

Britain purges 'Churchill faction,' angles for deal with Moscow

by Mark Burdman

"I know this appeasement problem very well, this Neville Chamberlain attitude. It comes when people get cold feet. I knew a lot of people who got cold feet during World War II." These words were spoken to *EIR* by an associate of the late Winston Churchill during a discussion in mid-October, before the Anglo-American rift triggered by the behavior of the British "Establishment" in reaction to American military actions in Grenada.

Indeed, the behavior of leading figures of the British Establishment after the Grenada invasion would have embarrassed Chamberlain himself (see box on following page). Fortunately, the world was spared the full infamy that the Establishment was prepared to commit. The decisiveness of American action, and the strong support expressed for President Reagan by the American population, caught the Establishment off guard. Relevant influentials like former Foreign Secretary Lord Home of the Hirsel decided that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's script had gone too far for the time being. Lord Home, Henry Kissinger's mentor, wrote in the *Sunday Express* on Oct. 30, and repeated in the British Parliament on Nov. 1, that America had, after all, been correct in its action, and the Anglo-American rift should be forgotten. On Oct. 31, parliamentarians were mobilized and the stationing of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom was voted up overwhelmingly, while a Liberal Party resolution calling for a "dual key" (joint control) system for the cruises was rejected by a wider margin.

But, barring some unforeseen awakening, "the stiff upper lip has been twitched," as an Australian commentator said wryly: "They are looking for some way to get back at the United States."

The Establishment has adopted what one London opponent of the policy derisively labeled "Foreign Office neutralism": an approximate "equidistance" between the superpow-

ers, in order to position Britain as the main crisis-manager and mediator between East and West. In its earlier post-World War II formulations, the policy was pushed under by former Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan, leading up to and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In its more recent expressions, as a British intelligence source told *EIR* on Nov. 2, the policy is "Lord Carrington's legacy, the desire to create a Europe increasingly independent of the United States and able to broker with the Soviets."

Sources report increasing coordination between London and Bonn's Kohl-Genscher government to accommodate to the U.S.S.R. and to distance Great Britain and West Germany from Washington, especially on Middle East matters. According to one anti-Carrington Briton, "London and Bonn have come to a common outlook, particularly pertaining to the questions of relations with Iran and toward international terrorism, a much softer view than that of the United States." He and other sources fear that this will only encourage Moscow to launch a giant strategic provocation in the Middle East, to humiliate the Reagan administration, and to terrify European appeasers into breaking with the United States.

Malcolm Rutherford, a Carrington co-thinker at the *Financial Times* of London, told a caller on Nov. 2 that there is "a great attempt to get a European agreement on Lebanon and on the Gulf situation," in the context of closer German-British coordination toward Moscow. "We are recalling that there is not really much difference between Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union today. We have to learn to live with the major European land power. We have to think again in terms of the nineteenth century balance of power conception. . . . Mrs. Thatcher, although she wants to patch up with the United States, is moving toward the need for more back channels with Moscow, she has gone out of her way since early October in an uncharacteristic way to stress how the Soviets

must be taken seriously.”

On Oct. 28, Rutherford had published a half-page op-ed titled, “The End of the Special Relationship,” advising Britain to develop a “new European identity” as a “counterweight” to the United States in NATO, since “what is questionable is how far Europe can support what appears to be an ideological crusade against the Soviet Union. . . . The time for bilateral relations, or special relations, with the U.S., is gone. . . . Successive British governments have been living in a fools’ paradise in looking to Washington first, and Europe second. In future, it should be the other way around.”

In the *Times* of London on the same day, David Watt, head of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London, warned shrilly that “The U.S. government could easily embroil its unwilling partners in a Third World War without any consultation whatever. . . . Europe as a whole certainly has an overpowering interest in Third World stability and in restraining the U.S. from rash ventures to promote it—whether in the Caribbean, the Middle East, or in Africa.” On the eve of this piece, the RIIA had hosted Georgii Arbatov, head of Moscow’s U.S.A.-Canada Institute, for a policy speech attacking the United States in characteristic lying Soviet fashion.

And, on Oct. 7, Watt had issued a bitter editorial attack against what he called the “Churchill posture” in British politics, the belief that Soviet policy today is identical in essential features to Nazi policy in 1938-39. Watt termed people who believe this—in which category he placed Ronald Reagan, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Mrs. Thatcher herself—“wretched.”

The aborted Churchill reflex

That article signaled the escalation of a process which had been given no attention in the press: the systematic purge or demotion within British policymaking milieux of individuals belonging to what might be called “the Churchill faction” in current British politics. These individuals are distinguished by their strong support for a close American-British alliance under perceived pre-world war strategic conditions, and by their specific support of President Reagan’s March 23 commitment to rapid U.S. development of directed energy-beam antiballistic missile systems. Starting in August, several members of this grouping found themselves on the “outs,” either jobless or ignored in the strategic deliberations of the day.

In the wake of Mrs. Thatcher’s mammoth spring 1983

Would NATO survive Lord Carrington?

The man who may be momentarily named to replace NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns is Lord Peter Carrington, the former British Foreign Secretary who with his business partner Henry Kissinger has long advocated negotiating a “New Yalta” deal with the Soviet Union. The bottom line of this “New Yalta” would be slashing U.S. “spheres of influence.”

At the time of the Malvinas crisis, Lyndon LaRouche warned in an April 27, 1982 *EIR* piece titled “Britain’s ‘NATO Pullout’ Bluff Could Be Called,” that Great Britain had blackmailed Washington with the threat that:

“1) The United Kingdom will withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allegedly thereby destroying NATO;

“2) If Washington opposes London on the matter of British military action against Argentina, Western Europe will drift into the arms of Moscow. . . .

“Such a humiliation of the United States would be fully consistent with the ‘third way’ policy to which Lord Carrington’s machinations were recently dedicated. Car-

ington’s ‘third way’ policy prescribed a significant withdrawal of Western Europe from the pre-existing form of SHAPE and related agreements and institutions. The thermonuclear alliance with the United States was to be continued, but the European components of the Atlantic Alliance, including France, were to be realigned under British leadership as a third force maneuvering between Washington and Moscow. The Socialist International and Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi are exemplary of the principal accomplices of Carrington et al. In recent deployments to this purpose, the transatlantic ‘peace movement’ is among the tactics deployed in aid of such a development.

“So, if Britain threatens to break up the NATO alliance, and threatens a more detached role of Western Europe, maneuvering between the two superpowers, Britain is threatening to do what it has been working to accomplish in any case.”

That this remains Lord Carrington’s policy was confirmed in the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture Lord Carrington gave before Denis Healey’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, a speech reprinted in the July issue of *NATO Review*.

“There is no longer any doubt about the decline of the East and of the Soviet Empire. Moscow is a decaying Byzantium. But this decay will take place over decades rather than months or years.” In the interim, the “Soviet Union has built up an awesome military machine and

electoral victory, supporters of the Churchill post-1938 legacy had hoped to maneuver Mrs. Thatcher into mobilizing Britain around a sense of purpose, in preparation for confronting the vastly worsening threat posed by the Soviet leadership and strengthening the relationship with the United States through alignment with President Reagan's defense policy.

Now it seems that these hopes have been smashed. As one Conservative Party strategist bitterly commented to *EIR* Oct. 31: "Mrs. Thatcher has made a complete ass of herself. She doesn't know what's going on in the world, she's adopted a very childish attitude. Her commitment to a strong defense of the free world stops at her mouth. She's a British-European domestic politician, and the world situation is alien to her."

'The greengrocer's daughter'

It should be noted that in Britain, ideas and strategies that matter in terms of everyday life only come from the top and filter their way down. Churchill could speak from and for the Establishment itself, conveying power and a sense of strategic mission. The middle-class Thatcher is viewed as "only the greengrocer's daughter."

As a scion of the British aristocracy, Churchill had more

shown that she is prepared to use it. She still has the means and motivation to project her power into large areas of the world. . . .

"My conclusion is not that we can afford to be generous in Geneva. But I am saying that these talks should be conducted in an atmosphere of calm confidence and that the broader political dimension of East/West relations should be constantly at the forefront of the Western mind."

As NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington would pursue "peaceful resolution of potential conflict through energetic and forceful dialogue. The notion that we should face the Russians down in a silent war of nerves, broken only by bursts of megaphone diplomacy, is based on a misconception of our own values, of Soviet behaviour. . . . I am not preaching a return to détente pure and simple. Détente was never pure and simple anyway—though I confess I find it hard to understand how both sides can have lost by it. . . . We need something less sentimental and less divisive than détente."

Lord Carrington concludes: "The truth is that, over the years, we have got into the habit of leaving ultimate decisions, and ultimate responsibilities, to the Americans. . . . Over the past few years we have developed a new political consciousness in Europe, through the mechanisms of political cooperation. We now need to build, equally cautiously, but equally purposefully, a European security consciousness too."

than his share of cultisms, Malthusian obsessions, fascist leanings, and (especially in his earlier life) strategic inanities. But when a significant portion of the Establishment itself, including members of the Astor Family's Cliveden Set, concluded that its own survival was threatened by Adolf Hitler, the policies of Chamberlain were brushed aside, and Churchill was able to mobilize a sense of historic purpose, a type of "British nationalism." At his best, he channeled frontier scientific developments as they applied to military questions for the defense of the United Kingdom.

This latter quality is described in the 1978 book *Most Secret War* by Prof. R. V. Jones, chief of British Scientific Intelligence during World War Two and the man who, in the face of great resistance within Britain itself, broke the secrets of the German air-navigation systems (the famous "Battle of the Beams") and thereby undermined German plans for mass bombing of the United Kingdom. Speaking of Churchill, Jones writes: "Had there been no Nazi movement, his posthumous reputation might have been at best a matter of dispute. But, now [1940] that the hour had come he was uniquely matched to its demands. . . . Alone among politicians, he valued science and technology as something approaching their true worth, at least in military application."

Jones adds that Churchill brought together "a sense of history and a feeling of destiny. . . . In speech after speech he helped the people of Britain to see where they stood in history, he convinced them that the direction at the centre was now both firm and good, and he called from them their supreme effort."

Under Mrs. Thatcher, in contrast, Britain is undergoing demontage. Monetarist austerity has not only dictated big cuts in fundamental services, but, ironically, dangerous cuts as well in defense capabilities against the Russian threat (see *EIR*, Nov. 1).

The intensity of the industrial dismantling suggests that factions in the Establishment has made the short-term decision to pick up their bags and go elsewhere, perhaps to the far reaches of Canada or Australia, to escape from the coming strategic confrontations, and leave Britain itself to go to seed, until such time as they calculate they can up-end the Russian bear by some covert means. One London economic expert estimates that since Mrs. Thatcher came to power in 1978, as much as \$200 billion in capital may have fled Britain, due to reduced income taxes for the rich and ending of exchange controls.

Under actual conditions of nuclear war, of course, there is no distant sanctuary. One can only estimate that the escapism of the Establishment actually signifies that they do not yet "feel" the strategic crisis in terms that are threatening enough to their own survival. The only hope for Britain is that under conditions of worsening crisis, a decisive number of Establishment members will become scared enough to recognize the reality principle at least as much as Churchill did.

The Malvinas then, Grenada now

When Argentina took the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands back from British colonial administration in April 1982, the British government and press were quick to proclaim England's undying friendship with the United States, and to pressure the initially reluctant U.S. administration to extend military and economic assistance for Britain's war to regain the possession. But today, with the U.S. invasion of Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, London is singing a different tune.

1983: Grenada invasion

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Oct. 30: "I am totally and utterly against Communism and terrorism. But if you are going to pronounce a new law that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people, even though it has happened internally there, the United States shall enter, then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world. I have always said that the West has defensive forces in order to defend our own way of life. But when things happened in other countries that we do not like, we don't just march in. We try to do everything by persuasion."

In the House of Commons debate Oct. 26, Conservative parliamentarian **Rhodes James**, who was a deputy to Lord Carrington in the Foreign Office and operated out of the office of Sir Ian Gilmour in the late 1970s and early 1980s remarked: "We have been treated abominably by the Americans. The whole thing is a total humiliation and disaster. There is no interest, in my view of foreign policy, in getting involved in American stupidities in the Caribbean."

Labour Party spokesman Denis Healey declared Oct. 26 that as a result of American actions in Grenada, Britain should refuse to station the 160 cruise missiles scheduled to be stationed in Britain over the next weeks. Healey called Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "President Reagan's pet poodle" for refusing to openly oppose American actions in Grenada. "With all due respect for President Reagan, the Governor-General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, is responsible to the Queen of England and not to the President of the United States, and so far Mrs. Reagan is not yet the British Queen."

The lead editorial of *The Financial Times* Oct. 26, titled "An Ill-Judged Adventure": "The invasion of Grenada by U.S. troops, supported by six of the small east Caribbean states, is an action which will require a good deal more explaining than has so far been forthcoming from President Reagan. . . . Force has been employed, with little apparent

effort to use other means to resolve the situation created by the bloody overthrow last week of Mr. Maurice Bishop. . . . The temptation to exert American hegemony in its own backyard, so soon after the tragedy of Lebanon and at a time when the Administration feels Cuba and Nicaragua need to be taught a lesson, seems to have been irresistible. . . . The invasion—no matter how successful—involves serious risks. In the first place, America's international image is liable to be tarnished. . . . It is doubtful whether the overthrow of Mr. Bishop seriously jeopardized American strategic interests in the area. . . .

"Britain disapproved of the use of force, and Britain is, after all, head of the Commonwealth. . . . As a result, the U.S. has seriously embarrassed its staunchest European ally and created a rift within the Caribbean. . . .

"This new American adventure, undertaken against the advice of the British government, is bound to strain Anglo-American relations. It comes at the worst possible time, when Mr. George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State, will shortly be attempting to persuade his European allies of the plausibility of American leadership in the Lebanese crisis."

The Guardian Oct. 27 described "mounting anxiety" in the British Foreign Office that "the row over Grenada threatens to become the most serious transatlantic split since the Suez affair in 1956."

1982: Malvinas War

British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, April 2, the day after Argentina took the Malvinas Islands: "I have been in touch with [U.S. Secretary of State Alexander] Haig on a number of occasions last night and today. . . . The U.S. Government has been extremely helpful."

Sir Nicholas Henderson, British ambassador to Washington, speaking in April after British troops recaptured South Georgia Island, said the United States has a "crucial role" to play in pressing the Argentinians to agree to a peace settlement. "Our view, frankly, is that American interests are at stake as much as ours. If it's a question of overthrowing frontiers and sovereignty and territorial integrity by force in the American hemisphere, goodness knows where it would end. . . . If U.S. territory were occupied or assaulted, as it has been [in the past], you wouldn't start negotiating until the military situation was restored."

The **Thatcher government** on April 30 hailed the Reagan administration's decision to "come down decisively on the side of Britain," abandoning its previous neutral position. Foreign Secretary **Francis Pym** announced he would go to Washington to discuss U.S. moves to increase military and economic pressure on Argentina. "To have the world's most powerful state on our side must make Argentina see that aggression cannot pay," said Pym at a press conference in London. He called the U.S. shift "a very significant acceleration of the buildup" of military, economic and diplomatic pressure on Argentina.

Cardinal Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, quoted in