

Modern Neville Chamberlains seek end to U.S. defense

by Nicholas F. Benton

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in what his press secretary termed the strongest speech in more than five years at his current post, invoked the name of this century's most infamous dupe, Neville Chamberlain, to describe the actions of the U.S. Congress in cutting the U.S. defense budget in the face of the Soviet military buildup. He also used the word "sabotage."

Speaking to the annual meeting of the American Security Council in Washington on July 16, Weinberger gave a stinging critique of Congress's plans to cut deeply from the President's original \$319 billion defense budget request for Fiscal Year 1987. With indications that the federal deficit projections will be much higher than predicted earlier this year, defense cuts are almost sure to go still deeper, as the commitment to hit the Gramm-Rudman law's deficit-reduction targets remains the top legislative priority, despite the Supreme Court's recent ruling that the law is unconstitutional.

"I use very plain language in discussing this budget proposal because that is what is needed, and I am sorry if what is wanted by my critics is a pragmatic, conciliatory message," Weinberger said. "But I have a responsibility, too—the defense of this nation." Targeting the House Armed Services Committee, which is moving to take more than \$35 billion out of the budget in marking up its authorization bill, Weinberger said their action "threatens us with a strategy far more appropriate to a Neville Chamberlain. . . . It calls for a change in national security policy that would sabotage our strategy for the protection of American interests." Weinberger said the action is "not designed to meet any strategy at all. It reflects no priorities or order for defense. It is simply a bill designed to cost less," with disastrous results.

Reports are that the Soviets have formally set up a committee to evaluate the effects of projected cuts in the U.S. defense budget by the Congress this year. Soviet strategy is now to play for time, and cultivate the illusion that they are open to negotiation, which fuels the arguments of those in Congress seeking to justify the massive defense cuts. This strategy motivated the sudden decision by the Soviets to meet with U.S. officials to discuss issues related to nuclear testing—something they have refused to do for years. They announced July 16 that they will now agree to discuss the verification provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

While the official White House statement mewed, "We hope the Soviets will be prepared to join in a constructive dialogue," others had a different view. "The Soviets' aim now is to avoid a dramatic Pearl Harbor," one congressman remarked at the American Security Council. With the American people deluded, and the Congress decimating the defense budget, "the Soviets are content to achieving relentless progress through a long twilight struggle," he said.

A bi-polar world order

The leadership of this nation's Eastern Liberal Establishment is indeed repeating the crime of Neville Chamberlain, who proclaimed "peace in our time" in 1938 as he gave Adolf Hitler the capability for launching World War II one year later. The appeasement-minded liberals are engaged in a "back channel" deal with the Soviets aimed at stripping U.S. and Western Alliance defenses, and handing over virtually the entire Eurasian land mass and Africa to the Soviets. This is being done in the name of an arrangement known as the

"New Yalta," a bi-polar conception of a one-world order, achieved by undermining the autonomy of nation-states, and giving rule over to the oligarchies of East and West.

Former President Richard Nixon's extraordinary seven-day trip to Moscow is part of this "back channel" negotiation. It involves offering U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a "bargaining chip" in strategic negotiations with the Soviets.

Proof that the leading financier families of the Eastern Liberal Establishment are behind the "Neville Chamberlain" syndrome infecting Congress is found in the August *Atlantic Monthly*, where no fewer than 10 Eastern Establishment figures join a new appeal for the unilateral disarmament of the United States. Entitled, "Back From the Brink," the article calls for the U.S. to kill the SDI program outright, scrap the MX missile and other strategic modernization programs, and join with its European allies to renounce any first use or even early second use of nuclear weapons, including the tactical neutron bomb, in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe.

This article was written jointly by the the following prominent American bluebloods, under the auspices of something called "The Project on No First Use" supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York:

- McGeorge Bundy—the "chairman" of the Eastern Liberal Establishment; former special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for National Security Affairs; former president, the Ford Foundation.

- Morton Halperin—director, Center for National Security Studies; former assistant secretary of defense.

- George F. Kennan—former ambassador to the Soviet Union.

- Robert S. McNamara—former secretary of defense and president of the World Bank.

- Gerard C. Smith—former director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of U.S. SALT I delegation.

- Paul C. Warnke—former director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of U.S. SALT II delegation; former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

The names of William Kaufmann, Madalene O'Donnell, Leon Sigal, and Richard Ullman fill out the list.

Bundy spearheaded a press conference in Washington D.C. July 11 where the rationale of this group's unilateral-disarmament argument was laid out. Repudiation of "first use," they argue, would ensure the Soviets that the West is serious about peace, and would involve not only eliminating tactical neutron weapons against the threat of Soviet conventional forces, but also scrapping the MX, Trident, and SDI.

The MX would have to go, they argue, because, since it is not designed as a missile which can withstand a Soviet first strike, it is only useful as a first-strike weapon itself. The Trident submarine would also have to go, they insist, since its only effectiveness is its ability to hit Soviet missiles while still in their silos, thus making it a first-strike weapon. As for the SDI, the authors concur that it is "technologically unfeas-

ible," but nonetheless destabilizing because it will "erode allied unity," cost billions of dollars, and force the Soviets to build more missiles to overcome it (exactly the same arguments used by the Soviets).

Finally, they argue that "early second strike" would also have to be renounced as a strategic policy of the West. They advocate "enhancing stability" by "requiring that the U.S. and its allies clearly identify the location, source and extent of any nuclear explosion before responding."

Miscalculation

Under questioning from *EIR*, Bundy conceded that the fundamental premise of all these proposals is that "the Soviets share our view that a nuclear war is unthinkable and impossible to win," and, therefore, "sincerely share our desire to seek out ways to avoid circumstances that might lead to nuclear conflict." This, of course, is the essence of the "Neville Chamberlain" mentality that Weinberger referred to in his speech.

In one sense, Bundy and his friends really believe this, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. They believe it as part of believing the Soviets will hold to their part of the bargain on the "New Yalta" deal. But in another sense, of course, Bundy & Co. are unwilling to confess that their "back-channel" deals with the Soviets on these matters involve abandoning the globe to irreversible Soviet strategic domination over the United States, such that they are fully conscious that they are engaged in what U.S. law defines as treasonous activity.

Bundy, in particular, is psychologically incapable of standing up to a sustained challenge of his premises. He deals with circumstances that easily destabilize him by abruptly cutting off dialogue. To the shock of the Washington press corps, that was his immediate resort when queried by *EIR*. Insisting on the "good will of the Soviets," he refused to provide any documentation to support his group's assumptions against the Pentagon's evidence that the Soviets have been working on "Red Shield" directed-energy strategic defense technologies for 17 years, and clearly operate with the strategic military policy that a nuclear war can be fought and won.

He also refused to comment on the overwhelming Soviet conventional force advantage on the borders of Western Europe, which would compel Europe into virtual overnight surrender to the Soviets, were tactical nuclear weapons ruled out or U.S. troops withdrawn from the region. Under the pressure of the uncomfortable situation created by *EIR* at the press conference, however, Bundy mused, half to himself, that were the Soviets planning to doublecross his Eastern Establishment friends in their devil's compact for the "New Yalta," then he would be very upset, indeed. "If," he mumbled, "it became the case that the Soviets did adopt a nuclear war winning policy, that of course would be very, very upsetting," he conceded. But then he assured everyone that, of course, that was "impossible, impossible."