

except for political declarations. This is an insane capability. In November, the newspaper *Sevodyna* published an article on one of our 30-ton thermonuclear bombs—2,400 Hiroshimas! And such bombs today are in the hands of people with a criminal mentality.

EIR: You're not exaggerating?

Urazhtsev: They are quite capable of using these weapons. During the last days of the seizure of the White House, I spoke with very high-ranking people, in particular with the cosmonaut Vitali Sevostyanov, who has known Yeltsin for 30 years. He said that Yeltsin would do anything to stay in power. He would even organize a nuclear world war.

It should be understood that Yeltsin's statements about the Parliament being crazy have some foundation. Yeltsin himself began as a deputy of Russia. Before becoming chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and then President, he was one of them, and was nominated for high office by the people he today defames as mentally deficient. Absurd!

In the case of Yeltsin and his close entourage, we should speak not about mental deficiency (that would be too easy an explanation), but about vice of another sort. What an unscrupulous lot there is around Yeltsin today! Shumeiko, Poltoranin. Listen to the ravings of Poltoranin or Shumeiko, look at what [Yegor] Gaidar does—an obvious sadist. Look at what kind of *duci* we have around Yeltsin today. Look at what they look like. Yuri Luzhkov, I believe, visited you in the United States not long ago, in mid-September. He's Fantomas [criminal in a popular detective story—ed.]. It's obvious. There is a method of determining by external evidence, whether or not a given person is criminally inclined. And this person is third after Yeltsin, in the hierarchy of state officials! Poltoranin! They're all thieves. Gaidar—a vampire. He sucks blood, at night. And these people, are "Russia's Choice"?! [The name of the main pro-Yeltsin electoral slate—ed.] This gang? Pure raving!

Of course, this regime is doomed. It's another question, what ruins it will leave us. If it's smoking ruins, we'll all be choking.

Yes, we are Upper Volta with missiles. But this Upper Volta will burn not only its huts.

Therefore, one has to see sober, rational people in Russia. There are such people. But it doesn't suit the leader of Upper Volta for such people to be visible, or to exist at all.

Why did the regime shed blood? When does a regime shed the blood of its own citizens? At the moment it is mortally threatened. Almost nobody came out to support Yeltsin. Fifteen hundred people, maybe. But on Oct. 3, I brought 200,000 people from October Square, and we lifted the blockade of the White House. That's why Yeltsin hates me to death, thinking that I thought the whole thing up, and brought those people.

Next week: The events of Oct. 3 and 4.

Could the elections be free and fair?

by Konstantin Cherenmykh

Editors' note: *Konstantin Cherenmykh is a journalist from St. Petersburg, Russia. In this article, first published in the German newspaper Neue Solidarität, he analyzes the political brawl taking place before the elections slated in Russia for Dec. 12. This vote will select a new State Duma, decreed into existence by Boris Yeltsin.*

On Sept. 21, Yeltsin abolished the elected Parliament, or Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, by decree. Although the Parliament attempted to resist its termination and the Constitutional Court ruled that Yeltsin had violated the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin summoned support from key Army units to crush the Supreme Soviet by force. On Oct. 4, the Parliament building was shelled, with heavy casualties. Some leaders of the Parliament are in prison or in hiding. The new Duma has been dubbed a "pocket Parliament" or even a new Politburo, since Yeltsin is also seeking ratification of a new Constitution, under which he will be able, as President, to exercise the ultimate veto over the new body by dissolving it.

If Cherenmykh's report recalls a Byzantine Empire court chronicle, it is also testimony—as he maps the network of banks behind the political parties and blocs—to the impact of western-brand "free market" reforms in Russian politics: Everything, from influence to television time to the franchise to proclaim new "sovereign republics" in the middle of Russia, is for a price. As the Russian economy slumps further into an abyss and justifiable rage builds against the wholesale destruction of the country that has been billed as "reform," it becomes more and more dangerous for western governments to applaud the corrupt horse-trading described in the West as the flowering of democracy.

The so-called victory of democracy achieved on Oct. 4 in Russia has been the occasion for the discreditation and dissolution of legislative bodies at all levels. The *soviets* (elected councils) are now being blackballed as communist and reactionary, by the official propaganda. Only a few years ago, during the first free elections (which were much freer than the ones being prepared now) the same political leaders now responsible for this smear, called the same *soviets* democratic.

In several city councils, such as those of Moscow and St.

Peterburg, those elections left the communists in the minority. The *sovets* became an opposition force, not because of the presence of communists, but because they tried to exert control over the Executive branch, especially concerning the distribution of property.

After Yeltsin's Sept. 21 Decree No. 1,400, abolishing the Supreme Soviet, the property of the Supreme Soviet became the property of the President's Administration. The Constitutional Court also lost part of its property, the moment it was suspended by Yeltsin. That has become traditional for Yeltsin's regime: All those who didn't show loyalty to his rule, lost not only their name and their fame, but also part of their property.

Property became the most important issue among democratic leaders in Russia. Yeltsin, Anatoli Sobchak, Gavriil Popov, and a lot of others left the Legislative branch in 1990 or 1991, for the Executive branch of government. Yeltsin was elected President in 1991, Sobchak and Popov became mayors of the two biggest Russian cities, St. Peterburg and Moscow. Shortly afterwards, they started speaking about the need for strong executive power, concentrated in the hands of a small number of people.

As mayor of Moscow, **Gavriil Popov** was the first to say that the Moscow City Council had become an obstacle to reform and should be dissolved. He tried to do that de facto, by redrawing the city's electoral districts, and dissolving all the district *sovets*. Thus he succeeded in removing all bodies that might have monitored him and other officials, as they manipulated city property as they wished. But he acted too quickly and underestimated the City Council (Mossovet) officials, who blocked his measures and forced him to resign.

The new mayor of Moscow, **Yuri Luzhkov**, took office in March 1991. This official, from an old team and with a lot of experience in management, exploited the struggle between Yeltsin and [Speaker of the Parliament Ruslan] Khasbulatov. He manipulated a number of party financial groups, which profited from selling and leasing out highly valuable Moscow real estate. The most powerful of these, a financial group called *Most*, or Bridge, had its headquarters on the 25th floor of the Moscow mayoralty building. After the "new October Revolution," as the massacres of Oct. 3-4 are called in Russia, Luzhkov, with Yeltsin's support, dissolved the district councils, as well as the Mossovet, under the pretext that some of their members had taken part in the opposition movement. He thus was able to acquire an enormous amount of property.

Luzhkov was pursuing not only his own interests, but those of a huge economic group, which is actually the owner of the biggest Russian petroleum extraction companies. The most important figure in this group is Prime Minister **Viktor Chernomyrdin**, the former minister of the oil and gas industry. Chernomyrdin is supported by the industrial ministries' elite: Vice Premier **Aleksandr Zaveryukha**, Central Bank head **Viktor Gerashchenko**, Minister of Foreign Trade **Oleg Davydov**, and Minister of Industry **Oleg Soskovyets**.

Two blocs in the government

This group within the Russian government is called the economic bloc, as opposed to the so-called democrats' bloc, which includes Yegor Gaidar, Anatoli Chubais (head of the State Property Committee), and Mikhail Poltoranin (head of the Federal Information Center, or propaganda department). Poltoranin was editor of *Moskovskaya Pravda*, when it was run by the Moscow city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) under Boris Yeltsin, in 1986-87.

Three other political figures should be mentioned in context of the democrats' bloc: Gennadi Burbulis, Sergei Shakhrai, and Vladimir Shumeiko.

Like Yeltsin, **Gennadi Burbulis** hails from Yekaterinburg. He lost his position of State Secretary, when Yeltsin failed to win support from the Army and the security ministers for his first attempt to dissolve the Parliament, in December 1992. Burbulis was made the scapegoat for this defeat, but he remained head of a political think-tank called Strategy. Recently he was elected as head of the executive committee of the new electoral bloc Russia's Choice, whose chairman is Sergei Kovalyov.

In the spring of 1993, Vice Premier **Sergei Shakhrai** said he intended to be elected President in future elections and tried to form his own political party. In this he has succeeded only now, heading up one of several slates formed for the Dec. 12 vote. Shakhrai also tried to exploit the controversy between the President and the Parliament, and he opposed dissolving the latter in September 1993. He deemed it too early. After the tragic events in Moscow, he indicated his disagreement with Yeltsin's extraordinary measures, and founded the Party of Russian Unity and Concord. It received semi-official support from Oleg Soskovyets and Viktor Chernomyrdin, and financing from the Foreign Commercial Bank (Inkombank), the Imperial Bank, and the All-Russian Stock-Market Bank.

Shakhrai's bloc also includes the new political movement Businessmen for a New Russia, led by **Konstantin Zapulin**. The latter belong to Luzhkov's group, so it is easy to see that Shakhrai has actually joined, or put himself at the disposal of, the economic bloc.

Vladimir Shumeiko succeeded Burbulis as head of the State Personnel Administration. He set his sights on becoming the number-two man after the President. In the summer of 1993, Yeltsin hinted that his successor should be "as tall as himself," which was interpreted to mean that he was choosing between Shakhrai and Shumeiko in favor of the latter, because Shakhrai is short and Shumeiko is as tall as Yeltsin.

In September 1993, Shumeiko came into conflict with **Mikhail Poltoranin**. Each pretended, firstly, to control the mass media and, secondly, to be author of the new state ideology. Both were accused by the Parliament of corruption. The latest statements by Shumeiko opposing Poltoranin and

accusing him of cynicism, reveal that Poltoranin had attempted to create a split between Shumeiko and Yeltsin, thus pushing Shumeiko toward the economic bloc. Shumeiko, who at first was number two on the slate of Russia's Choice, later withdrew his name.

With Yeltsin's decision not to hold presidential elections until 1996, Poltoranin has probably succeeded in convincing Yeltsin not to make Shumeiko his successor.

Banks behind the slates

The popular figure **Grigori Yavlinsky** has formed another democratic election bloc, which declared itself to be in opposition to the government and Yeltsin. He is known as a former ally of Communist Party leader and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov, and a future candidate for presidential elections. Yavlinsky's bloc includes mostly scientists, and some politicians who were in the party Democratic Russia, before it was transformed into Russia's Choice. It is supported by the above-mentioned Bridge group, centered on the Most Bank (Russian for "Bridge Bank"). It also depends on money from the economic bloc, and can be easily used by the latter.

Several other banks are supporting both Russia's Choice and Yavlinsky's bloc, just to be sure. One of them is Menatip, one of the most powerful financial structures, which most likely originated from CPSU monies.

Also of note is **Yuri Skokov**, former head of the Security Council, who was removed for insubordination, when he refused to support Yeltsin's second attempt to dissolve the parliament, in March 1993. Skokov is the leader of the Production Workers' Confederation and was preparing to create a strong electoral bloc on that base. Being supported by some banks (Unikom Bank, Prof Bank), he united some moderate nationalists, some socialists, some businessmen engaged in petroleum extraction, and Cossacks. His bloc was named Fatherland and would certainly have become the main opposition force in the new Parliament, but after the Communist Party of the Russian Federation got permission to take part in the elections, Fatherland lost part of its electorate and could not gather the necessary 100,000 signatures in time to qualify for the ballot.

Another new significant financial and political group that failed to achieve ballot status is the Consolidation Party. This organization was initiated unofficially by **Ruslan Khasbulatov**. It united the joint ventures Inter-Ural (Aleksandr Tikhonov) and Germes (Valeri Neverov). The Consolidation Party gathered the necessary number of signatures, but a few days later there was an official finding, that this and several other opposition groups allegedly violated some laws in gathering signatures. (Only 13 of 21 parties or blocs that submitted the required 100,000 signatures were accepted to participate in the elections. Of the parties that failed, five were opposition parties.)

Civic Union, previously headed by Vice President **Alek-**

sandr Rutskoy, has also formed a bloc to take part in the election. Rutskoy being incarcerated in Lefortovo Prison, Civic Union is now led by **Arkadi Volsky** and **Oleg Rumyantsev**, who was secretary of the constitutional committee of the Supreme Soviet. But, deprived of support from the Supreme Soviet, it has exposed its inability to become an independent political structure; The big industrial companies, whose interests it expresses, lack the financial means to support its campaign on a large scale. In early November, the leaders of Civic Union stated that they, like Shakhrai's bloc, support Chernomyrdin as prime minister. In other words, it also stands for the economic bloc.

Among the smaller political blocs that will take part in the elections is the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, founded in 1990 by elements of the Gorbachov elite, including some new officials like **Gavriil Popov** and **Anatoli Sobchak**. In 1992, the Movement began to oppose some of the measures taken by then Prime Minister **Yegor Gaidar**, executor of the decontrol of prices known as "shock therapy." It is well known that Gorbachov and Yeltsin are rivals within the old Soviet *nomenklatura*, who still hate each other. Probably because of this, people belonging to this group, including a former member of the Gorbachov Politburo, **Aleksandr Yakovlev**, will play a moderate opposition role.

Crafting the opposition

The organizers of the coming election campaign have done everything possible to avoid the return of the former oppositional parliamentarians into the new legislative organs. When the Fatherland bloc failed to gather 100,000 signatures, its leaders explained that a plane carrying 30,000 signatures from Siberia was delayed for several hours, but this was not taken into account by the central election bureau. Thus the potential opposition representation in the new Parliament will be limited to the Agrarian Union, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Liberal-Democratic Party, better known as the party of **Vladimir Zhirinovskiy**.

The Agrarian Union was able to gather the largest number of signatures. But since it will evidently get no support in urban election districts, it will not get more than 20%. The Agrarian bloc opposes Gaidar's team, but it will support the conservative part of the economic bloc around Vice Premier Zaveryukha and Central Bank director Gerashchenko. Probably it will oppose the majority of the Parliament on some rural issues. This bloc is financed by several banks that have to compete for influence, such as the Agrarian-Industrial Bank, which was formed (like many banks) thanks to money from the CPSU.

Gennadi Zyuganov, leader of the Russian communists, has never behaved as an orthodox communist, although he has been co-chairman of the National Salvation Front. He has never supported the plan for a strict communist restorationist constitution, promoted by some orthodox communists. Also, Zyuganov insisted that members of his party should not par-

ticipate in demonstrations for the Nov. 7 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Thus, he drew a line between his party and the other communist parties, of which there exist about five!

Zyuganov often repeats that "Russia has exhausted its limit of revolution and civil wars"; in other words, that he doesn't consider himself a revolutionary. He stresses that any future Russia must include all forms of property. These slogans appear more social-democratic than communist, and therefore many orthodox communists call Zyuganov an opportunist.

Zyuganov several times praised the appointment of Chernomyrdin to the post of prime minister in December 1992, and continues to support his holding that position. He also praised Sergei Shakhrai for his "sober point of view," when Shakhrai had just supported Chernomyrdin. Considering that Zyuganov has never uttered a word of support for Yuri Skokov and has always rejected any attempts to reunite the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Socialist Labor Party (one of Skokov's parties), although their political views appear quite similar, one has to conclude that Zyuganov is Chernomyrdin's man.

The Zhirinovskiy factor

I have to say a few words about **Vladimir Zhirinovskiy**. Experience shows that he is the best-suited figure to discredit any idea or any politician near to him. The question of whether or not he is part of the opposition is seldom discussed any more, because it was quite evident from the moment he appeared on the political scene, that this was just a sham opposition.

Zhirinovskiy emerged in early 1990. *Moscow News* wrote at that time, that his party was "the first opposition party in our country," despite the fact that the Democratic Union had been founded two years before! But this line was repeated, and the emergence of Zhirinovskiy's party was interpreted as a sign of new thinking and pluralism.

At first it was called the Social-Democratic Party, but later he changed his mind and the "Social" became "Liberal." It was learned later, that Zhirinovskiy was financed by the Commercial Bank, run by **Aleksandr Zavidiya**. There is documentary proof that this bank was capitalized by special resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU. When Zhirinovskiy launched his Liberal-Democratic Party, he pledged he would never oppose the CPSU of Gorbachov.

How Zhirinovskiy functions as a pseudo-opposition is exemplified by the case in which several Russian officers were arrested in Latvia in 1991. Zhirinovskiy led a communist protest demonstration at the Latvian embassy in Moscow, shouting that they must be released immediately, otherwise Russians would throw Latvians out of their houses and other threats. When the officers were set free, it was interpreted as a success for Yeltsin, but of course, Yeltsin could not have done himself, what Zhirinovskiy did. (In a similar trick, Rus-



Yegor Gaidar, architect of the shock therapy measures destroying Russia, at the White House in 1992. He had been appointed First Deputy Premier by Yeltsin.

sian Gen. **Aleksandr Lebed**, commander of the 14th Army, Russian forces fighting alongside separatists in the Trans-Dniestr part of Moldova, was later used to make very chauvinistic, offensive statements against the Moldavian President, in order to stop the war between Moldova and the Trans-Dniestr Russian separatist movement. It was handier for Moscow if Lebed made such statements, rather than, say, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.)

In the new Parliament, Zhirinovskiy will also have a certain function to fulfill. If some idea is being discussed that is not favorable for Yeltsin or maybe Chernomyrdin, Zhirinovskiy could begin chattering on the subject until it becomes impossible to discuss anything. In other situations, he may create a disorder that could stop the work of the Parliament itself. And if a situation such as in September 1993 repeats itself, he will be the man to shout: Take up arms! Shoot! and so on.

The deputies of Zhirinovskiy's party, at least in St. Petersburg, are known as people "with loud voices, and little intellect." It will be very easy to use them for any kind of provocation.

The real opposition

The democratic opposition—meaning democrats, who were democrats before and have remained democrats now, and who don't misuse the word "democracy" by attaching it

to Yeltsin's authoritarianism—is scattered in different blocs. Most of its members are not even part of a party bloc, but try to run in single-mandate districts, as independent candidates. But their chances look bad, as they seem to be unable even to collect the required amount of signatures within the very short period of time.

Instead of them, the districts will be won by people who have a lot of money from any source: businessmen, or so-called businessmen, who understood even several years ago, that everything and anything can be bought, in the “new social relations” under Yeltsin.

To my mind, it is very difficult, even almost impossible, for true democrats to make their way into the new Parliament.

Byzantine power games

As was to be expected, the events of Oct. 3 and 4 led to a sharp controversy between the democrats' bloc and the economic bloc in the Russian government, after the elimination of their common rival, Khasbulatov. Signs of this conflict could be seen already at the beginning of September, when Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Vice Premier Oleg Lobov criticized the privatization methods of the State Property Committee under Anatoli Chubais.

Then Yeltsin returned Yegor Gaidar to the government as first vice premier. **Oleg Lobov** was made secretary of the Security Council, which nowadays doesn't play any significant political role. These measures preceded Yeltsin's dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, which sharply opposed Gaidar and his team. Yeltsin was evidently trying to avoid an alliance of Khasbulatov and the economic bloc, against the democrats' bloc and himself.

But the economic bloc probably gained more profit from the Moscow events than did Yeltsin himself. Yeltsin has become more dependent on the Army structures, and the unwillingness to support him exhibited by many generals, shows that the Army will probably soon try to play its own independent role in Russian politics.

Media wars

In mid-October, newspapers and television channels controlled by the rival groups began an argument. The TV program “*Itogi*” (Results), financed by the Bridge group, tried to emphasize Yeltsin's inability to manage the Armed Forces. Their opponents highly praised Defense Minister General Grachov and criticized the Moscow city administration, i.e., Mayor Luzhkov, for not taking adequate measures to avoid involvement of common citizens in the bloodshed.

One TV program run by Gaidar supporters even stressed that the demonstrators on Oct. 3 “for some reason” did not touch the offices of the Bridge group, located in the same building as the Moscow Mayoralty, which was seized. (Actually, there was no reason why the demonstrators should be concerned with anything else than the mayor's office, and they would not have known what was located on the 25th

floor of the 33-story building. Besides, they were in a hurry to reach the Ostankino TV center as soon as possible.)

Some days later, Aleksandr Zaveryukha demonstratively left a government conference, saying that the “reformers” (meaning Gaidar) were not taking care of the needs of agriculture. Zaveryukha is responsible for agrarian policy.

On Nov. 21, the newspaper *Sevodnya*, also sponsored by the Bridge group, protested against a new attempt by the State Property Committee to ruin the national oil-refining industry. That problem has become crucial in the conflict among rival parts of the elite. Equating “victory of democracy” with “victory of privatization,” **Anatoli Chubais** declared his intention to reorganize the most prominent oil and gas extraction corporations, including Gasprom, led by Chernomyrdin, so that the petroleum-extracting organizations could not control the actions of oil-traders for three years. This was a true intervention into the financial interests of the economic bloc, an attempt to break their monopoly on oil trading. Of course, this would surely have led to a similar monopoly under Chubais's State Property Committee. According to the state program of privatization (passed by the now-banned Supreme Soviet, but still in effect), this committee is allowed to become owner of a majority of privatized state enterprises. That would be the final result of the so-called “people's privatization by vouchers.”

Then *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, a newspaper truly independent of either the democrats' bloc or the economic bloc, published a plan of Gaidar's group, to be realized after the election of the new Parliament on Dec. 12. *Nezavisimaya* cited reliable sources around the Council of Ministers. If Russia's Choice wins a decisive majority, the plan said, the first task will be to appoint the new prime minister: Gaidar, for sure. Secondly, **Viktor Gerashchenko** will be replaced at the top of the central bank, by current Finance Minister **Boris Fyodorov**. The report said that a total attack against the fuel and energy complex, the main component of which is the oil and gas industry, has already been prepared in Fyodorov's Finance Ministry.

Yeltsin's defensive measures

As we saw on Oct. 3 and 4, an attack can be realized not only by means of words, but by military force. A policy based upon sharing illegitimately acquired property doesn't feel bound by legitimate ways and means.

Yeltsin himself does not want to become a victim of his allies' plots against each other, and has taken his own measures to stabilize the situation, as he puts it.

Strange as it may seem, such events as the proclamation of the Ural Republic with its own constitution, and then the decree on the buying and selling of land, can be explained by the interests of the Russian President.

Not a word of reproach had been said against the newborn Ural Republic, until very recently. It was formed in Yeltsin's home region, where he ruled for many years as a

Communist Party official. I did not believe what the Supreme Soviet opposition figures like Sergei Baburin had said, that the Ural Republic was proclaimed on orders from the President, but in September an official of the President's office in St. Petersburg told me that this was really so. He confirmed that the Ural Republic was formed after a phone call by **Sergei Filatov**, head of the President's Administration. Meanwhile, a colleague of mine learned from the President's representative office in Yekaterinburg, the new capital of this state within a state, that the purpose was the Ural officials' desire to gain export privileges, respecting foreign trade and taxation, as the national republics within the Russian Federation have obtained: the right to form joint ventures between Ural and England, Ural and Germany, Ural and the United States, and so on. Thus a financial basis was being established, to feed the President's Administration, rather than the oil industry.

In the case of the decree on buying and selling of land, for which Democratic Russia has been struggling for two years, and which could be signed only after the elimination of the Supreme Soviet, the outcome deeply disappointed the radical democrats. The free sale of land is to affect only a minor part of rural land, leaving the land in big towns, and even the majority of collective farms, safe and sound. The agrarian lobby is blamed for that, although it is evident that this lobby is not so mighty that the President couldn't have opposed it.

The reason for such care can also be explained by the interests of the President's structures, because they don't want either bloc to gain super-profits. If the land in Moscow, for example, can be easily bought and sold, the elite of the Moscow Administration (controlled by the economic bloc) would become extremely powerful landowners, able to buy any political party, any Army unit, and anything else.

It seemed certain that Yeltsin was going to withstand the encroachments of the economic bloc, but on Nov. 8, Mikhail Poltoranin declared that the government "includes many totalitarian persons" and must therefore have a counterweight. He said that a special organ must be created, something like a new regional council uniting regional leaders and opposition figures, naming Mikhail Gorbachov as an example.

The week before, an All-Russia Zemstvo Movement was organized, also by Gorbachov's people. Thus, another political group has entered the ballgame, and may already have played a decisive role in the conflict between the democratic bloc and the economic bloc in the government. Poltoranin's statement could be a service to Yeltsin's rivals from the Gorbachov camp, indicating that Yeltsin is losing support even among his closer friends. In other words, Gaidar's team is becoming weaker.

Chernomyrdin has repeated that he is loyal to the President, and that he agrees with the prolongation of his reign until 1996.

Also in November, **Andrei Makarov**, a prominent figure

of Gaidar's team, was removed from his post on the Anti-Corruption Committee. This occurred the day that a group of state investigators came back from Canada, where they were investigating acts of corruption committed by former State Prosecutor **Stepankov** and his friend former Gen. **Dmitri Yakubovsky**. It is well known, that Shumeiko and Poltoranin had been implicated in these corrupt deals. Documents proving their involvement are very valuable for Chernomyrdin and the economic bloc.

Thus the latest tendencies in the Russian government elite show that the economic bloc, especially its centrist part led by Chernomyrdin, is the most reliable ally of the President. Also, this segment of the ruling circles is less engaged in infighting, than is the democrats' bloc, and can thus muster forces against the Gaidar team.

But this does not guarantee that monetarism will come to an end in Russia, if Gaidar is not appointed prime minister. The most important issue for Russia's ruling circles today, as this article has illustrated, is not programs or views or projects, but the manipulation of property and power. So, monetarism will remain, as long as it doesn't hurt the interests of Chernomyrdin or those industries led by him and his closest allies.

On Nov. 9, 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the Yekaterinburg City Council, the same that had declared the Ural Republic. Perhaps he no longer needs that source of financing, because he has drawn closer to Chernomyrdin. If he doesn't need to oppose Chernomyrdin, he also doesn't need the Ural Republic, which on the other hand could easily discredit him, if his financial sources were exposed. At the same time, to the people in Yekaterinburg he has become a traitor. This proves the saying: "If Yeltsin doesn't have enemies, he creates them himself."

But even if Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin work together and form a bloc that eliminates the figures of Gaidar's team one by one, this does not mean that Yeltsin has achieved absolute control over the most important political groups, social layers, and financial groups. Many parties and groups, due to the very selective work of the central election bureau, have been excluded from the election and will likely remain Yeltsin's enemies.

Yeltsin must remember that, having deceived so many men of his elite, he can never be sure whether he also will be deceived by them one day, or the day after.

There is a film by Stanislav Govorukhin about the time before the October Revolution, titled "The Russia We Lost." And what is now the new Russia we have got? Those opposition leaders who are not already in jail, claim that Yeltsin acts like a typical Communist Party secretary. I can't accept that point of view. To my mind, Yeltsin acts like a typical Russian czar, resembling not Peter I, who brought western culture into Russia, but rather his great-grandson Paul I, who betrayed so many of his nearest allies that finally he became their victim.