

What the Carter Administration is doing is, on the one hand, to attempt to unsettle the Soviets with the threat that the NATO countries will attempt to overtake the Soviets in high-technology areas, while, on the other hand, telling the political leaderships of the NATO countries that no such technology gap exists.

The Soviet leadership, most of whom wear a thick sack over their heads in matters of internal U.S. politics, hadn't understood the domestic policy reasons that

Carter couldn't opt for a technological catch-up policy. However, now that Carter has advertised his effort to deny that the Soviets have what the Soviets know they have, the truth of the matter begins to dawn upon them.

It would be most amusing to observe Richard Barnett's errand boy, Victor Perlo, currently in Moscow, attempting to explain away the implications of the London IISS meeting to Soviet leaders of the Marshal Zhukov of Mikhail Suslov persuasions.

How Kissinger And McNamara Wrecked U.S. Military Capabilities

The following statement was released May 13, 1977 by U.S. Labor Party National Chairman Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.:

Together with Donald Rumsfeld, Ronald Reagan and a few others, this writer is properly viewed as among the leading candidates to replace an impeached Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. Under those circumstances, and in the context of the present global economic and military crises, it is the writer's duty, as a candidate, to immediately assume the full range of duties of a President "in the wings." He must be, and is, prepared to promptly and efficiently assume all of the duties of the Presidency on virtually a moment's notice.

That announcement might appear a bit far-fetched to persons who do not yet understand how political processes operate under conditions of crisis. Under conditions of grave crisis, leading forces are impelled to repeatedly adjust their thinking in rapid succession, according to the dictates of a search for individuals and forces competent to extricate the nation from deadly problems. If that process does not occur, such a nation is doomed. If it does occur, all the standard rules of "past experience" for political procedures vanish at least temporarily. That is how Charles de Gaulle led the establishment of France's Fifth Republic in 1958; that is the process by which this writer's visible candidacy for President is presently developing.

The following crucial elements of a LaRouche Presidency are already fully developed, ready for immediate executive and congressional action: (1) a comprehensive energy policy; (2) a comprehensive policy for eliminating the terrorism and drug problems; (3) the establishment of a U.S. National Bank, to get the nation out of the present depression; (4) necessary emergency action to prevent waves of bankruptcies and social insecurity during the period of collapse of Chase Manhattan Bank and allied major, bankrupt institutions.

Also, in a major study, *The Case of Walter Lippmann*, the following further elements of a new Presidency are thoroughly elaborated: (1) a U.S. foreign policy consistent with our national interests; (2) a comprehensive and simplified reform of the Executive Branch; (3) a tax reform policy; (4) the policy of implementing the intent of the Constitution concerning both constitutional law and positive law in general; (5) a national basic scientific re-

search and research and development policy.

Meanwhile, this writer, as a prospective President, is acting in his capacity as a private individual to defend the most vital interests of the USA from both the dangers of general war and monetary collapse. He has initiated a

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major action toward establishing a private bank which shall function as an international central bank at the point of collapse of the International Monetary Fund, Eurodollar market, and key lower Manhattan banks. If successfully established — and numerous bankers and others already agree the measure is necessary — this new bank will act in concert with bankers, industries, and governments to maintain a flow of "hard-commodity" credit for world trade, and will begin the process of real capital formation in technologically advanced industry and agriculture. That will contribute substantially to preventing the financial collapse of Rockefeller and allied interests from leading into a deep and prolonged world depression.

The Military Problem

It is also a principal duty of the President to act as Commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces. The President must embody such qualifications of strategic command, both for responsibly leading the nation's forces and for developing them according to need. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the U.S. Labor Party, with aid of discussions with qualified officers in the USA, France, West Germany, and Italy.

It was through such qualifications that I was able to warn you accurately, in a nationwide half hour Nov. 1, 1976 television broadcast, of the nature and implications of the military and related adventures a Carter Administration would launch during the first half of 1977.

That danger, of which I forewarned you last Nov. 1, has

now materialized. With the complicity of France's President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the Carter Administration has moved to bring the United States and its NATO allies to the brink of war with the Warsaw Pact powers. This has been done in the way I forewarned you would occur if you permitted a Carter Administration to take over the White House, and is occurring for the reasons of which I forewarned you — for reason of the unsalvageable bankruptcy of Carter's patrons, David Rockefeller and his friends.

I can also report to you that the Warsaw Pact command is of the opinion that the Carter Administration's operations in Africa, the South Atlantic, and the Middle East are bringing the world close to the edge of full-scale thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Everything you are being told to the contrary — by Zbigniew Brzezinski's mouthpiece, Jimmy Carter, by James Schlesinger, by Vance, Warnke, Harold Brown, Admiral Turner and others, is either deliberate fraud or an outpouring of their criminal incompetence concerning the present strategic situation.

Under these circumstances, it is my duty to report to you on the military situation as your President should.

What I shall report to you are not in any sense military secrets. Every major government in the world knows these facts, and knows that the other governments know the same facts. It is the ordinary citizens of the United States and Western European countries who are being kept in the dark on these issues — together with far too many of their elected representatives. It is urgent that you and your elected representatives know these facts, so that you and they can act in time — before between 160 and 200 millions of our nation's population die in thermonuclear war.

Most of the basic facts I have to report to you are the judgment shared by the overwhelming majority of qualified general officers and other strategic professionals throughout the NATO countries. I shall also go beyond those bare facts, to explain to you how the United States military establishment and strategic posture degenerated into their present condition. On this second part of my military situation report to you, I can not presently tell you whether or not a majority of professionals fully agree with my observations, but I can say that a representative selection of U.S. military professionals of the highest qualifications do.

In brief, our overall present military-strategic situation is as follows:

The United States and allied military forces have a terrifying capability, sufficient deterrent that no potential aggressor would launch an unprovoked military confrontation against the United States or any of its allies. Therefore, unless the Carter Administration were to provoke the Soviet Union in the most outrageous and foolish fashion, there would be no danger of military operations against the United States.

However, if the Carter Administration were to force the Soviet Union to go to war, the United States would lose that war, and would in fact cease to exist as a functioning nation. Between 160 and 200 millions of our citizens would die in such a war — without the slightest margin for doubt that the casualties would be in that range. Although the United States' forces can inflict a hideous penalty upon the Warsaw Pact nations, kill-

ing perhaps 30 percent of the Soviet civilian population, the Soviet forces have a thin but significant margin of military war-winning capability over the USA and NATO, and a decisive margin of war-winning potential in depth in civil-defense capabilities.

Furthermore, on the basis of an existing Soviet marginal advantage in basic military-applicable scientific research, the Soviet war-winning margin will substantially increase over the period immediately ahead. The best current estimate is that in areas of basic scientific research applicable to military problems, the Soviets are advanced beyond the United States in the order of two-to-four years. As those basic advances in plasma physics and related areas come down the line into finished military product over the period immediately ahead, a possibility exists for a decisive Soviet military war-winning capability.

Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact command is presently committed to a policy of maintaining that technological superiority over the combined USA and NATO forces.

This Soviet marginal advantage would not represent a real threat to the security of the United States were I presently your President, or if a Whig conservative such as Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defense Secretary, were in the White House. From my knowledge of Mr. Rumsfeld and potential candidates of a similar persuasion and competence, I am reasonably assured that such persons would do nothing to place the United States security in jeopardy.

Some misguided persons in the Congress and elsewhere argue mistakenly that the Labor Party over-emphasizes its public denunciations of Mr. David Rockefeller and leading Rockefeller protégés, beginning with Jimmy Carter, in the control of the present administration.

Despite such criticisms, it remains a fact that Jimmy Carter has proven himself publicly and emotionally unstable individual, wholly unqualified to understand even the nature of the issues posed to him by leaders of other nations — as was exhibited once again in London most recently. His irresponsible and incompetent remarks concerning the current operational status of the Berlin Four Power Agreement are exemplary of Carter's befuddlement and dangerous bungling.

This unfortunate individual, Carter, is surrounded and molded by Zbigniew Brzezinski — an extremely reckless incompetent in strategic matters, James Schlesinger — a proven strategic incompetent, dumped by President Ford for excellent reasons, and by Rockefeller's wildly reckless Kennedy Administration "whiz kids" such as Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown. U.S. foreign policy is in fact being made largely by desperately bankrupt David Rockefeller, no genius, and by such Rockefeller associates as Marcus Raskin, and Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies, Paul Warnke, and Coca Cola's J. Paul Austin.

The Rockefeller crew, whose principal achievement has been to run the world's largest monetary system in history to the edge of the biggest financial bankruptcy in history, is presently engaged in adventures risking general thermonuclear war in a last, desperate effort to cover up the bankruptcy of Chase Manhattan Bank and allied institutions. This Rockefeller crew, and its Trilateral Commission Executive Branch, are pushing the United

States headlong toward World War III — and are either hysterically ignoring or publicly fraudulently denying the warnings of qualified military and related professionals in both the United States and other NATO countries.

For example, during the past week, the magazine of the leading Western Germany military strategy group, the *Wehrkunde Gesellschaft*, published an article correctly stating that official United States strategic policies and postures are entirely incompetent and bankrupt. The *Wehrkunde Gesellschaft* is correct, and no qualified U.S. general officer would disagree privately with the West German military's opinion on this point.

Despite those facts, the Carter Administration is pushing the United States headlong into World War III — with a bankrupt military strategy and an incompetent military posture.

The Kissinger Aspects of U.S. Strategic Incompetence

During the late 1950s, Dr. Henry Kissinger modeled himself for Peter Sellers's portrayal of "Dr. Strangelove" in the well known film of that name. Kissinger's proposal was predicated on a then-existing marginal strategic superiority of the USA and NATO forces, and proposed to use that marginal advantage as a psychological-warfare tool of Mutt-and-Jeff pressure, to force the Soviets to a step-by-step retreat into an entirely indefensible strategic posture at which the USA and NATO would then secure, presumably a decisive war-winning advantage.

The so-called Schlesinger Doctrine is nothing but a re-warmed relic of the old Kissinger doctrine.

What Schlesinger and others have proposed, and have imposed as NATO MC 14-4 theater nuclear policy, is to apply the 1950s Kissinger doctrine to a situation in which the Warsaw Pact forces have a marginal war-winning advantage!

Schlesinger and allied self-styled strategists propose that the Soviet leaders are so terrified of war that they will react to limited nuclear confrontations by trading away their marginal advantage, and then much more, in successive steps, and in this way give the combined USA-NATO forces a decisive margin of war-winning advantage. In brief, the Schlesinger doctrine — the present policy of the Carter Administration, is based on the assumption that the Soviet leadership is ignorant of simple arithmetic!

If a limited (theater) war between Warsaw Pact and USA-NATO forces involved the Warsaw Pact surrendering a marginal war-winning advantage to the Carter Administration, as the price for avoiding general war, the only possible Soviet response would be to immediately launch World War III, beginning that process by unloading every intercontinental bit of thermonuclear and other ABC throwweight in its possession against the continental United States. Between 160 and 180 millions U.S. citizens would become casualties during the opening hours of war.

Nonetheless, the Carter Administration pursues that as operational strategic policy, hysterically insisting that the U.S. and its military allies can provoke several theater-limited military conflicts with Soviet forces without triggering World War III.

It is true, of course, that the Warsaw Pact command will go to great lengths to avoid World War III. Since a theater military confrontation means instant World War III, the Soviets attempt to avoid theater situations in which the Carter maniacs force the onset of that general thermonuclear war.

That Soviet policy of war avoidance poses the second principal question of the strategic problem: How far can — and will — the Warsaw Pact command retreat to avoid a theater military confrontation? That line is drawn objectively at Cuba-Angola and the Middle East Gulf petroleum-exporting region.

Just as Soviet civil defense capabilities are the decisive margin of Soviet war-winning capabilities in depth, so the global correlation of political forces can determine the potential war-winning capabilities of either superpower in depth. To the extent that a significant portion of the world is non-aligned and that NATO countries have a war-avoidance posture, this political correlation of forces maintain a major element of strategic balance in depth between the two major powers.

If, then, David Rockefeller and Company destabilize the present governments of West Germany, Italy and Japan, and bring a terrorized developing sector under regimes enslaved to Rockefeller strategic economic and political policies, and also incite China against the Soviet Union, that correlation of forces is so absolutely strategically intolerable to the Warsaw Pact forces that they must be willing to go to general thermonuclear war to prevent that situation from developing.

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In brief, military strategy studies and policies center upon the topics of the vital interests and capabilities of a potential adversary. Although the interests of nations properly enter into these evaluations, the immediate definition of vital interests is the vital interests of the governing forces of a nation, rather than the nation as such. As we know — or ought to know — the interests of David Rockefeller's Carter Administration and the vital interests of the United States as a nation are direct opposites. The Soviet strategist is obliged to define the Carter Administration as a David Rockefeller administration, and to define the vital interests of the government in terms of David Rockefeller's desperation.

For this reason, any dramatic measures presently taken by the David Rockefeller administration to develop a strategic war-winning position in depth against the Warsaw Pact will be taken properly as an act of war against the Soviet Union. When a potential adversary's interests impel that adversary toward war, and when the adversary then acts to put a war-winning capability in place, a state of general war between the forces exists in fact, and will become actual war at the choice of the threatened party.

For this reason, the Warsaw Pact is presently placed in

the somewhat curious posture of being obliged, in effect, to defend Western Europe, Japan, and the Gulf states against the Carter Administration. If Rockefeller and his allies tie up African strategic mineral resources and Middle East petroleum resources as a means for bringing Western Europe and Japan to their knees before the Carter Administration, that action, because of its implications, represents an act of war by the Carter Administration against the Soviet Union. At the point, the Soviet Union is obliged objectively to commit itself to general war against the United States, and will go to war at the moment of its choosing.

One of the mental problems which legislatures and laymen suffer in this connection is that they have not been developed to be able to think like military-strategic commanders. If a strategic commander of any competence knows that he is going to fight a war, he opts to launch that war at a time and in a way that affords him the relatively maximum war-winning advantage. Wherever competent strategic commanders are in charge, mere "incidents" do not cause wars. In such cases, "incidents" cause wars only when the preconditions for war already exist.

The Carter Administration has brought the world to the edge of the preconditions for general thermonuclear war. One significant further shove in the direction being taken by Carter, France's Giscard, and Israel's Peres, and everything could go up the pipe.

Naturally, one cannot predict at exactly what point war will break out. We can do no more than forecast the situation in the following way. There is a certain broad area of alternative developments in which general war will not occur. There is an adjoining area of alternative developments in which an imminent state of general war exists. Once events move inside the latter area, war is imminent, and the situation has become virtually uncontrollable. The point is to keep out of that latter area of alternative developments unless one intends and is properly prepared to immediately fight general thermonuclear war.

In effect, David Rockefeller's Carter Administration intends, by weight of its current actions, that the United States should fight a thermonuclear war before the end of summer 1977. It is a war which the United States and its military allies are in no condition to fight.

The Folly of the All Voluntary Army

Even if the United States had a first-line war-winning advantage vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, the United States and NATO would nonetheless probably still lose such a war because neither the U.S. Army, nor the French or Italian armies are politically qualified to accomplish their NATO military assignments under conditions of general war. The exemplary point to be made in this connection on the U.S. forces is that the policy of the "all-volunteer army" represents a piece of stupidity, a parody of early eighteenth-century policies fatally discredited at Yorktown and during the French and German army operations of the 1790-1815 period.

What Washington, Hamilton and others demonstrated is that earlier forms of armies, composed in mass of recruits from backward poor farmer and slum population youth, are no match for modern armies or urban workers and highly skilled farmers based in depth on a well

trained militia. With this militia policy — e.g., the Philadelphia militia — the ill-equipped, small army of the American Revolution under Washington and Hamilton lost battle after battle, because of inferior means immediately deployable, but won a war.

Similar principles were employed by the First French Republic to shatter the opposing armies of Europe. A direct takeover of the lessons of the American Revolution by Gneisenau and the brilliant Scharnhorst created the German army which defeated Napoléon.

There are three vital principles of military policy involved. First, a modern nation which is unwilling to sustain a universal militia system as the basis for its military capabilities in depth is a nation which is not psychologically qualified to fight through a war. Second, the best fighting forces of a nation are the nation's most productive strata of working people and farmers. It is they who represent the psychological resource of a sense of social identity in depth, and who have a technologically oriented world-outlook of the sort indispensable for modern war-fighting. Third, it is the foot soldier who must in the final analysis win wars, and without whom all other military capabilities fall short of actual war-winning capability.

It is the quality of the mass of infantry in depth which determines the potential upon which technological war-winning capabilities are based.

This was key to the course of the U.S. operations during World War II. Typifying the unpreparedness, during the 1920s and 1930s, the initials for United States Army, U.S.A., were also conventionally interpreted as signifying "Useless Sons Accomodated!" Except for the U.S. National Guard, the United States began World War II without an adequate militia system *in depth*. Without the National Guard, it would have required much longer than three years to bring the U.S. war-fighting potential up to projected strength. The National Guard was the limited expression of Washington and Hamilton's heritage. Had a true universal militia system existed, the U.S. could have reached nearly full potential as rapidly as ships, planes and tanks were supplied.

The same principles were proven by Tito in the wartime Yugoslav partisan warfare, and were proven afresh by Giap in the French Indo-China war, and in the prolonged U.S. war in Vietnam. The Yugoslav partisan commanders' reports on the sociological composition of various qualities of combat forces are fresh exemplification of what Washington, Scharnhorst and the French army proved during the 1776-1815 period.

The "Hessian" system, originally developed into its characteristic seventeenth and eighteenth century forms by the House of Orange, seemed to function — as long as it was not pitted against Cromwell's militia-rooted forces — because it faced armies of similar qualities. It degenerated during the eighteenth century into the "set-piece" war-fighting doctrines shattered at Yorktown and by the initial battles fought by forces of the First French Republic and Napoléon.

The early strategic excellence of U.S. military doctrine was weakened under Thomas Jefferson's Administration — for which the United States paid dearly in the War of 1812 — and was dissipated after 1828. The United States military was obliged to relearn the strategic art of war afresh during the Civil War — aided by German im-

migrants trained in the Scharnhorst tradition. Now, with Kissinger, McNamara and the Kennedy "systems-analysis whiz-kids" who continue the miserable Kennedy tradition, Schlesinger and others have taken U.S. strategic doctrine and military capabilities policies toward the discredited "set-piece" war-fighting doctrines of the early through middle eighteenth century.

The problem is this. The poor sense of social identity of the youth taken from marginal agriculture and urban slums, plus his relatively inferior cultural adaptation to technologically oriented skills, results in troops whose discipline-and-training-induced surface capabilities evaporate psychologically in face of an adversary of matching military-performance capabilities. Just as they have difficulty in assimilating into technologically advanced production, they are also slow learners and respond poorly to tactical improvisation under battle conditions.

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However, it is not feasible to maintain the fighting capacities-in-depth of nations in the form of standing armies. The best fighters are in general the best workers, the best farmers, the best professionals. The militia system developed by the American Revolution, and extended by the German Scharnhorst, is the solution. In case of war, the nation uses the militia system to quickly concentrate and deploy mass forces of the best capabilities around a kernel of professional units, all under a professional officer and non-commissioned officer cadre.

The maintaining of a properly functioning militia system ensures the quality of the professional standing army itself. As for recruits from marginal rural and slum populations, it is by assimilating them into units of a higher cultural level that their cultural level for combat is raised, and they resume civil life with improved self-respect and cultural potentialities.

It is relevant to acknowledge that Kennedy's and McNamara's Vietnam War did much to destroy the militia system in the USA. On this, one should emphasize that one should not put an army through a war it should not have to fight in the first place. Protracted wars destroy the morale and other essential qualities of an army, and destroy the functioning of a militia system misused in that way. A militia system functions on the basis of the political willingness and preparedness of a population to fight a war.

A "Hessian" force — another name for "all-volunteer army" — functions with apparent effectiveness as occupation forces, or against a vastly inferior, ill-equipped force. Under those circumstances, such an army can function according to drill. The breaking point for a "Hessian" force is that condition of warfare in which a well-matched opponent renders the predefined drill in-

effective. Once the element of improvisation becomes dominant, an all-volunteer army becomes distinguished for its routability.

The Fat-Headed Accountant

The chief single cause for the deterioration of U.S. military effectiveness is the unfortunate individual who presided over the Department of Defense from 1961 through 1968 — "Slickum," as President Johnson termed him, Robert S. McNamara, who left the Defense Department in a shambles to continue his career in incompetence as head of the World Bank. To understand McNamara's role at Defense, one should characterize him scientifically as a *fat-headed, overblown accountant*.

Accountants, as accountants, are useful and even necessary within the proper confines of that profession. As persons, some accountants are intelligent and competent away from accounting. However, the sort of accountant who suffers the delusion that the accounting-point-of-view is the properly governing approach to industrial management or military policy is a dangerous lunatic. Such a lunatic was Robert McNamara at Defense — remember the Vietnam "body counts?" Such a dangerous lunatic is McNamara today at the World Bank.

Some people said that Slickum was a genius at Ford Motor. I reject that although, at the same time, I can appreciate why some deceived top people at Ford might have been taken in on the point. In the past, I have studied a number of accountants dabbling in industrial management at close range, observing both their characteristic incompetence in such matters, and also noting how some careless owners and others were deceived into mistaking what an accountant does in management for competence. The point is directly relevant to what Slickum did at Defense, and the worse horrors he has perpetrated at the World Bank. In view of the importance of the point, I illustrate the nature of the "accountant problem" here.

In order to make a specific case anonymous, I shall refer to the corporation involved as the well known "Widget Manufacturing Company." This firm was in financial difficulty. The cause of the difficulty, as a matter of background, was that the owners and managers had frittered away income over preceding decades, rather than reinvesting in developing the firm's productive technology. As such matters turn out, a decade or so of higher distributable earnings left an obsolescence-ridden production and marketing operation, and the obsolescence lawfully expressed itself in reduced earnings and then losses.

In such cases, there are only two workable alternatives. Either liquidate the shebang, or bring in equity or long term debt-capital for capital formation in sufficient amounts to overcome the obsolescence. Once a firm has reached the condition the Widget firm was in, there is no combination of reinvested profits or cost-reductions which can generate sufficient capital to bring operations up to a modern, competitive standard.

The Widget firm included well qualified persons in its management and ownership. However, in the circumstances they behaved as did certain leading Republicans last November and early December in connection

with the massive vote fraud for Carter. They avoided the risk of mobilizing to deal directly and effectively with the clear issues, and submitted for "practical political" reasons to alternatives they knew must fail. Not to single out Republicans, there are certain trade union leaders and industrialists who are showing similar gutlessness in permitting themselves to be arm-twisted and blackmailed into supporting the Nazi-modeled "Pacemaker" operation. Similar examples of such vacillation and gutlessness under fire are numerous in all aspects of life.

This vacillation among the competent persons left the matter of determining the firm's policies to sundry accounting mentalities within the management and among the firm's financial backers. Various "brilliant" cost-reduction schemes were launched, each advertised as "the solution" — the proverbial "light at the end of the tunnel" — and each essentially cutting the firm's operations still further below the breakeven point.

One included element of that program is citable here as exemplifying the same incompetence which McNamara's reign introduced to Defense.

Lo and Behold! As the firm's operations slipped, it exhibited a sizeable slow-moving inventory of finished stock. I recall how the accounting mentalities clucked over that marvellous discovery. Their solution: cut back production to give priority to moving the slow-moving stock. All the accounting mentalities, including the financier representatives, clucked more or less in unison — with decimal points — that this would, indeed, be the solution to that problem.

Naturally, as any competent management would have known, the accountant's remedy was worse than the illness. The slow-moving stock was slow-moving because it was slow-moving in terms of market demand. Cutting back new production did not move the slow-moving Widget styles one centimeter-per-year faster; it merely cut overall sales, made the sales-inventory ratios worse, and turned a bad loss into a catastrophe. The solution was the direct approach: increase production on high-demand new styles. It was by increasing total "shelf-position" through high-demand, high-turnover product that such a firm could have improved its inventory ratios, its inventory turnover, and accelerated the movement of the slow-moving items.

In general, that example is not exceptional. It is the intrusion into management matters by accountants with exaggerated sense of importance who have contributed (after foolish bankers) the next-to-greatest and most frequent managerial bungling in American business management. With Slickum's arrival at Defense, the granddaddy of all such bunglers had taken possession of the premises.

I do not know exactly what Slickum did at Ford Motor, but I can make a very shrewd guess. During the period he was at Ford management, there were two, successive processes under way. Up into 1957, the motor car industry, with Ford the worst offender, was engaged in the most insane marketing policies imaginable, tearing the gut out of the consumer market, ruining the financial and operating stability of dealerships, and turning this rotten economics back against the production side itself. It was a grand downhill ski-run until the 1957 precipice was reached. The succeeding period, the 1957-1961 recession period, was an orgy of grand old cost-cutting. During that

period Midtown and Downtown New York City streets were figuratively jammed with ex-\$40,000-a-year corporate vice presidents and division presidents scratching in hope of an \$8,000 to \$10,000 job. To run up an insane financial bubble in consumer-credit speculation — as the auto industry did between 1954 and 1957 — or to wield a pencil of cost-cutting during a recession, is a sort of work which any mere accounting mentality can conduct without the slightest managerial competence. The accountants who became styled as heroes of management throughout the 1954-1961 period were those who got off the financial orgy and onto the cost-cutting at the right point in time. It is most probable that Slickum's reputation at Ford was made on the basis of exactly such shallow-minded charades — since that is the outer limit of the mentality he has since exhibited at Defense and the World Bank.

It is such accounting mentalities that dominate the RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute, Brookings Institute, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund management team, and McGeorge Bundy's Ford Foundation. Their policy for bringing the world into financial balance is to drive nations and industries operating below the breakeven point to lower levels of production, while simultaneously willfully raising prices and reducing real wages! To have fascism, one need only place an accounting mentality in charge of economic policies!

(The only good accountants are secretly physicists, engineers, musicians, historians, and so forth — or, occasionally, a good legal mind.)

This devastating incompetence of the accounting mentality is associated with the fact that accounting practice is intrinsically *nominalist*. It counts the numbers of things according to their given labels. It does not know what it is counting, but only the name of the objects being counted, averaged, and so forth. This is the secret of the accountant's function in enabling a client to achieve tax avoidance — change the *name* according to some acceptable legal fiction, and bring the item in question under a different heading: give a tax-emptying name to some item of expenditure, real or implicit. Receive income after the period it qualifies as capital gains. (One of my minor goals for the time I become President, is to simplify the tax laws in such a way as to eliminate that nonsense.) The accountant does not know reality, but only the names he mistakes for reality.

'No matter how many tens of thousands of men a commander directs in battle, it is the fighting capability of that individual soldier, his level of culture, training, experience, and ability to deploy in concert, which is what the commander is deploying.'

That is precisely what Slickum did with his cost-effectiveness and related accounting-mentality programs and policies at Defense. That is the hideous thing he has done at the World Bank.

Beyond the basics of *interests* and *capabilities*, the business of military strategy is the definition of *flanking potentialities*. A flank is not inherently something which is to be displayed on a blackboard tactical diagram. A flank is *some new dimension of war-fighting*, for which - (preferably) one's own forces will have a developed capability and the adversary a poor countermeasures capability. Flanks are essentially *psychological* and *technological*. In both cases, one is exploiting some cultural advantage of one's nation and its forces against a relative cultural disadvantage of an adversary. What one does, in principle, is to create a geometry of warfare in some dimension of struggle at which one has a decisive advantage through the cultural capabilities of one's own forces.

Strategy exploits the flanking principle in two categorical ways. First, in the pre-war development of capabilities and in ordering the developed forces for the conduct of an impending war. Second, under actual war-fighting, the same principle of creative innovation is used by commanders to exploit potentialities as they emerge. *The essence of strategic command, as explored by Scharnhorst and Clausewitz, is the development in exceptional military professional leaders of the capability of rigorously predetermining the feasibility of creative discoveries of flanking potentials and committing themselves and subordinates to resolute action in behalf of the realization of those discoveries.*

Several most-relevant points follow from this.

First, the foot-soldier in warfare is not a *unit*. He is a human being of a definite culture, definite sense of personal moral identity, and associated capabilities of enculturation, training, and experience. No matter how many tens of thousands of men a commander directs in battle, it is the fighting capability of that individual soldier, his level of culture, training, experience, and ability to deploy in concert, which is what the commander is deploying. It is that individual soldier's interface with the adversary which is being deployed.

For example, if the platoon leader and non-commissioned officers of a platoon are casualties, how then will the remainder of the unit fight? Can the unit develop de facto platoon leaders and non-commissioned officer-leaders out of its own ranks? How will they deploy under such improvised leadership? How will they react to an unexpected form of adversary deployment? It is this, in the final analysis, that the commander of the ten thousands commands. His ability to rely on such tactical qualities of the small unit is indispensable to determining the way he coordinates the deployments of the larger wholes.

Second, the relationship between the military and the development of advanced technologies. There is no reason why military production ought to be — intrinsically — in the forefront of the development of industrial technology. However, in great powers (especially), the search for strategic flanks naturally and properly leads always to the search for new technologies — as Napoléon III learned to his sorrow at Sedan. Moreover, the qualified commander knows that his potential adversary

is engaged in the same search. Therefore, competent commanders always place a far greater emphasis upon basic scientific research than has been customary on balance among industrialists.

A military command that abandons basic scientific research policies, and goes instead to mere R and D as Slickum's reign defined it, is losing the future war flank to its adversary by default.

Strategy depends fundamentally on a preoccupation with things that as yet have no names, which, therefore, no accountant can know.

Third, line-by-line weapons-systems policies are strategic lunacy. A flank exists with respect to a total force capability taken as a whole. One looks for flanks in the whole of one's own and the adversary's force, and so pinpoints potential flanks, to the effect, "We need a gizmo that..." adding, "Can our scientists discover some hidden principle of nature that we can use for that purpose?"

The accounting mentality rejects all of these three subsumed basic facts of strategy. Systems analysis defines soldiers as mere units, overlooking that most essential quality of the superior infantryman — that he has skills and creative powers that are not in the book or the computerized psycho-profile. Accounting reduces war to a super chess game, in which each type of piece is predetermined, and advantage is obtained by cheating in the movement of the individual piece. *Accountants see war as successful embezzlement*; that is the Schlesinger doctrine; that was failed swindlers Vance and Warnke falling on their face at Moscow; that was the foolish Carter and demented Brzezinski at London and Geneva. Accountants cannot comprehend what does not yet have a name — the known name which therefore intrinsically eludes them in "victory" against a well-matched adversary.

To have a functioning Pentagon, it would be necessary to begin by cleaning out every taint of the influences of Slickum, Schlesinger and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and painting the faces of accountants a distinctive, indelible purple, so that their opinions on all military subjects might be efficiently ignored at the outset.

The Balanced View

For reasons developed in depth in my *The Case of Walter Lippmann*, under a President representing our nation's Federalist traditions, the adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union can be eliminated on a basis eminently satisfactory to the overwhelming majority of the people of both nations. However, at this moment, under the preceding administrations and present administration, an adversary relationship exists. We are in fact at the verge of war.

If the war should occur, our nation will cease to exist. The Red Army will ultimately bring political order to the survivors of that smoking rubblefield that was once the United States. That war must be prevented.

To prevent that war, it is necessary to mobilize the majority of the electorate and elected legislative representatives of the nation, to stop the war in the only way possible — impeach the Carter Administration. To tolerate Carter and other David Rockefeller protégés in powerful Executive Branch positions is the same as

wilfully condemning yourself, your children to radioactive cremation.

For you to act to eliminate this danger, as you must, you must understand the nature of the danger and the reasons our nation fell into its present predicament. Therefore, I have summarized the nature of our present peril and weakness for you. What I have said has the merit of being true, and is also in a form in which numerous others — legislators, experienced military professionals, and so forth — can verify each point I have made to you. You can verify each crucial point I have reported to you here.

You must settle your own mind quickly on this matter. We must act very soon, while it is still possible to prevent Rockefeller from launching his Israeli puppets on a general Middle East adventure or launch Giscard's French-led forces into a general war in Africa. Once those wars begin, it will be most difficult, and then quickly impossible, to prevent World War III from beginning.

If we act to prevent the Carter Administration from

triggering World War III, Chase Manhattan and the Eurodollar market will soon collapse of their own bankrupt condition. I will work meanwhile to get the new monetary system launched — and then we can rid ourselves of the horrors of the past period for once and for all.

If the Carter problem is solved, as I have proposed, then let us remember the lessons I have indicated concerning the way in which, from the Kennedy inauguration onwards, our nation was betrayed and imperiled, in part, by those in charge of our military policies and posture. It may well be that we do not need to use those lessons for war-fighting purposes in the future, but the lessons apply to many other dimensions of policy besides war. War is a branch of political strategy. War or no war in our future, political strategy is the foremost responsibility of U.S. national leaders during the decades immediately ahead. The lessons we have to learn on the military side can serve us well in other dimensions of political strategic undertakings.