

nia's current "AIDS testing confidentiality" statute even prohibits doctors from disclosing AIDS infection status to health authorities, endangering medical and law enforcement personnel, and the general public. For the first time in our history, a deadly disease is being treated as a "civil rights" issue, rather than as a public health issue.

Under present policy, since health officials generally do not know who is infected, there is little they can do either to prevent the infected person from infecting others, or to get that person proper medical attention before they develop full AIDS. Many who spoke against Proposition 64 now call for testing and contact tracing. Had it passed, these measures would already be in effect. How many more Californians must become sick and die before we act to stop this epidemic?

The medical facts are clear. The law is clear. Common sense agrees. You and your family have the right to protection from *all* contagious diseases, including AIDS—the deadliest of them all. If you agree, vote *yes* on Proposition 69.

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Rebuttal to argument against Proposition 69

The argument against Proposition 69 is actually an argument against use of traditional public health measures to stop *any* disease. AIDS is a disease of persons infected with the AIDS virus. Infected persons infect uninfected persons, and the infection is spreading. Medical literature has documented cases of non-sexual, non-needle-transmitted infection. At least three health-care workers, and a mother caring for an infected child, may pay with their lives for discovering that needles or sexual intercourse are not necessary to transmit AIDS.

Research indicates that other infections in AIDS virus carriers, like tuberculosis or herpes, can activate the AIDS virus and lead to full-blown AIDS. Identification of infected persons makes treatment of such "co-infections" possible and may forestall progression to full AIDS.

There is no vaccine, and no cure, for this deadly disease, but research has provided better tests. The opponents of Proposition 69 oppose widespread testing to identify and treat those at risk of developing AIDS and infecting others. Their "policy" makes it virtually impossible to treat and educate those most "at risk." The opponents' "policy" is to allow the uninfected to become infected, the infected to become sick, and the sick to die, preferably cheaply.

Proposition 69 enables health authorities to use traditional public health measures to stop AIDS. The cost is small compared to the cost of the growing number of AIDS cases resulting from the present non-policy. Restore a traditional public health policy in California. Vote *Yes* on Proposition 69.

Meese proposal for police force rebuffed

by D.E. Pettingell

Attorney General Edwin Meese, returned to Washington on April 13 after a one-week five-nation trip to the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia where he met with Presidents and cabinet members to discuss ways of increasing cooperation in the war on drugs. Top on Meese's agenda was the proposal for the formation of a "multinational police force" which, as the *New York Times* put it, would help "restore order in Latin American nations where governments are threatened by narcotics trafficking." The idea was utterly rejected by Ibero-American governments as an attempt, once again, to override national sovereignty on the pretext of "fighting drugs."

At the end of his visit to Bogotá, and in response to a Colombian journalist's question, Meese was forced to play down the proposed multinational police force as something that would not solve the short-term problem of drugs. He said that in his discussions with Colombian President Virgilio Barco, Barco called the "police force" idea "something that was interesting as a long-range concept" but that "would involve treaties and treaties are a difficult problem."

"We have never considered sending U.S. troops here," he added, "if Colombia does not request it." Furthermore, Meese said, "we are very impressed with the excellent job the Colombian Armed Forces and the Colombian Police are carrying out against drugs." Meese is the first high ranking U.S. official to visit Colombia in the two years that Andean nation has been ravaged by mafia violence. Meese's heavily guarded visit lasted only five hours.

But the U.S. secret government did not wait for "treaties" to be signed, to put into operation the illegal supranational strike force. The day Meese began his tour, the supranational force debuted with the kidnap-arrest of Honduran drug lord Ramón Matta Ballesteros April 5. Matta's long-awaited detention was run by the U.S. Marshals Service from the raid of his mansion in Honduras, to his formal arrest by the United States in Puerto Rico. In the proposed multinational police force, the U.S. Marshals would expand to the international arena the role they play domestically. According to U.S. officials traveling with Meese, the multinational police force, among other things, would offer protection to prosecutors, judges, and other public officers in Ibero-America, who are targeted by the Medellín Cartel, the cocaine empire based in Medellín, Colombia.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, the traditional anti-drug law-enforcement force which operates in foreign

supranational by Colombia

countries on the basis of bilateral treaties signed between the United States and host governments, was virtually left out of the Matta affair. A DEA official told *EIR* that while the arrest of Matta is good news for Ibero-America, the manner in which Matta was kidnaped has strongly hurt possibilities of cooperation in the war on drugs with governments.

The proposed multinational police force, for which Congress already approved an initial \$10 million budget for FY 1989, underscores the failure of the Reagan administration to adopt a sane anti-drug foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere. In 1985, Lyndon LaRouche proposed a "treaty of alliance" between the United States and Ibero-American governments to join political and military forces against the common enemy within a framework of mutual respect. Instead, the Project Democracy-dominated Reagan administration and Congress have opted for slapping nations with economic sanctions or threatening them with military intervention if, in the eyes of Washington, they fail to fight drugs.

An international gestapo

U.S. Marshals Service Director Stanley Morris, told foreign reporters April 8, that the Matta arrest sets an excellent precedent for U.S. raids into other Ibero-American nations where other "international fugitives," such as Panama's General Manuel A. Noriega, can "run but not hide." Panamanian traitor Jose Blandón, who has provided the only testimony against General Noriega which does not come from a convicted drug-pusher, has round-the-clock protection by the Marshals.

The Marshals' international fugitive program is run by alleged Mossad agent Howard Safir, Associate Director for Operations, the man who ran the Matta kidnaping. Safir played a key role in the 1980s when the Marshals Service was revitalized as part of Vice President George Bush's project to turn the United States into a police state.

Marshals director Morris is known to be close to former Associate Attorney General Stephen Trott and former Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns (see page 58).

Backing down after the Colombians told Meese the supranational police force was not welcome, Meese wisely decided to focus the discussion on other matters such as coca leaf eradication for the rest of his trip.

Speaking from Ecuador, DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, part of the attorney general's delegation, confirmed the change of mind when he went out of his way to try to convince ABC

Nightline anchorman Ted Koppel that the multinational police force idea was not part of Meese's agenda. Lawn insisted that were the idea to be formally proposed by the U.S. government, it would have to be negotiated within the Organization of American States or the United Nations.

Eradication of coca leaf production in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, the four main world producers, has been one of Meese's major concerns. Cocaine and crack are derived from coca. As Meese left for South America, the National Drug Policy Board, which the attorney general chairs, put into circulation within the administration an internal report on drug strategies proposing to cut in half coca leaf production.

"To accomplish this objective," the report says, "agreements must be reached with the several governments in the region, an effective coca herbicide must be identified and found environmentally acceptable, eradication programs must be carried out simultaneously in all coca-producing countries, and more accurate crop estimates are required for purposes of targeting illicit crops and verifying their destruction."

Coca leaf eradication was the key subject discussed between Meese and Peruvian President Alan García. Meese told reporters that the eradication efforts in Peru have had no effect on reducing coca production. According to U.S. estimates, only 850 of the 200,000 acres of coca in the upper Huallaga Valley were destroyed last year.

"It is overpowering," Meese said while flying in a helicopter over the upper Huallaga where the world's largest coca-growing region is located. Meese reported that the U.S. planned to begin aerial spraying of a potent herbicide in the Huallaga Valley within a year.

Recognizing that Peruvians have turned to growing coca because of its great profitability, Meese called for increasing economic aid to Peru and for initiating crop substitution programs. But Meese's call is naively insufficient in the face of the economic power that the cocaine cartel has gained. Repudiation of the foreign debt payments and large investments in job-generating development projects by the United States, Japan, and Europe are the only way to begin breaking the grip of the cocaine cartel over Ibero-America's economies.

In Bolivia, the last leg of his trip, Meese toured a jungle training center for Bolivian drug agents, after which he called on Congress to lift restrictions on arms sales to Bolivia. He told American reporters that he saw an "absolute critical need for weapons and ammunition" by the Bolivian police, "they are essentially outgunned by the narcotics traffickers," he said. Meese should know that the "demilitarization" of Ibero-America is U.S. foreign policy, regardless of how "outgunned" Ibero-America is in the face of the narco-terrorist mafia.

Meese returned to the United States with a pessimistic view. During his flight back, the attorney general said the trip was extremely helpful, but said he expects no short-term solutions to the cocaine problem.