

The Great Satellites Hoax

This has been the week of the British-scripted "Great Satellite Hoax." The British Round Table's press and media outlets in the U.S., including the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Washington Post*, CBS, and NBC, soon echoed by British agent-of-influence in the government led by energy czar James Schlesinger, paralyzed the malfunction of Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite into a preposterous "U-235" incident. It is a crude attempt to sabotage U.S.-USSR joint nuclear energy technology development, and space exploration, wreck the SALT talks, and make impossible potential both U.S.-Soviet entente and world industrial recovery.

This was followed by a "Big Lie" black campaign run by those same forces about alleged Soviet "killer satellites" used for similar Cold War purposes.

The timing of the Great Satellite Hoax is not accidental. Nor is the campaign predicated upon any objective U.S.-Soviet dispute. The Great Satellite Hoax is being used by the ruling British oligarchy and its agents of influence around the world as a psychological warfare instrument in behalf of their strategic policy. It is that strategic policy, and the evil forces behind it that must be defeated if there is to be any hope for peace and progress in the future.

How The British Are Wrecking U.S.-USSR Entente

The Jan. 26 *Christian Science Monitor*, in a centerfold feature titled "Does Britain Need a Nuclear Deterrent?", performs the service of advertising the fact that the British financiers' Round Table is now threatening to launch a unilateral first nuclear strike if it appears that the world is slipping out of London's grasp. A second *Christian Science Monitor* contribution, the Jan. 31 editorial "Stop the Space Arms Race," makes clear why British agents-of-influence Stansfield Turner and James R. Schlesinger, and Fabian Harold Brown, are now orchestrating the "Soviet killer satellite" and Cosmos 954 hoaxes.

Great Britain is deeply meddling in U.S.-Soviet SALT talks and other essential features of mutual "detente" policy to sabotage any U.S.-USSR high technology-based cooperation which might lead to *entente*. This British meddling is aimed at manipulating U.S.-USSR relations into conformity with City of London merchant bank policy for deindustrialization of the world economy, including the emergence of a new and wasteful U.S.-Soviet arms race.

British Nuclear Blackmail

"Britain must decide whether to update its ballistic submarine force, and thus remain a strategic power, or whether to rely solely on the U.S. in a threat of war with the Soviets," the headline to the *Monitor's* feature says, "Does Britain Need a Nuclear Deterrent?" By insanely championing what amounts to a unilateral British first-strike nuclear posture, the *Christian Science Monitor* has helped to emphasize the importance to world peace of Soviet strategic "Option A" — and an immediate public pronouncement by Moscow that it reserves that option to target only United Kingdom territories and satrapies in the event of a London-provoked nuclear war.

This insane nuclear blackmail threat, in line with ongoing British destabilizations and instigations of war in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, is immediately directed against the current talks between an 11-man Soviet delegation, U.S. government officials in Washington and business leaders in Houston, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Britain has succeeded in sabotaging such hopeful lines of negotiations in the past. Although these crucial discussions have been almost totally blacked out by the *Monitor*, the *Washington Post*, and other British media mouthpieces in this country, reports from congressional sources, USSR press accounts, and the several delegations' itineraries all indicate their substance to be a sincere Soviet push to reinvigorate *détente* and move toward U.S.-USSR *entente* — SALT, reconvention of Geneva, joint exploration of space, and expanded trade and investment.

British Wrecking Operation Against SALT

Yesterday's *Monitor* editorial, "Stop the Space Arms Race," advertizes the British strategy to wreck the U.S.-USSR SALT talks and turn them into a vehicle for a British-induced *ban on advanced technologies*. Targeting the two areas of high-technology U.S.-Soviet potential collaboration — nuclear energy development, and the joint exploration of outer space — which if coupled with disarmament proposals could make the SALT talks viable as an instrument for progress and lasting peace, the *British Monitor* writes: "Now that attention is riveted on the Soviets' military satellites and the need to make military authorities accountable for what is going on in space, especially where nuclear materials are involved, the time would seem to be opportune to negotiate a halt to the arms race as well. The Carter Ad-

ministration ought not to delay such discussions any longer."

Britain's wrecking operation against the SALT talks has been underway for some time. In fact, the present British inclusion as the "third power" at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks has only served to create a separate track that is disastrously undermining the effort to achieve a SALT agreement in the best tradition of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal. The British have already used the Test Ban talks to sucker the U.S. and the USSR into a ban on the peaceful use of nuclear explosives (PNE's). Britain, of course, is not interested in such tests. This British ploy is a foot-in-the-door for British agents-of-influence in the United States and their dupes to now demand a complete ban on nuclear reactors in orbiting satellites. *The current Comprehensive Test Ban talks are unacceptable and are serving to undermine the potential achievement of SALT.*

The British wreckers have also conspired through James Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger in the United States, and by their own NATO policies, to wreck the SALT talks by the insinuation of completely bogus issues — i.e., British issues.

Readers have been inundated in their daily newspapers with hysterical cries from British agents-of-influence and their dupes in the United States that the SALT agreement Carter and Brezhnev have been on the verge of signing would not count the Backfire bomber as a strategic weapon, that a three-year moratorium on the transfer of U.S. cruise-missile technology and their deployment to Europe endangers our allies, and that inspection of the arms agreement would not be possible.

The Soviet Backfire bomber is a British issue! In fact, its intermediate range is ideally suited to wipe out the City of London should that nation continue its provocations against world peace and economic recovery. In the U.S., including those who run the nuclear war lobby, the Committee on the Present Danger, desperate to bring the United States in behind Britain's nuclear blackmail policy line, have put out the Big Lie story that Backfire should count as a strategic weapon in the SALT talks because, it is falsely alleged, it could and would be used as a Kamikaze instrument to drop thermo-nuclear weapons on the U.S. in the event of World War III.

Similarly, the cruise missile, which is nothing but an updated version of the Nazi *Wunderwaffen* "buzz bombs" has been orchestrated into an issue by the Rothschild-controlled London *Times* since December; Britain is the only "European" country demanding its deployment. The British Round Table and the pathetic victims of their ideology want such an ineffective and unreliable war-losing weapon deployed in the NATO arsenal because, however useless in a war, it is very useful to provoke one.

The so-called inspection issue is really nothing but psychological warfare, camouflage for the British demand for a "technological disarmament" ban on scientific breakthroughs and their application to both commercial production and new weapons systems. The U.S. should not embark on the futile course of attempting to banish innovation from arms development. Precisely the areas of research which are most important to advanced

weapons technology, namely fusion and aerospace and their subsumed research branches, also demarcate the areas of potentially most fruitful collaboration between the NATO-OECD and Comecon-CMEA nations. "Technological disarmament" would not be a step toward peace, but a step away from technologies whose collaborative development to solve mutual problems of energy, resources, and production technology would be the firmest foundation of peace. Close U.S.-USSR scientific collaboration, especially in the various areas of fusion research — which must be put on a *treaty basis*, either in SALT or another U.S.-USSR treaty agreement — would not only assure the early practical development of a virtually unlimited energy source, but would also make all but impossible the secret achievement of destabilizing, major unilateral advantages in military applications.

In the last two weeks, liberal and conservative scientists who had been unified and rallying around the recent call for joint U.S.-USSR fusion power development by Soviet academician Nicholai Basov and American science leader Edward Teller have begun to succumb to British psychological warfare on these and related matters. For example, Representative Charles Wilson (D-Cal.), with backing from science and industrial in-

"Does Britain Need a Nuclear Deterrent?" asked the Christian Science Monitor centerfold Jan. 26. Below is an excerpt:

They bear the names Resolution, Renown, Repulse, and Revenge. In fair weather and in foul, somewhere in the North Atlantic, they move noiselessly below the slate-gray surface, bearing their lethal burdens: 16 sleek Polaris A-3 missiles per submarine, each missile with nuclear warheads many times as destructive as the bomb dropped over Hiroshima.

These four submarines constitute Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent...

In St. James's Square, not far from Piccadilly Circus, stands mellow Chatham House, once the home of William Pitt the Elder, now the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Since 1976, the institute has been engaged in a three-year assessment of Britain's foreign-policy options in the early 1980s, including the British nuclear deterrent.

Among the early fruits of this study is a thoughtful document entitled "The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent," written by strategic thinker Ian Smart...

Britain could probably choose a successor to its Polaris force at an acceptable level of cost. Mr. Smart's study concludes that although cruise missiles will be cheaper than ballistic missiles, the overall cost of a nuclear submarine force equipped with cruise missiles would be somewhat greater than a force equipped with ballistic missiles because more submarines would be required. (The study suggests costs of £2,245 million to £2,925 million at 1976 prices for a ballistic missile force and £2,740 million to £3,430 million for a cruise missile force.)

terests represented at Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories, has been foolishly attacking SALT on the Backfire and cruise missile questions as well as the inspection issue. Instead, these well-meaning prodevelopment forces should be training their fire on the anti-technology British-instigated Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, while resolving the technology ban problem in SALT by exposing the British "arms control" scenarios and by fighting for joint U.S.-USSR fusion development *as part of the treaty*. On the liberal side arms control-oriented scientists like Kosta Tsipsis of MIT have fallen into the trap of British political intelligence operative Ralph Nader and, in the wake of James Schlesinger's phoney "U-235" Soviet spy-satellite hoax, have foolishly encouraged President Carter to call for a ban on nuclear technologies in outer space to prevent an "arms race" there. This preposterous proposal only undermines the fantastic possibilities contained in U.S.-Soviet joint exploration of outer space.

Brown's "No Choice"

On Feb. 2, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown presented Congress with his annual report — containing

announcement of plans to develop "killer satellites" while speeding deployment of cruise missiles and beginning a massive conventional build-up of NATO forces, all because "the Soviets leave us no choice." At the same time, Brown telegraphed plans for development of the \$35 billion MX-mobile missile, and, according to the *New York Times*, stated that the U.S. must develop effective relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. Brown's report, in short, was probably authored by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies.

On Feb. 3, a day later, the *Washington Post's* Stephen S. Rosenfeld told readers "How to Sell SALT." Rosenfeld recommended that the current Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, step out of the SALT negotiations, and that Harold Brown, the "wonder weapons" boy who opposes U.S. collaboration with the Soviets on nuclear energy and space exploration, be made Jimmy Carter's "point man" to "sell SALT." The message couldn't be clearer: Let the Soviets submit — and the U.S. agree — to "technological disarmament" as the substance of a SALT treaty, or London will begin a spiraling new arms race, that could lead straight to nuclear war.

Press Uses Cosmos 954 To Whip Up Cold War Hysteria

New York Times, Editorial, Feb. 2:

The fiery plunge to earth of a Soviet military satellite, carrying a nuclear reactor, has now ignited a debate over what, if anything, should be done to prevent a recurrence....

Assessing the risks and benefits of using nuclear power in space is difficult; scant information is available....The Soviets have reportedly put 16 reactors in orbit. They apparently depend on reactors to power radar systems that track American ships at sea, and thus may be reluctant to accept a ban on them.

The risks imposed by nuclear systems in space are difficult to estimate. Both superpowers boost their satellites into high orbits where the nuclear materials will have centuries to decay. But they guard against malfunctions differently. The American program packages its radioactive power sources in cases designed to survive a plunge through the atmosphere. The system has worked thus far but there is always some risk of rupture. The Soviet program counts on the satellite burning up and disintegrating high in the atmosphere, where its radioactive cargo could presumably disperse harmlessly. But the accident in Canada reveals that some dangerous material can reach ground...

The worst accident would involve a nuclear satellite disintegrating low in the atmosphere and showering radioactive materials and gases over a heavily populated area. That might kill hundreds, or even thousands of people...

President Carter has proposed that reactors be used only for deep space missions where solar energy is inadequate and that they be banned from earth orbit unless "sure-fire" methods are found to prevent global pollution. That fits nicely into the current American space program but may not sit well with the Russians. Nor does

it answer all the doubts about safety. Could not the launching of a nuclear probe into deep space go awry, showering the earth with nuclear debris?...

New York Times, Jan 29:

Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger said today that it was inappropriate for satellites containing nuclear reactors to orbit the earth. But he said he did not know whether nuclear-equipped satellites could be banned effectively.

Mr. Schlesinger, appearing on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers," was commenting on the Soviet spy satellite that fell from orbit Tuesday with a nuclear reactor aboard.

Asked whether the United States should push for an agreement with the Soviet Union to prohibit nations from sending up nuclear reactors with their earth-orbiting vehicles, he said: "I would prefer to leave that particular question to the Department of State. But there are serious hazards, and I regard it as inappropriate to have nuclear reactors orbiting the earth."

"I think that if all powers were to agree on that, that such events could be avoided in the future," he added, "but there's no possibility of that unless the Soviets were to agree to cease using this particular form of satellite."

The Daily News, New York, "Russians Can Kill Us in Space, CIA Chief Says," by James Wiegart, Feb. 1:

The Soviet Union not only has the ability to orbit increasingly sophisticated spy satellites to monitor United States military activities worldwide, but the Soviets also have perfected a killer satellite to shoot down U.S. spy-in-the-sky probes, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday.

Turner, in a wide-ranging meeting with reporters, con-

firmed that the Soviets have the "operational capability" of shooting down American intelligence satellites. This means that the Russians not only have successfully tested their killer satellites, but actually have some deployed, ready for use.

But Turner declined to say whether all U.S. satellites were vulnerable to the Soviet killer satellite or only those flying in a low earth orbit. He also refused to be drawn into a detailed discussion on the implications of the Soviet anti-satellite capability for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which rely on intelligence satellite monitoring for reinforcement.

But Turner made no effort to conceal his concern over the Soviet anti-satellite capability and the danger it poses to U.S. security, particularly at a time when the United States is relying more heavily on so-called "technical intelligence" — intelligence gathered by electronic sensing or photographic satellites.

The United States has been testing various anti-satellite devices, some using lasers and others armed merely with high explosives, but defense officials have said privately that it will be at least several more years before such devices will be operational.

President Carter last April referred publicly to Soviet killer satellite tests as the "satellite intercept" program, but Carter did not sketch out in detail how extensive the program was.

With the SALT negotiators moving toward a Phase 2 agreement strictly limiting the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles that each side can maintain, Carter was clearly concerned about the problem of verification, which, of course, meant verification by satellite....

Unlike the Soviets, who are beefing up their ground-based espionage activities around the world, the U.S. is cutting back its conventional spy force in favor of technical intelligence, Turner said. As a result, more and

more of the U.S. intelligence product comes from spy satellites, electronic eavesdropping and other technical means...

The Trib, New York, "Soviets Breed Killer Viruses," Jan 31:

The Soviet Union is believed to be breeding new strains of killer viruses and microbes in heavily guarded biological warfare factories, Western intelligence sources said yesterday in Brussels.

They said American spy satellites have photographed several establishments near Moscow and the western Soviet Union which intelligence analysts have concluded are biological research and production centers... The sources said Western intelligence services believe the Soviets are working on refining and making more lethal microbes and viruses which cause the worst diseases known to man — plague, anthrax, tuberculosis, smallpox, yellow fever and diphtheria.

More seriously, Western scientific experts who advise NATO's military authorities have reason to suspect that the Soviets are adapting three horrific new diseases for warfare purposes. The sources describe the diseases as hemorrhagic fevers discovered in Africa during the past 20 years.

They are lassa fever, which according to the sources kills 35 out of every 100 people it strikes, ebola fever, which kills 70 out of every 300, and the deadly marburg fever, also known as green monkey disease.

The sources said the Soviets were working along four principle lines involving both the old and new diseases:

- Increasing their lethality;
- Cutting their incubation time so they will kill more quickly;
- Finding means to protect Soviet troops and civilians from the diseases, and

The British Line On Technology

We reprint here a statement issued by Judith Hart, Britain's Minister of Overseas Development, which puts forward the British notion of "appropriate technologies" for the Third World — and elsewhere. It appeared in the Venezuelan newspaper, El Universal Jan. 30, 1978.

In a few words, the most appropriate technology for...Third World development is that which permits the fabrication of a product whose economic form makes use of more materials that are found in abundance in the same region and less of those which are scarce.

The answer in this case to what would be the most appropriate technology is the animal-pulled plow adjustable to make furrows from 20 to 46 centimeters in width. This plow only costs 30 pounds and requires almost no maintenance of any kind. Its application would leave no one without work and, on the contrary, could be produced in the same locality and would thus create a source of employment. Labor would be carried out in better form with more yield and more easily.

Given the low level of investment made by the Third World, it would only be possible to equip a small section of the labor force with the installations required by

"Western" techniques. With its immense problem of unemployment, the countries of the Third World need less advanced techniques which imply more employment and less capital.

At the same time, they should prove more productive than traditional methods...For this reason they are often called "intermediate" techniques...

The intermediates technologies for the utilization of energy, as for example, those applied in the use of solar and wind energy, could also be important, especially in the rural zones.

To help resolve this problem, the ministry that I head — and the other international aid organizations — must depend on the knowledge that any government to which aid is given accepts the necessity of putting the most appropriate technologies into practice. That which we can do is contribute to introducing the concept of intermediate technology among the technicians and professionals of the Third World dedicated to research, high and middle level functionaries, contractors and manufactures, educators and particularly university students who will be the ones making future decisions.

•Improving means of delivery...

The main weapon for a Soviet chemical or biological attack would be the 40-tube BM-21 multiple rocket launcher. Two batteries of six launchers could lay down nearly 500 chemical warheads in a few seconds.

NATO has only a limited ability to fight a chemical war. The United States is the only country with a substantial retaliatory chemical capability but has renounced altogether the use of biological agents and weapons...

U.S. Labor Party: Satellite Hoax Must Not Wreck SALT Talks

The following is a U.S. Labor Party statement first published on Feb. 3 as an editorial in the USLP's newspaper New Solidarity.

The wholly unwarranted but ever-growing furor over a piece of benign Soviet satellite debris in the northern Canadian tundra — as pointed out by columnist Joseph Kraft, long known to U.S. and Canadian authorities to be on its way — and the immediate clamor for control of satellites, and banning of nuclear power in space, make it necessary and urgent to reaffirm what the viable basis for a strategic understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union must be.

As emphasized and spelled out in the Labor Party's statement on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), "From Détente to Entente," released in December 1977, the sole acceptable basis for negotiations expressing the only true interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States is a SALT agreement based on collaborative arrangements in the two fields of technology which comprise 99 percent of the basis for advanced weapons systems — fusion energy and aerospace technology. We have developed the argument for collaborative efforts in advanced fusion research and the many Soviet initiatives in this direction (most recently by laser fusion specialist Nikolai Basov in Maimi, Florida) on many past occasions. In the case of space technology, information on satellite and related capabilities incidental to the "crash" actually underscores the importance of this area of research, involving not only the basic science of the earth's atmosphere, but technological applications ranging from resource prospecting to climate control.

Such a reaffirmation of the required SALT policy is necessary because it is clear that the satellite hoax and the seemingly unrelated issue of renegotiation of a Test Ban Treaty are being used to turn the present SALT talks into a replay of the 1920s and 1930s League of Nations disarmament talkathon. The only purpose for turning present articles appearing in the Christian Science Monitor: that is the attempt by the technologically most backward nation in the advanced sector, England, to

retain its strategic nuclear blackmail ability. Given the technological and scientific backwardness of "Great" Britain, it can only assure continuation of this threat by imposing its own backwardness on the community of advanced industrial nations through maintenance of technological "parity." This also explains the peculiar interest shown by Her Majesty's government in Soviet fusion disclosures to the U.S., as in the matter of Soviet electron-beam fusion specialist Leonid Rudakov, documented in the files of the U.S. Department of Energy.

Toward a SALT Agreement

Initially, strategic arms negotiations must be a matter conducted *exclusively* between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the policy basis indicated. Issues relating to satellites, incidental weapons systems, and other secondary matters must be subsumed features of an overall settlement, rather than operating on separate tracks from which diversionary and destructive maneuvers can be launched against the core of the negotiations.

Second, once an understanding on the basis indicated is reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, such a *collaborative* arrangement then becomes the framework for expanded negotiations between the U.S., the Soviets, and other progress-oriented advanced sector industrial nations and Third World countries for joint development and peaceful applications of nuclear and space technology-based projects.

When one considers the high-technology, industrial-centered itinerary of the visiting high-level Soviet delegation led by Boris Ponomarev to Houston, Los Angeles, and Detroit: Ponomarev's own public and explicit linkage of progress in SALT and increased U.S.-Soviet economic collaboration, modeled on cooperation with Henry Ford and other Midwest industrialists during the 1930s; and this week's expression of support for nuclear-based space research, directly in the face of Schlesinger's campaign, by leading scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory, it becomes clear that this SALT policy is not only necessary, but immediately feasible.