

# Helms puts Ogarkov Doctrine at center of INF debate

by Kathleen Klenetsky

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, issued a 180-page memorandum to his Republican colleagues Jan. 25, critiquing the INF agreement line-by-line. Entitled "The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons, Does it Decrease—or Increase—the Danger of Nuclear War?" the memo reviews the history of Soviet cheating on other arms accords; charges that the Soviets have a large, covert force of SS-20 missiles; maintains that the Soviets have developed an ABM capability, beyond the Moscow point-defense system allowed by the ABM Treaty; and concludes, "Removal of the Pershing II shield leaves Western Europe virtually exposed to Soviet domination, either directly or indirectly."

But the most important part of the memo is Chapter Two, which situates Moscow's decision to agree to the "double zero option" in the context of the nuclear war-winning doctrine advocated by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Deputy Supreme Commander of Soviet forces.

In this respect, the Helms memo departs from every other public analysis of Soviet military strategy, save one: *EIR's* 1985 *Global Showdown* report, and its recently published sequel, *Global Showdown Escalates: The Zero Option and the Berlin Crisis of 1987*, which were the first publications to reveal that Mikhail Gorbachov's vaunted perestroika, hailed by many Western circles as proof that Moscow is no longer interested in military conquest, actually is a crucial part of Ogarkov's grand design for ensuring Russia's global imperial domination.

Key excerpts of the memo follow:

*From "Issue Two: Preparations for War: Is the INF Treaty a major step forward in the implementation of the Ogarkov Doctrine that the Soviets can dominate Europe despite the danger of nuclear war?"*

Ogarkov's . . . service includes the position of Commander of the Western Theater of Military Operations [which is] responsible for all combined operations in Europe.

But Ogarkov created more than a job; he created a doctrine, a doctrine that formed the basis for the massive reorganization of Soviet military systems in 1981. The Ogarkov Doctrine was summarized in his book, *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland* (1982).

The Ogarkov Doctrine called for the Soviet Union to go

on a war footing, with massive mobilization of all military, economic, industrial, and civil defense resources to defeat the imperialist enemy. The concept of total military preparedness included revamping of the educational system to prepare future soldiers for the complexities of modern war machinery.

In short, the Ogarkov Doctrine holds that war is winnable, even in a nuclear age. Moreover, Ogarkov constantly argued that Europe could be dominated without triggering a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Moreover, Ogarkov has been more than a theorist. As early as 1969, he was a key strategist involved in the SALT I and later in the Salt II negotiations. . . . In 1969 he was also put in charge of the newly-created Directorate of Strategic Deception (Maskirova), where he developed techniques of camouflage, concealment, encryption, and deception that were used effectively to circumvent the restraints of the strategic arms control treaties. In 1977, he became Chief of Staff. He was Chief of Staff when the SS-20 INF missiles were deployed against Europe.

His attitude toward the West is best exemplified by his unprecedented and brazen press conference defending the Soviet action in shooting down KAL-007. . . .

## Preparations for war

In December, 1983, [Ogarkov] created three, overall theater commands. . . . The most important of these theaters the Western Theater, was organized to direct operations against Europe, placing all operations, including naval operations, under a single commander. Thus, Europe would be confronted directly by the Soviet Union, instead of through the Warsaw Pact.

The significance of this action was . . . to place the Soviet Union on a war footing. . . . The high degree of mobilization in the Ogarkov plan is necessary only if the Soviets had aggressive designs against NATO. . . .

As commander of the Western District, Ogarkov is in direct charge of all theater forces, including the SS-20s—and perhaps the variable-range SS-25s—in the Western Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. As a former SALT negotiator, he is keenly aware of the role of the SS-20s in the Soviet panoply of intermediate-range and long-range nuclear weapons. He is also keenly aware of the

need to remove the Pershing IIs if his doctrine is to be fully implemented.

Through new force alignments and operational changes, the Soviet Union is constructing a military which they believe to be capable of conducting strategic deep encirclement operations to occupy Western Europe in a new "lightning war. . . . As Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov was responsible for developing and implementing the strategy, plans, organizational changes, and revisions of Soviet operational art. . . ."

As the INF treaty currently stands, the Soviet Union does not sustain a parallel loss [to the Pershing IIs] in its deterrent capability. . . . The consequences of this situation is an asymmetry in intermediate range nuclear missiles exacerbated by the very significant asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. . . . In such a situation, the NATO alliance is dangerously vulnerable from an objective military standpoint. Such vulnerability can be manipulated by the Soviet Union through psychological operations in order to neutralize Western Europe. . . . With Western Europe neutralized and Finlandized, the Soviet Union is able to devote its attention and power more fully to the confrontation with its "main enemy," the United States.

*From the introduction by Gen. Bernard Rogers, who retired in June as NATO Supreme Commander in Europe.*

First and foremost, I am concerned over the elimination of the PIIs, the theater-based system that the Soviets fear most. . . . Secondly, elimination of the GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] and PIIs reduces the number of escalatory options available for use by the political authorities, should circumstances dictate. The total impact of losing these two key tools is that the credibility of NATO's deterrence is reduced in the Soviet mind, and the future of security of the West—including the U.S.—will be affected.

Another concern is that the potential agreement puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, which is what the Soviets want. Such denuclearization would make Western Europe safe for Warsaw Pact conventional aggression with no fear of nuclear escalation. More likely, however, in view of the imbalance in conventional forces, it would result in accelerating the achievement of the Soviet objective of neutralizing Western Europe without having to fire a shot.

The Soviets will be giving up only about 3 percent of their current nuclear warheads; almost all of the remaining 97 percent—thousands of warheads—can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish. . . . And what is NATO giving up? The only theater weapons system, that, in the eyes of the Soviets, makes NATO's deterrent highly credible—the PII. . . .

My final concern is that NATO, following the apparent accelerated timetable of the United States, is about to sacrifice the long-term credibility of its deterrence on an altar of

short-term political expediency and image enhancement of some of its leaders. And all because of a 1981 proposal that close analysis over time has proven we should not have offered, especially if we did not expect, or want, the Soviets to accept it. Unfortunately, when the full adverse impact of this accord is felt, today's leaders and their governments will be long gone. And who will bear the brunt of this short-term approach? The people of NATO's nations, especially those in Western Europe."

*From "Issue Three: Militarily Significant Advantages: Can the Soviet Union gain any militarily significant advantages by cheating on compliance with the treaty?"*

The United States does not know how many SS-20s have been produced. Unclassified DIA estimates for years have assumed that the SS-20 force was close to and even over 1,000. Yet, the Soviets in the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying the INF Treaty have declared that they have only 650. . . . If U.S. intelligence Soviets are already violating the treaty obligations, and we can assume they intend to cheat on a massive scale.

Moreover, the situation may be even worse. . . . Some intelligence analysts believe the Soviet SS-20 force could be as high as 2,250. . . .

There are at least three uses for a covert fleet of SS-20s [each of which] could have a tragic, catastrophic effect upon the United States and NATO. . . .

1. The Surprise Party: a sudden revelation of covert, massive, over-kill capability to force the United States and NATO to accept decisive geostrategic changes.

2. Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare: the MIRVed warhead is ideal for the strategic dispersal of chemical, bacteriological, and biological agents from a distance that would not contaminate Soviet troops.

3. The "Dome of Light": a temporary ABM effect, already tested, which could shield the launch of a first strike. . . .

The Ogarkov Doctrine relies heavily on military tactics that will achieve victory without engaging in nuclear war. Since the time of the great Soviet strategist Sokolovsky, Soviet war doctrine has included the concept that a nuclear war is winnable if the steps toward war are accomplished prudently and the strategic components are correctly analyzed. The Soviets consider the rejection of such analysis to be an irrational act. The fact that the West rejects such a concept completely is a critical element crucial to the doctrine of nuclear victory.

The Ogarkov Doctrine contemplates a situation in which the Western horror of nuclear war will be so great as to lead the West to permit wars to occur without escalating to the level of a nuclear holocaust. . . . From the Soviet point of view, such Western horror merely puts a ceiling on practical escalation, allowing wars to be won by superiority of forces below the ceiling.