tems simultaneously, and he concludes:

"There is no doubt the transition to the new model of strategic stability will involve a certain political risk. There are apprehensions that at a definite stage the U.S. might try and use its technological superiority in some fields to deploy an effective ABM system before the Soviet Union has a chance to do so, thereby attaining military advantage. It seems, therefore, that the only way to the new strategic structure is that of gradual, mutually agreed, coordinated steps, which might include phased deployment of ABM components, strictly restricted both qualitatively and quantitatively."

Considering the alternative models of strategic stability, we cannot gloss over such an important issue as the economic consequences of this or that way of military structuring. It is often argued that the asymmetric way will prove cheaper than the symmetric. Following the asymmetric way, however, we would invest in unpromising technologies, which would yield a temporary military effect but do nothing for the development of our country's technological basis. Consequently, investing in promising branches such as directed energy, space industry, optics, microelectronics, and artificial intellect, we will proceed towards strengthening the country's defense capability for a long period of time, and besides, lay a technological foundation for the progress of our industry in the 21st century."

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

What West and Soviets must discuss about SBMD

What follows is a statement released by Lyndon LaRouche on Feb. 13, 1990. Mr. LaRouche, a former U.S. presidential candidate, has announced his candidacy for Congress from Virginia's Tenth District.

The article by Soviet Foreign Ministry Assessment and Planning Department official Mikhail Aleksandrov in the December issue of Soviet Military Affairs is a very useful declaration. It represents a basis for competent discussion between representatives of the Western powers and the Soviet Union on the subject of Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense (SBMD).

I first became involved in back-channel discussions on this policy in February 1982. Those discussions with Soviet officials continued, with the backing of people in the U.S. government, up through April 1983. The purpose of those back-channel discussions was to present the Strategic Defense Initiative to Soviet channels to avoid a destabilizing misunderstanding of what it would be, and to additionally establish adversary points of agreement to enhance war avoidance, under conditions in which depressed-trajectory nuclear missiles represented a potential hair-trigger for general war.

The crux of my policy was to substitute war-avoiding strategic defense for Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and to use a crash SBMD program to spill over into the civilian economy.

In this context, I can today say things that the U.S. government is not free to say.

The Soviets will recall earlier private communications and public documents authored by me. From the outset, my proposals agreed in conceptual terms with the Sokolovsky Doctrine in the age of rocket-borne thermonuclear warheads, particularly on the point that the only effective strategic defense was that based on "new physical principles"—not on kinetic energy weapons (as Sokolovsky deprecated such weapons in 1962-63). It can be easily recognized why this is the case. The calculation of comparative firepower, mobility, and depth of slow warheads versus defensive weapons traveling at the speed of light, or at relativistic speeds, underscores the point. This was understood in 1982: It is possible to destroy a dollar's worth of missiles with ten cents' worth of defense based on new physical principles.

It was understood in my discussions with the Soviet government, that SBMD based on new physical principles was an effective proposal, and it was agreed that associated technologies would yield increased productivity.

There were certain difficulties during the 1982 period, from the Soviet standpoint. In 1982, before the devolution of the U.S. economy, the United States could sustain a crash program, which would have enabled the U.S. and its allies to rapidly outpace the Soviets in real economic terms. This was the principal stated reason for Soviet opposition. The second reason was that the Soviet Constitution prevented the government from negotiating-away a strategic capability in good faith with a strategic adversary.

They also understood that the key SBMD points I represented to the Soviet government were precisely echoed in the March 23, 1983, Ronald Reagan television address. Both President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger affirmed this policy repeatedly and publicly thereafter. The Soviets also noted, however, that, as the result of resistance in Britain, the U.S. did rapidly back away from SBMD, into dubious and implicitly obsolete kinetic approaches, though the 1982 feasibility estimates of the more advanced systems were proven correct.

Pacifists are the real war-mongers

Now we approach the question of SBMD anew seven to eight years later. The current strategic reality contains dramatically new elements, although some things remain constant. The question of war avoidance must be considered
in the new circumstances of structural changes and institutional changes in the communist and other sectors, and of the rising great economic collapse globally. In these revised circumstances, we must define a pathway of war avoidance not based on the utopian sentimentalism of the pacifists and arms-control negotiators. The Soviet Union and the Western powers are major military adversaries still, regardless of self-deluding denials.

We face in reality an ongoing physical economic collapse in the Warsaw Pact, Communist China, Yugoslavia, at the same time that there is a less advanced, but equally significant collapse in the United Kingdom, the United States, and much of the British Commonwealth. This economic collapse is the principal energy driving social and political eruptions, regardless of other causes. The military potentials of the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans might engage in a war which both sides now delude themselves as being impossible and unthinkable. The collapse of great empires and powers from internal reasons has been the pathway in history for wars of the greatest destruction. Rome, Byzantium, and the turn-of-the-century Czarist Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires, are examples of empires destroyed through such processes.

Therefore, the idea that peace is breaking out is so dangerous a delusion, that we must consider pacifists to be the true war-mongers.

We must therefore look at the present situation from my standpoint as a Western strategic planner. This is the most useful framework for a discussion with both my Western colleagues and Mr. Aleksandrov and those forces in Moscow whom he represents.

The most likely war scenario today is the Soviet Union, especially the Russian Federation, finding the core empire imperiled by internal economic-driven instability, being propelled to use military superiority for an external solution in its existential crisis. Thus, war avoidance means defining for the Russian Federation (which represents half the total Soviet population and a preponderance of decision-makers) a safe route to survival, alternative to the perils of war.

A question of physical economy

This brings us to the issue of political economy.

Competent strategic planning begins with the premise: "To the devil with ideologies—Marx, Lenin, and Adam Smith." Rather, emphasis must be placed on the work of Leibniz, a figure not unknown to Russian historians. In the United States and Germany, the same Leibnizian current is associated with Alexander Hamilton, the Careys, Benjamin Franklin, and Friedrich List. In France, the reference point is the American System of political economy and the contributions of Carnot, Monge, Chaptal, Ferrier, and Dupin. By invoking these reference points, we demonstrate our disgust with monetarists' utopian ideas and our commitment to proceed from the standpoint of physical economy.

This focus must be on the issue of physical economy and the relationship of SBMD to the economy. This is a topic which most so-called economists today, who have no understanding of elementary principles of political economy, may see as a seemingly academic issue irrelevant to policy deliberation.

The essential distinction which sets man above the beasts is the creative capacity of individual human minds, through which individuals radiate valid scientific discovery to the effect of increasing the capacity of labor by this knowledge. The economic role of SDI situates this. Details of how creativity is transformed into societal advances are contained in many published locations. The laboratory apparatus which proves the crucial experiment is the reference point of design for machine tools. Machine tools echoing laboratory successes define technology. The challenge is how to convert science into technology, and thereby cause the proliferation of technological advances throughout the society, such that they increase the productive powers of labor.

Returning to the battlefield of Eurasia, the role of SBMD as a deterrent to war is essential. SBMD is critical to the enhancement of deterrence. However, the danger is that even the enhanced deterrent is superimposed on an ever hotter kettle—and the limits of the safety valve may be surpassed. As necessary as the military side of war avoidance is, the key is using the crash program for SDI as a solution in the domain of physical economy.

If we correctly define new physical principles, the technologies we will need to perfect will be the technologies that give us the greatest rate of growth in the productive powers of labor. This in turn will give us, with greater speed, the greatest solutions to the political economic dimensions of the global strategic crisis. Thus, the political-social solutions become realizable as well.

This should be the core of the doctrine and the ensuing discussion. An exemplification of this approach is found in the proposal for an economic development triangle running among Paris-Berlin-Vienna (including Prague). This proposal defines the highest rate of action in energy per capita or energy per square kilometer anywhere today. The stream of energy and transport systems services a 400-500 million person market and provides a means, aided by new transport, for solving the internal economic problems of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, etc.

If the Soviets and others are interested in avoiding war, it will be useful if the proposals outlined by Aleksandrov are discussed in the general framework outlined in this response.