From Volume 3, Issue Number 32 of Electronic Intelligence Weekly, Published Aug. 10, 2004

This Week You Need To Know

A G.W. Bush Intelligence Czar Is Obviously an Oxymoron

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

(Read the complete article, PDF format)

The LaRouche PAC released this document, excerpted here, on Aug. 3, 2004. The complete text can be found www.larouchepac.com, or in the Aug. 13 EIR.

The fact that there are some rather large loopholes in the present organization of the U.S.A.'s intelligence-security system, is no excuse for the current tendency to plunge, stupidly and recklessly, into rushed efforts to create an intelligence "czar." Idiot! Get your fat foot off that gas pedal! There is no need to rush into surrendering the powers of government to some alleged superman. The U.S. does not need a Heinrich Himmler.

In fact, our nation does not have any need for the re-election of that pathetic George W. Bush who proposes that, he, now, shall create the Great Golem of national security, the man of mud, to save us all. One Mussolini, one Hitler, one Francisco Franco, one Iron Guard, were each already much too much. In fact, Golem or no Golem, the slide into national bankruptcy under one term of George W. Bush, was itself already much too much.

Better leave the decisions about intelligence reorganization to the leadership of a new President, until a new day, come January 2005, after the completed work of the "9-11 Commission" has dealt with those most crucial issues not yet touched upon by its presently uncompleted investigation.

Nonetheless, without waiting any longer for those further inquiries, there are several important conclusions which I report now, on the subject of the proposal for reorganizing the top-most structures of our nation's security apparatus.

1. The '9-11 Commission' Report Itself

To begin with, in the real world there exists no such species as the "international terrorism" which George W. claims to have seen in his visions. The effects which he has blamed upon "international terrorism," are, chiefly, an assortment of actions belonging to the modern military-science classification of properly called "asymmetric warfare," "irregular warfare," or, in German, Kleinkrieg. The reported act of terrorism, as a bomb-like effect, is not a perpetrator, but only an effect; the cause of that which produces the effect, is another matter. Those deployed to assume the disguise of terrorists, are used like a bomb; those agents have a father, who uses them, a father which poor President Bush's delusional outbursts do more to protect, than to expose.

The frequent cause of such effects, "asymmetric" or "irregular" warfare, includes such examples as the warfare used in defense against the U.S.A. deployment in the 1964-1972 U.S. War in Indo-China. It includes what the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom organized, using instruments such as their recruit Osama bin Laden, for asymmetric warfare launched against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan back during the time ever-naughty Samuel P. Huntington's confederate Zbigniew Brzezinski was incumbent National Security Advisor. When we plunge into global asymmetric warfare, enhanced with threatened use of nuclear weapons, as Vice President Dick Cheney has done since Day One of the present G.W. Bush Administration, we bring the risks of asymmetric warfare, sooner or later, intimately into our own backyard.

Our nation were better protected, when we cease using the words "international terrorism," when we should be using the alternative terms "asymmetric" or "irregular" warfare.

The obvious task of domestic national security, is to get rid of both those presently most common causes for the risks of asymmetric warfare, and of such relevant carriers of that mass-murderous disease, as Dick Cheney; the objective should be, to push those factors of risk out of the territory of the U.S.A. and out of our nation's and partners' vital interests abroad.

Rather than entertaining proposed magical, Golem-like solutions for the problems of our present intelligence-security organization, we should weigh, very critically, the three, respectively distinct, leading features of the report of the "9-11 Commission."

Admittedly, some very good people have served on that Commission. However, they have been operating under two great impediments:

First, the obvious, concentrated demand for a "cover-up" from the relevant sources associated with the George W. Administration, especially Cheney's circles of neo-conservative "chickenhawks."

The associated cause for that appearance of a "cover-up," more significant, but less readily noticed, is not organizational, but cultural.

The chief difficulty hampering the attempts to maintain competent intelligence-security functions, has been the effect of the moral and intellectual degeneration of the popular, increasingly recreation-rather-than-reality-oriented culture of the Baby-Boomer generation. This generation is gripped by a careening custom of sophists' almost instinctive, reckless disregard for truth, practiced under pressures to "go along to get along." This pervasive avoidance of truthfulness, in favor of perceived personal convenience and "spin," has made it difficult for even the best among the relevant circles to cope with the idea of truth. The tendency of people affected by that syndrome, is to prefer to tend to perceive what they wish to perceive, while, with reckless disregard for truth, denying every reality which militates against that wishfully spun, quasi-organized pre-disposition for choosing a fanciful perception.

Thus, the worst damage our nation suffers from what have been called "terrorist attacks," is the impact of the mass-disorientation induced by the mass-media promotion of the myth of "international terrorism."

This effect among that generation is partly the carried-over by-product of the prevalent "witch-hunt" atmosphere of the post-World War II period; but, it is also the effect of the piling on top of that of the systemic infection which the subversive programs of the Congress for Cultural Freedom spawned, all combined with the impact of crucially terrifying events, such as the 1962 missiles-crisis and the unsolved assassination of President John F. Kennedy. These and related developments had special, deep psychological effects on the generation entering university age during the middle to late 1960s. The older, pre-1946 standard of professional performance, of face the truth even if it hurts, is an unwanted guest in the escapist modes, such as party-going life of post-industrial, post-'68er, recreation-centered mass-culture.

It is difficult to maintain competent performance in intelligence-security functions in the spin-doctored realm of people of those "go along to get along" strata which refuse to see those clear facts which they find it politically uncomfortable to believe.

Thus, especially under the special pressures of the onrushing election-campaign, the first and foremost, leading feature of the appended summary conclusions of that report, is the legendary "camel: a horse designed by a committee." Those politically opportunistic conclusions appended to the body of the report, have very poor correspondence to the useful, factual features of the report as a whole.

The second feature of the report, where the body of the report is at its relative best, is the set of facts and associated findings under the heading of that arguable negligence which might have contributed to the risk of something like the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks; this part is very useful as far as it goes.

The third feature [see complete text—ed.] is the matter of the authorship of the attacks, on which virtually nothing of substance is actually provided. Dead bodies and similar, probably misleading clues planted at the scene of the crime, do not, in themselves, identify the ultimate perpetrator behind the operation.

The best argument which should have been made in that report for reorganization of the intelligence establishment, would be to point out the failure of the intelligence establishment to prevent the U.S.A.'s going to war in Iraq, when we as a nation were incompetently prepared, in mind-set and deployed means, for the asymmetric-warfare reaction which was the virtually inevitable, foreseeable consequence of launching that war. All of this blundering and worse was crafted on the basis of fraudulently crafted false premises, concocted chiefly by aid of the "stove-piping" actions of neo-conservative "chickenhawks" associated with Vice-President Cheney and his office. This was a war crafted, by aid of fraud, in a way directly violating those constitutional conditions which the framers of our Constitution intended in designing the powers of an incumbent President.

A President who had actually served in the Indo-China War, and had learned the bitter lessons of that experience, were a more appropriate talent than a fellow who had spent his relevant war-time years as a Houston playboy.

Yet, even after all such factors have been considered, we do have a remaining problem of policy and organization in respect to the intelligence functions of our Executive Branch; but, on one point there should be no confusion: we do not need a Heinrich Himmler as "intelligence czar." Indeed, it were better that a President with the current incumbent's obvious personal problems, were not encouraged to continue his cat-like efforts to cover over the mess which his administration has, in large part, made. Let us sort out the artificed myths of the current administration, from the very real problems, before suggesting possible reforms in our security system.

Now, preliminaries stated, let us get down and dirty; let's get into the meat of the proper line of argument over the most crucial defects in the post-World War II organization of the U.S. intelligence establishment....

All rights reserved © 2004 EIRNS