peasant federation, founded in 1974 by Velasco government to defend agrarian reform, is dissolved.

Peru’s Standing With The IMF
At this moment, Peru is renegotiating its stand-by agreement with the IMF. According to banking circles, Peru will accept “week-by-week monitoring” by the IMF and repeated rounds of austerity shocks in return for IMF approval of its refinancing of its public and private debt. The “moratorium” granted by the private banks is conditional on persistence in triage policies. Chase Manhattan telexed Peru an ultimatum that debt relief is also dependent upon Peru giving special privileges to Southern Peru Copper Company, the Lazard Freres operation which has $700 million invested in a new copper pit in Peru.

While the government has been siphoning off 55 percent of export income for paying its debts, private industry has fallen $130 million in arrears to suppliers, and is unable to obtain further vital supplies. The Wall Street Journal June 2 quotes Samuel Drassinower, Peru’s most successful industrialist, “The time has come when paying the government debt isn’t top priority anymore. We must use all the foreign exchange we need to keep the country productive.”

The Consequences Of Brzezinski’s Folly

The deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations engineered for the past eight months by British Special Intelligence Service U.S. operatives Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski has turned U.S. foreign policy into a dangerous shambles, putting America on track toward a dangerous shambles, putting America on track toward a European theater nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union in the near term, over Africa or the Middle East.

Jimmy Carter’s June 7 speech to the U.S. Naval Academy (see below), a mismanaged product of the “unity program” instituted in the White House in an attempt to keep the Administration faction fight over SALT and dealings with the Soviets from perpetually erupting into the unfriendly hands of the Washington Post, is only the most obvious symptom of the problem — that National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was hopelessly manipulated by the Chinese on his recent trip to Peking, and is manically furthering the Chinese scenario for a war between the world’s two superpowers.

The realization that near-term Atlantic theater nuclear war is likely has provoked a split in the ranks of the same British intelligence gamemasters who run Brzezinski and Kissinger — British SIS, which has sought to promote a U.S.-Soviet showdown in the Pacific, with the British as a leading surviving power. In recent days, the London Financial Times, Toronto Star, Christian Science Monitor, and the New York Times, all British-connected outlets, have run editorials warning that Brzezinski’s NATO-in-Africa antics and campaign to destroy detente could produce war; and broadly suggesting that “evidence” that the Soviets and Cubans were responsible for the recent Katangese invasion of Zaire, evidence “collected” by Brzezinski’s factionally ally CIA Director Stansfield Turner, is a hoax.

Even more indicative are statements by British Prime Minister James Callaghan, who is defending detente with the Soviets in a way that has not been seen in Britain in years. Callaghan in Parliament warned last week that the world is a “powder keg,” and that “the Soviet Union understands that this government is not anti-Soviet for its own sake...we intend to live with that country in the world and not set up artificial confrontations with it....I am trying not to raise the temperature with the Soviet Union. I am trying to lower it.” Callaghan concluded, “We don’t want a new Cuban missile crisis,” in defending his attempts to work with Carter to secure a SALT II agreement.

Paralleling the split in Britain, in the U.S. the so-called “left” in the Democratic Party, the heirs of the British Fabian Society, has begun to deliver strong warnings to Carter that Brzezinski-inspired confrontationism in Africa will destroy his Presidency. Although the liberals have been most vocal, the Brzezinski-Turner “evidence” is being greeted with outright disbelief in much of the U.S. Congress, which understands that the U.S. population is in no mood for Cold War frenzy and military showdowns.

The Carter Administration has announced that it is scheduling another round of negotiations on SALT II between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in early July, and informed Washington sources say it is still possible for a SALT treaty to be concluded by fall. But new anti-Soviet provocations by Brzezinski are occurring daily — the most recent, reversal of a previous Administration decision not to sell certain military-related technology to the Chinese. The same technology is denied to the Soviets on national security grounds; the decision will no doubt be read in Moscow as a further evidence of a NATO-directed “two-front war” strategy against the USSR.

The major foreign policy debate over Africa opening up in Congress, however, provides an opportunity to stabilize the Administration by forcing adoption of a broad-ranging economic development program for the African continent, in a context of continued detente. Without such a commitment, no “geopolitical” balance-of-power gimmicks can stabilize an international climate rapidly deteriorating toward general war.

Carter To Soviets: Buy Detente On Brzezinski’s Terms

President Carter’s speech to the U.S. Naval Academy June 7 got wide advance billing as an effort to “clear the air” on U.S.-Soviet relations and to organize political support for a SALT II agreement which is “95 percent complete.” It will have precisely the opposite effect.

True, Carter said “prospects for a SALT II agreement

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are good.” True, he took note of past U.S.-Soviet collaborative efforts, including the World War II alliance against Hitler. True, he pointed out that “there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons.”

But stripped of its modest amount of “peace and cooperation” rhetoric, the basic policy framework enunciated by the President cohered completely with the “new world order” of his Peking-oriented apostle of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Saner forces in the Administration, typified by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, arms control negotiator Paul Warnke, and UN Ambassador Andrew Young, are apparently pursuing a program of “peaceful coexistence” with Brzezinski, rather than going for his head, in exchange for a renewal of Carter’s formal commitment to SALT.

The result of their foolishness was all too evident in Carter’s remarks. Conspicuous by its absence was any response to Soviet overtures for joint collaboration on world energy and economic development — for example, the Velikhov proposal for joint U.S.-Soviet construction of a “breakeven” thermonuclear fusion power experiment in a third country, which the Soviets presented at the recent United Nations disarmament conference. Nor did Carter himself present any rationale by which the U.S. and Soviet Union could collaborate in preventing the genocidal depopulation of the Third World which is inevitable under current World Bank-IMF zero-growth austerity policy.

Carter also avoided a substantive discussion of the issues of the prospective SALT II treaty itself, despite the fact that even the New York Times, hardly a pro-Soviet newspaper, accused the Administration of creating “homegrown” difficulties for SALT. “What has been lacking during the Carter Presidency,” said the Times in a lead editorial June 7, “is a detailed Presidential discussion of the strategic arms negotiations...a vigorous explanation of the treaty as it stands and a reasoned discussion of the principles at stake in the remaining issues.”

Even in his Annapolis speech, Carter’s commitment to SALT was equivocal, as it has been ever since Brzezinski raised the spectre of “linking” the SALT negotiations to Soviet “good behavior” in Africa last fall. Said Carter, “We have no desire to link these negotiations with our competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, when public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes and threats to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of fact.”

The Soviets are likely to read this as a Carter “hunting license” to Senate and other opponents of a SALT II treaty to walk all over him in the name of “public opinion,” if and when a completed treaty comes up for ratification.

The rest of Carter’s remarks seemed largely aimed at assuring that “public opinion” toward the Soviets grows increasingly hostile, as the President echoed the basic line used all year by Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, the

**Congressmen Critical of Brzezinski Line, Deeply Suspicious on Zaire “Evidence”**

Key members of Congress, including much of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are openly expressing their outrage with the drift toward the viewpoint of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Carter Administration foreign policy, and openly skeptical of Brzezinski and CIA Director Stansfield Turner’s purported evidence of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the recent Katangese raid into Zaire.

Follow Committee to hear Turner June 9, committee chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala) found the evidence “substantial in quantity but circumstantial in nature, and not conclusive.” Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was equally unwilling to certify it as definitive proof of the Administration’s charges. Sen. George McGovern (D-ND) said it would result at best in a “hung jury” if presented in a court of law.

McGovern and Sen. Frank Church (D-Id), after White House visits with Carter, both suggested that the President “cool the rhetoric” about the Soviets and Cubans if he wants to get a SALT treaty through the Senate. McGovern was particularly blunt, saying he saw “no purpose in ginning the American people into a kind of anti-Soviet hysteria.” Church called Carter’s speech “the rhetorical image of the United States great seal, complete with the eagle’s claws and talons. I don’t believe in a demon theory of history....If the President’s policy is actually postulated on the premise that the Russians should stop what they are doing in Africa and elsewhere, then it is doomed to failure....It is in the nature of governments to do all they can to increase their influence...let the Cubans and Russians make their own mistakes in Africa without duplicating them.”

Following the Turner testimony, which was not made public, it was announced that the Foreign Relations Committee would conduct a full staff investigation and hold hearings on U.S. Africa policy. The Administration is itself preparing a Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa policy, in which the policy viewpoints of Vance, UN Ambassador Andrew Young, and Brzezinski will again clash. Present indications are the committee wants to counteract the Brzezinski influence at all costs.
Chinese, and the "superhawk" Committee on the Present Danger — the Soviets have, as Brzezinski charged on national television, "broken the code of detente" and are determined to achieve "global hegemony."

Carter explicitly rejected a definition of detente as "easing of tensions," calling it "simplistic" and substituting Brzezinski's phrases about "broadly defined reciprocity." The Soviets, charged Carter, have used detente "to struggle for political advantage" using military power and assistance as a means to political influence; Carter's denial that the U.S. has quite obviously done the same will ring as hollow in Washington's corridors as in the Kremlin's, given the U.S.'s abrupt shift to "keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East" following the U.S.-Soviet joint communique on reconvening the Geneva conference.

Carter concluded, "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice. We would prefer cooperation through a détente with increasingly similar restraint for both sides — a similar readiness to resolve disputes by negotiation and not violence, a similar willingness to compete peacefully and not militarily. Anything less than that is likely to undermine détente...."

In other words, "Take détente on Brzezinski's terms — or else."

—Don Baier

U.S. Press Trumpets Washington Split On Carter Speech

New York Times, "Carter Calls on Soviet to End Confrontation or Risk 'Graver' Strain...Toughest Stand Yet," June 8:

In his toughest speech to date on Soviet-American relations, Mr. Carter attacked the Soviet interpretation of détente, which, he said, "seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence."

New York Times, editorial, "From Linkage to Sausage," June 8:

For all its ambiguity on the linkage of SALT to Africa or tension elsewhere, his speech was essentially conciliatory....This was the speech of a President ready to take an arms treaty to the country and to the Senate and to defend it on its merits if the Russians will not further inflame conditions in Africa....

Washington Post, "Carter Challenges Soviet Leaders...Two Different Speeches," June 8:

...The Soviet Politburo may have heard almost the opposite speech that most Americans did...Carter made numerous explicit accusations against the Soviet Union that no American president has made before....He charged the Kremlin's leaders with using "proxy forces" in Korea as well as in Angola and Ethiopia....One of the most extraordinary paragraphs in the Carter speech combined the U.S. desire to increase "collaboration with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China" with American dedication to achieving "genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world"....If Carter meant what he said, he surpassed the rhetorical goal of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "to liberate" the people of Eastern Europe from the Communist yoke.

In Africa, Carter joined his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in drawing the line in the dust against "the persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba...."

It may appear superficially that Carter split the difference between Brzezinski and Vance, but he did not. Carter yesterday said that "tensions, sharp disputes or threats to peace will complicate the quest for a SALT agreement....." Quest literally embraces both negotiations and ratification....The speech came against a background of the struggle between opposing forces inside the administration....

Washington Post, editorial, "Mr. Carter on the Russians," June 8:

The president has enunciated a government approach toward the Soviet Union....There is one fundamental condition on which the value of the president's speech rests. It is that he impose and continue to impose on his government the discipline that the mere preparation of such a speech implies....

Baltimore Sun, "Carter Warns Soviet," June 8:

...Still, there was confusion both inside and outside the Administration about Mr. Carter's priorities. To the extent that others among Mr. Carter's aides won or lost in shaping the policy declaration, Mr. Brzezinski may be most nearly satisfied. But the balance Mr. Carter struck is not expected to cause great difficulty for Mr. Vance.

There can be no certainty, of course, that what Mr. Carter said yesterday will develop as a clear, predictable policy...