

Liberal democracy and the end of mankind

by Mark Burdman

The End of History and the Last Man

by Francis Fukuyama

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A reader of *The End of History and the Last Man* should have immediate sympathy for those civilian and military forces in Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and other countries that have mounted resistance over the past year to so-called liberal democracy. The world view in Francis Fukuyama's book is abhorrent, heralding the end of man as a moral and creative species, and should be opposed by all means consistent with the Augustinian-Christian notion of "just war."

The End of History and the Last Man is both a book and a phenomenon, albeit of a negative sort, and a review of it must face an unavoidable paradox. On the one hand, it was certainly one of the most talked-about books of the past year internationally. This reviewer attended three different conferences in Germany and Austria, at which discussions of the "Fukuyama thesis" were prominent on the agenda, as putatively representing the thinking in Washington in the era of an emergent "new world order."

Yet during the same year, the mood of triumphalism about the "irreversible historical victory of liberal democracy over all possible alternatives," which followed the Gulf war and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, for which mood

this book had become a chief expression, has become untenable. An anti-liberal-democracy backlash has begun sweeping Ibero-America, eastern and central Europe and the former U.S.S.R., and parts of Africa and Asia, while the nominally liberal-democratic bulwark nations of western Europe and North America are swept with profound social, economic, and moral crises that have called into question the axiomatic premises that they have tended to accept over the recent years.

What has become obvious to millions of people across the globe, over the course of 1992, is that liberal democracy, as meant by Fukuyama, his State Department cohorts like U.S. representative to the Organization of American States Luigi Einaudi and by the "Project Democracy" mob more generally, does not have the benevolent connotation in practice, that the media like to convey by the words "liberal democracy." Liberal democracy in practice has become associated with a new totalitarianism, a modern-day variant of classical fascism, in which nations and peoples are held subject to the arbitrary whims of the International Monetary Fund and the oligarchical elites who control the policies of the IMF and the banks.

The End of History and the Last Man has become necessary reading for those seeking to understand the mind-set of "Project Democracy" and the architects of the "new world order"; there can be little doubt that it is being decreed required reading on university campuses both in the United States and in many countries around the world. At the same time, it shows what it is that more and more people are rebelling *against*, even if those rebelling may never have heard of Fukuyama or know what he has to say. Hence, *The*

End of History and the Last Man has, to some extent, become a curious and perverse metaphor for the year of 1992 as a whole. As for 1993, the prospect is of a battle between two trends: the rejection of liberal-democratic tyranny, vs. the promulgation, including by leading forces within the incoming Clinton administration, of a neo-imperialist doctrine that upholds the "right of intervention to restore democracy" into nation-states whose sovereignty is declared "limited."

The State Department view

In identifying Fukuyama's production as important from a critical-clinical standpoint, this reviewer nonetheless feels pangs of guilt that *EIR* readers might be motivated to obtain the book and subject themselves to the agonies of reading it. Not only is the content of Fukuyama's argument abhorrent, but the argumentation is so confused as to make the book often unreadable. It is the work of an intellectual charlatan, who spends a good deal of his time either outrightly lying, or adopting pseudo-intellectual postures which betray a complete misunderstanding of the subject he presumes to be expert in.

Fukuyama is an important charlatan. He is former deputy director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff and has been patronized by some of the chief institutions and ideologues of the American "neo-conservative" movement. These have included the RAND Corp. think-tank in Santa Monica, California; the recently deceased Prof. Allan Bloom of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago (the related John M. Olin Foundation is one of the prime funders in the United States of activities linked to Project Democracy's National Endowment for Democracy); and erstwhile Trotskyist Irving Kristol of the American Enterprise Institute, whose *National Interest* magazine published the original Fukuyama "End of History" article which generated the controversy that led to the writing of the book-length version. Some months back, Kristol featured Fukuyama as a speaker at an AEI-sponsored conference on the importance of "American popular culture" as an expression of the liberating effects of "American-style democracy" worldwide.

The oligarchical historical line

The smell of fascism is in much of what Fukuyama writes. The predominant thesis draws upon the intellectual tradition that produced fascism.

The first half of the thesis is what the first half of the book title says: "the end of history" (or "History," with a capital "H," as Fukuyama prefers it, in the supposed tradition of Hegel and Hegel's 20th-century epigone Alexandre Kojève of France). Most commentaries on Fukuyama have only drawn attention to this part of the thesis. The essence of it is that:

"As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning

have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity; liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. . . . Indeed, the growth of liberal democracy, together with its companion, economic liberalism, has been the most remarkable phenomenon of the last 400 years. . . . There is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for *all* human societies—in short, something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy. . . . If we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end."

That mouthful is bad enough, but it gets worse when one takes into account what the commentaries generally ignore, namely the second half of the book title, "the last man," which is a term taken directly from the 19th-century Swiss-German philosopher and forerunner of fascism Friedrich Nietzsche. Basically, what it signifies, as per Nietzsche, is that once liberal democracy of the form envisioned by Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, and others takes hold, the human type produced by that culture will inevitably be a satisfied, smug bourgeois, or what in more recent parlance might be called a "bored yuppie." That "last man" can, in Fukuyama's analysis, either revert "peacefully" to a state of an "animality in harmony with nature," or, as per Nietzsche's own preference, produce a counter-reaction, that brings about wars, chaos, the destruction of all Christian values and morality, and the emergence of the "*Übermensch*." But either way, Nietzsche's "last man" is the ultimate product of "the end of History" and the triumph of "liberal democracy."

Were this analysis to be written as a warning, Fukuyama's book might have merit. But it is not. Fukuyama is *lauding* what he asserts to be the inevitable end result of a so-called historical process, which ends up in a world that is *Nietzschean*. Indeed, Fukuyama has a shameful, slavish fascination with the man who, more than any other, has inspired fascist and other anti-Christian, "Aquarian Age" movements in this century. Fukuyama's "new world order" is the entry-point to the "new Dark Age."

The slavishness to Nietzsche is part of a more general slavish loyalty to a philosophical and scientific tradition, which is Gnostic in content, that includes Francis Bacon, René Descartes, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the modern-day professed philosophers Alexandre Kojève and Leo Strauss. Here is where the charlatanism and fraud enter in force. Fukuyama presents this *oligarchical* line of philosophical-scientific thinkers as if they represent the only tradition of thought in history, while *willfully omitting* from his heavily footnoted tome any mention of such figures as Nicolaus of Cusa, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Friedrich Schiller,

who represent the opposing *Christian republican* tradition. Hence, the whole book is fallacy of composition accomplished by omission.

To the same point, the man who has revived the Christian republican tradition during the last half of the 20th century, Lyndon LaRouche, receives but one derogatory reference, in which LaRouche is effectively likened to the leader of a Hare Krishna or theosophical cult.

The omission of Schiller is of special relevance to the overall composition of *The End of History and the Last Man*, since Fukuyama professes to be writing in the tradition of writers of "Universal History," among whom he cites, as forebears, the French Enlightenment's Condorcet and Germany's Kant and Hegel. Yet it was Friedrich Schiller who wrote the most astute and truthful version of a "Universal History," where Schiller identified two conflicting traditions, one the humanist republican beginning with the lawmaker Solon of Athens, and the other the oligarchical bestialist tradition associated with Lycurgus of Sparta. The Spartan tradition has been assumed in this century by the British Empire, by the fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, by Stalin's Russia, and most recently, by the proponents of what George Bush coined as the "new world order." Schiller's writings on Universal History are well known and readily available, and must have been known to the learned Mr. Fukuyama, but he is so emotionally attached to the Spartan tradition, that he can't even admit the existence of the other!

In Fukuyama's manner, such sins of omission merge with sins of commission to produce some wild frauds. What, for example, can one make of this diatribe? "The principles underlying American democracy, codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, were based on the writings of Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton and the other Founding Fathers, who in turn derived many of their ideas from the English liberal tradition of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. If we are to uncover the self-understanding of the world's oldest liberal democracy—a self-understanding that has been adopted by many democratic societies outside North America—we need to look back to the political writings of Hobbes and Locke." Never mind that Hamilton and other Founding Fathers were passionately *opposed* to the British liberal-democratic tradition, both in its political and economic expressions. In the *Federalist Papers*, Hamilton, Madison, and others argued persuasively for the necessity of a *republic*, as a counter to the tyranny that *democracy* would represent. Such arguments have no effect on the unrepentant former State Department senior official, who later describes Benjamin Franklin and Abraham Lincoln as "Lockean liberals," a characterization that undoubtedly has both of these great men turning in their graves.

The principle of paranoia

What ultimately underlies all this grotesquerie, and what carries the reader to the threshold of fascism, is Fukuyama's

conception of the human race, which is rather a picture of an un-human, or anti-human race.

A great deal of his writing is devoted to the overriding importance in man's make-up of the striving for recognition, a notion that Fukuyama traces back to the Greek concept of *thymos*. Leaving aside for the moment the not-unimportant question whether this interpretation of the word *thymos* is exactly what Socrates and Plato had in mind when they used it, Fukuyama's concept leads to some specific axioms that attribute a bestialist, non-human identity to mankind.

While the desire to have one's achievements recognized is not necessarily a bad thing, the extreme fetishism that Fukuyama gives to this emotion, including citing its central importance in acts of erotic love (the only form of love he gives credence to), is strictly aimed at fomenting the "other-directed"—i.e., paranoid—psychopathologies of the American population, particularly those ego-gratification-seeking 1980s-style yuppies whom Fukuyama seems to regard as his peer-group. That this is no exaggeration is seen in a remarkable footnote: "David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* . . . used the term 'other-directedness' to refer to what he saw as a creeping conformism in postwar American society, which he contrasted to the 'inner-directedness' of Americans in the 19th century. For Hegel, no human being can be truly 'inner-directed'; man cannot even become a human being without interacting with other human beings and being recognized by them. What Riesman describes as 'inner-directedness' would actually be a form of covert 'other-directedness.' For example, the apparent self-sufficiency of strongly religious people is in fact based on a once-removed 'other-directedness,' since man himself creates religious standards and the objects of his devotion."

This last sentence about "the apparent self-sufficiency of strongly religious people" is pure Gnosticism, and shows Fukuyama's hatred of Christianity. The true Christian, in the image of Christ at Gethsemane or the Virgin Mary exclaiming "Thy will be done," is acting as the instrument of God's will, from the standpoint of the non-recognition-seeking emotion of *humility*, and is not in the least "creating religious standards and the objects of his devotion" in the manner of some contemporary neo-liberal who had just read William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* after emerging from Bloomingdale's department store. The Christian viewpoint, as enunciated so poetically by St. Paul, is driven by the emotion of *love* for God and fellow-man, the emotion of *agapē*, which is *not* an emotion dependent on being "recognized," whether it be by the Lord Himself or by one's fellow man. It was that same quality of emotion, driven by the love of beauty and the works of the Creator, which brought about the 15th-century Golden Renaissance, and later, the music of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, and others. Could anybody in his right mind think that Beethoven composed his great pieces because he was "seeking recognition"?

True republican cultures, including in societies where Christianity may not be the predominant religion among the population, are based on fostering such capabilities in all its citizens. This is the opposite of the eclectic, anomic “fulfillment of the need to be recognized” for which Fukuyama lauds “liberal democracy” as the end achievement of “History.”

‘What disappears is Man’

From such psychopathological premises, Fukuyama, not surprisingly, becomes hypnotized by the writings of Nietzsche, as we indicated above. Without going through all the gyrations this involves, we let Fukuyama speak, about how he envisages the “end of History” and the arrival of the “last man” to evolve.

As Fukuyama blatantly states, citing his adored mentor Kojeve, the satisfied, smug “last man” will likely revert to the stage of an animal. He quotes Kojeve: “The disappearance of Man at the end of History, therefore, is not a cosmic catastrophe: the natural World remains what it has been from all eternity. And, therefore, it is not a biological catastrophe either: Man remains alive as animal in *harmony* with Nature or given Being. What disappears is Man properly so-called . . .” (emphasis in original).

Fukuyama’s comments immediately following give a flavor of the amorality/immorality that permeates page after page of his book:

“The end of history would mean the end of wars and bloody revolutions. Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes for which to fight. They would satisfy their needs through economic activity, but they would no longer have to risk their lives in battle. They would, in other words, become animals again, as they were before the bloody battle that began history. A dog is content to sleep in the sun all day provided he is fed, because he is not dissatisfied with what he is. He does not worry that other dogs are doing better than him, or that his career as a dog has stagnated, or that dogs are being oppressed in a distant part of the world. If man reaches a society in which he succeeded in abolishing injustice, his life will come to resemble that of the dog. Human life, then, involves a curious paradox: it seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man.”

Here is not the point to speculate what my pet Labrador retriever, could she speak, would say about this idiotic neo-Pavlovian misrepresentation of the beloved canine species. We allow Fukuyama to continue: “Unlike Nietzsche, Kojeve did not rage at the return to animality at the end of history; rather, he was content to play out the rest of his life working in that bureaucracy meant to supervise construction of the final home for the last man, the European Commission. In a series of ironic footnotes to his lectures on Hegel, he indicated that the end of history meant also the end of both art and philosophy, and therewith, his own life activity. It would no longer be possible to create the great art that was meant

to capture the highest aspirations of an era . . . for there would be no new eras and no particular distinction of the human spirit for artists to portray. They could write endless poems on the beauties of springtime or the graceful swell of a young girl’s breast, but they could not say anything fundamentally new about the human situation.” In Kojeve’s own words, “philosophy or the search for discursive Wisdom” would “disappear” among “these post-historical animals.”

Sinking to the depths of swinishness, Fukuyama then writes: “The revolutionaries who battled with Ceausescu’s Securitate [secret police] in Romania, the brave Chinese students who stood up to tanks in Tiananmen Square, the Lithuanians who fought Moscow for their national independence, the Russians who defended their Parliament and President, were the most free and therefore the most human of beings. They were former slaves who proved themselves willing to risk their lives in a bloody battle to free themselves. But when they finally succeed, as they eventually must, they will create for themselves a stable democratic society in which struggle and work in the old sense are made unnecessary, and in which the possibility of their ever again being free and as human as in their revolutionary struggle had been abolished.” The reader is then referred via footnote, to a quote from Leo Strauss, the late University of Chicago “conservative” philosopher and regular correspondent of Kojeve: “The state through which man is said to become reasonably satisfied is, then, the state in which the basis of man’s humanity withers away, or in which man loses his humanity. It is the state of Nietzsche’s ‘last man.’ ”

But the swinish Fukuyama has forgotten a few things. The students in Tiananmen, like the Lithuanians and others, fought their fight to the sounds of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, which either blared from loudspeakers or was played and sung by orchestras and choruses supporting the revolutionaries themselves. If, today, a demoralized Lithuanian population is voting communists back in power, it is not because the promises of liberal democracy have brought them “satisfaction,” but because the ravages of liberal economics have destroyed their society’s ability to reproduce themselves. If, in Lithuania, or in China, or in Romania, the revolutionary spirit is rekindled, the sounds of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony might be heard again, because, whether the populations in question knew it at the time as a conscious fact, they were fighting for *republican* societies, in which man’s worth as an “inner-directed” individual fighting for God’s kingdom on earth, would be realized.

As cited above, Fukuyama has appropriated an important idea for the wrong purposes: Indeed, “the struggle against injustice calls forth what is highest in man.” The problem is, the name for injustice is Francis Fukuyama, and “what is highest in man” would mandate a relentless struggle to relegate “State Department man” to the dustbin of history where he belongs.