**Russian ‘doctrine’: the posture of a big military power, under attack**

by Rachel Douglas

On Saturday, Oct. 16, the Russian military newspaper *Kras-naya Zvezda (Red Star)* published a long-awaited draft “Mili-
tary Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” The document was long-awaited, because the most recent prior such enunciation of the military principles of the state was adopted at the end of 1993—at the very moment that President Boris Yeltsin tore up the Constitution, upon which the Military Doctrine was supposed to be based. Composition of the new draft has continued, off and on, throughout the tenure of six govern-
ments and three ministers of defense, through the drastic shrinkage of the former Soviet military machine, and the expansion of NATO, with its admission of new members from eastern Europe, and its first adventures into out-of-area deployments.

The published draft quickly attracted attention for its changed formulation about the conditions for the use of nu-
clear weapons. Some commentaries, abroad and especially inside Russia, reduced this issue to the question of whether Moscow were preparing to “nuke Chechnya” at any moment. The nuclear first-use question is important, as is the related matter of disputes within the Russian military over the allocation of pitifully small resources among conventional forces, strategic nuclear forces, and non-nuclear new technologies, including those based on “new physical principles.” But, both are subsumed under the strategic posture of the Russian state, as it is conceptualized in the minds of people within those national institutions that have survived nearly a decade of imported, devastating so-called reforms.

The new policy document has yet to be signed by Presi-
dent Yeltsin, but the defense newspaper broke with the prece-
dent of 1993, when the Military Doctrine text was not released in full, by publishing it beforehand.

**What is ‘military doctrine’?**

In Russian military terminology, the Military Doctrine of a state is superior to the domains of Military Science and Military Art (strategy, operational art, and tactics). Military Doctrine, according to the late Marshal Grechko, is “an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its armed forces, on the nature of war and methods of conducting it, and on preparations of the country and the army for war.” It deals with the identity of potential adversaries, the likely nature of wars, and the material and methodological prepara-
tions to fight such wars.

Accordingly, the Oct. 16 draft contained a “military-polit-
ical” section and a “military-economic” section, in addition to the central discussion of “strategic military” principles.

At the outset, the section on the “military-political” foun-
dations of the doctrine motivates defenders of Russian state-
hood to look for allies or partners among the other great na-
tions of Eurasia. It calls the desirable order a “multipolar world,” the term most prominently employed in Russian-Chi-
nese diplomacy during recent years. “The current status and prospects for the development of today’s military-political situation are defined by the opposition of two tendencies,” says the draft. “On the one side, a unipolar world, based on domination by a single superpower and the solution of key world political questions by military force; and, on the other, the tendency toward a multipolar world, based on equality among peoples and nations, . . . a balance among the national interests of states, and adherence to fundamental standards of international law.”

Among the key tendencies of the recent period, the Russian military writers single out the weakening of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as institutional venues for international security. The draft lists as other new and typical features of the world situation: “the growth of ethnic and religious extremism,” “separatism,” the increasingly “transnational character of organized crime, terrorism, and illegal weapons and narcotics trade,” and the use of “informational and other (including non-traditional) means and technologies for destructive mili-
tary political-purposes.”

The Russian draft Military Doctrine defines as the main external threats to the Russian Federation: territorial claims against the country, interference in its internal affairs, countermeasures against Russia’s becoming a center of influence in a multipolar world, hot spots close to the borders of Russia, deployment of troops close to Russia’s borders, the buildup (without UN approval) of forces near Russia that could be deployed into Russia, attacks on Russian military facilities in other countries, psychological warfare and propaganda against Russia abroad, and hindrances created to the functioning of Russian state security systems, including the strategic
nuclear forces, warning systems, anti-missiles defenses, satellites, weapons stockpiles, and key industrial facilities. Among the internal dangers, are the activation of extremist and separatist groups, the planning and preparation of actions to disrupt the infrastructure for the functioning of the state, organized crime, unregulated trade in explosives and weapons, and so forth.

In recent weeks, top military officers like Gen. Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s international department, have voiced their acute sensitivity to the strategic articulation of such threats. General Ivashov spoke on Qatari television in early October, about Zbigniew Brzezinski’s designation of Central Asia as “the Eurasian Balkans,” and suggested that it was “the old dream of the West,” at least since Henry Kissinger’s time, “to pit Russia against the Islamic world.”

The Military Doctrine draft mandates a traditional Russian, elaborate check-list for the timely identification, classification, and response to military threats to the country.

The use of nuclear weapons
It was under the late Soviet President and Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, that Moscow publicly renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, although Soviet military planners never stopped their study and development of “first strike” options in modern warfare. In 1993, the passages made public from the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine allowed that nuclear weapons could be used first, “in the event of a full-scale aggression by a nuclear power against Russia,” or, if Russia were attacked “by an ally of a nuclear power,” even if the attacking country lacked a nuclear arsenal of its own.

Gen. Valeri Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, said back then (November 1993), “The Russian Armed Forces will use all means at their disposal, to repulse an attack on Russia or its allies, and defeat the aggressor.”

The new draft Military Doctrine broadens this language in several respects. The main relevant paragraph is: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use, against itself and its allies, of nuclear and other weapons of mass attack, as well as in response to large-scale aggression employing conventional weapons, in situations that are critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.”

With the release of the new draft, General Colonel Manilov was much in evidence, once again, as one of its lead authors. He told Krasnaya Zvezda, that “recent events, including in the Balkans and the North Caucasus, meant that we had to complete the work on the draft started more than two years ago.”

Advanced technologies
Under the “military-economic” heading, the draft Military Doctrine outlines a number of requirements, which allude to the Russian push for “energy-dense,” new weapons development, under conditions of very austere financing. These are the development areas, discussed in EIR several times this year: July 16, R. Douglas, “Russians Seek ‘Asymmetric’ Advantages in Military Technology”; Oct. 15, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., “Science Versus ‘New Math’ Witchcraft”; and L. Hecht, “Nuclear Nightmare of the Information Age.”

In the new Russian draft, the identified priority tasks include:
- development of the scientific, technological, and production base of the state’s military organization and military infrastructure;
- creation and development of weapons systems and special military equipment;
- initial scientific and design work “for the creation of a highly effective new-generation weapons system,” and preparations to supply it to the Armed Forces;
- “development and production of highly effective command systems for troops and weapons, communications, intelligence, strategic warning, radioelectronic warfare, and highly accurate, mobile non-nuclear means of attack, as well as their informational support systems.”

“The Russians are doing very significant work on EMP-based [electromagnetic pulse] weapons and directed energy weapons, LaRouche is definitely pointing in the right direction,” a knowledgeable European expert on the Russian military told EIR in early October. “These area-destruction weapons immobilize the communications and information of an entire area. At the same time, watch the newest series of Russian ground-to-air missiles, the S-400 series, they have directed-energy weapons components as well, I understand . . . . The General Staff is very committed to developing new weapons, new technologies, new types of weapons systems. The General Staff wants to upgrade Russian tactical nuclear weapons capabilities, as well as develop EMP and directed-energy weapons.”

If war-avoidance policies were to be adopted at the political and economic strategic level, by U.S. and other national leaderships turned competent, then these types of energy-dense military R&D endeavors in Russia have a different sort of potential for the future — as the means for the reengagement of Russia in its own economic development, and the world’s.

Russians briefed on LaRouche Webcast

Prof. Stanislav Menshikov, who took part in Lyndon LaRouche’s Oct. 13 press conference over the Internet, published an article, headlined “Plato Among the Bulls in the China Shop,” in the Oct. 20-21 issue of the Russian weekly