

"Not only did they not have time to properly check his identification," a Department spokeswoman said, but, "he kept changing his story so many times, they did not know what they could believe." Cooper was supposed to be on a flight to Frankfurt Wednesday evening.

Eidson, meanwhile, still was befuddled about the

whole thing and said he still had no idea exactly what was going on. When he talked to Cooper Tuesday evening Chief Eidson said Cooper told him the special assignment was something that "in no way would reflect back on this Department, that anything that came out on it would be good."

Policies For Terrorist Target Victims

The following statement was released Aug. 5 by U.S. Labor Party chairman Lyndon LaRouche.

As a result of the past several days experience, and because of the extraordinary assistance I have received from several governments and other sources, I am unusually advantaged to outline crucial points of policy for targetted victims of actual or probable terrorist attacks, and for the assistance of those agencies responsible for security.

The crucial problem confronted by security officers responsible for a list of targetted victims is that of avoiding the situation in which, in effect, the victim and shield are entrenched in foxhole positions, waiting for the adversary to strike at the time and in the manner of his choice.

In some situations, "Foxhole" security procedures may be unavoidable, for lack of credible or actionable approaches to eliminating the threat at its source. In this case, the military tactical analogies to be applied are obvious. This is, of course, a matter of resources available.

Let us review my own case, to illustrate the problem actually under consideration.

First, the facts concerning the attack itself.

As has been reported, I received warning from the most reliable channels that a "Baader-Meinhof" attack upon me had been activated with complicity of very high level strata within the Carter-Mondale Administration. This was verified by another highly-qualified source. This information was corroborated by massive evidence of mobilization within terrorists and their political-support strata for a specific and early attack upon me as part of the deployment for the current general wave of terror being launched from (notably) safe-house bases in Switzerland.

Is this "absolute proof" of a terrorist attack? It is proof of some form of terrorist attack, but not necessarily of an actual assassination. The kind of "proof" demanded by some press and police agencies could never be obtained until after the indicated victim is dead. ("Now, you're dead, therefore, you have finally produced proof that you are a terrorist's victim.") Obviously, the sort of editor or police official to which we refer in that way is an incompetent fool — or worse. Those are the editors and police officials who make the work of the terrorist assassination much, much easier.

However, putting aside incompetents of that sort, there are highly-relevant questions to be addressed to any pre-

ponderance of qualified information of impending kidnapping or assassination.

The key word to keep in mind in security intelligence evaluations is "terror". Terrorism operates generally on the basis of issuing either a long list of victims by name or a list of categories of targetted individuals. Out of the entire list of indicated victims, some selected victims are actually attacked, thus terrorizing the other victims on the same list or in the same categories. Within any list, we can broadly subdivide the list as follows. Some of those, category "A", are prime targets of an operational attack. Others, category "B", are secondary targets, for which attacks are ready to be made operational quickly. Still others, category "C", are the focus of simulated attacks, either for diversionary effect or some other special purpose. The remainder, category "D", represent the "field", possible targets of operational attacks who are otherwise prime victims of the terror in general rather than necessarily of attacks as such.

Unfortunately, without precise information of the sort which may not be accessible, one does not know off-hand which individuals on a list belong to which sub-classification of security problems.

For example, a terrorist attack against a government may: (1) be intended to eliminate specific governmental leaders, (2) be intended to control the actions of governmental leaders by killing some close associates, (3) be aimed to set into motion police-state measures, as a way of activating a number of derived capabilities for further operations. Never lose sight of the significance of the word "terror."

Thus, in my case, our obligatory course of action was to set into motion a set of measures which covered all the probable implications. Having set those measures into place, the next task was to quickly reduce the number of alternatives by security-intelligence and related means. This continuing effort involves (A) interests, (B) capabilities, (C) deployments of the adversary force and (D) countermeasures against the adversary forces.

As indicated in a report issued yesterday, the conditions of the "belief structure" of the terrorists' Maoist-Trotskyist-anarchist-environmentalists auxiliaries, their political-support layers — their "cheering sections" — reduced the political capabilities of the action to a focus upon my role in working for new national and international banking measures — which is why I was on the same list with Juergen Ponto, and other leading politicians, bankers and industrialists representing what might be termed a "Secretary Blumenthal Enemies

List." Hence, we could confidentially eliminate any motive, interest and political capability of the "Baader-Meinhof" action except that bearing upon my effectiveness in (A) primarily, the establishment of a USA Third National Bank and an International Development Bank, (B) my organization's work in exposing the Institute for Policy Studies-Interpol terrorist network itself.

In brief, we could eliminate quickly any evaluation based on the assumption that I was a victim chosen at random or mere convenience from a selected population-category as a whole. This coincided with the fact that the terrorist machine in motion was a tool of the "Bust OPEC" faction and its political instrument, a circle among supporters of the Brandt faction of the Socialist International. Zbigniew Brzezinski et al.'s war against the U.S. Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency was the key to the attack pattern of the terrorists as a whole, and the terrorist action of Brzezinski et al. represents the use of such assassination-waves as a form of factional warfare by the "Bust OPEC" faction centered in the White House, Congress and certain lower Manhattan circles. This use of terrorism was an escalation whose successive phase would be general thermonuclear war or something very close to it — hence, the Carter Administration's effort to destroy the U.S. government's political and military intelligence capability, to prevent the Congress and others from catching the Carter Administration in treason before the evil was done.

Given this, the problem of getting the victim out of the foxhole was that of selecting a counterattack to force the perpetrator to expose his own vulnerable flank to the intended victim's allied "reaction force." In my own case, this required a willingness to sacrifice myself if necessary under certain conditions, on the condition that the "reaction force" was operationally in place, such that my "taking the point" for this action would serve the fundamental objectives of the "combat mission" as a whole.

In this case, as in all analogous cases, the security forces involved must assess the victim's willingness to fight. If the victim is willing to fight, that commitment represents a battle out of the foxholes. The danger then to be considered is the "fight forward" problem — the impulse to simply charge blindly ahead as a way of ending the problem.

The victim has two main categorical choices. If his forces are "routed," he must pull a "de Gaulle," find the nearest "England" from which to remount a counter-attack. If his allies remain committed, then he must commit himself to the common objectives of the alliance. Thus the security forces involved must represent a leading expression of such a committed alliance in order to eliminate the "de Gaulle option" as the otherwise only remaining alternative. If those conditions are satisfied then, as the saying goes, "We have ourselves a ball game."

The essential principle of anti-terrorist countermeasures is to escalate the penalty against the ultimate authors of the terrorism. Thus, knowing the identity of those authors and their connections to the command-structure of the terrorist networks is the key to effective counteractions.

In general, there are no "independent terrorist" gangs of any serious capabilities against a forewarned victim. The only significant part of the terrorist problem is the networks controlled and created by governments and government-like supranational agencies. The gut of the main international terrorist phenomenon is the neo-fabian or "left CIA" network, the latter based in the machinery behind the Carter-Mondale Administration and that Administration's principal political ally, the Brandt-linked factional forces of the Socialist International. If the victim and his supporters are afraid to create an open political penalty against such forces by name the victim is as good as dead.

The principle of anti-terrorism, as other forms of combat, is to make the loss of one's own forces cost the enemy more than it costs the anti-terrorists, and to escalate that advantage to the maximum.

The intelligence problem is this. Working downwards in the command-structure, we know the dramatis personae with decreasing precision as we go below the above-ground political supporters of the combined terrorist and auxiliary forces. We do not know generally the names of the specific task-force personnel being deployed, etc. However, we know how the pro forma "covert" nature of terrorist deployments by Maoists, environmentalists et al. is developed and maintained.

We also know which police and security agencies are highly contaminated by Interpol and by other elements of the terrorist forces and their ultimate backers. (If a qualified intelligence team had access to the massive computer data-banks maintained by contaminated security agencies, the nature of the terrorist network, especially the vital role of progressive criminalization in developing ordinary new lefters into terrorists, would make possible precision pin-pointing and neutralization of the terrorist network as a whole).

The point is to use the kind of intelligence available to attack the adversary at his most vital, home-based points, and thus to force the adversary to redeploy his forces to defend that base. This attack must be shaped so that that adversary redeployment situates his forces for prepared attack. This may require a series of such attacks, until the adversary has been maneuvered into the desired posture.

In warfare, one can not deploy forces for "maginot line" defense of each foot soldier. Rather, one must define a course of action by which the adversary's capabilities are neutralized, a course which demands effective advances against his deepest, home-base interests.