

EDITORIALS

Our Mission to Future Mankind

by Diane Sare

*Steer, courageous sailor! Although the wit may deride
you,
And the skipper at th' helm lower his indolent hand—
Ever, ever to th' West! There must the coast be
appearing,
Yet she lies clearly and lies shimm'ring before your
mind's eye.
Trust in the guiding God and follow the silent ocean,
Were she not yet, she'd rise now from the billows aloft.
Genius stands with Nature in everlasting union,
What is promised by the one, surely the other fulfils.*
—“Columbus” by Friederich Schiller,
translated by William Wertz

This poem was brought to mind during a conversation this past week with Schiller Institutes founder Helga Zepp-LaRouche. The topic was the challenge presented to organizers by fast breaking and often contradictory global developments—how does one keep up, and provide qualified leadership to a confused and demoralized population? Mrs. LaRouche responded that the priority must be to have in one's mind's eye an image of what the world should look like 50 or 150 years from now. She said then one must attack those things which would prevent this vision from coming into being, and support and build on those which contribute to its realization. Not coincidentally, her husband Lyndon LaRouche authored a book by the title, [The Earth's Next 50 Years](#), over a decade ago which does exactly that, and more.

This past week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson held a discussion with members of the U.S. State Department where he also expressed that his reference point is 50 years from now, and that the intent of the

Trump Administration is to act with the next 50 years in mind. After 16 years of Bush and Obama, this was highly unusual, and probably the most competent speech on U.S. foreign policy made by any government official in the last 17 years. A few sections of this speech are excerpted below.

So let's talk first about my view of how you translate “America first” into our foreign policy. And I think I approach it, really, that it's America first for national security and economic prosperity, and that doesn't mean it comes at the expense of others.

Our partnerships and our alliances are critical to our success in both of those areas. But as we have progressed over the last 20 years—and some of you could tie it back to the post-Cold War era as the world has changed, some of you can tie it back to the evolution of China since the post-Nixon era and China's rise as an economic power, and now as a growing military power—that as we participated in those changes, we were promoting relations, we were promoting economic activity, we were promoting trade with a lot of these emerging economies, and we just kind of lost track of how we were doing. And as a result, things got a little bit out of balance.

And I think that's—as you hear the President talk about it, that's what he really speaks about, is: Look, things have gotten out of balance, and these are really important relationships to us and they're really important alliances, but we've got to bring them back into balance.

So it doesn't have to come at the expense of others, but it does have to come at an engagement with others. And so as we're building our policies around those notions, that's what we want to support. But at the end of it, it is strengthening our national security and promoting economic prosperity for the American people, and we do that, again, with a lot of partners.

Now, I think it's important to also remember that guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated. Those are our values. Those are not our policies; they're values. And the reason it's important, I think, to keep that well understood is that policies can change. They do change. They should change. Policies change to adapt to the—our values never change. They're constant throughout all of this.

And so I think the real challenge many of us have as we think about constructing our policies and carrying out our policies is: How do we represent our values? And in some circumstances, if you condition our national security efforts on someone adopting our values, we probably can't achieve our national security goals or our national security interests.

[On North Korea:] In evaluating that, what was important to us and to me to understand was, first, where are our allies? And so, engaging with our allies and ensuring that our allies and we see the situation the same—our allies in South Korea, our allies in Japan.

And then, secondly, it was to engage with the other regional powers as to how do they see it. And so it was useful and helpful to have the Chinese and now the Russians articulate clearly that their policy is unchanged. They—their policy is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. And of course we did our part many years ago. We took all the nuclear weapons out of South Korea. So now we have a shared objective, and that's very useful, from which you then build out your policy approaches and your strategies.

So we are being very open and transparent about our intentions, and we're asking our partners around the world to please take actions on your own. We want you to control how that hap-

pens. We're not trying to control it for you, but we have an expectation of what you will do. So we're putting that pressure on. We are preparing additional sanctions, if it turns out North Korea's actions warrant additional sanctions. We're hopeful that the regime in North Korea will think about this and come to a conclusion that there's another way to the future. We know they have—they're—they aspire to nuclear weapons because it's the regime's belief it's the only way they can secure their future.

We are clear—we've been clear to them this is not about regime change, this is not about regime collapse, this is not about an accelerated reunification of the peninsula, this is not about us looking for an excuse to come north of the 38th Parallel. So we're trying to be very, very clear and resolute in our message to them that your future security and economic prosperity can only be achieved through your following your commitments to denuclearize.

And then if I pivoted over to China, because it really took us directly to our China foreign policy, we really had to assess China's situation, as I said, from the Nixon era up to where we find things today, and we saw a bit of an inflection point with the Beijing Olympics. Those were enormously successful for China. They kind of put China on the map, and China really began to feel its oats about that time, and rightfully.

They have achieved a lot. They moved 500 million Chinese people out of poverty into middle class status. They've still got a billion more they need to move.

So China has its own challenges, and we want to work with them and be mindful of what they're dealing with in the context of our relationship.

So we are using the entree of the visit in Mar-a-Lago, which was heavy on some issues with North Korea but also heavy on a broader range of issues. And what we've asked the Chinese to do is . . . to take a fresh look at where is this relationship going to be 50 years from now, because I think we have an opportunity to define that.

This speech by the American Secretary of State indicates that there is a potential to forge the kind of part-

nership that Lyndon and Helga LaRouche have long advocated between the United States, Russia, and China which will make it possible to address most of the world's conflicts from a higher standpoint. The fact that none of the major news media in the United States have bothered to inform the American people of their government's expressed intent reveals that the British—Liberal-Imperialist owners of the press and “public opinion” consider this potential a grave threat to their terminally bankrupt system. They would much prefer global war.

As Schiller recognized and expressed in his remarkable short poem “Columbus,” translated above, it is a quality of genius to be able to see the future, and to know and understand the laws of nature well enough to know that this potential “dream” will exist in reality. In *The Earth's Next Fifty Years*, in the section entitled “Toward a Second Treaty of Westphalia: The Coming Eurasian World,” LaRouche writes the following, which if taken seriously, will allow us to realize the potential now before us.

In statecraft, as in physical science, the primary challenge and responsibility, is the thinker's ability, and willingness, to adopt an emotionally driven sense of moral responsibility for the long-

term effects on future society, of the choices we make in the short term of the here and now. Competent statecraft requires that we not make the potentially fatal mistake of even many figures who are otherwise gifted and well-meaning; we must not permit strategy (i.e., policy) to be driven by tactics, as does an otherwise able commander in battles who wins the day, but loses the war.¹

Then, once we have accepted that requirement, we must, as I shall also show here, now match that view of an integrated, millennial process of European civilization against the challenge of building a secure future for our planet, through new forms of relationship with what are broadly classed as Asian culture. Now, after thousands of years, precisely that challenge now faces us all, as never, in comparable degree, in history before this time.

1. An example is the case of the qualified professional U.S. military commanders sent to fight an anti-Constitutional, unjustified war in Iraq, a so-called “war without an exit strategy,” which the U.S. forces are dying now, ultimately to lose. So, in Indo-China, U.S. forces won the battles, but ultimately, inevitably, lost the war. The highest expression of strategy in military affairs, is, as General Douglas MacArthur did often in the Pacific, to win the war without fighting unnecessary battles, thus even causing the potential adversary to praise the ultimate outcome.