

he was supposed to carry out. Well-informed sources in Rome have let it be known that Fanfani is crucial for a medium-term program to split Europe from the United States, in other words, the plan of Soviet chief Yuri Andropov, and Andropov's British co-thinkers. Despite his conservative profile, in fact, the present Prime Minister has always been an advocate of Europe as a "Third Force." After having been a young Fascist intellectual and a professor of Fascist Mysticism, after the war Fanfani joined the leftist current of the Christian Democracy, led by Dossetti, an admirer of the "British model." Dossetti opposed the policy of CD founder Alcide De Gasperi as "too pro-American," and he had close links with Eastern European countries.

In the 1950s the Dossettians had been part of the "peace movement" of that time. Fanfani's closest associate, the mayor of Florence, Giorgio La Pira, was one of the leaders of the so-called "Partisans for Peace" in Italy. This organization, part of the World Peace Council, had international offices in Stockholm and Prague. The other two Italian leaders were Socialist Riccardo Lombardi, a notorious British-Soviet intelligence agent, and Communist Pietro Secchia, more directly linked to KGB forces. Secchia was the first sponsor of terrorist nobleman Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who created the first terrorist structures internationally in the 1960s and practically initiated all the terrorist groups in Italy. The connection of Feltrinelli (who died trying to blow up a power line near Milan in 1972) with Prague and the Soviet Union is also well known in relation to terrorist training facilities.

Fanfani and La Pira always enjoyed the best of relationships with the East. For example, it was La Pira who personally smuggled to the *New York Times* the text of the famous de-Stalinization speech by Khrushchev. La Pira received it in Florence from the hands of the Soviet Ambassador in Rome.

It is also interesting that Fanfani was one of the first Western leaders to meet Andropov, shortly after the Christian Democrat became Prime Minister, stimulating the hopes of the controllers of the peace movement, like professor Adriano Buzzati-Traverso, boss of Venice's Societe-Européenne de Culture (SEC).

Now the big project is falling apart. The new option for the "Venetians" is some kind of understanding between the Christian Democracy and the Italian Communist Party, with the aim of carrying out austerity and doing exactly what Fanfani couldn't do. The General Manager of Olivetti electronics company (a stronghold of the Venetian gang), Carlo De Benedetti, and his associate Bruno Visentini, are currently "testing" Communist Party General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer. Recently in a public debate broadcast by the TV station "Telequattro," De Benedetti asked Berlinguer whether the Communists would be able to carry out the "necessary austerity measures" more efficiently than Fanfani. Berlinguer basically responded: Try me! Since then the Communist leader has not missed a chance to contrast the old-style capitalists with the "enlightened entrepreneurs" like De Benedetti and Visentini.

## Nakasone and Reagan to talk baseball bats

by Richard Katz

"Nakasone did what he set out to do," Johns Hopkins Professor Nathaniel Thayer said to *EIR*. Thayer had just met the day before with his old friend, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, soon after the latter's meeting with President Reagan. "Nakasone wanted to establish a personal relationship with the President. He wanted to let people here understand the political problems that arise back home around issues like farm imports, and so forth. And, most of all, he wanted to let people here know that he—and Japan—are not 'the enemy.' He kept using the word 'teammate.'"

In return, Nakasone got what he wanted most: official statements of "appreciation" for his "personal leadership" on defense and trade issues from both President Reagan and U.S. Trade Representative William Brock. To be sure, both statements also insisted Japan must "do more." But Nakasone can still use them to tell opponents at home that he knows how to maintain good ties with the Americans, unlike his predecessor Zenko Suzuki. This, Nakasone hopes, will enable him to ride out the storm of opposition arising from his ties to Lockheed bribery defendant and former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

Aside from aiding Nakasone's political fortunes, it is hard to see exactly what the trip accomplished. The leaders of the two largest economies in the non-communist world spent much of their two hours together deliberating on whether Japan—which already purchases 60 percent of America's beef exports—could manage to buy still more; and whether Nakasone would loosen the stiff regulations that hinder imports of American-made baseball bats. Like his predecessors, Nakasone pleaded with the Americans not to repeat the disaster of the 1930s, when the Depression provoked an all-out trade war that eventually turned into world war.

At one point, Reagan chimed in with a baseball metaphor, recalling his movie portrayal of the legendary pitcher Grover Cleveland Alexander. This sent Japanese officials scurrying to discover the identity of 'Cleveland Alexander.'

Yet, the underlying cause of the increasing bitter trade frictions, what Thayer referred to as "the paramount issue affecting our nations, the fact that the world is in a serious recession," appears to have received very short shrift. At one point in their "broad-ranging" discussion, according to a

# meet in Washington and battleships

senior State Department official, the leaders discussed the plight of the world economy and their respective "responsibilities" to help developing countries "manage their debt problems." This is a code word for asking Japan to aid the U.S. taxpayer in bailouts for Chase Manhattan's debtors. Nakasone received great appreciation for the precedent set by his \$4 billion low-interest loan to South Korea (see *EIR*, Jan. 25), and, according to Japanese sources, at one point Shultz specifically asked Nakasone to help Yugoslavia.

However, Japanese officials report the entire issue of the world recession and debt crisis was "discussed very abstractly." Absent at the summit, apparently, was the kind of urgency which had led New York bankers to wake up the Japanese ambassador to Brazil well after midnight Jan. 13 to insist that Tokyo strongarm Japanese banks into coughing up \$700 million in rollover loans, lest Brazil default. (At press time, the Japanese banks seemed likely to agree.) There was neither the anticipated intense pressure on Nakasone to participate in some elaborate bailout scheme for debtor nations, nor genuine discussion by either side of ways to end the depression.

## Japan and the U.S.S.R.

The one area of new ground appears to have been defense, specifically Japan's role, during time of war, in dealing with Soviet war vessels. At a post-meeting press conference Jan. 19, Nakasone reaffirmed Suzuki's 1981 commitment to protect two major Pacific sea lanes up to a 1,000-mile limit. The day before, in a breakfast meeting with *Washington Post* editors, Nakasone explored the possibility of Japan accepting the responsibility in time of war of bottling up the Soviet fleet, by preventing it from passing from its primary Pacific port of Vladivostock into the Pacific through its only possible routes, the straits bordering Japan.

Nakasone told the press conference that the *Post* was inaccurate in calling his informal talk a *pledge* to bottle up the straits in time of war. Thayer likewise stressed, "Nakasone made no pledges on this. He simply exercised his prerogative to explore ideas with Americans not in the administration." The *Post*, however, the next day cited unnamed administration officials as saying these "ideas" were in fact discussed with Nakasone. Undeniably, Nakasone, a long-time advocate of Japanese defense buildup, has made a major

step in Japan's incremental evolution toward a NATO-style regional military defense posture in Asia, a longtime U.S. goal.

According to one Washington source, a peacetime role is also implied by Nakasone's discussion. "We now monitor all the ships going in and out of Vladivostock. Presumably, if Japan agrees to take this responsibility, they will take over a major part of that job, freeing our resources for other areas. Similarly, taking over sea lane protection frees up U.S. resources."

The defense expert took as an example the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February of 1980. "The U.S. had to know what the Soviet response would be. We had to monitor the movement from Vladivostock. Now, Japan could begin to take on that kind of role as a primary task.

Since the Soviet naval presence that moved into Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay following China's 1980 invasion has been used to motivate an expanded Japanese role, *EIR* asked if Japanese responsibility might eventually extend to Southeast Asia: "Keep in mind," he replied, "that the Japanese right now don't have the wherewithal to protect 45 miles of sea lanes, never mind 1,000. It will take them years to build up. The important thing is that a commitment to undertake that buildup has now been made. How far it goes remains to be seen. Also remember, the Southeast nations don't like the idea of a Japanese role that far south, and the U.S. government has never brought it up with Tokyo."

It should be added the Southeast Asians aren't the only ones worried about a Japanese regional role. China's press reacted very coolly to Nakasone's defense discussion in Washington. The Soviets responded with language not heard in years.

Just before Nakasone's arrival in Washington, the West German daily *Die Welt* attributed to new Soviet chieftain Yuri Andropov the statement that Moscow might move some SS-20s into Asia. Moscow immediately stated that the *Die Welt* story was false. So far, according to Japanese sources, the Soviets have never deployed such theatre nuclear weapons in Asia. However, as the defense expert pointed out, earlier this year, the United States announced plans to deploy F-16s on Japan's northern most island. F-16s carry nuclear bombs. If the U.S.S.R. does indeed move SS-20s to Asia, it might be a reaction in part to that.

Nakasone denounced the SS-20 statement attributed to Andropov at his Washington press conference, and discussed the matter with Shultz. TASS in turn, citing Nakasone's comments to the *Washington Post*, charged that, by assuming a greater role in Washington's military plans, Japan posed an increasing threat to the Soviet Union. In a reference to the atom bombing of Hiroshima, TASS declared that, by deploying "arsenals of armaments, including American . . . the authors of such plans make Japan a likely target of a retaliatory strike. For such a densely populated, insular country as Japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago.