

## After the Reagan speech, the politicians are still babbling

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

*The following statement was issued March 29 by EIR founder Lyndon LaRouche.*

It is almost a week since President Ronald Reagan delivered his historic, televised address transforming U.S. strategic doctrine, and still most of the politicians of the United States and Europe are in a state of babbling incoherence.

The most important case of confusion appeared in an interview with Soviet Communist Party Secretary Yuri Andropov, published by the leading daily, *Pravda*. Secretary Andropov asserts, falsely, that the President's strategic doctrine is a violation of the existing ABM treaty. He also states, with total military incompetence, that the new strategic doctrine is the premise for a U.S. ballistic-missile "first strike" against the U.S.S.R.

Secretary Andropov would not have risen to his present position if he actually believed the falsehoods which the *Pravda* interview regurgitates from the *New York Times* and British daily press. The Soviet leadership has very strong, but entirely different objections to the new U.S. strategic doctrine. What the *Pravda* interview does is exactly what the Soviet leadership has done in supporting publicly, and massively, the West German "Green Party," which the Soviet leadership privately despises. In repeating the lies of the *New York Times* and British press, *Pravda* is attempting to strengthen the collapsing credibility of President Reagan's opposition in the West.

### The view from Moscow

To a top-level strategic planner in Moscow, what Presi-

dent Reagan did on March 23, was to pick history up by the neck, and send it off moving in a new direction. This imaginary Soviet top-level planner sat stunned before the television screen of his office video-recorder for about five minutes. Then, he emitted in a very deep, very Russian sigh, slapped the top of his desk hard with the flat palms of his hands, and stood up slowly. He walked to a large row of filing cabinets, which contained 10 years of long-range Soviet strategic planning, and began to tear the files out of the cabinets, scattering those files on the floor around him. He was not a happy man.

For 15 years, approximately, the United States and Western European nations have been systematically destroying themselves from within. Their economies were drifting into the condition of "post-industrial societies," and their youth were being systematically destroyed by the influence of a rock-drug-sex counterculture. If Moscow could get through safely the interval in which a dying West made its final threat to conduct a nuclear war, by some time during the 1990s, the Soviet Union would be the unchallengeable strategic power of the world.

After March 23, such long-range Soviet dreams were no longer credible; all those rows of files were suddenly useless paper. No Soviet leader could be particularly happy over these obvious implications of the President's March 23 address.

On the other side, for the medium-term military problem, the Soviet leadership is deeply relieved. At the moment, Moscow is marginally ahead of the United States in developing deployable, space-based and ground-based anti-missile beam-weapons systems, but Moscow knows that the

United States could catch up. Both superpowers could deploy effective strategic ABM defense systems at about the same time during the period of 5 to 10 years ahead. Moscow knows that what the President had decided will work, technologically and militarily. Moscow knows that the new U.S. strategic doctrine is the best option for what Richard Allen has named "Mutually Assured Survival."

At the moment the President addressed the nation, the world was headed toward a new missiles-crisis, one far more dangerous than the 1962 "Cuba missiles-crisis."

U.S. "Forward Nuclear Defense" was met by the Soviet SS-20s. Now, implicitly, between 400 and 500 SS-20 warheads are aimed at every significant target available in Western Europe. This is clearly unacceptable to us. We respond with "third-generation versions of old World War II German V-1s and V-2s." The land-based cruise missiles are more of a nuisance than a durable threat; the precision Pershing IIs are another matter. These Pershing IIs would be between 5 and 10 minutes distant from an assortment of targets in the Soviet homeland: plainly unacceptable to Moscow. The Soviets must escalate the deployment, resorting to such available options as stationing missile-carrying submarines off our Atlantic and Pacific coasts: that we could never tolerate.

By as early as fall 1983, and probably no later than the winter months of 1983-84, we were all about to look deeply into nuclear Hell.

It was not probable that the new missile-crisis would lead directly into a shooting nuclear war. We would negotiate our way out of the mess somehow. Both powers would back off sufficiently to avoid immediate nuclear warfare; that is almost certain—almost certain. However, the crisis would set off accelerated military preparations for the future by both sides. The new missiles-crisis would set off the count-down for an actual nuclear war sometime during as early as the second half of the 1980s.

By no stretch of the imagination could the United States have a significant ABM capability in time for the missile-crisis itself. However, the new strategic doctrine established by the President changes the conditions of negotiation under which we try to avoid, or, in the worst case, negotiate our way out of the winter 1983-84 confrontation.

Until March 23, the U.S. strategic doctrine and posture was Nuclear Deterrence. The Soviet doctrine was one of response to U.S.-NATO Nuclear Deterrence. The deployments leading into the projected missile-crisis were produced by this combination of U.S.-Soviet doctrinal postures. The negotiations during the missile-crisis would be based on strategic estimates of self-interest derived from those interlocked strategic doctrines. It is those interlocked doctrines which caused the missile-crisis itself, and would cause missile-crisis negotiations to set the stage for later nuclear warfare.

Now, with the new U.S. strategic doctrine, the U.S.-Soviet negotiations of the next 12 months will be on an entirely new basis. The respective strategic estimates of self-

interest of the two superpowers will be different than under the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine. Instead of leading inevitably toward future nuclear warfare, the negotiations are directed toward creating a foundation for Mutually Assured Survival.

The instant that the Soviet strategic planner has nodded happily over this part of the problem, he becomes very unhappy. The technological boom which the new strategic doctrine will set off in the United States means that the United States will begin to zoom back to its former relative position as a great economic power. The capitalist United States, with all that that implies to the mind of the Soviet strategic planner, is going to be around for a very long time to come, and as a great world power. That is why the contents of the long-range strategic-planning files are being scattered, angrily, around the floor.

### **Meanwhile, back at Arden House**

The *New York Times* is also very unhappy. The hardened peace-lovers, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Henry A. Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and so forth, are very unhappy with the new U.S. strategic doctrine. The President has spoiled their plans, too. They are also very displeased by the instant reactions among a majority of our citizens.

For somewhere between 10 and 15 years, the average citizen of the United States and Western Europe has been walking around with a miserable headache, like men and women wearing manhole-covers on their heads. The Vietnam War, the explosion of "environmentalism" at the beginning of the 1970s, and the endless collapse of almost everything, has driven the people into what was, until a week ago, a very deep cultural pessimism. "The world is nuts. There's nothing you or I can do about it. We just have to learn to go along with the way things are going, and just concentrate on trying to survive personally. Say anything, do anything, no matter how absurd it is; just survive." On March 23, President Reagan lifted that manhole-cover from their heads. "My headache is gone! I can think again."

An upsurge of technological optimism rocketed up from the effects of the President's address. Sanity reappeared suddenly in a world gone mad. It was the end of Mutual & Assured Destruction; it was the end of 20 years of Robert Strange McNamara's MADness. Now, things will begin to change, and the change will accelerate rapidly.

The *New York Times* is not happy about this. Neither is that strange accountant with the greased-down greying hair, McNamara. All the fine plans of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and Democratic Chairman Charles T. Manatt are spoiled now. They look wistfully toward Moscow: "Please, Comrade Andropov, put a little more vodka in our tea."

Like a convention of Rumpelstiltskins, these fine, disappointed gentlemen stamp the earth with all the fury of a bad-tempered 2-year-old child. "He can't do it. We won't let

him. We'll budget-cut it to death!" The reality of the matter has not fully overtaken their consciences. What the President has done is done. It is irreversible.

By speaking with his authority as Commander-in-Chief, President Reagan has established a new U.S. strategic doctrine. He has not merely proposed a change in policy; he has accomplished a change in policy, a change entirely within the scope of his independent constitutional powers. Moreover, no Soviet leader would ever believe that the United States was not operating on the basis of ABM beam-weapons-systems development, no matter how loudly spokesmen for the U.S. government attempted to deny it. The Soviet Union will now accelerate its ABM defense-systems development. The world is now locked into the new reality which the President unleashed with that address.

As for our allies, they are locked into the same new realities. The chorus of European politicians' quibblings against the new strategic doctrine, are simply British-orchestrated quibblings. There is nothing anyone can do to reverse the effects which the President unleashed on March 23. There are only successful dinosaurs of the Mesozoic Age having difficulty adjusting intellectually to the sudden arrival of the Cenozoic.

In part, the same is true in Moscow's leading circles. Politicians and others who imagined that they each had their future plans more or less neatly arranged, boarded a boat one night, as a man filled with the spirit of Manhattan might have boarded the Hoboken ferry in the old days and discovered in the morning that he was on a ship bound for Shanghai. "This can't be happening to me, and to all my fine plans!" he exclaimed. "Stop the world, and turn it around. Take me to Hoboken."

What stuns these politicians is the fact that the President of the United States had the power to make a single address, and that the mere words he uttered with that address could change the course of human history. The power of those words, when spoken under such circumstances by a President of the United States, is a power which none of the clever, calculating politicians of Europe, including those of Moscow, previously imagined to exist. The President has spoken words which have changed the world, and all the words these politicians might shout, whisper, poetically declaim, or howl in the streets and parliaments of the world, can not undo the powerful effect on history the President's words have produced.

Unfortunately, the world has not completely changed. We are in a deepening new economic depression, and at the brink of the greatest financial collapse in history. Around our shoulders hang still the thermonuclear relics of the absurd Nuclear Deterrence doctrine which has ruled the world's affairs too long. This is still a dangerous period, the more dangerous because of confused political figures in Moscow and elsewhere, who still might insanely miscalculate. There are still politicians wearing manhole-covers on their heads.

# The President has put Moscow on the spot

by Rachel Douglas

When President Ronald Reagan committed the United States to the development of strategic defensive weapons and then seconded Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's statement that Soviet development of a like capability could be welcomed, he confronted the Kremlin with a historic opportunity for which, to judge by the first response, the Andropov leadership was quite unprepared. Not during the entire period of Brezhnev's detente, not since Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace policy and John Kennedy's plan to put a man on the moon, has an initiative from an American or Russian leader so threatened to deprive the rule-writers of post-war arms control, chiefly operating from middle ground in London, of their prerogative to dictate caps and ceilings on the technological development of the two great powers.

It is a moment at which the attitude toward the United States of Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov at the end of World War II, which sent chills up and down the spine of Winston Churchill, might be recalled: "If we are partners, there are no other countries in the world that would dare to go to war when we forbade it," Zhukov told Gen. Dwight Eisenhower in the first days of victory.

Andropov, however, either could not recognize that Reagan was turning three-and-a-half decades of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine on its ear, or chose not to. Responding to Reagan by way of a *Pravda* interview on March 27, Andropov ignored the fact that Reagan had posed his policy as a fundamental shift away from MAD, when the President said: "It is inconceivable to me that we can go on thinking down the future . . . that the great nations of the world will sit here like people facing themselves across a table each with a cocked gun."

The implications of this approach for Soviet foreign policy are momentous: four decades of Soviet investment in peace movement/disarmament efforts to undermine the West can suddenly stop yielding a return.

## Missile crisis interrupted

Before Reagan spoke on March 23, a crisis eerily mimicking the great missile crisis of 1962 was taking shape between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, Reagan's opening the door to development of a strategic defensive capability was a crucial move to avert that confrontation—