

Mexico's PAN party crushed at polls, prepares violence

by Timothy Rush

"Shed blood for democracy!" cried the speaker. The 20,000 in the demonstration roared their approval. The speaker was Luis J. Prieto of the National Action Party (PAN), the place, the central plaza of Monterrey, capital of the PAN stronghold state of Nuevo León. As the roar died down, Prieto ripped into the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): "The PRIistas are an inferior race because they are corrupt; we are a superior race, the race of the new political revolution. The moment for sacrifice has arrived."

The mob began to move toward the city hall. They only turned back when confronted by Mexican soldiers positioned on the steps, guns held in firing position.

This kind of scene has been repeated across northern Mexico in the days since Mexico's mid-term elections on July 7. Added to the violence is a new level of alliance between the PAN—identified in U.S. intelligence documents dating back to World War II as a Nazi political formation—and three parties of the Moscow-run revolutionary left, headed by the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (formerly Mexican Communist Party). Those three terrorist-linked parties have begun to circulate a PAN petition for annulment of the elections, and have charted a campaign for 335,000 signatures with PAN leaders.

The PAN suffered an overwhelming electoral defeat. Though massively boosted in the U.S. Establishment press as a "conservative, pro-business" alternative to the PRI, the PAN failed to get more than 25% of the votes for governor in Nuevo León or Sonora, its other stronghold state.

But, as *EIR* has consistently warned, for the Nazi-communist PAN, elections are only a screen for insurrection in Mexico, and violence along the border.

U.S. interests boosting the PAN were everywhere to be seen during the elections. Hundreds of reporters, taking their cues from such sources as Henry Kissinger's Center for Stra-

tegic and International Studies (CSIS) in Georgetown, swarmed over the northern areas, acting as a PAN booster club. In one particularly flagrant case, two British reporters interrupted a meeting of the Hermosillo, Sonora, election commission the night before voting, to demand investigation of PAN charges of fraud.

Mexican reporters in Ciudad Juárez spotted FBI agents functioning in the PAN's campaign apparatus there, across the river from El Paso, Texas. The U.S. State Department beefed up all its consular facilities to help the PAN in the northern areas, and sent one new consul into Hermosillo for the six weeks of the election period.

The Soviets, the beneficiaries of these preparations for PAN insurrection—the Kissinger gameplan calls for withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe in order to send them to the U.S.-Mexico border—had their own eyes and ears on the scene. Mexican authorities reported that an inordinate number of TASS reporters suddenly showed up to monitor the progress of their asset.

Nationalist mobilization

What was not anticipated by these gamemasters was the mobilization undertaken by nationalist forces in the last days of the campaign. This mobilization broke the PAN momentum and deprived the party of credible victories, since it was clear even to that part of the population that believed the PAN's charges of vote fraud, that the PRI had in fact won the key races.

As a result of this mobilization, the government withstood the pressure of Kissinger circles abroad, and quislings inside the government at home, who demanded that it hand at least one key race over to the PAN "to avoid violence." If the government had shown such weakness, it would have been hit with violence anyway—and would have lost the

moral and political resources to deal with it.

The key figure in the mobilization was 84-year old labor chief Fidel Velázquez, second only to President Miguel de la Madrid in terms of power within the party. "The moment of trial has come," he told textile workers on July 2, and repeated the message in daily national television and other media appearances up to election day.

Velázquez and other PRI leaders installed hot-line phones to keep abreast of any provocations launched by the PAN. All police units in the country were placed under military control for election day. Army patrols were stepped up in contested border areas.

The coalition which had inspired the PRI rebound—the Mexican Labor Party (PLM) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM)—went for the PAN's jugular during the last weeks of the campaign. The PLM's book, *The PAN: Moscow's Terrorists in Mexico*, was in the hands of the highest levels of Mexican and U.S. policymakers within a few hours of its release on June 28. The book detailed the involvement of Kissinger-allied elements of the U.S. government—including the FBI and State Department—in a scenario to "Iranize" Mexico.

Velázquez picked up this theme when, the day after the election, he urged his party to keep up its mobilization. The PAN "is a traitor to the nation, and seeks the solution of Mexico's problems abroad," he charged. Velázquez threatened business factions which had helped the PAN. Should they create any trouble, "the labor movement will have to act as it knows how to. . . . I don't believe that these industrial gentlemen will be able to take an indefinite general strike."

The question now, is whether the Mexican government can rally the country to repel the new round of financial warfare which Anglo-American banking and financial interests unleashed against the country to coincide with the PAN upsurge. (See *Dateline Mexico*, p. 18.)

The PAN and its sponsors are counting on this rapidly worsening economic situation, led by pressures for a new peso devaluation and a collapsed world oil market, to fan the flames of PAN violence. The agenda for violence includes the period around the announcement of official election results, on July 14, and the inauguration of PRI victors, varying from one to two months later depending on locale. The PAN's previous highpoint of violence, the burning of the Piedras Negras City Hall on Dec. 30, 1984, in which one person was killed, occurred not on the day of local voting, but on the day the PRI victor took office.

'Plan Madero'

"The most intense phase of [the PAN's] activities has been programmed not for before or during the elections, but for after the elections, even after the election is certified," wrote columnist Carlos Moncada on July 8. The PAN is "less interested in winning the elections than in sowing the poison of agitation in the public's mood." This strategy conforms to a secret "Plan Madero" adopted by the PAN leadership in a

meeting with business interests in Monterrey two months earlier.

A "technical" side to the Plan Madero, involving deployment of goons to disrupt voting and intimidate voters and election officials, was leaked into the Sonora press just before the elections. (See *Documentation*.)

But there is an "ideological" side as well. The plan's name refers to Francisco I. Madero, first Mexican President of the Revolution (1910-1917), and uncle of current PAN president Pablo Emilio Madero. Madero initiated the phase of the Mexican Revolution in which, under guise of "democratization," Mexico became the playground of foreign interests, and rapidly became ungovernable. This side of the PAN program is steered from such places as CSIS and the new "dirty tricks" arm of Danny Graham's High Frontier apparatus, the "Council for Democracy in the Americas."

On voting day, much of the PAN violence conformed closely to guidelines issued in the portions of the Plan Madero which had reached the public.

The course of events in the two Sonoran border towns of San Luis Río Colorado and Agua Prieta, the first with a PAN city government for three years, and the second for six, show what kind of beachhead for insurrection would have been handed the PAN, had the government ceded either of the two governorships demanded by the PAN's international sponsors—Sonora and Nuevo León.

In San Luis, PAN stormtroopers went into action early in the day. When army units arrested Fausto Ochoa, the son of the mayor, for acts of vandalism, a PAN mob of 2,000 went on a rampage, setting fire to five police cars and the city hall. Police and army units dispersed the crowd with tear gas. There were 60 arrests; 20 people were injured. In all, 10 of the 40 polling sites in the city were demolished.

San Luis is of special importance as a center of PAN drug- and arms-running operations. Just one week before the elections, the busting of a large-scale heroin ring in Mexico's southeast led investigators to San Luis as the "over-the-border" outlet. And only two days before the elections, former PAN member Roberto Estrada Valera revealed that the PAN in San Luis had purchased firearms from U.S. suppliers, to equip what he called "shock groups" for action on election day.

PAN state president Carlos Amaya, crony of drug-tainted PAN gubernatorial failure Adalberto Rosas, immediately called for Amnesty International to investigate charges that 20 members in San Luis had been tortured by security forces.

In Agua Prieta, several hundred miles to the east, the PAN blocked the border crossing with burning furniture and old tires on the morning of voting, and then staged a dramatic withdrawal from the elections mid-day, to protest what they alleged were widespread voting irregularities. After this show of force, the PAN militants turned "quiet and secretive," according to *EIR* sources in Douglas, Arizona. The sources say the PAN is now carefully shielding its plans from both Mexican and U.S. government informants.

'Mexican stability may be short-lived'

Excerpts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "Mexican Midterm Elections Report No. 2," dated June 26, 1985, and written by M. Delal Baer.

. . . [I]t is considered possible that the PAN might win a gubernatorial position in Sonora or Nuevo Leon. The state of Sonora, in which PAN support is strong and the charismatic PAN candidate Adalberto Rosas is running, is the more likely of the two. . . . Such a triumph would represent the first time an opposition party has ever controlled a governorship. Modest opposition victories of 10 or 20 Congressional plurality districts are also possible and would represent a symbolically important departure from the norm. . . .

Should the opposition win a few key races, pressure to open up the system will be relieved. However, should the opposition lose critical races, or feel (correctly or incorrectly) that victories in critical races were thwarted, then the post-election environment, particularly in the northern regions, could become highly sensitized and prone to violence.

The PAN . . . is a conservative party, appealing to a business and middle class constituency located especially in urban areas and in the north of Mexico. . . .

. . . If opposition parties fail to make a significant gain, it is uncertain whether they will be willing to return to the more limited role of pressure group. *The immediate post-election environment might be explosive, especially in the northern regions.* [Emphasis added]

The Council for Democracy in the Americas, a front-group of Gen. Daniel Graham's "High Frontier" operation in Washington D.C., attacked the PRI and Mexico's institutions in a five-page memo distributed in early June, called "Mexico's Dominant Party, PRI, fights to Hold Power in July 7 Election." Excerpts follow:

On Sunday, July 7, Mexico will hold midterm elections for 400 members of its national chamber of deputies, seven gubernatorial seats and an array of state and municipal posts.

These elections represent a crucial political crossroad for Mexico, because for the first time in 55 years the ruling PRI is facing some real competition at the polls.

In recent months, the center-right opposition PAN has been capturing blocks of voters impatient with government corruption and continued economic hardship due to debt-related government austerity programs. . . .

Until now, PRI's (and Mexico's) stability has been based on rigid party control on all levels and in all sectors of society. *This control is not one of cooperation for the common good, but one based on graft, patronage and fear. It is a control easily unraveled.* . . .

PRI is now confident that with the measures it has already implemented coupled with its "traditional" methods of manipulating election results, it will take the elections and keep control of the country. PAN candidates, however, have warned that voters will not tolerate election fraud or strong-arm tactics and will respond with violence if winning opposition candidates are kept from office.

Considering the repeated PAN protests in the northern state of Coahuila following charges of election fraud in December, these warnings must be taken seriously. To keep the peace and regain a degree of stability, the PRI must reform and democratize itself and the government, allowing domestic discontent a legitimate means of expression. If not, PRI-imposed stability may be short-lived.

On July 4, the Mexico City daily El Nacional published a summary of the PAN's secret guide to insurrection, "Plan Madero," as it had been originally leaked in three installments in El Sonorensis of Hermosillo, Sonora. The following excerpts are taken from the El Nacional coverage.

According to this [Plan Madero], on July 7 the PAN would carry out intimidation of some of the presidents of local voting precincts, and of their families, with use of a "hammer" to attack at the moment of voting. . . . The first point of the Plan, designated "A," recommends that the PAN's poll watchers arrive equipped with . . . hammer and nail in case there is no hole punch [to punch voting cards], seeking to keep the hammer . . . if there is violence.

Point "B" specifies . . . that there will be strategic shock groups, designated "citizens" and "reinforcements," to intimidate voters and voting officials. . . .

Point "C" indicates that this group will try to trigger repugnance for the PRI, by shouting to the voters that the tricolor party [the PRI] is committing fraud.

Point "D" calls for the formation of active and violent groups for proselytizing . . . which will be approximately 60 meters away from each voting site. . . .

Point "E" indicates that in case of disturbances, [these] groups should violently take possession of the ballot boxes, seeking to push people, women, children, etc., in actions for which they should immediately hold the PRI to blame.