

LaRouche's SDI policy cracked the Soviet empire

Congressional candidate Lyndon LaRouche recently reviewed his work in developing a Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense, a policy which President Reagan announced on March 23, 1983, as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). LaRouche stressed that he viewed SBMD as a military and an economic and cultural policy which was key in cracking the Soviet-Communist empire without having to fight a war. The following statement is edited from verbal remarks made on June 17.

Let me tell you a true story, which will make for many of you, I believe, a lot of things much clearer.

Back in the period 1977 through 1979, I worked on the germ of an idea. The problem that occupied me was as follows: On the one hand, we had an insane drift of economic, financial, and monetary policy inside the United States. At the same time, we had an increasingly brutish, forced collapse of the economies of the so-called developing nations, largely under emerging U.S. and British policy influence. And thirdly, we had this menace of Bolshevism from Moscow and Beijing. This had reached the point, also, that, by about 1977, with the disastrous Carter administration coming in, we were moving toward increasingly short-range, thermonuclear warhead-tipped missiles facing the Soviets from Europe, and facing the other states in such forms as the Soviet SS-20 missiles. The short-range missile had the specific significance, that it gave the party being attacked, or believing that it was attacked, only a few minutes to decide whether to go to full-scale, intercontinental thermonuclear war.

Obviously on all these counts, there had to be a better way. I looked at this problem from many standpoints. I had become a leading, controversial figure by 1975, because of my work on behalf of an international monetary reform which would provide justice for developing nations and at the same time open up the development of the developing sector for a capital goods export boom in Western Europe and the United States, as well as Japan. I worked toward reform inside the

Philip Ulanowsky



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Clockwise from below: LaRouche and Ronald Reagan chat during a 1980 New Hampshire campaign debate. National Democratic Policy Committee rally in September 1983 presents 50,000 signatures in support of SDI to the U.S. Congress. LaRouche in Rome in 1983, briefing allies on SDI program.

United States and Western Europe, in the form of pushing advanced technologies to launch what some would call a “new industrial revolution,” to revitalize these economies from the inside.

I fought against those, such as the radical environmentalist cults, which were destroying our culture, the morals of our citizens, and our economy from the inside, and which were leading advocates of policies causing genocide literally on a scale greater than that attributed to Hitler, under the influence of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and environmentalist policies then emerging in the mid- to late-1970s.

Strategic defense must replace MAD

But I looked particularly at this problem of the missile crisis. We were going on a shorter and shorter fuse, toward World War III, almost by miscalculation; or by the instability represented by a three- to five-minute short fuse on missile attacks. Obviously, on the latter account, we had to eliminate a policy called Mutual and Assured Destruction (MAD), the policy advocated by such figures as Henry A. Kissinger, the former secretary of state, and by the evil, curious fellow, Robert Strange McNamara, one-time butcher for the United States at the Defense Department and later a butcher through malthusian weapons at the World Bank.

So, what we had to do, it was obvious to me, was to go to a defensive capability; it was obvious that Soviet doctrine and Soviet capability were moving in the direction of an appropriate sort of doctrine of Strategic Ballistic Missile De-

fense. The first important traces of this emerged in the famous Soviet military strategy, the Sokolovsky Doctrine, so-called, from the 1962-63 period. Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky emphasizes that the ability to destroy a significant percentile of the total weapons launched by an adversary—nuclear weapons—made war fightable; that this could not be accomplished today by what we call kinetic energy weapons, but would require weapons based on new physical principles, such as—Sokolovsky said at the time, back in 1962—lasers. So, from that point on, kinetic energy system weapons were essentially an obsolete form of defense, for very simple, elementary physical reasons.

Now, it was obvious to me, through work with physicists who I was coordinating or otherwise associated with, that we had the technologies to mount an effective form of SBMD. That did not mean, however, that you could build one kind of, sort of, safety system—one fence system—and leave that fence standing for 20 years. It wouldn't work: The other side would be developing new methods of offense, and better methods of defense. So, when we're talking about defense, we're talking about what military people and others call technological attrition. The defense meant, adopting a policy of developing effective defensive weapons against thermonuclear missiles and later weapons, and constantly advancing our technology for coping with these kinds of weapons, as the years pass; that is, constantly updating our system. This all had to be done within a realm, which was known in diplomatic arms control language, then, as “new physical

U.S.-U.S.S.R. SDI cooperation raised

The possibility of Soviet reconsideration of its rejection of the U.S. March 23, 1983 offer for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was raised in the lead editorial of the June 13 *Wall Street Journal*. Decrying the "animist religion of nuclear deterrence," the *Journal* references recent articles in the Soviet press which might signal a potential shift in Soviet policy towards acceptance of the SDI.

One article cited, by Mikhail Aleksandrov in *Soviet Military Review*, suggested that the SDI might "result in a better model of strategic stability" between the two superpowers than the one now existing.

The editorial, entitled "New thinking on SDI," fails to address the broader policy issues raised in the accompanying piece by the SDI's designer, Lyndon LaRouche. The editorial, in part, prompted LaRouche to review the broader economic and cultural issues involved with the SDI because, as LaRouche noted, without action on these issues, "it's not going to go anywhere."

principles"; that is, physical principles of warfare not covered by existing arms control treaties, including the so-called Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. As a matter of fact, the treaty of 1972 had left the door open, explicitly, for the development of these kinds of weapons systems of defense, based on new physical principles.

That indicated a partial solution. But we have to look more deeply at the problem.

Technological attrition boosts the economy

What would be the effect of such a defensive system, based on technological attrition, on the economies of the respective parts of the world? Well, provided that the United States abandon the so-called monetarist policies, which have dominated the United States—and ruined it, since the assassination of President John Kennedy—and went back to a kind of policy which John Kennedy, as President, had proposed in connection with a crash program of aerospace development, the benefits we would get in the civilian economy from this military development of defensive weapons would vastly outweigh the costs of developing such a new military system.

The taxable portion of the increased tax-revenue base generated by physical economic expansion and improved productivity, would give the U.S. federal government, at

existing tax rates, more revenue from the SDI's impact, than the government would spend on the SDI; that's the way to think of it.

If the Soviets were to agree with the United States, to go this way, to use these new defensive weapons as a way of getting out of the deployment of short-range missiles, which put a hair-trigger on thermonuclear war, that would produce a fundamental change in the world; particularly since this would require the United States to abandon the monetarist system, which has been characteristic so far of the Carter and Reagan-Bush administrations, and go back to the policies of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, President Lincoln, or so-called dirigist or mercantilist system policies, which built the United States in all its great building phases. That would mean the Soviets would have to go that way; that would mean the opening of the developing sector, or large amounts of new technologies, capital goods technologies, flowing in; a great global infrastructure development; a general, global expansion.

Soviets must change or fall behind

Now, this would solve two problems for the Soviets. First of all, it would provide what you would think every Soviet citizen would wish: an alternative to a hair-trigger on thermonuclear war. Seems like a pretty good idea, since we get the same benefit. Also, it would change the context as an integral part of a general, international economic boom—also a good idea—and the Soviets would benefit from this. Well, there's only one problem for the Soviets in the whole system: They would have not only a problem in keeping up with us, because of the problems with their system; but it would force them to adapt their economy and their practice, culturally, to a philosophy of practice which was once known as the "American System" of political-economy, so named by Hamilton; and also associated with Gottfried Leibniz, in terms of principles; and in modern times associated with me as a leading exponent of that brand of political-economy, or economic science.

So this would mean we could win, if we could hold war off, we would win war without fighting it, through the cultural influence associated with what came to be known after March 23, 1983, as the SDI.

But, beginning very late-1981, two things happened. First of all, there was a Soviet feeler in my direction from a leading known Soviet diplomatic channel. I reported this Soviet approach to the relevant U.S. institutions, and the answer from them was the recommendation that I play it. So I had some discussions back and forth with these sources, and I agreed to play it, provided I could select the Soviet official with whom I would set up discussions, and choose my own Soviet back channel, which I did. That went into operation in February 1982, under sections of our intelligence services which I worked with, with the understanding that I would be accountable to the President, and not working



Dean Andromidas

Lyndon and Helga LaRouche visiting the Memorial of German Resistance to the Nazis in West Berlin in October 1988, after a speech by Lyndon LaRouche proposing Western economic aid to rebuild Eastern Europe, in exchange for Soviet agreement to the reunification of Germany.

as a service to some other intelligence institution, but I'd be working on behalf of President Reagan, in this case. So that went into effect in February.

About the same time, I came into close relations with the National Security Council (NSC), with whom I discussed a number of matters which were agreed to be of mutual interest, and on which we seemed to vibrate in the same direction; as opposed to those issues, such as some economic issues, on which we did not vibrate in the same direction.

In due course, the two things became coordinated; so that, while I was working with the NSC and other services on outlining what became known as the SDI, I was dealing with the Soviets on this subject through a back-channel arrangement, which continued up until the beginning of April 1983.

I was also running around the world, forewarning key sections of allies, such as the top ranks of the French military, the relevant military planning centers in Germany, and others in Italy and elsewhere, that this might happen, in the sense of saying, "What if—I'm proposing this—what if the United States accepted it? What are the implications, for Europe?" Say, in discussions with French officials, discussion at the end of 1982; or in discussion with German officials in late 1982-early 1983, before the announcement of the SDI; or discussions with top military circles in Japan, and others, in Thailand, or in India, in Argentina, and so forth, and so on, "What if?" this sort of thing, to make sure they had the full appreciation of what this thing was, on the table, understood it, and would know how to react to it, because the United States government directly was doing nothing on this, and as a matter of fact, did virtually nothing to inform or consult with our allies even after the SDI was announced. So, I was carrying the SDI, both in dealing with the Soviets, in discussing the possibility with them, and discussing with key institutions, and briefing key institutions among our allies on what this would mean.

Soviets 'blew' when SDI announced

Well, the Soviets were confident that certain forces in the Democratic Party, and Trilateral Commission types of Republicans, would successfully oppose my proposal, to the point that they said, confidently, it was their view, that my proposal on strategic policy would never reach the President's desk for approval.

Well, of course, as we all know, it did reach the President's desk for approval. And on March 23, 1983, the President read an address, the last part of which was prepared by a particular speechwriter who was working closely with one of my close associates, who worked up the details of that part of the speech on behalf of the President, to give him a technically competent representation of what this would mean in simple language which the American public, as well as statesmen around the world, would tend to understand.

At that point, the Soviets blew.

Their friendliness to me in the back-channels ceased, once it was apparent that what I had proposed had been adopted. As of the end of March and the beginning of April, the Soviet government of Yuri Andropov, his apparatus, demanded my head. This demand was an attitude which was echoed by certain circles in the U.S. liberal establishment, from Democratic Party circles, including a fellow close to McGeorge Bundy, John Train, a New York banker close to the Rothschild interests in the United States, but also generally known as an errand boy for circles such as those of McGeorge Bundy, out of the Council on Foreign Relations circles. They both launched an operation against me, which was picking up on an operation which had already been set into motion, on the initiative of Henry Kissinger, about a year earlier, and also pushed by such members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, such friends of Freedom House as social democrat Leo Cherne, as the late Edward Bennett Williams, David Abshire, and so forth; who had all, according to the record, gone after my head.

So they decided to dispense with my head; and the Soviets made a number of very demonstrative pressures, including a close associate of Andropov dubbing me, personally, publicly in the Soviet press, as a *casus belli*. Fyodor Burlatsky, a close friend of the Mondale circles in Minnesota, and a very close adviser to Yuri Andropov, a top KGB official, associated with the magazine *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, identified me publicly, to the world, as *casus belli*: That is, if the Reagan administration continued to have any relations with me, and the U.S. government continued to have relations with me, in connection with the SDI, that could lead to World War III. That's what was said; it was said, repeatedly. In 1984, a major campaign was run to break the LaRouche connection to the Reagan administration, telling the Reagan administration, it had better do that openly, as a sign of good faith for any dealings with Moscow. So we had Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D-N.Y.), as a voice echoing the Soviet demand, in the Congress, and elsewhere at that time. A number of other dupes, witting and otherwise, echoed the Soviet demand: "Get him out of there, at all costs!" A barrage of press, mass media, black propaganda, the wildest lies you ever heard against me, were not only issued, but repeated over, and over, and over, and over, and over again.

Soviets demanded LaRouche's head

It didn't work. We continued to function. The Soviets ran into trouble. From August through October 1986, the Soviet government—the Gorbachov government—demanded my head, and demanded that the United States government put me promptly in prison. In response to this pressure from the Soviet government, a massive, 400-man, armed raid was done on the city of Leesburg, in Loudoun County, Virginia, at the beginning of October 1986, *under Soviet orders*; and orchestrated with complicity of a well-known Soviet intelligence channel inside the United States, the drug-pushing Anti-Defamation League, the friends of Edgar Bronfman, and other such scoundrels from the organized crime repertoire. By 1986, the Soviets were in real trouble. They had to respond to the SDI. And despite the Reagan administration's capitulation on many points, the Soviet efforts to preclude the danger that the United States might develop an effective ballistic missile defense, *wrecked* the Soviet political system. The strains *wrecked* it.

This was apparent already in 1986: For example, in October 1988, I gave an address in the Kempinski-Bristol Hotel in West Berlin as a part of the 1988 election campaign—broadcast later throughout the United States—in which I forecast the imminence of the circumstances in which Berlin might become again the capital of a united Germany. This had been in the wind since 1986. What caused it? The SDI. What caused it? Well, in a larger sense, I caused it.

Well, here I sit in jail, as a reward for setting into motion the process which successfully *cracked* the Soviet-Communist empire, *without war*.

Soviet 'Third Rome' outlook rejected SDI

Congressional candidate Lyndon LaRouche addressed the issue of why the Soviet outlook of the "Third Rome" led the Kremlin to so vehemently reject the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The following is edited from remarks made on June 16.

It is now just over seven years since I, together with a number of my associates, published our first warning in the *EIR* that the Soviets were moving along a new track in the direction of establishing a Moscow-dominated world empire, and that all Soviet behavior must be seen from a new standpoint corresponding to this fact. This warning, published in May 1983, was the result of an evaluation of the Soviet personal threats against me, prompted by President Ronald Reagan's announcement of the SDI on March 23, 1983.

In back-channel discussions conducted prior to President Reagan's announcement, I presented to the Soviets the option that the United States might 1) decide to move to a global Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense based on new physical principles; 2) that the United States government, in making this proposal, would offer to the Soviets cooperation in proceeding toward this in the least destabilizing way; and 3) that the new technologies forced into being by development of strategic defense, would be of the greatest benefit to the respective powers and the global economy in general.

The Soviets, in the course of these back-channel discussions, had stated they agreed with my analysis of 1) the feasibility of Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense based on new physical principles (what most people would think of as the SDI); 2) that there is no doubt in the Soviets' mind at the highest level that the development of these strategic military technologies would result in a great benefit for the civilian economies, through technological progress. But, they said, 3) we will oppose this because our economy cannot match the U.S. economy in digesting such types of technological progress. . . .

Once the SDI was announced, within a matter of weeks, top Soviet agents around the world at the highest level, said that what I had done (they blamed me personally for what Reagan had announced and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger had backed up) was a threat to the entire life's