

## Weinberger: Soviets ready missile-defense 'breakout'

by Charles B. Stevens

In his April 2nd, early morning wakeup press conference, particularly designed to reach the Western European public, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger presented the latest U.S. government edition of *Soviet Military Power 1985* and some startling facts confirming the U.S.S.R.'s breakout of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty with both conventional and beam weapon systems. According to the data and photographs reported by Secretary Weinberger for the first time, the U.S.S.R. seeks a "monopoly" on missile defenses, it is completing a nationwide conventional ABM system which could "be operational in the late 1980s," and "they have progressed beyond technology research and they're actually developing prototype laser weapons . . . for ballistic missile defense by the late '80s," while simultaneously maintaining the largest offensive weapons buildup in history.

### Soviets preparing beam weapon defenses

Contrary to some news reports, both the Secretary and this Pentagon publication described in stark detail Soviet programs for early deployment of more advanced beam-weapon missile defenses which the U.S.S.R. has been working on for more than 20 years.

*Soviet Military Power* reports, "By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic missile defense. . . . The many difficulties in fielding an operational system will require much development time. . . . However, with high priority and some significant risk of failure, the Soviets could skip some testing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based laser BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] by the early-to-mid-1990s. . . . Soviet pro-

grams for the development and application of directed-energy technologies to strategic defense have been very vigorous in the past and will continue to be so in the future, irrespective of what the U.S. does about new strategic defense initiatives."

With regard to this Weinberger emphasized: "Now I think perhaps most important of all, some of the most important data in the book, relates to laser technology. The Soviet Union's high energy laser program is now much larger than the United States' effort. It involves more than half a dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges, and the one shown here is at Sary Shagan. It has about 10,000 scientists and engineers devoting full time to this project. The importance of it of course is that they have progressed beyond technology research and they're actually developing prototype laser weapons. They've already got ground-based lasers that can be used to interfere with American and allied satellites. And they could have prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. They could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic missile defense by the late '80s. . . .

"These are the systems that the Soviets are doing everything they can to block the Americans from proceeding in, and it's quite obvious why they are doing that. It's because they are not only doing it themselves, but they've made very great progress, and they clearly want a monopoly in this field. . . . And even as they move ahead in that ground-based and eventually space-based laser systems that are the heart of the strategic defense initiative, and they are working also on systems that interfere with U.S. and allied satellites. Meanwhile, they're doing more than research. They continue to maintain the world's only anti-satellite system."

In terms of realizing the key technological base for full-scale laser weapon deployment, according to *Soviet Military Power 1985*, the Soviets have apparently demonstrated one of the essential ingredients: a light-weight, mobile and compact means of high power electricity generation. As pointed out in *Soviet Military Power* the Soviets: "have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power—a device that has no counterpart in the West." Most laser and particle beam systems are powered by electricity. The U.S.S.R. has long had the world's largest MHD development program. By actually constructing an MHD system which directly converts the high-power heat and thrust of a rocket engine exhaust gasses into intense pulses of electricity, the U.S.S.R. has perfected a compact beam power supply that can be used both on earth and in space.

In responding to a question about the Soviet nuclear bomb powered X-ray laser program, Secretary Weinberger noted that: "There are a lot of things that we were not able to put in the book. We have in the book . . . the maximum amount that can be published in this unclassified form."

And while the U.S.S.R. is spending as much or more on strategic defense, the Soviet nuclear offensive buildup is truly awesome. For example, Secretary Weinberger revealed that beyond the two new ICBMs, "their fifth generation" which will be deployed this year and next, "Activities at the ICBM test range indicates that two additional ICBMs are under development. . . . One . . . is likely to replace the SS-18" which is the monster battle queen of the Soviet nuclear missile force. This means that the U.S.S.R. will have developed and deployed four new types of ICBMs within the same period that it has taken the U.S. to develop and build one—the MX Peacekeeper.

Most sobering of all is the Soviet "civil defense" program, which is one hundred times bigger than that of the U.S. While the United States is proceeding to demolish its basic steel-making capacity through demolition of numerous blast furnaces across the country, the U.S.S.R. is utilizing its two-fold greater steel output to build a "comprehensive and redundant system, composed of more than 1,500 hardened facilities" for "175,000 key personnel" and "extensive sheltering in or near urban areas" for the general population, according to the Pentagon publication.

Both Weinberger and this 4th edition of the U.S. Defense Department's official review, *Soviet Military Power 1985*, detail how the U.S.S.R. is continuing its buildup of more conventional ABM, anti-missile missile defenses and the radars that guide them in direct violation of the U.S.-Soviet 1972 ABM treaty.

In particular Weinberger refutes some published reports that the new Soviet radar is not an ABM radar: "The new large, phased array radar for ballistic missiles, early warning, and target tracking under construction at Krasnoyarsk that you see here, a whole series of those well inside the prime-

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ters of the Soviet Union, is designed to close the final gap in their old radars and their modern, phased array radar network. . . . This new radar violates the 1972 ABM treaty. It is not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union. It's not pointed outward—and this complete network of these radars to provide target tracking data for ABM deployments beyond Moscow, which of course is another of the violations of the treaty. It probably will be operational in the late 1980s."

*Soviet Military Power* elaborates on this: "The new, large phased-array radars under construction in the U.S.S.R., along with the HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, CAT HOUSE, and possibly the Pushkino radar, appear to be designed to provide support for such a widespread ABM defense system. . . . In addition, the Soviets are deploying one surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and are flight testing another, the mobile SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 is both a tactical SAM and antitactical ballistic missile. It may have the capability to engage the LANCE and both the Pershing I and Pershing II ballistic missiles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic ballistic missiles as well. These systems could, if properly supported, add significant point-target coverage to a widespread ABM deployment."

One senior defense intelligence official in a background briefing before Weinberger's press conference noted that previous news reports to the contrary are wrong and all U.S. governmental agencies agree on this essential point. And since the construction of this type of ABM radar requires several years and therefore represents the one key, long-term bottle neck to the deployment of a full national defense, the Krasnoyarsk radar is the most serious and egregious type of violation of the 1972 ABM treaty.

In summary Secretary Weinberger emphasized: "If the Soviets should get a kind of defensive system that we are doing the research on now, as I say they've been working on it a lot longer than we have and in some areas are ahead of us, then you have a very much more dangerous world in which stability would not be one of the factors that you'd be permitted to talk about any longer. . . ."

## Defense head: IMF could hurt U.S.

*Excerpts from the transcript of questions and answers at Secretary Weinberger's April 2 press conference follow. In reply to a question from an Executive Intelligence Review reporter, Weinberger became the first cabinet-level official of the Reagan administration to publicly identify the International Monetary Fund as a strategic liability to the Western Alliance.*

**Q:** *Executive Intelligence Review* has produced a new Report showing that there is a staggering collapse in U.S. basic industry at the same time as the Soviets are increasing their advantage in this area. For example, steel. The Soviets are out-producing us by two-to-one in this critical area. That is only one example of a similar trend. Do you see a basic industry gap as a key factor for Soviet worldwide hegemony as both Gorbachov and Arbatov have suggested?

**Weinberger:** No, I think we have the capability and the potential of converting our immense industrial resources to the kind of military production that we would need in the event we had to go to war. But I think it's extremely important to recognize that we have to take steps now to maintain and preserve that industrial capability.

It is certainly true that the Soviets are adding enormously to their military-industrial capability at the great expense of their economy and the quality of life of their citizens which is, again, one of the extraordinary differences between our two societies. I am confident that we do have the military capability, the industrial capabilities, that we need to support the kind of military that we require to maintain deterrence. But we have to bear in mind that we have to continue to take the necessary steps to preserve and strengthen and protect that.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, I notice you do not mention the nuclear bomb-powered X-ray laser. Why would the United States apparently forego the development of this apparently most effective defense system when the Soviets never appear to neglect to go ahead with the most effective systems?

**Weinberger:** There are a lot of things that we were not able to put in the book. We have in the book the maximum amount that combined discussions over the months have produced

between the intelligence community and the Defense Department, and this represents the maximum amount that can be published in this unclassified form. What we are doing with the strategic defense and research program will be to examine all methods of trying to destroy Soviet incoming missiles outside the atmosphere, and to destroy them with non-nuclear means. These are the basic specifications to which we're working, and we expect that the research will disclose whether or not a thoroughly reliable defense can be developed based on those parameters.

**Q:** Why is it stabilizing for us to get [the SDI] first and destabilizing if they [the Soviets] get it first?

**Weinberger:** Well, because of the difference in the systems, because of difference in usage, because of the way they have behaved in the past, and because of their obvious world ambitions. We had a total monopoly on nuclear weapons for many years and did not use it. I cannot imagine the reverse of that situation.

**Q:** Regarding Soviet offensive developments, could you elaborate a little bit further on the situation facing our allies in Western Europe, and particularly their various reports of Soviet consolidation of command and control and logistical capabilities, offensive operations, the headquarters established by Marshal Ogarkov in the Western theater, and these developments facing Western Europe?

**Weinberger:** Yes, I think there's no question that the Soviet forces facing the central front, facing the NATO countries in the central front, as well as on the flank, is under a continuous process of strengthening and modernization and adding to the basic imbalance that has existed for some considerable time. That's why we think it's so critically important that we continue to take a very active role in NATO while we continue to support our NATO allies to the maximum extent possible.

The old theory used to be that the Soviets had very large, heavy, relatively slow, immobile forces, and that is not true now because they are quite flexible in their willingness to study and adapt new tactics.

This book originated at the urgent request by my colleagues in NATO four years ago, that we get something out that could be published, to demonstrate exactly the points you make. We in the United States have to be part of [the improvement of conventional forces in the central front] because in my opinion and the opinion of the administration, the United States could not possibly live in a world in which Europe were overrun by the Soviets.

**Q:** There's more in this edition of *Soviet Military Power* than ever before about the Soviets' strategic defense program. Is that tied in at all with your own campaign to convince Congress and the allies to accept the American SDI?

**Weinberger:** It isn't so much a campaign as it is to present to the Congress the urgent necessity of our doing what we're doing. A lot of people have seemed to take the position that

## Nicholson's murder an 'Act of War'

"No. It was not a random act. It was deliberate, as indicated by the fact that there was more than one Soviet soldier involved. It reflects the nature of their system."

This was the response of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to a question concerning the cold-blooded murder of U.S. Major Arthur D. Nicholson by a Soviet soldier on March 27, at an international press conference held to announce the release of the Pentagon publication, *Soviet Military Power IV*.

Major Nicholson, a member of the U.S. Military Mission stationed in Potsdam, East Germany, was fatally wounded while carrying out an unarmed assignment in the company of a staff sergeant near the East German town of Ludwigslust. Such military missions are part of a sanctioned arrangement between the Soviet Union and the Western nations, worked out as part of the Four Power Agreements on Occupied Germany in the aftermath of World War II. That arrangement, which has been described as "licensed espionage," allows each side several

outposts, that is, Military Missions, and travel rights in the other side's occupied zones.

The Soviets have three such missions in West Germany and constantly engage in missions like that of Major Nicholson—over 2,500 such missions in 1984, sources say.

According to information made available to *EIR*, Major Nicholson was *not* "inside a Soviet military warehouse" when he was shot, as reported in the press. On the contrary: The major had simply arrived in the general vicinity of the warehouse *while on his way to a prearranged meeting with a Soviet counterpart*.

Nor was Major Nicholson killed in a flurry of gunfire by a Soviet soldier. He was assassinated by means of *a shot to his head*. Simply put, the unsuspecting Major was lured to a prearranged location by Soviet intelligence, and then murdered.

According to U.S. intelligence sources, there are to be four more such killings carried out in Western Europe within the next 90 days. The targets will include field-grade officers of at least the rank of major, as well as one U.S. general officer.

In these cases, the assassin will not necessarily be a Soviet soldier, but could as easily be drawn from the ranks of the numerous terrorist groups, or the drug networks who are in close collaboration with the Soviets.

this is some brand new American initiative which is an interesting pursuit of some kind of very improbable fantasy weapon. The problem is that it is a very necessary thing to do, and a prudent thing to do, as the NATO Defense ministers unanimously agreed last week at Luxembourg, in view of the Soviet activities. Now we have other ideas in mind besides that. We do think that it could offer a great deal more hope, ultimately, to the world, but the two forces are there and require it.

We are publishing now, after a lot of discussion, as I say, with the intelligence community, a part of what we know about the Soviet efforts in this field, and they are very substantial. They've gone on for a long time and they're very clearly pointed toward acquiring the precise kind of capability that they not only deride but argue is so terribly destabilizing and dangerous, and from their point of view it probably is because it would break their monopoly.

**Q:** There has been a lot of talk about spokesmen saying that the federal deficit is the greatest threat to the stability of the world economy right now, and specifically from that standpoint saying the defense budget must be cut. The International Monetary Fund at its interim meeting coming up here in Washington later this month is reportedly going to try to seek oversight on the U.S. federal deficit. Don't you think that

represents a threat to the sovereign interest of the United States defense budget if they were to obtain oversight capacity and seek—

**Weinberger:** We're one of the largest contributors to the IMF. I'm a little surprised if our representatives agree to anything of that kind. I've not heard that proposal made before. I would agree that it would be a serious infringement on our own sovereignty.

Everybody would like to reduce the deficit, and we have to ask whether sharp reductions in the defense budget would do that, and we don't think they would. We also have to ask whether or not the priorities are straight, because we need to have the kind of defense that guarantees us the ability to pursue all of our interests, and particularly to maintain peace and freedom. We need that and our allies need it.

So it's vital that we make sure that we do have the defensive strength that is needed, particularly when we're up against a system that doesn't have any restraints of any kind on the amount that they put into the military. They don't worry about their civilian economy, they don't worry about the quality of life for their people which we do and must do and should do, and so we have to keep all of these things in perspective. Reductions in the deficit are possible, but we should not feel that reductions in the deficit take precedence over absolutely every other policy and issue in the world.