LaRouche: A Case Of Crass Soviet Stupidity

The following statement was issued on August 30, 1977 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. U.S. Labor Party chairman and presidential candidate.

In a classic example of the Soviet peasant mentality, Soviet officials, acting through the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Pyotr Abrasimov, in August intervened to sabotage the previously arranged visit of the West German Christian Union parties' representatives to the Potsdam site in the East German Democratic Republic. Such incredibly thick-headed Soviet blunders make a mockery of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's otherwise correct emphasis on the need for the greatest energy in fighting to avoid war.

Even granting the fact that the Soviet leadership is presently engaged in a massive deception operation against dominant circles in London and Manhattan, the Soviet interference in the relations between the two Germanies represents an inexcusable blunder of the sort which, in effect, brings the danger of total war one step closer. The relevant background facts are as follows.

Under the sponsorship of East Germany's leader Erich Honecker, and with strong support from the leadership of the nation's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), that nation has recently made qualitative advances toward what some might call a "more open society." To some ignorant observers, this more open internal and outward-looking East German policy is contradicted by a crackdown on reported "dissidents." If the facts of the matter are faced — that the dissidents are essentially Zbigniew Brzezinski's spies and agents-of-influence — then the rather gentle-East German treatment given those spies underlines the lengths to which that government is going to avoid the "Stalinist image."

This same move toward "openness" by East Germany involves a decision to end the practice of hermetic defensiveness toward Voice of America and other propaganda, and to face Western European opinion, in particular, with an East German attitude of, "See, look at our society. You see, we have nothing of which to be ashamed. We have those problems, like any nation, which are an embarrassment to us, but no reason to be ashamed of our general condition before external opinion." In sum, the East German party leadership has been moving to tear down the "garrison" mentality within the East bloc built up over the Cold War years.

This shift in East German policy has been most emphatic toward West Germany. The East German government recognizes that the pro-industrial-growth forces around the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt are the optimal available bargaining partner for qualitatively improved cooperation between the two Germanies. The East German leadership has seen through the illusion of Willy Brandt, and has recognized that peaceful relations are best based on common principles of technologically vectored industrial and agricultural progress. In this perspective, the pro-fission forces within the Helmut Kohl-headed Christian Union parties of West Germany are to be seen as Chancellor Schmidt's true allies for his government's efforts.

This East German policy has not been a deviation from longstanding policies of the Soviet leadership itself. The outstanding Warsaw proposal of Leonid Brezhnev, for cooperation on energy and transportation issues, is a case in point. The Berlin questions are naturally the test laboratory for getting such policies into practical motion. Steps toward "normalizing" the situation in Berlin, with emphasis on the formula "steps toward," are among the most prominent features of the overall effort.

This does not mean negotiating presently to "tear down the wall," but rather, so to speak, "building a bridge or two over the wall."

The first major step in this effort is the negotiation of agreements to supply West Berlin's energy requirements in significant part from East Germany. The negotiation of such local transportation matters as the odd (presently blocked) street or canal route, and other improvements in transportation services from West Germany to West Berlin are illustrative of the numerous little matters through which the two Germanies can get better movement toward broader, more significant cooperation along the same general lines.

The visit of a delegation from the Union parties to Potsdam (within East Germany just outside Berlin) was a small but politically significant token effort to improve the relationship of East Germany to all major forces within the West German parties. Given the growing danger of thermonuclear confrontation, a Soviet-directed slap in the face to the union parties' delegation in the Potsdam matter was a crass piece of Oblomovist stupidity by the Soviet leadership.

The Polish Debt

The Abrasimov meddling correlates directly with the fresh efforts of the Carter Administration to put its snout into the middle of the Berlin negotiations. In short, the Soviet leadership is propitiating (e.g., kissing the foot of) the Carter Administration (i.e., Henry Kissinger) in foolish hopes that agreement can thus be reached on the SALT negotiations. In fact, the Abrasimov slap in the face to Helmut Kohl et al, was a by-product of the Soviet
leadership's present Stalin-Hitler agreement with Henry Kissinger et al.

This Soviet Stalin-Hitler agreement with Henry Kissinger has the following intersecting elements.

First, there are forces in the Soviet leadership which wish to buy time for Warsaw Pact military strategic build-ups, and are basing themselves not only on the accelerated delivery of new series of Soviet missiles, but on the collapse of NATO countries' industrial strength under Carter-Mondale-IMF policies. It is on this point that the Hitler-Stalin element of the Brezhnev government's "undertaking" with Henry Kissinger is most prominent. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's telephone chats with Henry Kissinger are echoing the "playback" delivered through the pro-fascist Georgii Arbatov on this account.

Second, the combined right-wing and center factions within the Politburo and Central Committee are desperate to secure an arms reduction. This desire is not motivated by objective considerations of peace, but by factional problems intersecting the current Soviet Five-Year Plan.

Third, the CMEA external debt situation, for which the Polish external debt is most significant, is a major element in the Soviet leadership's Hitler-Stalin agreement with Henry Kissinger et al.

It is necessary to make the comparison, "Hitler-Stalin pact," for the understanding with Kissinger if one is to properly evaluate Soviet behavior at this juncture. Although now as then the pact with Kissinger is premised on Soviet deception policies, the Soviets carry out such a deception with a brutal thoroughness, to the effect that many things are sacrificed short of giving an actual strategic advantage (at least, according to Soviet perceptions in the matter) in the effort to make the deception convincing and thus successful.

As we have emphasized in earlier published accounts concerning the Soviet problem, there is no purely deceptive deployment in history. A deception operation demands substantive political gestures, which have a substantive effect on the overall correlation of forces and events. To understand the overall current Soviet deception operation, one must understand that it is a rational policy in the eyes of a majority of the Soviet leadership. In their mistaken view they are sacrificing things which they have prediscounted as having no significant and durable value. If they were correct in their evaluation of these sacrificed matters, one could not competently criticize their current deception policy from their standpoint. It happens that their strategic outlook on the internal political processes of the OECD countries is profoundly incompetent, to the effect that they are in fact sacrificing the only elements of development in the OECD nations by which total war could be averted.

The Polish external debt problem is the most useful access to understanding the Warsaw Pact-CMEA political problem as a whole.

Polish Backwardness

Present-day Poland is best characterized by the contrast between the modernization of its coal-mining operations and the almost pre-capitalist, pathetic back-wardness of its agriculture. Poland carries within it the germs of the same evil of the Soviet New Economic Policy which led to the social crisis of the First Five Year Plan period.

The dismal backwardness of the Polish agricultural sector offsets the modernization of Polish industry, and acts as the principal obstacle variously to Polish living standards, lags in Polish industrial progress and the problems of the Polish balance of foreign trade and earnings. It is, to use the language of the mid-1920s Soviet experience, a Polish "scissors crisis."

The Bukharinist "smychka" of the Polish government (and, the CMEA) with the ultra-individualized Polish farmer not only perpetuates the technological backwardness and cultural-political backwardness of a large component of the national economy, but spreads the poisonous influence of the "idiocy of rural life" throughout the society, into the ranks of industrial workers themselves. Thus, Polish susceptibility to the various tentacles of Zbigniew Brzezinski's networks through such conduits as the "Fourth International" and allied Socialistische Büro types into Polish agents of foreign networks such as Kuron. The most important target of the West Berlin Ostbureau today is not East Germany, but Poland. However, this is only the key pressure point on which Kissinger and related influences operate in Poland. The most fundamental reason for the buildup of CMEA external debt balances to their present level is the ongoing, post-1967 development of the present global economic depression.

Overall, the external economic problems of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a whole are not a consequence of lack of social productivity within the CMEA nations, but the lack of export markets in the OECD and developing nations. Since Poland is the weakest, most backward link in the CMEA economic chain, it is the Polish external debt which is the most serious CMEA by-product of the depression in the IMF-dominated sector.

The way in which the Polish government has permitted this problem to accumulate is understandable, but not excusable. Since the Hungarian upsurge of 1956 and correlated internal Polish developments, the Polish government and ruling party have essentially avoided facing the principal internal economic and social problems, in order to maintain an uneasy balance between pro-growth and backward strata of the population. The low per capita productivity of crude agriculture is the keystone to the problem which has been avoided.

Low agricultural productivity means a high cost of consumption in the Polish household budget. This cost must be transmitted to the household budget either directly, through high social costs of per capita nutrition relative to industrialized nations generally, or must be indirectly reflected either in low real wages or in, the same thing, shortages in supply of non-food consumer commodities. It also means a reduced value of the Polish currency in international trade, which, in turn, means reduced industrial development and reduced real wages.

The economic solution is obvious. A program of rationalization of agriculture, moving away from the backward small farm to modern farming, is the essential
chore. The Czechoslovakian approach to this problem is one of the best examples of what can be done. The Czechs, rather than launching a head-on "collectivization," have allowed the retirement of individual farmers to facilitate the process of modernization, steering a course among the alternatives of collectivization, cooperatives and individual farming in which the benefits of broad-based coordination of improvements in agricultural production proceed with a minimum of offense to farmers. The evolutionary, rather than "crash collectivization" approaches to the agricultural problem is the soundest approach, both economically and politically, as, for example, successful pilot programs in India have shown. Let the best farmers, those who most readily assimilate new technologies, provide the leverage for the advancement of agriculture in each region.

Given limited resources and so forth, one must acknowledge the difficulties faced by any Polish government. Thus, one should not demand too much of the Polish government, but only consistent progress of a sort which has not been adequately manifest over the past 20 years.

Again, Oblomovism

The central, continuing problem of the Soviet leadership is that heavily underlined by V.I. Lenin, who called it "Oblomovism." The heritage of rural backwardness permeating Russian culture to the present day, mediated significantly through the old Soviet Ukrainian party apparatus — from which N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev came up — has been re-enforced by the garrison-economy experience of 60 years of invasion, containment and Cold War. The majority of even the Soviet Central Committee has no sensuous comprehension of the "outside world." They lack, in particular, the intellectual powers of a V.I. Lenin or Rosa Luxemburg. They are unable to throw aside inherited errors in face of contrary scientific evidence, unable to project a self-consciousness of the world as seen through non-Soviet eyes.

They can not, in particular, see the world as it is seen by Helmut Kohl and his party, by West German industrialists, by French industrialists, and so forth. They can not look into the souls of industrialists, for example, within the OECD nations, to discover within those souls what is in fact a humanist impulse, the active basis for a humanist world-outlook. They see principally only pro-Communist and anti-Communist verbage, pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet postures. They fall prey to the ignorantly appraised appearance of things.

This, as we have frequently reported before, is the reason that Soviet military thinking is so excellent by contrast with the crass stupidity of Soviet political strategic perceptions. The military professional looks at the outside world as the world of the potential adversary, and is able to assess the OECD and other nations by projecting the military outlook on the Warsaw Pact into the eyes and minds of political and military commanders of the NATO nations and their allies. Hence, the Soviet leading military professional analyzes the world objectively, according to the Soviet version of "Clausewitzian" doctrines. Whereas, when the same objectivity is applied by Soviet political leaders, the result is that the NATO and other countries are seen only as adversary or potential-adversary countries, and as solely an arena for realpolitik in preparation for ultimate warfare.

Despite this, the Soviets overall have a war-avoidance posture because they have no driving force for war beyond narrow considerations of strategic defense capabilities and deployments of Warsaw Pact forces. On the contrary, Chase Manhattan, Lehman Brothers and certain forces in London are seized presently by a driving force for war-by-miscalculation, not because they are anti-Communist, but because their political-economic strategic interests compel them to bring the Warsaw Pact into a position of subordination.

At best, the Soviet long-term political strategy is a crude parody of Lenin's anti-imperialist perspective of world socialist transformation. Their policy is one of waiting-out the internal process in the capitalist sector which leads eventually to the "final triumph of socialism," and correlates this with a policy of developing and maintaining a sufficient margin of war-fighting capability to win a total war if that can not be avoided. Their perception of peaceful relations with capitalist states is essentially one of a long-term delaying tactic against nations which they regard as intrinsically absolute adversaries.

Thus, they will ally with Nazis against liberal England, and with liberal England against the Nazis with great flexibility under conditions of imminent war threats. So, the formal Khrushchev-initiated policy of regarding David Rockefeller as a "realist." They regard the Dartmouth Conference as a kind of Hitler-Stalin pact conduit. They have no preference between OECD industrialists and the Rockefellers. They regard both equally as enemies. Their policy toward one or the other is based only on the principle of realpolitik maneuvers among adversaries, along the lines of promoting "inter-imperialist rivalries."

The remark attributed to Stalin: "How many divisions does the Pope have?" is exemplary of the point. At present, vis-à-vis Western Europe, the Soviet majority reasons that Kissinger commands more divisions than Western Europe; hence, the order, transmitted through Abrasimov, to slap West German Christian Union parties in the face over the Potsdam matter.

From this vantage-point it is correct to state that the majority of Soviet leaders are by no means in the tradition of Karl Marx. Although they profess principles, they do not believe in the force of ideas. They imagine that the contrary is the case; they point, in this connection, to the assertion of "principles of socialism" in Pravda and so forth, thus confusing the waxen dummy of an idea, often a poor likeness, with the idea it is presumed to represent.

This is not a fair uniform characterization of CMEA leaders. Many, going far down the ranks of the parties and state apparatus, are among the most estimable thinkers in the world today. The point is that the contrary, ignorant Oblomovist world-outlook has still a savage grip on crucial aspects of Soviet leadership thought and policy making.

No Soviet official can say we are unfair in emphasizing the point of criticism made here. The piece of Soviet
stupidity represented by the Potsdam incident is merely exemplary of a broad profile of stupidities to the same effect. Unless this nonsense ceases, the Soviets will find themselves moving, by way of precisely such abominable stupidities, right to the brink of a total war triggered by mutual miscalculation.

If Soviet President Brezhnev were a younger man, in better health, I would be seized by an impulse to kick him at least once around Red Square in Moscow. Not that I register an unfriendly impulse toward President Brezhnev; I merely acknowledge the need for drastic measures to awaken him to the danger into which he and his associates are presently sleepwalking. Such an event would be properly regarded in the Soviet Union as a gesture of solidarity with V.I. Lenin.