfare, which resulted in the unprecedented great improvement in the demographic characteristics of populations under the influence of what became known as modern European civilization--incidentally, specifically that improvement which that rabid ecologist and Vice-President Al Gore deplored, and proposed to reverse, as in his perverse Earth in the Balance.

All wars fought within and by states of modern European civilization, since the late Fifteenth Century, have been fought either among modern nation-states, or in the effort to destroy the emerging institution of the modern sovereign nation-state. Even though a bad-tempered fool, like Al Gore, may passionately desire to return the world to a depopulated, "Pre-Raphaelite" sort of feudal utopia, like mid-Thirteenth-Century Europe, it is upon the terrain defined by the modern sovereign nation-state and its technology, that all modern war has been, and will be fought, whether Gore's aberrant ideology desires to recognize that fact, or not. In other words, whether today's wild-eyed post-modernist utopians wish it, or not, it is within the physical-space-time geometry of the modern, technologically advanced sovereign nation-state, that all global or nearly-global conflicts of the present age will be fought. The issue of all significant warfare, is the choice between population growth and worse-than-Hitler, genocidal global depopulation, a choice which will be fought out on the terrain defined by the existence of the modern sovereign form of nation-state.

The possibility of continuing to improve the demographic characteristics of entire national populations, and that of the world besides, depends upon two crucial subjective factors, both factors unique to individual members of the human species. The increase of mankind's power in and over nature, per capita and per square kilometer, depends upon the generation of validatable discovery of new universal physical principles, discovery possible only through the cognitive powers of the cultivated individual human mind. The ability of society to employ such validated universal physical principles for organizing society's effective cooperation in use of those principles, depends upon certain principles of social relations. These latter are typified by the greatest works of Classical forms of artistic composition, such as the great tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Friedrich Schiller, the works of Classical art which led to the establishment of such institutions as the U.S. Federal constitutional republic.

Thus, in the military science of history, the same principle of tragedy employed by the Classical tragedians, is applied to the reading of lessons to be learned from real military and related political history. The only science of history is that based on the same Classical-artistic approach to the study of mankind's failures and successes in times past.

Thus, on the battlefield, the essence of strategy is insight into those principles, both old and newly discovered, by which man's power over the terrain, and also the social conflict, is increased. All successful solutions to seemingly hopeless military and related situations, such as Frederick's situation when greatly outnumbered by the Austrians, at Leuthen, are to be located in this way. The SDI, as I defined the concept prior to President Reagan's March 23, 1983 address, was such a solution to a seemingly hopeless situation.

The strategic situation as seen in 1983

From about 1973 onward, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact alliance were on the way to a choice between internal collapse, over the coming decades, or a military breakout launched in a desperate effort to avert the effects of internal economic collapse. Although the Soviet scientific-military-industrial complex remained an impressive military-technological capability, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact civilian economy were a worsening disaster, in both industry and agriculture. This degeneration was accelerated over the 1970s and 1980s, by de-emphasis on building up Soviet industry and agriculture, and increasing dependency upon dumping raw materials on the world market, that, in part, in payment for the Soviet system's increasing dependency on food supplies organized by the Anglo-American global food cartel. Thus, a self-aggravated spiral of future economic disaster was built into the post-SALT-agreement Soviet system.

This long-range problem, on the Soviet side of the equation, was compounded by the folly of President Richard Nixon's wild-eyed collapsing of President Franklin Roosevelt's Bretton Woods monetary system, in mid-August 1971. If the new, "floating exchange-rate monetary system," today's IMF system, defined a trend, then the entire global financial, monetary, and economic system, was not far beyond the deteriorating Soviet economy in facing a general collapse somewhat more than a decade down the line. The policies adopted at the 1975 Rambouillet monetary conference, and the prospective election of a Trilateral Commission-controlled Jimmy Carter, signified an orgy of deregulation, and related follies, which assured, if continued. a general collapse of the world system, a decade or so down the line. By the end of the 1970s, both long-range prospects, economic collapse of the Soviet system, and of the IMF system, too, not long after that, were the direction being taken by unfolding global developments. All of this has now come true.

In 1989, the preparations for an East Germany-based assault westward existed. It was still on the edge. It did not happen, but it might have. The alternative, the Western allies' post-1989 economic raping of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, kept the Western economies alive a decade longer, but the present IMF system's doom is now inevitable, either its replacement or self-disintegration.

Given that long-range trend, as of 1972-1973, the continued reliance upon the lunatic doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the doctrine of H.G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, John J. McCloy, McGeorge Bundy, Henry A. Kissinger, et al., threatened civilization as a whole, by one or another sort of terrible outcome, a decade or two down the line. As President Ronald Reagan was to make the point in 1983, the continued reliance on the "revenge weapons" of nuclear deterrence, would be poor consolation for a planet devastated by a nuclear exchange. Avoiding such a war, and letting the planet collapse economically into a spreading economic "new dark age," was an alternative, but not an acceptable one. There had to be an alternative to both. The alternative was what I defined, what President Reagan named the SDI. It was the alternative which I stated, once again, in a televised address which I delivered in Berlin on Columbus Day, 1988, on the eve of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system.

The solution was to scrap the Wells-Russell-Szilard lunacy of nuclear deterrence. The key to the solution was to do precisely what Szilard insisted not be allowed: develop anti-missile systems, based, not upon technologically obsolete interceptor rockets, but more advanced physical principles, by means of which the possibility of a militarily effective ballistic-missile attack could be eliminated. The trick was, to have the U.S. and Soviet governments jointly undertake that common-interest mission; otherwise, it could not succeed.

The possibility of developing weapons which would be capable of overwhelming ballistic-missile flotillas, lay in and beyond the microphysical domain of controlled thermonuclear fusion. Space-based systems, detecting and striking missiles and related objects at, or near the speed of light, were feasible goals for crash-program development in relevant U.S.A. and Eurasian laboratories. At the same time, such more advanced technologies, based upon already emerging types of new physical principles, would produce a revolution in productive technologies for the entire planet. It was this spill-over into the world's civilian economy, which would more than repay the entire cost of developing the needed defensive systems.

This would require, on the U.S. side, a "crash program" on the kind of scale we associate with all the "crash programs" the U.S.A. had undertaken since the 1930s. This meant hundreds of billions of dollars-equivalent poured into the greatest technological revolution the world has known to date. However, it were readily possible, back then in 1982-1983, if the political will to do it were mustered. It is not possible a decade and a half later, today. It could be possible, in the not distant future, but not under the present economic and related policies of the leading governments and "globalizing" supranational institutions of today.

What the Heritage Foundation and Graham proposed, instead, was a type of interceptor system which had already been technologically obsolete when initially proposed, back during the early 1960s--this is pretty much the same basic, incompetent design which Heritage's TMD advocates are proposing today. It is pure political pork, not science.

However, today, a different approach to a similar sort of strategic problem is possible. If we first put the existing IMF-dominated, financial, monetary, and trade-regulation systems into government-supervised bankruptcy reorganization, a new wave of forced-draft scientific-technological progress could arise, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of our present-day technological catastrophe. The remnants of science and technology exist in the U.S.A. and Eurasia, to start such a revival.

Today, although advanced nuclear and other highly destructive weapons systems exist, no force on this planet has any longer the ability to win a general war in the conventional sense of war-winning. That includes the U.S.A., and NATO. What exists is the capability for unleashing the kind of vast destruction which would plunge the entire planet into a new dark age, the kind of war everyone, including all of humanity, would lose. What the U.S. once had, back in the Kennedy days, or what we could have had, during the early 1980s, is long gone. The entire world has a lot of rebuilding to do, before any nation could achieve a true war-winning capability in the traditional sense of the term.

Therein lies the continuing importance of identifying my authorship of that strategy of ballistic-missile defense, still today. In this matter, I am the teacher, and the Heritage Foundation crew typical of the students who insist on flunking the course, still, nearly two decades later. One wonders: what is the dividing-line between stubbornness and stupidity?

The SDI, as President Reagan presented the proposal to Soviet General Secretary Andropov on March 23, 1983, and to General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik, later, had two aspects. One of these, the scientific-military aspect, is more commonly referenced, although rarely with any appreciation of the principles involved. The first aspect was defined by reference to the diplomat's phrase: "new physical principles." The social-political and economic implications are less widely understood, chiefly because the political-pork faction, such as that behind the Heritage Foundation's strategic outlook, never wished to understand how the SDI's application of "new physical principles" leads, still today, to the kind of political solutions for military conflict which are otherwise unavailable from a simple-minded sort of military doctrine as such. These simple-minded fellows, such as author Anderson, have no grasp of the difference in the meaning of the term flank, as applied to pork products, from the use of the term in military strategy.

Creativity and strategic surprise

At Leuthen, Frederick defeated the Austrians by surprising them, by doing what the Austrian commanders would not have believed were a possible course of Prussian action. In the words of the physicist, Frederick recognized a usable added dimension of the physical-space-time field of action, which the Austrian command failed to recognize as existing. Just so, earlier, Hannibal had recognized the folly misguiding the Roman commanders into a fatally errant, tight disposition of their troops; Hannibal had exploited that folly to lead the Roman force to its slaughter at Cannae. So, Alexander the Great, advised by the followers of Plato from the Academy at Athens, came to the Macedonian command, with a clear strategic conception of the strategy for outflanking, and thus obliterating the greatest empire of that time, the Persian Empire of the Magicians and Achaemenids.

The Prussian troops under Frederick's command did what the Austrians had assumed to be an impossible deployment--scampering. This surprising action was a possibility built into the training of the Prussian cadres, and their habituation to the role of Frederick as a military commander whose "trumpet never sounded an uncertain note." The Prussian command had developed this possibility; Frederick's genius, on that occasion, lay in recognizing that an added dimension of action could be derived from this. Thus, Frederick deployed his troops in a dimension outside the imagination of the Austrian command.

Similarly, later, the power of the ultimately self-doomed Napoleon lay temporarily in what the French economy and army had inherited from Lazare Carnot's 1792-1794 leadership, a French economy and military force which had acquired the habit and competence for victory from Carnot and others. Napoleon's victories thus continued, until the time that the tragic principle of Napoleon's increasing self-corruption--Napoleon's role as a Romantic figure, echoing pagan Rome's Caesars, and anticipating the Romantic figures of those neo-Caesars Mussolini and Hitler--dissipated those physical, political, and related resources which Napoleon's France had inherited from the common tradition of France's Louis XI, Cardinal Mazarin, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, and Lazare Carnot. Thus, the Classical Greek and Christian tradition, typified by the Prussian reformers, triumphed over the Roman imperial legacy of the pagan Pontifex Maximus, Napoleon. What Napoleon's defective, Romantic personal character would not allow him to acknowledge as existing, defined a dimension of action through which the students of Friedrich Schiller's tragedies were able to define a war-winning strategy for Russia's Tsar Alexander I. Carnot had foreseen this strategic folly of Napoleon's, and it was Carnot who saved France from dismemberment by the allies, once Napoleon had been crushed.

"Surprised?" Surprise lies in the mind of him who either does not know, or is self-blinded by his refusal to know, like the routed Roman commanders at Cannae. It was not the inferior forces of Hannibal which defeated the Romans there; it was the inferior minds of the Roman commanders. So Charles was twice outflanked by Frederick, at Leuthen. So, Napoleon and his empire were crushed, because Napoleon's mind was incapable of recognizing the dimension of action through which the destruction of his empire was brought about. Notably, today's Heritage Foundation wiseacres represent minds vastly inferior, on this and other accounts, to that of a Napoleon.

It is notable here, that there were aspects of Frederick's Prussia which prefigured the quality of the post-1806 leadership shown by the Prussian, pro-republican reformers, as typified by Scharnhorst, the Humboldts, vom Stein, and the role of these reformers in defining the strategy which shaped the 1812-1813 victory over Napoleon's Romantic imperialism. The best quality of the Prussian military and its German successors, lay in that republican tradition which echoed the France of Lazare Carnot and the American Revolution of 1776-1789, both so much admired by the followers of Leibniz, Lessing, and Schiller among the Prussian reformers.

Those considerations thus summarized, the crux of excellence in all modern military strategy, is both physical scientific progress and the deployment of that progress by leaders schooled in Classical principles of composition in art and history.

Thus, the 1982-1983 conflict between the Heritage Foundation, on the one side, and my co-thinkers, on the opposing side, was a conflict between the intrinsic, Mephistophelean moral corruption of simple greed, expressed by the Mont Pelerin Society's Heritage Foundation, and the commitment to both science and Classical principles of strategy on the other. Thus, it was a battle, then as today, between political pork and science.

From the standpoint of the method I applied to define what became known as the initial proposal for the SDI, the so-called LaRouche-Riemann Method, the root definition of grand strategy lies in the multiply-connected character of two sets of universal principles. As I have just emphasized, these are, respectively, sets of universal physical principles, and also sets of universal principles of social relations, the latter typified by the greatest works of Classical artistic composition. The multiple-connectedness among these two sets of universal principles, defines the means by which mankind increases our species' power in and over the physical universe, and also the means of cooperation by which that physical power is developed and effectively applied.

On the physical side, the essence of the principle of the flank is focussed upon the application of validated new universal physical principles. The appropriate employment of such new principles, defines an added dimension of willful action not known to those who do not share knowledge of that principle. Hence, the effect of strategic or tactical surprise so achieved.

Typical of the universal principles of social relations, is von Wolzogen's use of Friedrich Schiller's studies of both the struggle for the freedom of the Netherlands and the Thirty Years War, to devise the strategy recommended to, and adopted, against Napoleon's attack, by Russia's Tsar Alexander I. This view of Wolzogen and his fellow Prussian military reformers, coincided with the view of the great Lazare Carnot. Carnot, like Scharnhorst, emphasized the principle of the defense in warfare, and warned against Napoleon's intended Russian-campaign folly on these specific accounts. Von Wolzogen's strategy: draw Napoleon in, avoiding decisive battles, until he should reach St. Petersburg or Moscow, and then use Napoleon's advance--preferably to Moscow--to destroy the city around Napoleon's forces, and thus turn Napoleon's conquest into a winter's death-trap for the Grand Army. Von Wolzogen's--like Schiller's insight--was more profound than that, but that is the gist of the matter.

In the case of my design for what became the initial proposal for the SDI, the shift into new dimensions was several-fold. First, on the physical side, was the emphasis on destroying the Russell-Szilard-McCloy strategy of "Mutual and Assured Destruction" (MAD), by outflanking it with validatable new universal physical principles. Resistance to this was key to the opposition to me and Teller from the pork-barrelling apostle of off-the-shelf strategic obsolescence, Heritage's Graham. The added cultural-economic dimensionality, was the use of the technological spill-over from a crash-program-driven development and application of "new physical principles," to define the strategic geometry of relations among the world's nation-states. In Dr. Teller's words, the object was to use the new physical principles developed for strategic ballistic missile defense, to unleash technological progress of a type consistent with the common aims of mankind, of all mankind. Thus, the creation of the latter, most desirable benefit, represented the underlying strategic principle of defense for the effort taken as a whole. The essence of the strategy, was to shift the definition of the adversary, away from a conflict between nation-states, to a defense against the economic attrition which had been ruining all leading states since the adoption of the Russell-Szilard-McCloy MAD dogma, that in the wake of the 1962 missile crisis.

In general, the principle of the flank always signifies: redefine the issue, by taking into account previously overlooked, or undiscovered, validatable principles.

Today, the enemy is typified by Vice-President Al Gore's fanatically mass-murderous doctrine, set forth in his Earth in the Balance. The cult of "post-industrial" utopianism echoed in that book, including its implied, pro-globalist elimination of the modern sovereign nation-state, is truly the common enemy of all mankind. What is killing us all, in one sense or another, is that fairly described as nothing other than what Gore openly stands for. That is what has been destroying the economies of the world, and is the economic and related policy which has produced a degraded military-strategic situation, in which more and more powers are joining wild-eyed Zbigniew Brzezinski in seeking war, while those same fools are, at the same time, destroying the possibility that any power could actually win any of the wars it unleashes in that way. Al Gore's connection to the development of the lunacy known as "Air Land Battle 2000," is to be recognized as a symptom of the same folly permeating Earth in the Balance: an Earth ruled by Unbalanced Minds.

Thus, as we see from the recent NATO war against Yugoslavia, all NATO has become, from the top down, a ship of fools, with some of the most foolish of those fools seated as Heritage Foundation fellow-travellers in our U.S. Congress. That is the threat which we must remove. That is our true adversary, one many U.S. leaders visit in their shaving mirror each morning.

The doctrine of strategic ballistic-missile defense, is a doctrine which I devised, which I introduced in various ways, including my work on behalf of the Reagan Presidency, during 1982-1983. The enemy to be destroyed then, was not any targetted nation; the enemy was a folly into which all of the leading military powers had trapped themselves in common, the Russell-Szilard-McCloy doctrine of MAD. That doctrine and its concomitants were the enemy to be destroyed. It is pretty much the same, but also much worse, today.

Strategy is too sensitive a profession, to be consigned to baboons.

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