

Emergency Senate Action Required

The following statement was released on July 18, 1977, by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., U.S. Labor Party Chairman and Presidential candidate.

It is my certain knowledge that the Carter Administration has the United States on a track leading toward intercontinental thermonuclear war within possibly as short a term as weeks and no longer than months. The most immediate danger is not the war itself, but the combination of institutionalized foreign and domestic programs which would make the commitment to such war irreversible.

The most immediate problem is the fact that the U.S. Congress, as well as the main bodies of the military and intelligence communities, are now operating increasingly in the blind. Traditional essential lines of strategic and related information are now being made increasingly non-operative, to the effect that the Congress and other relevant institutions lack regular channels of digested information through which to correct the massive outpouring of disinformation channelled through the Carter Administration and its factionally-allied institutions.

Various measures must be taken quickly to ensure that the Congress is competently informed on vital issues of national security. The most appropriate formal measures would be the establishment of permanent or semi-permanent investigatory and advisory bodies aiding the Senate's Intelligence and Armed Services Committees.

The leadership of the U.S. Labor Party offers its specialized skills and resources to assist these measures, and offers to aid such Senate bodies in an advisory capacity.

The following specific steps are recommended as variously feasible as stated and as otherwise of heuristic value in suggesting workable alternative approaches.

Intelligence. A bipartisan chairmanship should be made up of a distinguished Republican knowledgeable in military and intelligence matters, plus a distinguished specialist recommended by former Governor Averell Harriman. The investigatory body itself should be heavily weighted with retired general and fleet officers and leading, most qualified retired members of the intelligence community, principally emphasizing the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency as backgrounds.

Three points of view should be represented inclusively in such an investigatory body: The viewpoint associated with Governor Harriman, the so-called "Team B" viewpoint, and the viewpoint represented by the USLP. The object of such a composition should be to provide a balanced assessment of the subject alternative to assessments available through the Administration.

Military. A similar advisory body should be created for

the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the work of the two advisory bodies should be aided by exchanges of relevant information.

The most immediate special problem to be faced by the military advisory body is that the NATO and Warsaw Pact commands are operating under totally asymmetrical policies and associated capabilities and orders of battle for thermonuclear war-fighting.

Soviet perception of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces begins with a total deployment of intercontinental strategic ABC (atomic-biological-chemical) weapons against the in-depth war-fighting capabilities of a NATO adversary — with emphasis upon USA population and logistical centers, rather than silos which are presumed to have been emptied prior to arrival of Warsaw Pact intercontinental warheads. Warsaw Pact doctrine perceives war-fighting as continuing beyond "maximum deterrent deployment" with ABC "artillery" sanitization of battlefield areas, followed by naval and groundforce deployments.

NATO doctrine takes the opposite view. It presumes an ABC-enriched ground-forces (or naval) confrontation as the initial phase of conflict, escalating by prescribed phases toward the asymptote of "mutually assured destruction."

It is the writer's view, shared by numerous leading NATO military professionals, that from the standpoint of a USA-Soviet adversary presumption, NATO doctrine ensures the crushing defeat of the United States and NATO under war-fighting conditions. Essentially, NATO doctrine and forces' development stops short of the conditions of war-fighting at which Warsaw Pact doctrine begins.

Thus, from a purely military standpoint, NATO forces represent sufficient penalty to preclude any actual or hypothetical attack by Warsaw Pact forces, under all conditions in which NATO forces have not provoked the Warsaw Pact to war by threatening vital strategic interests of the Warsaw Pact nations. However, under conditions, such as those associated with the performance to date by the Carter Administration, in which war is being provoked, NATO is not an effective thermonuclear war-fighting capability at this juncture. Thus, a military strategy and posture — the so-called "aura of power" — adequate to conditions of détente becomes a military doctrine and posture of national suicide under conditions of imminent war-fighting.

The military question confronts the United States with two policy alternatives. (a) As long as it is USA policy that war with the Warsaw Pact perceived adversary is a reasonably large possibility, U.S. strategic policy must be ordered to include capabilities of war-fighting *beyond* so-called "deterrence." (b) The political alternative is that such an adversary condition can be removed, by

either previously established or redefined "détente" policies.

The responsibility of the military advisory committee, with aid of the intelligence advisory committee, must be primarily to competently define these two alternatives on a basis independent of the currently manifest presumptions of the Administration.

The further, subsumed duty of the military advisory committee should include reexamination of the "all-volunteer army" proposition. That critical assessment should not be narrowly defined, but should take into account matters of order of battle and weapons systems within the context of the alternative, traditional modern emphasis on the militia system.

Overall Objectives

With the aid of these two, coordinated advisory task-forces, the Senate as a whole must unify national intelligence and military policies into the form of an overall strategic doctrine. This proposal is neither utopian nor otherwise speculative. This writer and his associates represent a strategic point of view which is itself coherent and which interfaces and overlaps in major areas with traditionalist military and intelligence professionals. By using the Labor Party perception as an agenda-outline, we can bring together the fragmented specific perceptions of other professionals into a coherent set of majority and minority reports, on which basis the Senate would be provided an informed basis for choices.

The problem of providing a common point of reference among various specialist points of view can be established by taking the modern conception of the militia to that purpose.

From such points of historical reference as the use of archery in the Hundred Years War and the evolution of modern infantry from the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft, it has been demonstrated that professional military forces along are effective only in the absence of an adequately developed militia. It is the well-developed militia, centering around the foot-soldier, which represents the combined expression of the in-depth war-fighting capabilities otherwise represented by the technological development and political development of a nation and its population. This principle can not be a lapsed feature of preceding modern history, since the winning of wars means the occupation of populated areas by the armed footsoldier. The technological dimensions of that axiomatic formulation may change, but the principle itself is integral to the essentially political conceptions of all conceivable warfare.

Among otherwise well-matched adversaries in war, the capabilities for developing the potentialities of a militia are the central parameter of war-winning potentials.

By taking the principle of the militia as the common point of reference, all of the technological and political considerations are efficiently tied to this point by obvious connecting threads.

The central point of conceptual weaknesses in thinking of military and intelligence professionals is that their perception of the adversary relationship between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is predominantly delimited to derived, secondary features of the problem. This delimitation is more or less inevitable in our nation's established policy concerning the role of the

proscribe the determination of the nation's political strategies and interests by military leaderships, and relegate the military command to pursuing its tasks according to externally-defined definitions of political interests and issues.

For such reasons, the advisory committees should be composed inclusively of *retired* military and intelligence professionals rather than professionals on active duty. We require a comprehensive view of strategy, which combines in a systematic way the determination of the strategic policy-interests of the United States with the military and related implications of the alternative policy-interests being considered. In particular, since 1946-1947, the military and intelligence professionals of the United States have been conditioned by assignment to externally-determined definitions of the nature of the potential adversary-relationship between what are presently NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. These professionals, as an organic community, have been conditioned against considering alternative configurations of policy and associated military postures. What we require is a competent set of military posture evaluations for each of several mootable political strategies. Thus, we require the military and intelligence expertise of leading retired professionals, persons politically free to examine the problem in the broader terms of reference not presently agreeable to professionals on military and intelligence assignments.

By defining the alternative perceptions of United States national and global vital interests, and outlining the matching military strategy and posture for each alternative perception, we must develop a truly informed basis for the advice and consent of the Senate in these matters.

Special Features

It is our indicated information that longstanding "safety valve" channels of communication between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have been breaking down. In addition to fostering an otherwise-improbable "covert operations bloodbath" between NATO and Warsaw Pact intelligence forces; which has been prevented by these longstanding liaisons, the inadequate exchange between USA and Warsaw Pact military and intelligence professionals contributes to several other sorts of grave danger in the present situation.

If complementary channels of exchange of information can be established between Warsaw Pact sources and well-established anti-Communist conservatives in the USA, we can provide the sort of safety-valve channels which must be eminently politically acceptable to the United States electorate's sensibilities.

At the moment, nothing would be more useful than a hard-boiled cussing-match between Soviet military and related spokesmen and some of our tough, anti-Communist retired generals and so forth. Provided more substantive matters were systematically discussed, apart from the rough language otherwise included, the net result would be greatly enhanced objectivity in thinking and evaluations — avoiding the Rand Corporation and related sorts of propaganda pouring out as plausible distortions of fact in support of the wretched Schlesinger and related doctrines now adopted by the Administration and Brussels NATO command.

The most deadly condition for the United States under circumstances of the present world monetary crisis and

Carter Administration policies is the circumstance in which the CIA, DIA, and Congress were operating "in the blind" in a controlled environment of disinformation managed by Zbigniew Brzezinski et al. Such a condition is profoundly unconstitutional, in that it nullifies in fact the competence of the Senate to perform its assigned duties of advice and consent in these matters.

It is our knowledge that the United States has at its disposal sufficient information to quickly produce a sound evaluation of the strategic situation. The chief

problem on that account is that we lack institutionalized instruments through which such evaluations can be formulated and channelled in the politically credible and efficient way required by the Senate in particular. It is therefore urgent that appropriate institutions of the Senate be established for that purpose, and that this be conducted in accordance with the constitutional prescription of the separation of powers as pertinent to the Senate's specific adversary-function of independent competence on matters of advice and consent.