saved if he had lived,” he is quoted as having said. Furthermore, he said, “Hitler has been of the greatest possible assistance to the war effort,” because of his incompetence.

The Times acknowledged on July 23, 1998, that the British had committed themselves to a policy of unconditional surrender to impose on Germany, and this “ruled out for Churchill not only any prospect of negotiating with Hitler, but also with any German leaders who might succeed him.”

Marion Countess Doenhoff referred to Churchill’s policy, in an article which appeared in mid-July 1998 in the weekly Die Zeit commemorating the failed July 20, 1944 coup attempt. She wrote, that “although Churchill was perfectly informed about the real situation, he declared at the House of Commons on Aug. 2, the events of July 20 represented nothing but ‘fights of extinction among the notables of the Third Reich.’

“Apparently, Churchill was interested in breaking the Germans, and not admitting that they themselves had tried to liberate themselves. . . . Indeed, he had already declared on Sept. 3, 1939, the day when the war began: ‘This is an English war, and its objective is the extinction of Germany.’ ”

It was the extinction of Germany, not the defeat of Nazism, which was the priority of the British. In fact, due to consistent British sabotage of the German resistance, even providing information to the Nazis, to liquidate resistance fighters, and refusal to take action against concentration camps, the British succeeded in prolonging the war and killing massive numbers of Germans. There were as many casualties in the last nine months of the war, that is after the failed attempt against Hitler by Stauffenberg, as in the entire five years of war up to that point.

The British bear direct responsibility for the Holocaust, as well. Not only did they not intervene to bomb rail lines into concentration camps, once the existence of such camps had become common knowledge, but they deliberately concealed information they had about the Holocaust years earlier.


The stories are based on what is documented in a new book, by American University historian Richard Breitman, entitled, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew, based on his reading of recently declassified intercepts by British codebreakers during the Second World War. Breitman reveals that the Churchill government, and Churchill personally, knew about the Holocaust a year earlier than was thought, and concealed the information from the Allies. Britain had recognized the Nazi policy of mass killing of Jews in the East by mid-September 1941, and by the following January, realized that Hitler was intent on exterminating European Jewry. Nevertheless, the information from the secret radio intercepts was not passed on to the United States until 1982 (!), as part of an American investigation of suspected war criminals.

According to Breitman, Churchill’s reputation as “a great hero” should be challenged, since he should have alerted Jews in Germany’s satellite states and in neutral countries, while Roosevelt’s role in the whole story should be more positively reassessed, as he was kept in the dark by the British. In a statement Oct. 14, quoted by the Times, Breitman says: “The British did not share these decodes with the Americans. There was a secrecy reason for not doing so, but there were also a number of conflicts, and a great deal of mistrust between London and Washington on Jewish issues. Anthony Eden [the Foreign Secretary] was a strongly negative influence. To some extent, the reputation of Roosevelt needs adjustment on this issue, because the British knew this earlier. I do not see how it follows that Churchill was a great hero in responding to the Holocaust and Roosevelt was a great villain.”

Breitman charges that the British “simply hoarded” the vital information they were accruing, on transport and other aspects of the infrastructure of the Holocaust. Asked by the Telegraph how he assessed British conduct in late 1941 and much of 1942, he said: “I do not use the word ‘atrocious,’ but I believe that Britain, not in a military sense but in a political and diplomatic sense, could have done more than it did.”

Supplement II

Churchill’s plans for World War III

The British press revealed in early October, the contours of a plan conceived by Winston Churchill, to launch an Anglo-American war against the Soviet Union, after the war in Europe had been effectively ended. Churchill’s Chiefs of Staff committee turned down the plan, on military grounds. Excerpts of the plan were published by the Daily Telegraph on Oct. 1, 1998.

According to the Daily Telegraph report by Ben Fenton, Churchill feared that after V-E Day on May 8, 1945, the Russians could move westwards and threaten Britain. Churchill’s view was that an assault against the Soviet Union would be the only solution, and that it would have to be mounted before the Americans withdrew the best of their forces for combat
in the Pacific. Churchill ordered his staff to “think the unthinkable,” and draft a plan. The report which resulted, named “Operation Unthinkable,” was delivered to Churchill on May 22, by his Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay. This was five days after German Admiral Doenitz had formally surrendered. The scenario for this “Third World War,” which was to have started on July 1, went as follows:

**‘Operation Unthinkable’**

“The overall political or political object is to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire. . . .

“Even though ‘the will’ of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment.

“A quick success might induce the Russians to submit to our will at least for the time being; but it might not.

“That is for the Russians to decide. If they want total war, they are in a position to have it. . . .

“To achieve the decisive defeat of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of manpower to counteract their present enormous manpower resources.

“This is a very long-term project and would involve: a) the deployment in Europe of a large proportion of the vast resources of the United States. b) the re-equipment and re-organisation of German manpower and of all the Western European Allies.”

Opting for a limited war, given that total war would be unwinnable, Churchill’s team, according to Fenton’s account, planned “an attack by 47 British and American divisions, 14 of which would be armored, on a two-pronged offensive, one part along the Baltic coast of Germany towards Stettin [Szczecin], the second further south towards Poznan, both cities being well inside Poland.” Ten Polish divisions were supposed to join in, as well as 10 German divisions, rearmed “under a reformed German High Command.”

According to an appendix to the report, entitled “German reactions to conflict between Western Allies and Russia,” the team considered the possibility of having up to 100,000 Germans engaged: “War-weariness will be the predominant feature of the attitude of the German civil population. However, ingrained fear of the Bolshevik menace and of reprisals by the Russians should make the German civil population prefer Anglo-American to Russian occupation and therefore incline it to side with the Western Allies.”

The plan which emerged, according to Fenton’s summary, was that, “as infantry attacked westwards, the Royal Navy would sail along the Baltic coast, supporting the attack’s left flank and harrying the Russian right almost unopposed. The RAF and USF would operate from bases in Denmark and northern Germany, outnumbered by the Russians, but with superior machinery,” Fenton wrote.

Operation Unthinkable assessed the situation as follows: “Superior handling and air superiority might enable us to win the battle, but there is no inherent strength in our strategic position and we should, in fact, be staking everything upon the tactical outcome of one great engagement.” Churchill’s team considered that Russian retaliation could include attempts to take over Norway, Turkey, Greece, and the oil fields in Persia and Iraq. Thus, they argued: “If we are to embark on war with Russia, we must be prepared to be committed to a total war, which would be both long and costly.” They added: “Our numerical inferiority on land forces it extremely doubtful whether we could achieve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object.”

**‘A protracted war against heavy odds’**

The report on Operation Unthinkable, was then handed over to the Chiefs of Staff committee, which included Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. On June 8, the senior officers replied that, considering the numerical superiority of Russian divisions (264 to 103), a different approach should be taken.

“It is clear from the relative strength of the respective land forces that we are not in a position to take the offensive with a view to achieving a rapid success.

“Since, however, Russian and allied land forces are in contact from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we are bound to become involved in land operations. In support of our land forces we should have technically superior, but numerically inferior, tactical air forces.

“As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared to those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these strategic air forces to supplement our tactical air forces in support of land operations.

“Our views, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds.

“These odds, moreover, would become fanciful if the Americans grew weary and indifferent and began to be drawn away by the magnet of the Pacific War.”

Churchill, having received the response of his military officers, wrote to Ismay on June 8, saying, considering American redeployments and possible Russian advances westwards, “Pray have a study made of how then we could defend our island, assuming France and the Low Countries were powerless to resist the Russian advance to the sea.” Churchill ended his letter, “By retaining the codeword ‘Unthinkable,’ the Staffs will realise this remains a precautionary study of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical contingency.” The study Churchill commissioned was presented on July 22.