

strategic arms limitation (SALT) from the very beginning....

It is typical that even during the Soviet-American negotiations in Moscow, certain circles in the USA and the press connected to them undertook new efforts to poison the atmosphere around the talks with all sorts of provoking cries....

The constructive position of the USSR greatly aided the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the talks, talks which are of such great importance for our two countries, as well as for all peoples of the earth. The existing difficulties on the road to reaching a mutually acceptable SALT agreement are evident. But it is even more evident that given the good will of both sides, they can be surmounted. This is precisely the position which the Soviet Union has taken and holds to.

Soviet Analyst: Will Carter Be Another Truman?
Spartak Beglov, a commentator for the Soviet agency Novosti, in an article on U.S. politics contributed to the Czechoslovak daily Rude Pravo, and published April 20:

In American press commentaries on James Carter's March 17 speech on defense questions, the word "hard" constantly turned up ("sharp warning," "hard speech"). A historical association also comes to mind. In April 1945, when Harry Truman became President of the United States after the sudden death of Franklin Roosevelt, he adopted — on advice from anti-Soviet advisors — a "hard position towards the Russians." Without doubt, this was the cause of the subsequent turn from alliance to cold war.

West Europeans Won't Buy Kissinger's Anti-Salt Myth

The idea that European countries are somehow worried about the prospective success of a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreement is nothing but a myth circulated by circles allied with Henry Kissinger. The governments of both West Germany and France are in fact coordinating their own detente efforts with the U.S. State Department, a fact to be highlighted by the upcoming visit of Soviet leader Brezhnev to Bonn, and the new disarmament proposals to be presented at the special United Nations session later in May.

The actual status of the neutron bomb controversy in Europe is exemplary. Early last week, French newspapers reported without substantiation that the French government had just tested a neutron weapon device on the Pacific island of Mururoa. The very first to praise this "news" were the Chinese, in their weekly *New China*. The Chinese praised France's "independent" nuclear policy for being similar to that which China pursues to "break the monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union."

French government reaction to this was quick and firm: "The information which has appeared in certain press organs concerning experimentation by France on the neutron bomb is not serious. No experiments of this type have taken place, and none are scheduled."

To counter similar misinformation in West Germany, government spokesman Klaus Bölling told the press April 22 that the neutron weapon will definitely not even be brought up during Brezhnev's talks with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

The British Lyin

As the Chinese reaction demonstrates, support for an arms buildup in Western Europe does not come from the continent, but rather from Great Britain and other advocates of the grand plan to encircle the Soviet Union on two fronts, and to undermine current U.S.-Soviet SALT

negotiations. In West Germany, the major advocate of the stationing of the neutron weapon is not even a government official, but an opposition spokesman, Manfred Wörner. Wörner is a member of the London Institute for International and Strategic Studies, and is now in the U.S. holding consultations with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.

While the details of the negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko remain inaccessible to the press, one aspect of the overall effort was presented last week by the NATO representation at the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR). NATO's new MBFR proposal is said to be close to the one originally presented by Chancellor Schmidt to President Carter last year, and incorporates a number of concessions which could provide an ending to the current deadlock. The most significant point is that NATO will no longer demand a withdrawal of an entire 68,000-man Warsaw Pact tank army, which in practice meant a Warsaw Pact withdrawal from East Germany. Instead, the same amount of troops could be removed as divisions from either East Germany, Poland, or Czechoslovakia.

Another concession deals with the U.S. offer to withdraw 29,000 U.S. troops from Western Europe. For the first time, NATO is willing to specify the precise units to be withdrawn for two-thirds of that figure. This is an opening towards the Warsaw Pact demand for the setting of strict national quotas for withdrawal.

The major blockage in MBFR — the question of whether there currently exists a balance in forces on both sides — remains unresolved. However, State Department officials are optimistic that the NATO package will not be rejected out of hand by the Warsaw Pact when the talks resume next month.

— John Sigerson