

## George Shultz and two clichés of our time

by Criton Zoakos

Secretary of State George Shultz left for Moscow Saturday Nov. 2, 1985, resolved in his heart to commit treason against the United States. Two great clichés of our time are protecting his mission. One is the universally popular, axiomatic assumption, shared by all, humble and mighty, that men and institutions of government, in the United States, serve the national interest, real or perceived, of the United States. This axiomatic cliché is cloaking Shultz's treason from the eyes of his fellow countrymen and from those of his fellow diplomats. The other great cliché of our times is the delusion that Mutually Assured Destruction, deterrence based on offensive nuclear arms, alone, can ensure peace; this cliché is cloaking Shultz's treason from the eyes of Shultz himself, the victim of delusion.

Prior to his departure for Moscow, Secretary of State Shultz announced to the Washington press corps that it was his high hope and expectation that the Nov. 19-20 summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachov would produce both an arms-control agreement and extensive "cultural exchange" agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. He was deliberately contradicting President Reagan, who, the previous day, had cautioned the same group of Washington journalists against building "high hopes and expectations" about the outcome of the upcoming summit.

Following Shultz's assertions, the official Soviet news agency TASS issued a statement accusing President Reagan of making "rude attacks" against the Soviet Union and of "embarrassing his aides" with his comments about the arms race.

Our secretary of state, having taken the trouble twice in the space of one month to contradict publicly not only the secretary of defense, but also his President, has finally enlisted the factional backing of TASS's Sergei Losev and other

Soviet spokesmen. What are Mr. Shultz's objectives respecting the summit, and whence does he derive the ability to publicly counter the President?

George Shultz is neither a confused man, nor one to shy away from upholding his opinions and policies. He knows what he wants and is willing to fight for it. It is what he wants that is the problem.

Prior to his becoming secretary of state in August 1982, George Shultz had been very outspoken in his espousal of what he then called a new, emerging order of world affairs. On numerous public occasions, Shultz displayed his utter contempt for persons whom he believed to be either "misfits," or "too weak" to accept and adjust to this new order of things. Then as now, the secretary believes that such misfits and weaklings will have to be swept away by the inexorable march of this new order of things, without regret. The secretary himself would be the first to admit that these lines, should he ever read them, represent his sentiments fairly and accurately. He never tried to conceal his contempt for those he believes to be misfits and weaklings.

However, behind this facade of decisiveness, is a stupid and disastrous conception of policy. The secretary's notion of a "new order in world affairs," is as crude, as boorish, as banal, as the modest cultural baggage embodied in the secretary's tough appearance: He has inherited it from Henry Kissinger. Shultz's strong convictions are attached to the following policy objectives: a) reduce the President's Strategic Defense Initiative program to a minor, limited scheme of partial point-defense of a portion of U.S. land-based ICBM sites, eventually to be traded off for "substantial reductions" in offensive weapons; b) withdraw all U.S. strategic assets from the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia; c) conduct an overt

strategic decoupling of the defense of Europe from that of the United States; d) accelerate genocidal economic policies against developing-sector nations; and e) replace the national states, as institutions for managing societies, with private, multinational corporate management techniques.

These strongly felt convictions of Secretary Shultz are now carrying him to Moscow, where he intends to hammer out agreements to bring about a "New Yalta."

Shultz's greatest "preparation for the summit" was an international campaign which went on throughout October, trying to topple the pro-American governments of the Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, Italy, primarily, and to systematically undermine and oppose any pro-American faction and tendency virtually everywhere else in the world. Two situations are exemplary of the way in which Shultz and the State Department have operated: the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Those who know how to read military maps, conclude that if the United States loses its Filipino bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Field, it will have to fall back to the U.S. Pacific Coast, the result being a reduction of U.S. naval operational potential in the Pacific Ocean down to one-fifth of its present level. Yet, the State Department is pursuing an aggressive campaign designed to either wreck the Filipino state, or force it to expel the U.S. bases itself.

In the Mediterranean, Shultz during October succeeded in demolishing what had remained of American ties with the friendly nations of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan, and arranged with Moscow and Israel to transfer the entire region over to the Soviet sphere of influence. As a last gesture toward completing this arrangement, State Department Undersecretary Michael Armacost arrived in Ankara, Turkey, one day prior to Shultz's trip to Moscow, to announce to the Turkish government that the United States will not be able to increase military assistance to Turkey which, Turkey had argued, was needed if that nation were to meet the increased threats to its national security which have resulted from the presence of American military bases there. In short, Shultz is leaving Turkey no option but remove American bases from there.

### Shultz's pleas for 1988

Developments such as these place in perspective the American request that "regional issues" be negotiated together with strategic arms issues at the upcoming Geneva summit. Reading the military map and ignoring diplomatic statements and other verbal assertions, we arrive at the following, irreducible, measurable facts: 1) If Shultz's Pacific Ocean policy succeeds, United States military potential in the Pacific is reduced by about 80% between now and 1988; 2) if Shultz's Mediterranean policy succeeds, United States military potential there is eliminated totally, by 1988; 3) if Shultz's policy toward South Africa succeeds, United States influence in South Africa, military, political, or otherwise, is also totally eliminated, by 1988; 4) if Shultz's policies of military bullying and forcible debt collection in Ibero-America succeed,

the Ibero-American subcontinent, by 1988, will have been reduced to a brutal battlefield in which the United States will have been reduced to a brutal battlefield in which the United States will be fighting against her erstwhile natural friends and allies, the Ibero-American republics.

These four items are not mere projections into the year 1988; they are actively pursued policy objectives to be attained by that year, an important election year in the United States, and otherwise an important strategic turning point for long-term Russian strategic aspirations. These four policy perspectives constitute the essential context against which Shultz is organizing the "regional issue" negotiations for the Geneva summit. What is the relationship of these to the principal issue of arms control, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)?

When the Russian chief will be meeting President Reagan, he will have been briefed that the SDI is three distinct things: First, it is a policy objective of President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, to provide a comprehensive anti-missile defense for the populations and civilian and military assets of the entire Western alliance. Second, there is a different SDI, a policy perspective shared by Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others, to develop a technological capability for point defense of nuclear missile silos and, after developing this capability, to try and negotiate it away in exchange for "large" reductions of offensive nuclear arms. Finally, there is a third SDI, the actual research and development program now in progress in various research centers in the United States. With respect to this, Gorbachov will be in a position to know that it is so strapped by underfunding, oversight, congressional pressure, and so forth that, if allowed to continue languishing in its present miserable political exile, it will never be able to produce anything but a miserable, half-cocked point-defense system, as projected by Shultz and his cronies.

What will, then, be the realistic "bottom line" of the summit negotiations?

Will the United States, committed to a policy of rapid retrenchment and withdrawal from every corner of the globe, and preparing to live, by 1988, with only 25% of her post-1945 "sphere of influence," be pleading with the Russians to be allowed a minimal point defense of her nuclear missile silos as the only available military guarantee for the security of its splendidly isolated continental territory? Is this the secret agenda for the summit? Is this the perspective upon which the great political coalitions for the 1988 presidential election are being brokered?

This writer is not in a position to know the answer, but is in a position to be aware of the importance of the question. As for Gorbachov, he will be careful at the summit. He will try to avoid any action which might trigger a train of events back in the United States which would free the SDI program from its present restraints and set it on a course of a national wartime mobilization. In this sense, Gorbachov has bought shares in the 1988 "American succession struggle."