

EIR Special Report

Soviet war games are for keeps

by Criton Zoakos


Beginning the week of March 20-26, the Soviet military command launched a qualitatively new phase in its ongoing operation of global showdown which this intelligence review has ascertained has been in progress definitely since October 1983 and probably since the Sept. 1, 1983 shooting of the Korean airliner. This latest phase of escalation of Soviet military pressures and nuclear blackmail was not identified by Western intelligence authorities until March 28 and not reported to the general public until April 3 and 4, and then only briefly.

First, the essential facts of the matter:

Beginning on Monday, March 26, most of the Soviet Union's almost 1,000-ship-strong navy was deployed out of home port in combat formations around the globe, under a hastily concocted guise of "military exercises." No such exercises were announced in advance as had been the custom until now. On the 28th, NATO surveillance spotted five Soviet anti-submarine frigates turning south from North Cape toward the Sea of Norway. They were followed by a 15-cruiser task force led by the flagship 28,000-ton battle cruiser *Kirov* proceeding out of the Northern Fleet headquarters of Severomorsk. On the 29th, NATO verified that a Baltic Fleet task force originating from Kaliningrad had passed the Straits of Skagen and was heading toward the Shetland Islands off the Scottish coast.

At the same time, large-scale air activity was observed involving large numbers of Soviet Badger and Backfire bombers. On Tuesday, April 3, NATO naval surveillance headquarters in Northwood, England started reporting to the public that the Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic was made up of "over 200 Soviet naval vessels," in what is "thought to be the biggest seaborne exercise ever launched by any nation."

The Soviet North Atlantic maneuvers include well over 20 nuclear submarines and over 25 major surface combatants, led by the *Kirov*. They are centered on three areas: The Greenland-Iceland gap around Jan Mayen Island, the Iceland-Faroe Islands-Shetland Islands passes, and the region along the Norwegian coast. Many of the Soviet submarines have been identified as of the nuclear-missile-carrying Delta class, and are armed with nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise mis-



U.S. Department of Defense

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siles which now have the British Isles within range. The entire Soviet fleet in the North Atlantic is being continuously overflowed by Soviet Backfire bombers.

Simultaneously, the Soviet navy is conducting similar maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific. Extensive presence of Soviet Oscar-class, deep-diving nuclear submarines has been reported off Japan.

What is the deployment mode?

The deployment involves forces greater and more formidable by far than those deployed by the Soviets during the historic worldwide naval exercises of autumn 1975 code-named Okean 75. However, the question is: Are these forces, carrying nuclear ammunition, deployed in a normal training exercise mode, or are they deployed in an actual combat mode?

As these forces are expected to remain in their current operating areas through April, May, and probably June, the question is urgent.

It so happens that the Soviet military command has provided the answer in its own name, assuredly because it wished its Western opposite numbers to know the facts. The announcement was made on March 28, the day on which NATO intelligence was initially alerted to the new Soviet naval deployment, via a major article published in *Red Star*, the daily newspaper of the Soviet Defense Ministry.

The article, written by Major Gen. A. Milovidov, was titled "With Consideration for the Increased Danger of War." In it, the Soviet general presents the following case: "The

U.S. administration, in international relations, is impudently crossing the 'threshold' of what is permitted. . . ." It is doing so by "rapidly developing and deploying" new systems of "strategic offensive forces: the MX missile, the Midgetman ICBM, nuclear-powered submarines carrying Trident missiles, the B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and air-launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched cruise missiles. New, highly accurate conventional weapons systems are also being created."

The Soviet general explains that all these horrible things are being done because "the monstrous essence of the conflict between communism and the West is a sinister one and consists in the fact that communism flourishes under conditions of peace, wants peace, and triumphs in peace. The West, if it wants to avoid perishing, must be pervaded with a terrible determination to wage war.

"Hence the priority tasks of enhancing the Soviet Armed Forces' combat might and combat capability," he asserts.

He then comes to the official announcement of a new permanent status of combat-readiness:

"The sharp aggravation of the international situation which it [the West] has generated is making the highest demands on the Soviet Armed Forces' level of combat readiness. First, in connection with the possibility of a surprise attack by an enemy equipped with nuclear missile weapons deployed, as they say, at the threshold of the socialist community states, *there has been a fundamental change in the temporal limits of combat-readiness.* The high level of combat-readiness which is essential for the fullest realization of combat potential as rapidly as possible has essentially become *the perma-*

ment condition of the Army and Navy.

"Second," General Milovidov continues, "the exceptionally tough demands regarding combat-readiness are dictated by the virtually unlimited range of strategic nuclear missile weapons. That is why not only the troops in the immediate vicinity of the border (as was the case in the recent past) but also *the entire armed forces and all military control systems must be in a state of high combat-readiness today.*

"Not as a potential in a hypothetical sense but as real, dynamic forces which manifest themselves in practice during sea cruises, flights, tours of combat duty, and military exercises and maneuvers. . . ."

And then, the concluding paragraph: "The leaders of our party and state have warned quite specifically that the Soviet state's strategic forces are in a supreme state of readiness. . . ."

Pre-war situation?

Senior NATO naval officers have expressed themselves "stunned" by the size, extent, rapidity, and surprise of the Soviet deployment. "It dwarfs the fabled Okean-75 exercise," said one. "Okean-75 had been well prepared and staged in advance," said another, "while this one appears to have materialized suddenly after someone got on the telephone and said 'Go!.'"




The massed and growing Soviet naval presence throughout the North Atlantic is going to stay in the general vicinity for at least two or three months without any major difficulty. Both U.S. and NATO strategic analysts attempting to evaluate the Soviet deployment have apparently failed so far to view it from the standpoint of General Milovidov's explicitly presented context. This is an error rendering the remainder of the still-ongoing evaluation useless nonsense.

Meanwhile, as of April 4, a consensus had been established among Western military observers on the following secondary features:

- 1) The Soviets achieved surprise regarding the rapidity and global scope of the maneuver.
- 2) The Soviets tested successfully a brand-new global command-control-communications system.
- 3) In the North Atlantic, they achieved massive disruption of NATO's submerged submarine early-warning sensor system by means of super-saturation.
- 4) They are testing unexpectedly sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
- 5) They have deployed, for the first time, the majority of their nuclear missile submarines out of home port and into battle stations in the high seas.

Anglo-American dispute

Beyond these self-evident points of agreement, a pathetically dangerous state of confusion and disagreement reigns among the professional military layers in NATO trying to



EIR has warned over the past months of the momentum toward a decisive U.S. humiliation or a superpower showdown.

evaluate what the Soviets are up to. Critical is the difference in evaluation which British military authorities decided to stress against a relatively sounder U.S. preliminary assessment. As of this writing, British Admiralty sources insist that the Soviets' North Atlantic deployment is designed to demonstrate "improved capability to defend the Soviet homeland."

Contrary to this view, during a televised appearance on April 3, both the U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and former CIA Deputy Director Admiral Bobby Inman presented the evaluation that the Soviets are demonstrating the capability to cut off Western Europe both logistically and militarily from the United States as a precondition for launching a conventional ground assault against Western Europe.

The Lehman-Inman evaluation is supported by the fact that the Warsaw Pact launched a series of maneuvers of land forces, code-named YUG '84, on the same day their North Sea and Baltic Sea fleets were launched, March 26. Participating in these maneuvers are troops of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland.

Beyond this point, the Lehman-Inman evaluation is seriously flawed because it ignores the most critical feature of the new Soviet deployment: *Most if not all of the Soviet*

Union's nuclear-missile submarines are out of port, at battle stations ever nearer their ultimate targets against the continental United States. Apart from those Soviet nuclear submarines stationed along our two coasts since the first deployment of our Pershing II missiles in Europe at a distance of six minutes' missile flight, most or all of the remainder of the Soviet nuclear submarine force is now deployed at locations of significantly reduced missile flight-time. This is occurring when the Soviet land-based ICBM force is on an announced virtually "instant-launch" status.

This places enormous pressures against mainland U.S. security while Western Europe is under a different type of military blackmail.

It appears that the Soviet deployment has as its immediate purpose to force the United States, under threat of nuclear blackmail, to renounce unconditionally its guarantee of nuclear protection of Western Europe from Soviet conventional attack. If, in the course of April and May, the purpose of the Soviets is to cause a formal repudiation by the United States of its right to use nuclear weapons against superior Soviet conventional attacks in Western Europe, then Western Europe will formally capitulate to some form of contractually formulated Soviet suzerainty over what had been the European part of NATO. This might occur before Lord Peter Carrington formally assumes office as General Secretary of NATO on June 23.

And war avoidance?

Back in October 1983, *EIR's* chief executive officer, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., warned that we were by then in a countdown toward a thermonuclear confrontation between the two superpowers "perhaps not later than the end of March 1984."

In *New Solidarity* of Oct. 24, he wrote: "The majority perception among influential strategic planners around Washington, D.C., is that the Soviet leadership will be forced to turn to serious negotiations with President Reagan once the Pershing II missiles begin to be installed. . . . The minority view shares precisely my contrary perception of the situation. The Soviet leadership is presently escalating a thought-out plan toward thermonuclear, global showdown with the United States, and will merely accelerate its drive toward confrontation once the first missiles are installed.

"The problem is, that by spring 1984, the minority's view will be fully confirmed. . . . The problem is that there exists no fallback option for the case that the minority's view is corroborated. . . ."

To an *EIR* conference in Rome on Nov. 9, 1983, LaRouche stated: "In the spring of 1983, I forecast that the Soviets would begin to escalate on a countdown toward a thermonuclear confrontation as early as August 1983. Events proved my spring 1983 forecast of such a Soviet posture to be correct; the countdown toward thermonuclear confronta-

tion began during August, and has been escalating in various sections of the globe ever since.

"The general evidence I had available . . . was essentially as follows.

"The Soviet leadership knew that as long as superpower negotiations were defined within the setting of Nuclear Deterrence doctrines, a new missile crisis before the end of 1983 was probable, and virtually certain by spring of 1984. . . . Therefore, in flatly rejecting even exploratory negotiations on the basis offered by the President [President Reagan's March 23, 1984 speech calling for the development and deployment of defensive beam-weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R.—ed.], ted themselves to an early thermonuclear confrontation. . . ." (see *EIR*, Nov. 29, 1983.)

LaRouche's strategic estimate of that time was bitterly debated and disputed among national security and military intelligence specialists. As the Reagan administration had begun slipping into the irrational practice of subordinating global strategic evaluations to the exigencies of presidential election policies, fewer and fewer military professionals were found with the courage to buck what the boss wanted to hear. Most in the Washington bureaucracy began subscribing to the idea that the Russian military threat was well under control.

By the time of the President's State of the Union address in late January, we were told that "never before" had the world seen such peace and tranquility. The threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail had miraculously disappeared into the rosy hues of Reagan's Norman Rockwell pre-election canvas. No military professional stepped forward with the courage needed to challenge this deceptive picture.

Then the Soviet naval maneuvers came along to shatter all this. The dispute between the United States and the British Admiralty reflects a more profound difference, over what an appropriate "war-avoidance strategy" ought to be. The British Admiralty, expressing Lord Carrington's policy, believes that only appeasement of or capitulation to the U.S.S.R. is available as a means of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war.

The American side of the current argument, equally inadequate, believes that a head-on acceptance of the Soviet military challenge is the best policy under the circumstances. The Russian planners are convinced that the more they escalate the military threat, the more the Americans will be forced, presumably out of fear, to accept the British view on the matter. All three are miscalculating, thus bringing us all closer to Armageddon.

Under these strategic circumstances, on March 30, four days after the Soviet naval maneuvers began, Lyndon LaRouche outlined and communicated for general circulation the following policy draft, the one set of policies now potentially capable of turning around the current situation and finally building the underpinnings of a durable peace.