

Economic and military strategy in the European revolutionary process

by Michael Liebig

No one today—in February 1990—can seriously dispute that historic revolutionary convulsions and changes have taken place in the realms of the Soviet Russian Empire, and also in Communist China. The pressure of internal weaknesses has brought the Soviet leadership to the position of no longer categorically rejecting German unity. The superpower condominium hangs onto existence, even though the overall potential, especially the economic potential, of the superpowers—the United States included—has declined both relatively and absolutely. So, what happens now?

Will there be a further radicalization of the revolutionary movements in eastern Central Europe as the result of worsening economic conditions?

Will the revolutionary movements encroach on the Soviet heartland itself?

Are the revolutionary movements subsiding, going over into their “retirement years” through exhaustion?

What effect will these revolutionary changes have on the military potential of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact?

Will there be a reactionary backlash from the Moscow *nomenklatura*, and will there be a new “ice age” in eastern Central Europe?

Can the revolutionary changes be channeled through the superpower condominium into a “neo-Metternichean” structure of “stability and equilibrium”?

How will the process of German unification be completed, and into what political-strategic formation will it lead us?

In what direction, politically and economically, will the United States go in the coming months?

What is the future of the Atlantic Alliance?

These are only some of the central questions that arise amid the present frenzied historical transformations. It is already enormously difficult to find answers, in order to arrive at a reasonable judgment in a rapidly changing situation. Cultural values and goals and strategic interests contribute decisively to the judgment, analysis, and prognosis of the situation. And this is naturally all the more true, to the extent that it is a matter of drawing creative conclusions from the changing situation.

LaRouche and Beaufre

In the following, I will attempt to give an assessment of the situation and, flowing from that, will sketch, from our point of view, the fundamental parameters of a order of secu-

rity in Europe. In so doing, I associate myself with the concepts of the American strategic thinker and dissident Lyndon H. LaRouche. The following considerations also take into account the ideas of the French strategist André Beaufre, who employed those ideas on the question of Western European security in the 1960s. In my view, there exist remarkable parallels between the strategic options available to France under de Gaulle in the 1960s, and those today of western Central Europe as a whole at the beginning of the 1990s.

The following rough considerations, put forward for discussion, are oriented around a comment which Beaufre made in 1966: “Strategy is therefore a constant new creation, that is, a process that rests on hypotheses whose validity can only be tested in the course of action itself. . . . The greatest difficulty of strategy lies primarily in times that, as is true today, are subject to a rapid change.”

LaRouche is among the very few who foresaw the life-and-death crisis in the Soviet Russian Empire. The strength of his prognosis has consisted in his recognition that this life-and-death crisis is not a crisis of ideology, of the *nomenklatura*, or of the oppressed nationalities, but rather that the crisis is a symptom of the accelerating decline of the Soviet Empire’s physical economy. The Soviet Empire’s physical economic potential—both in terms of personnel and material—was subjected to a kind of auto-cannibalization. The *nomenklatura*, the security apparatus, and the “military-industrial complex” have subjected the overall potential of the Soviet Empire to a form of systematic “primitive accumulation,” which reached a critical point of decay at the beginning of the 1980s. That is why LaRouche has never been impressed by the continual hectic “restructurings” in the organization of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, and the particular role of Gorbachov. These transformations in the political “superstructure,” and especially Gorbachov’s economic ignorance, have not only failed to halt the decline of the Soviet Empire’s physical economy, but have actually intensified that decline.

For that reason, profound socio-economic convulsions, leading to mass strikes and bloody civil war, is preprogrammed for the Soviet Union. This is the first fundamental strategic parameter in our assessment.

Simultaneously, LaRouche recognized that, since the end of the 1970s, the physical economy of the United States in material and personal terms, has been increasingly losing its output capacity, as the gap between real productive output

and financial superstructure grows wider and wider. LaRouche correctly predicted that this gap could only be eliminated in the course of a profound convulsion of the American economic and financial system. From the 1970s onward, the relative economic weight of the United States vis-à-vis Western Europe and Japan has been decreasing, and has diminished dramatically since the mid-1980s. Every attempt to change the economic and financial policy responsible for this real-economic decline has, up to this point, been wrecked by the bitter resistance of the U.S. establishment. This economic decline is leading to increasing social and political instability in the United States. Even now, the Bush administration is pursuing a domestic policy of “neo-absolutism” in response to the continuing internal crisis. This crisis of America is the second fundamental strategic parameter of our assessment.

The superpower condominium

The increasing internal crisis and objective weakness of the United States has led the American establishment since the mid-1980s to turn toward the Soviet Union, itself convulsed by crisis. Since the mid-1980s, we can and must speak of a Soviet-American condominium. The basis for the condominium was created by the Andropov proposal of April 1983 concerning the “partnership” of the nuclear superpowers—the “continental power” of the Soviet Union, and the “sea power” of the United States—which he expressed in an interview in *Der Spiegel* on April 24, 1983. Obviously, Andropov wanted to block the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program and to come to terms on mutual interests toward—or against—the Third World; but Western Europe was included in the package, of course. The “stationing debate” and the so-called peace movement concerned not only the Russian SS-20s and U.S. Pershing IIs, but also France’s (and to a lesser extent Great Britain’s) nuclear forces, along with the German nuclear-capable Pershing Ia missiles, whose range extended into the western Soviet Union. The INF Treaty, because of massive French resistance, did not affect French nuclear forces; but as the result of common pressure from the superpowers, it did eliminate the German Pershing Ia. There can be no doubt today that the Soviet Union and the United States both agree that the U.S. SDI Program must *not* be extended to the West European NATO partners, since that would allow them to escape the superpowers’ nuclear control.

The “partnership” between the superpowers, as it was explicitly characterized in the Andropov *Der Spiegel* interview, has been aimed at doing the most possible to hinder and, if possible, prevent the formation of an economically, politically, and ultimately militarily strong and independent Western Europe. The superpowers refused, and continue to refuse to accept the shift of the absolute and relative weight of global potential. It is in this perspective that we must see the irregular warfare being carried out against Western Europe, with its huge psycho-political mass campaigns (the

so-called anti-nuclear and peace movements). Indeed, it is no accident that eminent economic leaders such as [Dresdner Bank head Jürgen] Ponto, [German Employers’ Association head Hanns-Martin] Schleyer, or [Deutsche Bank head Alfred] Herrhausen, who worked to develop a western Central European economic zone, were the victims of terrorist attacks. And the same is true for leading representatives of the military-industrial complex in France, the Federal Republic [of Germany], and Italy.


U.S.-Western European ‘economic war’

The American establishment’s hardening stance against its allies in Western Europe (and also against Japan, South America, and the pro-Western Third World as a whole) is revealed with brutal clarity in the so-called Webster Doctrine. On Sept. 19, 1989, CIA director William Webster stated that he now sees U.S. national security primarily threatened, not by the military power of the Soviet Union, but by the economic power of Western Europe and Japan.

Despite diplomatic statements from Washington to the contrary, the U.S. establishment has been deeply disturbed by the process of creating the European domestic market by 1992. Above all, the U.S. establishment hopes to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as well as international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, in order to water down the European Community’s domestic market as much as possible and gain influence over it. Washington’s profound “disturbance” concerning the European Community’s common market increases, of course, by orders of magnitude with the approaching prospect of an expanded western Central European economic region which would include East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Apart from certain advanced military-industrial technologies, in which the United States continues to be the world leader, this economic region would be far and away the most productive, expandable economic region in the world. We can imagine the reaction of the Bush administration when LaRouche put forward his project for the Central European triangle of real economic expansion in December 1989.

In reality, war is always total war; that is, the military never stands alone, but is only one dimension alongside politics, culture, and, above all, the economy. As LaRouche has repeatedly emphasized, strategy must always be understood as “grand strategy” which includes the political, cultural, and economic along with the military. In addition to the two parameters referred to above—the parallel, but not equivalent, internal economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union and the United States—comes a third, additional parameter: the Soviet-American condominium for strategic control of Western Europe; and a fourth one: the increasingly aggressive thrust of the U.S. establishment against its NATO allies in the western Central European economic zone.

Simply compare the Webster Doctrine with the key points



The French Army Engineering Corps preparing a war bridge over the Rhine River, in the LV '88 Exercises of NATO. Conducted under the command of a German Territorial Army, such exercises are a model for Franco-German military collaboration. The bridge part in front is aptly named "Carnot" after the great French strategist and engineer.

of the original NATO treaty. The fact is largely overlooked today, that in the NATO treaty of April 4, 1949, military assistance is only first mentioned in Article 5, whereas before that, in Article 2, one finds the statement, "The treaty partners will contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations . . . by promoting the preconditions for internal stability and well-being. They will strive to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies, and will promote economic cooperation between the various individual or all parties."

Up to this now, only a small circle of international policymakers and economic leaders have had any consciousness of this highly dangerous split within NATO. But the progressive economic crisis in the United States over the course of this year will bring this bitter reality into the consciousness of the general population. It is now clearly foreseeable that the Bush administration will react to the economic crisis, which can no longer be denied, with a "scapegoat" reflex, and the Federal Republic and Japan will be made primarily responsible for what is actually a self-induced economic crisis. This will lead to massive, overt tensions within the Alliance, possibly even to the breaking-point.

NATO: parallels 1966 and 1990?

As already mentioned, we cannot escape the impression that the year 1990 could show astonishing parallels to the years 1965-66. At that time, France under de Gaulle withdrew from the military integration of NATO, and eliminated NATO troop presence and NATO bases in France. Could the Federal Republic and other continental European states be forced into a similar situation? The following questions are on today's strategic agenda:

- Could economic conflicts and obstruction of German unity, and the simultaneous obstruction of a greater Central European economic region, by the United States in cooperation with its condominium partner the Soviet Union, lead to a Gaullist reaction by the Germans?

- Could the Germans then be forced by the American-Soviet condominium into the corner of a "New Versailles"? Is it not conceivable, that the condominium powers might tie their "agreement in principle" to German unity to massive, tribute-like economic demands or, even "war reparations" in connection with the signing of a formal peace treaty?

Should we not expect that German unity will be tied to security policy conditionalities which will lead not only to undercutting German sovereignty, but also to eliminating the very possibility of a Western European defense system?

What is true for all alliances, is also true for NATO, namely: Alliances live only as long as the sum of shared goals and interests is greater than the sum of conflicting interests and contrary goals. Is continued membership in NATO still in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany? Is it still in the interest of the French and Germans—Western continental Europe—to maintain the Atlantic Alliance? The answer would certainly have to be: Yes, but not at any price! And secondly: The present structure of NATO cannot remain the form of the Atlantic Alliance in the future!

A new Atlantic Alliance

Furthermore, in 1966, de Gaulle did not leave the Atlantic Alliance, but only quit the military organization of NATO. It is in our interest—that of Germany, France, and Western continental Europe—to maintain the Atlantic Alliance, even under extremely difficult conditions. Several

things speak in favor of this:

First, despite extraordinary cultural decline and degeneration, there still exists a common cultural potential on both sides of the Atlantic.

Second, the Atlantic Ocean must be kept open as an economic and military-strategic line of communication, precisely to keep open the potential for economic cooperation and interaction.

Third, what André Beaufre wrote in 1966 is true today: "Under these conditions, it is essentially a matter of maintaining the closest ties to the United States, in order to be in the position to have influence on American decisions and to accommodate our own course to the foreseeable development of American strategy." The foreseeable social and economic convulsions in the United States will free up new political forces there that have been suppressed up to now, or who, like LaRouche, have been politically persecuted. Continental Europeans will "quite pragmatically" incorporate the American dissidents into their considerations, just as they did—even if only at the last moment—with the dissidents in the Soviet Empire.

Military strategy follows lines of force in the real economy. This will express itself in an unavoidable restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance. It will begin quite concretely with the fact that the military-strategic condition of threat that underlies the previous NATO structure is changed and will increasingly continue to change. The connection of economy and military potential in the Soviet Union manifests itself in the fact that the profound economic crisis in the Soviet Russia makes it difficult, if not impossible for it to maintain the military-strategic positions it has occupied up to now in Central Europe.

This connection between the Soviet Union's economic crisis and its military potential is not mechanical. The Soviet Union's "military-industrial complex" (MIC) consists of their one economic sector which remains intact, as the result of its preferential control over the best in personnel and material resources. It is not so much the absorption of economic resources by the MIC that is blocking a recovery of the Soviet economy, as it is its complete insulation, which prevents the technologies and advances in technology achieved in the MIC being made generally available. And we must be vigilant against the idea that dismantling the Soviet military presence in eastern Central Europe will "save costs," i.e., resources, in some mechanistic way. On the contrary, in the short term there will be enormous logistical costs for the withdrawing and redeploying inside the Soviet Union. Finally, it is absolutely not the case, that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Central Europe would probably free them up for tasks associated with quelling domestic rebellion, since for the most part, these forces' high degree of mechanization makes them unsuitable for such deployments.

The objective pressure, produced by the economic crises, to dismantle the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe,

is having a political impact. It is here that we see reflected the enormous energy loss and erosion of power which the Soviet leadership has suffered domestically, as the result of the socio-economic crisis and its massive and manifold effects every area of social life in the Soviet Empire.

The people's will as the driving force

Second—and here we pick up on our initial point about the revolutionary character of the changes in the Soviet Union—the people themselves have become a central determining factor. The will of the people is the cause of the historic changes in the Soviet Empire. The Soviet leadership's action or inaction in the past months toward the peoples of eastern Central Europe, but also toward those in the Soviet Union itself, is the effect of the people's will expressing itself. The Soviet leadership is reacting to the people's will, is being forced to accommodate to the people's will.

The degree to which the people's will manifests itself politically in eastern Central Europe is not the same as, and is obviously further advanced than it is within the Soviet Union itself. But even there it is effective in multifarious ways. It is fascinating to observe how many strategic experts confuse cause and effect. For eastern Central Europe, and the Soviet Union itself, Lenin's characterization of a revolutionary situation is true: It exists "when the people refuse to go on, and their rulers are unable to go on."

Up to this point, the revolutionary ferment in the consciousness of the peoples of the Soviet Empire has had virtually no effect on the Soviet Union's *material* military potential. But the effects on its personnel, in the collective consciousness of the armed forces, will be of overwhelming significance. The moral psychological condition of the Soviet armed forces will be of enormous importance in any strategic assessment of the situation. Obviously, the Soviet leadership has at its disposal a broad spectrum of possibilities for influence and manipulation, especially among the armed forces. Especially regarding Germany, there exists a profound negative potential in Russian nationalist sentiment. We must consider that deliberate measures by the Soviet secret service can be utilized to construct an emotional reaction based on Russian nationalism. It is conceivable that Soviet services could be planning to stage "Gleiwitz" incidents in eastern Central Europe [the incident Hitler staged and then used to invade Poland]. It is not difficult to imagine what emotional reactions could be produced in the Russian people if terrorist groups, guided by the secret services, were to carry out bloody, terrorist attacks, on the model of West European terrorists, against Soviet military personnel, for example, in East Germany.

Even if we consider the possibilities of massive psychological manipulation of the population and armed forces in the Soviet area of power, it is at least questionable whether the degree of basic trust, motivation, and necessary allegiance of the Soviet army still exists for carrying out military

attack operations beyond the borders of the Soviet Union itself.

The peoples and governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have already unmistakably expressed their desire for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It is only with great difficulty that the Soviet leadership will be able to resist this pressure. After the upcoming March 18 elections in East Germany, the previously taboo subject of the Soviet occupation army in East Germany will be put on the political agenda. Even before a complete withdrawal from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the question of communication lines to Russia for the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces will become more and more problematical. The military operational capability of the armed forces in the reforming eastern Central European countries within the context of the structure of the Warsaw Pact hardly exists anymore. In the event of a Soviet military confrontation, its "rear flank" would be quite exposed to extortion, and even to offensive operations. Freedom of operation in its rear flanks and secured communication lines play an overwhelming role in the operational thinking and actions of Soviet armed forces.

The 'transitional phase' in Europe

The presence of Soviet armed forces in eastern Central Europe, and especially in East Germany, is currently receiving critical support from the expressed wish of the Bush administration that they remain there, even if in reduced numbers. There is no other way to understand the U.S.-Soviet agreement, pushed by the Bush administration, on the upper or lower limit of 195,000 Soviet and U.S. troops in Central Europe—i. e., in Germany. This Bush administration policy is in blatant contradiction to, first, the objective internal political pressure in the Soviet Union to withdraw their armed forces from eastern Central Europe; and, second, to the expressed wish of the peoples of eastern Central Europe for the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from their countries; and, third, to the security interests of Germany and Western Europe.

We are also obliged to conclude, conversely, that the presence of the United States in the Federal Republic is likewise supposed to be secured in this manner. Moreover, the legal demands of the United States as a victorious power of World War II toward a Germany pushing toward unification, no longer rests essentially upon U.S. economic superiority, but rather on the political weight of U.S. military presence in West Germany.

And with this, we return to the question of the necessary restructuring of the NATO alliance. There is no doubt that the U.S. military presence in Germany and Western Europe was indispensable until the revolutionary changes that began in the fall of 1989 in eastern Central Europe. American forces in Europe were an unconditional prerequisite for deterrence against the superior military power of the Soviet Union in Central Europe. For the reasons given above, the advanced

position of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces on the Elbe River has suffered strategic erosion not from outside, but from within. At the present moment, we find ourselves in Central Europe in a very difficult "transitional period," in which the Western Group, despite considerable reductions, remains on the bank of the Elbe. It therefore cannot be excluded that the Soviet Union's still available military potential in Central Europe could be used for threats, extortion, confrontation, or even for a military "flight forward." It is the absolute duty of military strategy to plan for the "worst case." Unfortunately, we cannot categorically exclude the possibility that the Moscow leadership would launch military actions as "madness with method." Nonetheless, grand strategy must not become fixated on, and limited by planning for the military-strategic worst case.

No one can predict the outcome of the the bloody confusion which, unfortunately, we can expect to engulf in the Soviet Empire. The fact remains, however, that the present Soviet Union will have the task, as the future Russian nation-state and world power, to enter into long-term, economically based cooperation with the western Central European economic region now coming into existence. This "Berlin formula," conceived by LaRouche in October 1988, is one side of the answer to the real possibility of a military flight forward by the Soviet Russian leadership. Only the western Central European economic region is capable in the short term of bringing about an enormous increase in real economic productivity that will make available the goods necessary for the regeneration of the economy of a consolidated Russia. Only this initiative goes to the heart of the life-and-death crisis in Russia; only this approach leads to successful conquest of that crisis.

German 'neutrality' is absurd

The second side to a credible answer to the possibility of a Soviet Russian military flight forward in Central Europe, is the establishment of a convincing Western European military deterrence and defense capability. The necessity for Western Europe deterrence and defense arises in the short term from the continuing presence of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces on the Elbe. In the medium and long term, however, the necessity of Western European deterrence and defense stems from the foreseeable reorganization and consolidation process in Russia. A Russian national state within the context of legitimate boundaries will also be a nuclear global power with large armed forces.

For this reason, the idea of a neutralized, or virtually neutralized Germany is absurd. A neutral Germany would be completely exposed to the strategic undertow of the consolidated major power of Russia. The remainder of Western Europe simply lacks the economic, political, and military potential to resist the Russian superpower with a neutralized Germany within the Russian sphere of influence. But if it flows from what we have said, that it is necessary to create a

Western European deterrence and defense system, then the question remains whether a continued U.S. military presence in the previous structure of NATO is necessary or sensible.

Here we should an essential aspect, namely, the significance of nuclear weapons as part of the U.S. troop presence in Europe. Since the founding of NATO, the American military presence in Europe has been under the "umbrella" of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. By this we mean not U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, but rather tactical weapons, primarily those in Germany. Since the signing of the fateful INF Treaty, a result of the condominium agreements at Reykjavik, there are no longer U.S. nuclear systems capable of covering the sanctuary of the sole conceivable aggressor, the Soviet Union. There is still nuclear artillery, with a maximum range of 30 kilometers; the Lance missile system with its 120 kilometer range; and tactical combat aircraft without effective stand-off weapons. It requires no military brilliance to recognize that the deterrence capability of these tactical weapons, which has become highly doubtful since the INF treaty was signed, would be completely absurd in the case of a foreseeable withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Central Europe. To threaten the nuclear self-destruction of Central Europe in order to deter Russian aggression, is simply absurd. Nuclear deterrence for both Western and Central Europe can only mean that the sanctuary of the aggressor, not the territory of the aggressor's victim, is vulnerable to nuclear attack. The present disposition of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic, as well as in the Netherlands and Belgium, is not militarily or politically feasible in the event that the Soviet armed forces pull back from eastern Central Europe. The following question also arises: To what extent could conventional American armed forces, acting in accordance with U.S. military doctrine, remain in continental Europe without a tactical nuclear umbrella?

As I already mentioned, even if the Soviet Union were to withdraw from Central Europe, even if today's Soviet Union were to become a consolidated Russian nation-state, it would remain a military world power with enormous nuclear forces. Guaranteeing the military security of western Central Europe will remain an urgent necessity. But the security of western Central Europe, of the greater Central European economic region, will no longer be guaranteed within the present structure of NATO. The greater western Central European economic region of the Paris-Berlin-Vienna triangle needs a self-subsisting "security blanket"; it requires the dimension of a credible deterrence and defense capability. For that reason, a fundamental reform of the Atlantic Alliance is an urgent necessity. And with regard to such a fundamental reform of the Atlantic Alliance, the strategic concepts of André Beaufre seem astonishingly up-to-date: "In my opinion, the key reforms called for today must aim toward bringing the Atlantic Alliance into harmony with a European defense system, closely associated with the United States. . . . The present NATO structure blocks the way to Europe, since

it prevents Europeans from becoming conscious of their own problems. . . . Europe [has] the right and duty to take its security into its own hands."

A European security system

France and Germany would have to form the heart of the European defense system. As with the creation of the European Economic Community in 1956, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg would also come along. Spain and Portugal would be natural partners in the European defense system, and the same is true of Denmark and Norway. Great Britain's participation, if it is desired at all, should be delayed until the defense system has been internally secured. The sum of economic, political, and military potential of the six to ten member states of the European defense system would not need to fear comparisons with the potentials of the two superpowers or even of Japan, or of a future China or India. The member states of the European defense system would naturally seek the close political and ultimately security policy collaboration with Switzerland and Austria, and emphatically with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Beaufre's reflections from the year 1966 concerning the formation of the military-strategic components of a Western European defense system are also extremely timely today:

- Military defense of one's country is national in character. Military security is always primarily national security. In peacetime, land and sea forces remain under national command.

- The general staffs of member states of the European defense system during peacetime will form a common military committee, from which a joint high command will be formed in defense situations.

- Air forces and a common European missile defense system, yet to be built, will be permanently under a joint command answerable to the military committee.

- The member states of the European defense system will commit themselves to close cooperation in military research and development, and the production and acquisition armaments.

- The member states of the European defense system and a common military committee will be in close military policy consultation with the United States and Canada. A naval staff subordinated to the military committee will be in permanent institutionalized contact with the naval staffs of the United States and Canada.

- For nuclear weapons, there can be "only one finger on the trigger." France's nuclear forces will remain exclusively under national command.

Only out of the combination of the economic power of western Central Europe and the resulting capacity to offer Russia (and the Third World) economic cooperation *and* the secured deterrence and defense capability of western Central Europe, will peace be assured in Europe and beyond.