does not rule out accepting our proposal."

Iranian sources confirmed to *EIR* that the Iranian ambassador essentially accepted the Russian proposal. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki then stated that Iran wanted to have such enrichment facilities also on Iranian territory, but it is understood that this could be seen as a second step. The Majlis (Parliament) National Security and Foriegn Policy Committee Chairman Aleddin Boroujerdi said Iran had not rejected the Russian proposal, which would be studied carefully. He said he hoped an agreement could be reached to conduct joint enrichment both in Russia and in Iran.

Then on Jan. 19, Larijani intervened again, proposing a compromise on enrichment. Speaking to *BBC*, he said Iran would be open to discuss concerns about its program, and to present guarantees. "If they want guarantees of no diversion of nuclear fuel we can reach a formula acceptable to both sides in talks," he said, while maintaining the position that Iran would not give up its research. "They should not ask a brave nation with very good scientists to expect not to engage in nuclear research," he said.

As *EIR* has reiterated, a compromise can be reached, as long as the Iranians' fundamental *right* to nuclear technology be acknowledged. LaRouche, who has welcomed the Russian proposal for joint facilities as "workable," elaborated on it in his Jan. 11 webcast. (See *EIR*, Jan. 20, 2006)

A Grand Design for Southwest Asia

If the Russian proposal is pursued, it can lead to at eleast a temporary solution to the crisis. But this is merely putting out the fires. To change fundamentally the adversarial relationship that has been instilled in the region through the machinations of Cheney's war party, what is required is a grand design for the region. In April 2004, LaRouche, asked to present options for ending the Iraq catastrophe, developed his "LaRouche Doctrine" (See EIR, April 30, 2004). In it, he posited the need for a U.S. plan for gradual withdrawal of troops, within the context of a regional stability arrangement. This security agreement should be anchored on four key nations-Iran, Turkey, Syria and Egypt-and should be endorsed by the U.S. government. Key to stabilization of the region, LaRouche wrote, is the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, based on, again, a regional perspective for economic development, through cooperation on vast infrastructure projects (water, transportation, energy, etc.).

What LaRouche wrote two years ago is eminently appropriate to facing the current crisis. But, to make it a reality, and transform Southwest Asia from a breeding ground of violence, chaos and anarchy, into a true oasis of development, there must be a change of thinking in Washington; i.e. a change in the political constellation which is running policy. The LaRouche Doctrine is not something a Dick Cheney is likely to accept. But then, Dick Cheney's plan for wrecking the region, is not acceptable to the peoples of the region.

Dick Cheney must go.

Nuclear Strife With Iran: Where Is the Solution?

by Jürgen Hübschen, Colonel (GS), ret.

Col. Jürgen Hübschen, retired from Germany's Air Force, was German defense attaché in Baghdad during 1986-89. He worked in Latvia for several years with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and served in the German Defense Ministry until March 2004. EIR published an interview with him on Aug. 6, 2004, and a transcript of a briefing to EIR staff in our issue of April 8, 2005.



Col. Jürgen Hübschen (ret.)

The West—led by the Bush-Cheney Administration—is issuing increasingly tough threats

against Iran, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threatens the West, especially Israel and the U.S.A. Ahmadinejad and the Bush Administration are both under considerable internal pressure. The wind is blowing in Bush's face, especially because of the Iraq disaster, and Ahmadinejad, who had been a successful mayor of Tehran, is not able to satisfy the hopes of his voters, especially the poorer layers.

The Iranian government is not ready to capitulate to the pressure from Washington without substantial concessions in exchange. Iran will not relinquish its right, clearly defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to uranium enrichment for peaceful uses, with a corresponding concession. How can this Gordian knot be broken?

Militarily, the U.S.A. has no possibility of successfully forcing Iran to accept its political will. The U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are already overstretched. Thus, the only alternative would be to deploy cruise and other missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads. For Vice President Cheney and his neo-conservatives, both alternatives seem thinkable, although all military experts and also rational politicians in the U.S.A. have advised otherwise. In the case of deployment of conventional aerial attacks, Iran would respond against U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Israel would be hit by Iranian Shahab missiles. If tactical nuclear weapons were

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deployed, the world would be drastically altered. NATO and the Atlantic partnership would be shattered. U.S. troops would be forced to withdraw worldwide—from Europe to Asia. A world war would not be excluded. All responsible politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are therefore challenged to do everything in their power, to ensure that an American attack against Iran does not take place.

For a "political solution," Washington and forces in the EU are counting on the UN Security Council, though in opposition to UN General Secretary Kofi Annan. There, the "Iran case" is supposed to be dealt with. To do so, however, it will be necessary to provide proof that Iran is really secretly working on a military nuclear program, something that Tehran energetically denies. An order from the UN to Iran, that it should relinquish its right, enshrined in the NPT, to peaceful use of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment, has absolutely no legal basis. Furthermore, Tehran would point out that Israel, Pakistan, and India too, who have not even signed the NPT, have developed nuclear weapons in the meantime, and reject any controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even the "official" nuclear powers, China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the U.S.A., would have a hard time arguing if Iran were to accuse them of violating the NPT, because it calls for complete nuclear disarmament. Were the UN Security Council to work with a double standard regardless, in that it allowed certain countries what it denies Iran, and slapped sanctions on Iran, then, as in Iraq, it would be the population, not the government which would pay the price.

Is there a solution at all, against this background? I think so.

First, in the context of negotiations below the level of the UNSC, Iran, for psychological reasons, should be granted the right to uranium enrichment for civilian use, in a fundamental and explicit form. Perhaps then Iran would not even insist on this right, if the community of nations offered it another option for nuclear technology, and were ready for more intensive economic cooperation. Naturally, Iran, for its part, and without any ifs or buts, must cooperate with the IAEA. A voluntary signing of the NPT additional protocol, which guarantees the IAEA further rights, would be a clear sign of good will from Tehran's side.

Independently, India, Israel, and Pakistan must be unequivocally called on to enter the NPT and allow unhindered access of IAEA inspectors to all their nuclear facilities.

Finally, the "official" nuclear powers must be called upon to expedite their atomic disarmament. The demand presented many times by the UN, for a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East region, must be declared an official aim.

Once again, in the conflict with Iran, credibility is required, and this must be shown in talks and actions. One should not lose sight of the fact that the "Iran case," in the eyes of the Third World, has long since become a test case for the credibility of the West.

Pakistan in Turmoil May Complicate U.S. Plans

by Ramtanu Maitra

A deadly missile released from a U.S. aircraft in the dark of night, in the early hours of Jan. 14, killed 18 people and destroyed three houses on the outskirts of the village of Damadola Burkanday, in the Bajaur district in Pakistan's populous North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), bordering Afghanistan. A number of Pakistani civilians were killed. According to the Pentagon, the targets were al-Qaeda's number-two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the top Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, who were supposedly scheduled to attend a feast in that village.

Bajaur is one of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) situated along the border with Afghanistan. These mountain areas, home to 6 million inhabitants, have long been used as sanctuaries and rear bases by al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Central Asian terrorists, including some Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Chechens.

The Confusion

Amidst conflicting reports about exactly who was killed, Fahim Wazir, the chief Pakistani government official in the region where the strike occurred, issued a statement saying that militants had carted off the bodies of a few foreigners before authorities arrived at the scene of the attack. Locals have told reporters that Islamabad is afraid to admit that only Pakistani civilians were killed in that attack, and Fahim Wazir's statement of the deaths of a few unidentified "foreigners," whose bodies were not admittedly seen by anyone, is Islamabad's way of giving a seal of approval to Washington's murderous policies against Pakistanis.

The reason the local population is so upset, is that this is not the first time that such an incident has occurred, and despite routine diplomatic protests issued by Islamabad, ostensibly to soothe the rising temper of Pakistani citizens following every such incident, Pakistani intelligence sources say the United States has Islamabad's tacit agreement to carry out such operations in the Pushtun tribal areas.

In December 2005, an supposedly unidentified drone shelled a house inside Pakistan along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and allegedly killed Abu Hamza Rabia, a leading al-Qaeda operative, whose body was never identified. The United States military, facing a growing opposition within the Pakistani population against the tacit agreement that allows the United States to carry out such sneak attacks within

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