

think in White House armor, reasoning that the desperate negotiations conducted in Israel by Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, a Kissinger crony, were endorsed by President Reagan. Such an endorsement would have to be read as a U.S. attempt to secure Israeli ground forces in place of more American troops if the crisis in Lebanon were to escalate—as clearly it would if the White House chose to answer Syrian/Iranian provocations. In short, Moscow would have reason to question both the President's willingness to lead and the U.S. citizenry's willingness to follow in case of war.

On Dec. 11 and 12, senior spokesmen for American-allied moderate Arab states, King Hussein of Jordan and Dr. Osama el-Baz, an adviser to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, appearing on U.S. television, attacked the strategic accord in violent terms. Indeed on Dec. 11, Shultz, Eagleburger's co-conspirator, began an urgent visit to Tunisia and Morocco, after being dis-invited to Algeria, in a supposed effort to calm the moderate Arab allies of the United States, who, themselves weak, saw treachery and disaster in the new U.S. policy.

The reported arrangements for financial and military aid to be granted to Israel without concomitant Israeli concessions on the Palestinian question define the policy both Shultz and Eagleburger were advised to promote by Henry Kissinger. This arrangement would constitute the revival of a similar deal between former Secretary of State Alexander Haig and former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which was scotched when Israel, with Haig's secret help, invaded Lebanon in 1982. When Haig was replaced, Reagan initiated a new Middle East policy, on Sept. 1, 1982, dubbed the Reagan Plan, which was strongly supported by the U.S.-allied Arab states. Resurrecting the Haig Plan means the Reagan Plan's death.

Meanwhile the Israeli government itself moved to capitalize on the perceived weakness of the United States when, on Dec. 11, it firmly announced it would not accept the evacuation of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and his forces from Tripoli. Shortly after that announcement, the Israelis began naval shelling, and continued it even after Shultz and other administration officials, on Dec. 13, publicly pressed for Arafat's safe passage.

Finally, on Dec. 12, Syria and Iran, backed by Moscow, escalated with a wave of terror bombings in Kuwait aimed primarily at Americans. Then Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov arrived in Algeria at the same time Shultz was "dis-invited" to that country. Reportedly Ogarkov was seeking to assure port-of-call rights in the wake of potential increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.

In short, all relevant parties to the Middle East conflict now read U.S. weakness, not strength. The administration's actions have only helped to fuel an environment in the United States in which the use of American force, loss of life, and future loss of life in the Mideast are becoming the principal administration vulnerabilities.

## General Graham is

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

We have recently received a copy of a letter of Dr. Edward Teller to Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham, which Graham is circulating to his supporters with his own covering letter.

Apparently, Dr. Teller was pressured or duped into endorsing a lie which Graham is circulating against Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Teller's letter devotes two of its three paragraphs to attacks on LaRouche in support of this falsehood. However, Dr. Teller being Dr. Teller, the third paragraph of his letter informs Graham that the "High Frontier" policy is incompetent and useless against Soviet technology today.

Typical of Graham, his own covering letter advises his supporters to circulate only the first two paragraphs of Teller's letter in a whispering campaign against LaRouche.

General Graham's rise to the rank of Lieutenant-General came by the same route as the fictional character in Gilbert and Sullivan's *H.M.S. Pinafore*, who rose to "Lord High Admiral of the Queen's Navee" by "polishing up the handle" on the office doors, and never going to sea. Graham, a flunkie for former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the screwballish Kissinger sidekick James R. Schlesinger, rose to his present rank by the same general practice as the four-paper-clip Kissinger sidekick Al Haig.

Graham's outstanding achievements have been faking intelligence estimates in Vietnam, and working with Schlesinger to wreck the system of national intelligence estimates of the U.S. executive branch at the beginning of the 1970s. Graham's most famous achievement was underestimating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam by 100 percent on the eve of the 1968 Tet Offensive, and defending the same methods of strategic intelligence estimates during the early 1970s from the Pentagon's DIA. Since the beginning of 1983, even prior to President Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement of the new U.S. strategic doctrine of "Mutually Assured Survival," Graham has been a leading figure in efforts to block all funding for beam-weapon defense, arguing that his own obsolete "High Frontier" concoction is more "practical," and insisting that scientists are incompetent in matters of technology.

Graham's "High Frontier," proposal interestingly, requires about six years to put into place (approximately 1990). He estimates that it would cost about \$50 billion; it would actually cost about 50 percent more than that estimate, ig-

# at it again

noring inflation over the next six years. A first generation of strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) based on beam-weapon-centered policy could billion over three to five years if an Apollo-style crash-program approach were used. Additionally, a first-generation beam-weapon defense would work, whereas High Frontier would not. Yet, Graham insists that High Frontier represents a workable, off-the-shelf system which could be put into place immediately, a decade earlier than a beam-weapon system. Graham is informed of all the leading facts on this point; Graham is simply lying outright.

During 1982, after reviewing LaRouche's version of the policy President Reagan announced on March 23, 1983, Graham stated that he was sympathetic to LaRouche's designs, but that since the LaRouche-hating Heritage Foundation was paying Graham's bills, he could have nothing to do with LaRouche's proposals publicly. Operetta fans will recognize in Graham something of the character of Peter Schlimihl in Jacques Offenbach's *Tales of Hoffmann*. Between *H.M.S. Pinafore* and *Tales of Hoffmann*, one might think of General Graham as your basic light-operetta general, a bad-tasting chocolate soldier, perhaps. Or, as the sort of general who would admire the memory of George Washington more passionately if the Federal Reserve would use President Washington's portrait for its \$1,000 notes. Our own view is that General Graham's portrait is a suitable candidate for three dollar bills.

Nonetheless, General Graham has firepower around Washington, paper-clip firepower. He was presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's listed military advisor during 1979-80, when he was already retailing Heritage Foundation lies against LaRouche. He still insists that LaRouche, whom Moscow officially places to the right of President Reagan, is an asset of the Soviet KGB; but, idiots around Washington in Graham's circuit repeat this nonsense, as they do the lying of FBI Senate asset Joel Lisker, that LaRouche is a "Trotskyist East German asset," the same FBI which is covering up openly for direct KGB influence over presidential candidate Mondale, and blocking competent counterintelligence against terrorist forces preparing bloody action for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Three-paper-clip General Graham has accumulated political firepower around Washington amount-

ing to significant political clout with old cronies behind-the-scenes.

## Joffre fired the generals

A prominent French military historian has reminded us that the key to Marshal Joffre's victorious defense at the Marne, during World War I, was that Joffre, as his first act, fired his generals.

Naturally, the United States could not conduct successful military operations without its generals and ranking colonels and majors. However, in the history of warfare, when matters become serious, the successful conduct of warfare requires a rather large-scale reshuffling of top-ranking professionals. The need for such reshuffling is chiefly two-fold. First, when a sharp change in military doctrine is required, there are inevitably ranking military professionals who cling with hidebound stubbornness to the old doctrines, to the point of being more or less uneducable. Second, during long periods of peace, the ordering of appointments and promotions tends to be governed by political and social criteria, bureaucratic criteria. During such periods, emphasis on military competence may play second fiddle to the bureaucratic practices of "career management."

The worst case among our military professionals today is the Delta Force group, with its First Earth Battalion. The touchy-feely brainwashing programs based in California's self-styled "Aquarian" think tank complex, such as Stanford Research Institute at Palo Alto, have turned the minds of a number of U.S. military professionals into the psychological equivalent of overcooked oatmeal. Worse, the coordination of training programs for the Delta Force, and parallel operations such as the operation codenamed "Lifespring," are proven to be deeply interfaced with leading Soviet brainwashing institutions, including the Moscow University parapsychology center. According to Delta Force sources, these activities center around the London Tavistock Institute's Elliot Jacks, currently associated with London's Brunell University.

In case of any condition above lowest level of U.S. military alert, all officers tainted with such Esalen/Delta Force connections should be shunted into assuredly harmless positions or retired as an elementary counterintelligence-security measure of precaution.

At the same time, it is indispensable to jerk the professional officer corps back to its senses, to shake out of the officer corps the bureaucratic dust of "career management" and "inter-service budgetary rivalries." It is in that dusty side of the military and intelligence profession that the paper-clip firepower of operetta-general Daniel Graham thrives. Such action ought to be taken immediately, as the Soviet command now shifts toward the status of next to the equivalent of a U.S.A. Red Alert.

The Soviet military command is without doubt of the highest professional quality among military forces of the world. The strategic motives governing their behavior may

be, and almost certainly are permeated with a quality of Russian irrationalism dating at least from the period of the Mongol occupation, but the military-professional thinking employed in service of such irrationalist motivations is of relatively the highest quality of objectivity and rational thoroughness. They are deeply committed to the engrained doctrines of Sokolovskii, Malinowski, Grechko, et al. on the order of battle for surviving and winning a general thermonuclear war.

In estimating the risks and possible penalties of a 1984 Soviet thermonuclear confrontation with the United States, the Soviet command will continuously monitor not only U.S. capabilities and state of military alert. They will place at least equal weight on the perceived mental state of preparedness and will of both the U.S. political and military commands.

The Soviet command's greatest single advantage in the thermonuclear confrontation now in progress is not the Soviet margin of military superiority; their greatest strategic advantage in this escalation now ongoing is the long conditioning of both the U.S. political and military commands to the false doctrine that thermonuclear war is "unthinkable." This widespread, wishful thinking within the U.S. command reinforces a pragmatic practice of "business as usual" in the Pentagon and around the White House, as well as permeating the liberalism-saturated ranks of both major political parties in the Congress. It is this disorientation, this "business as usual" sort of bureaucratic mentality in the U.S. political and military commands, which is the Soviet command's decisive psychological edge in the present escalation toward thermonuclear confrontation.

During April and May 1983, this writer and his associates warned Washington, D.C. circles that 1) Soviet rejection of the President's March 23, 1983 offer of Mutually Assured Survival signified a Soviet command's commitment to an early, 1962-style thermonuclear confrontation with the United States; 2) That the Soviet scenario for step-by-step escalation toward such a thermonuclear showdown would probably begin to be deployed by August 1983, and would escalate toward a climax at perhaps March 1984; 3) That the key to this would be both the Soviet-directed Nuclear Freeze movement in Europe and the United States, the Soviet negotiations with *Mittleuropa* factions grouped around the Hohenzollern and Thurn und Taxis factions in Germany, and also the Carrington-Kissinger moles within the Anglo-American establishment. We warned that the Soviet command had no serious intention to negotiate with President Reagan, and that all signals of willingness to negotiate were merely calculated deceptions leading toward a breakoff of negotiations near the close of 1983. We reported also that at the point the Euro-missile deployment began, the Soviets would announce that the mainland of the United States is under immediate thermonuclear threat from submarine-based missiles off the U.S. coasts, and that other measures to the same effect would be added.

As of Monday, Dec. 5, with Marshal Ogarkov's Moscow

press conference, all of these predicted developments were confirmed as accomplished fact. Yet, the State Department as well as the U.S. newsmedia are covering up Ogarkov's announcement that Soviet nuclear submarines off our coasts are now officially targeting the U.S. coasts. Around Washington, there persists the same kind of refusal to face facts which we saw in the Kennedy administration's refusal to face the evidence that Khrushchev was preparing to test the President's will in Berlin, and the same refusal to face evidence showing that Khrushchev had made agreements with Fidel Castro to place Soviet thermonuclear missiles in Cuba.

As long as the White House and Pentagon appear to be clinging wishfully to the delusion that the U.S.A. can slide through the 1984 election campaign with a business-as-usual attitude toward strategic preparedness, Moscow will proceed confidently to attempt to do to President Reagan what it did to Kennedy in 1962.

Moscow's present confidence in the success of its present plans for thermonuclear blackmail was born during April 1983. Immediately following President Reagan's March 23, 1983 address, Moscow was terrified. Britain's Lord Carrington, of Kissinger Associates, Inc., howled in protest, saying that the President's announcement would lead to the downfall of Andropov, an Andropov who Carrington avowed was his faction's precious asset in Moscow. Then, Moscow's—and Carrington's—confidence was restored. The first development reassuring Moscow was a U.S. State Department-sponsored broadcast by General Daniel Graham on April 4, 1983, in which Graham announced that the President's March 23 address represented official U.S. adoption of Graham's High Frontier policy. The second, more important development, was the President's endorsement of the work of the Scowcroft Commission. Moscow recognizes Brent Scowcroft as a Kissinger asset, and admires the military folly of the Scowcroft Commission proposal itself. If Kissinger were coming back into the administration, Moscow was assured the projected replay of 1962 would succeed as desired.

By himself, Daniel Graham would not be an important security risk to the United States. To the extent that military professionals and others do not ridicule Graham's antics, Moscow will laugh at any attempt to prove that the United States will not back down to a 1984 thermonuclear showdown as Kennedy did in 1962. By tolerating Graham's nonsense, and otherwise clinging to the wishful delusions of "business as usual" for the duration of the 1984 election campaign, Washington is sending the wrong signal to Moscow.

If a tombstone is raised over the radioactive ruin of the United States, that tombstone should bear the following legend. "U.S.A. 1776-1984, R.I.P. Died of an infection of business as usual." Then, Daniel Graham may gain a well-deserved immortality on Soviet children's television, as the model for the ridiculous cartoon-figure of the American general, whose Rube Goldberg concoctions are always easily defeated by noble Soviet generals at the end of the cartoon strip.