

Mondale-Gromyko meeting seeks U.S. backdown on SDI

by Kathleen Klenetsky

Speaking at a Rio de Janeiro press conference Sept. 19, Henry Kissinger informed reporters that he believes the United States and the Soviet Union will start "serious negotiations" after or even before the American presidential elections. Asked to comment on the significance of the Sept. 28 meeting between President Reagan and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Kissinger replied: "I think it is very likely that at least after our election, and maybe before then, serious negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union will start. Both sides have important reasons to do it."

Kissinger had every reason to gloat. Just a few days earlier, Walter Mondale had announced that he, too, would be conferring with Gromyko in New York Sept. 27. That highly unusual meeting had been arranged, *EIR* has learned, by two prominent Kissinger associates, David Aaron and Dr. Barry Carter. Both men worked closely with Kissinger at the National Security Council in the early 1970s, specifically assisting him in selling U.S. national security down the river via the SALT I and ABM treaties; and both now occupy leading positions in the Mondale campaign apparatus.

Kissinger, Mondale, and Gromyko

By helping to set up the Mondale-Gromyko tête-à-tête, Aaron and Carter were simply playing their assigned roles in a scenario authored by Kissinger. Acting on behalf of the American Eastern Establishment and its Western European counterparts, Kissinger is helping to negotiate a so-called New Yalta deal with the Kremlin to wreck the U.S. beam-defense program—termed the Strategic Defense Initiative by the administration and "Star Wars" by its detractors. The Mondale-Gromyko meeting is part of that.

According to the "New Yalta" advocates, the Reagan-Gromyko meeting is supposed to serve as the occasion on which Reagan will agree to significant concessions on the SDI, supposedly in exchange for some vague Soviet promise to reopen the stalled START and INF talks. Reagan is being urged to give up the SDI—the only military system with the potential for deterring a Soviet nuclear strike against the United States and/or its allies—by his political advisers, led by the treacherous White House Chief of Staff James Baker III, who are claiming that it will help the President politically.

There are myriad signs that such a deal is in place. In a recent interview with the *Christian Science Monitor*, chief U.S. arms negotiator Edward Rowny said it is possible that the United States, having demonstrated the feasibility of missile defense, might agree not to deploy beam-weapons, in exchange for reductions in the Soviet Union's large and accurate ICBMs.

In his Sept. 13 column, William Safire also suggested that the administration is preparing to give away the SDI. Safire writes that Gromyko will focus on getting concessions on the SDI from Reagan—specifically, an agreement that the U.S. won't proceed with the space-defense program—as a precondition for reopening the stalled START and INF talks.

Safire says that while Reagan has "wisely refused till now" to agree to such preconditions, "Mr. Reagan has recently hinted that pre-election picture-posing would be accompanied by the kind of disguised precondition that Mr. Gromyko could triumphantly brandish before Politburo friends and foes. Watch for weasel phrases like 'in the context of' or 'in the expectation that.' They will mean that we are halting our defense initiative in return for the pleasure of Soviet

company at the table, something we said we would not do. . . .”

A similar story is coming from the Brookings Institution—home base of Kissinger clone Helmut Sonnenfeldt. In a discussion with a reporter today, Brookings director of foreign policy John Steinbruner reported that it was “inherently possible” that the Gromyko-Reagan meeting would produce “some sort of limited breakthrough in the area of weapons in space. Reagan should agree to a temporary ban on U.S. ASAT testing,” said Steinbruner, who is close to the Mondale camp and frequently meets with Soviet emissaries to the U.S. thinktank circuit.

Subverting the SDI

Although Mondale has issued solemn assurances that his upcoming tête-à-tête with Gromyko does not represent “meddling” or “interference” with the administration’s meetings with the foreign minister, that is patent nonsense.

The Soviets deliberately set up the Mondale-Gromyko meeting to increase political pressure on Reagan to negotiate away the U.S. missile-defense program. Indeed, within hours of the announcement of his meeting with the Soviet foreign minister, Fritz took to the stump with renewed assaults on “Star Wars.” In a speech to a Sept. 17 gathering of 100 American Jewish leaders, Mondale declared that he intends to “make war and peace a major issue” during the final weeks of the campaign, and pledged to stop Reagan’s anti-missile beam defense program even before it gets started.

“Four years of Ronald Reagan has made this world more dangerous,” intoned Mondale. “Four more years will take us closer to the brink. No wonder the globe has the jitters. U.S.-Soviet relations have not been this tense since the Cuban missile crisis.”

Mondale accused Reagan of being “obviously hell-bent to get started” with an anti-satellite program. . . . We can stop this trillion-dollar madness before it impoverishes us and moves us toward the final disaster.” Fritz promised his audience that, if elected, he will put arms control talks at the head of his foreign policy agenda, and impose a temporary moratorium on testing anti-satellite weapons in space—ostensibly to “lure” Soviet negotiators to the bargaining table.

Significantly, Mondale’s Sept. 17 remarks bore a remarkable similarity to an “Open Letter to American Jews” issued by the Soviet Novosti News Agency in November 1983. Nominally written by 50 Soviet Jews, it called on “influential circles of American Jews” to stop the SDI.

Two days later, Mondale told a rally at the University of Southern California that Reagan is “risking a headlong anti-satellite race” with the Soviets. “It’s clear what Mr. Reagan is up to,” Mondale asserted. “He is risking a headlong anti-satellite race with the Soviets—even though we’re more dependent on our satellites than they are on theirs. He’s lax about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty—because he intends to tear it up. He intends to commit America to a Star

Wars scheme . . . a full-scale, \$1 trillion effort with no scientific basis for it.

“That will create a dangerous new defensive arms race,” he ranted. “It will destabilize the globe. It will divide us from our allies. . . . It will put crisis on a hair trigger.”

Mondale cited a litany of what he called “needless baggage” Reagan will bring to his session with Gromyko, charging that the President has “opposed every arms control agreement that every President of both political parties has ever reached,” and has “virtually abandoned efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe.”

“On Nov. 6,” Mondale solemnly concluded, “we face a fateful choice. If Mr. Reagan is reelected, the arms race on Earth will be extended into the heavens.”

‘I’m no agent!’

Aside from inducing in Reagan a false sense of euphoria over the Soviets’ apparent newfound willingness to negotiate, the Kremlin wants to get specific results from the Gromyko-Reagan talks.

One key goal is to wring an agreement from the President to delay tests of the U.S. anti-satellite weapon scheduled for this fall, as a precondition for resuming American-Russian arms talks. If that doesn’t pan out, the Kremlin plans to set its American assets—including most emphatically Walter Mondale—yammering about how the “failure” of the Gromyko-Reagan talks “proves” that the President isn’t “sincere” about reaching an agreement with the Soviets.

This scenario is now circulating widely among Washington “insiders.” Syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft, a long-standing member of the New York Council of Foreign Relations and a regular mouthpiece for Henry Kissinger, wrote Sept. 11 that should the Reagan-Gromyko meeting fail to produce results, “arms control would emerge as a live issue in what has so far been a dead campaign.” Mondale’s proposal to impose a six-month moratorium on weapons in space, including ASAT testing, would begin to “look like a real starter.”

Judging from past performance—notably, the May 1983 meeting in Minneapolis where KGB agents handed out marching orders to Mondale and his advisers to conduct an anti-beam weapons crusade—Fritz will emerge from his conference with Gromyko with a new round of attacks on Reagan and the SDI. Mondale has publicly stated that the main aim of his discussion with Gromyko is to “stress the importance of resuming serious and businesslike negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to ease tensions and halt the nuclear arms race.”

So much for Mondale’s pious protestations that he isn’t concerned Moscow will try to “use” him or play him off against Reagan. “They won’t be able to use me,” Fritz told CBS-TV. “I’m tough and I know what I’m doing.”

Neville Chamberlain said much the same thing as he left for his meeting with Adolf Hitler in Munich.