

Foundation, described the entire process in some detail. Among other things, Cody said that the institutional Army, including the logistics base, will have to be reorganized onto a “wartime footing,” because “we believe war will be the norm for a while and peace will be the exception.”

Within that context, and that of the commentary noted above, *EIR* asked Cody whether or not the insurgency war the U.S. is now fighting in Iraq is winnable. He first complained that the metric that people use “could lead you in different ways.” He then said that nobody should expect that transforming Iraq from 30 years of a brutal dictatorship to freedom and democracy can be done quickly, but he then expressed optimism. “I think over time this is winnable,” he said. “It has to be winnable because at the end of the day this is a test of wills, and we cannot falter. We have to stay the course.” He concluded that “you either understand” that this is a test of wills, “or you can start applying your own metrics and lane-grading it day by day and come out with the wrong conclusion. This is a test of wills, and we’ve absolutely got to win it, and if we falter, we will have home games,” meaning, there will be terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

The way the Army is reorganizing itself reflects the implementation of the perpetual war policy, while at the same time rejecting the principles applied by President Franklin D. Roo-

sevelt and Gen. Douglas MacArthur to fight and bring to an end to World War II, as rapidly as possible. To begin with, there is no large-scale economic mobilization of the economy to fight and win the war. During World War II, the United States put 16 million men into uniform, trained and equipped them, and sustained them in combat from New Guinea to the fields of France and Germany. In the post-industrial “Information Age,” such a mobilization is deemed unnecessary.

When the World War II mobilization was pointed to by this author at an Aug. 19 Heritage Foundation forum on Army force structure, Brig. Gen. David Fastabend, the director of the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Futures Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia, essentially said “Oh, we don’t do that, any more.” In other words, we don’t build conscript armies and we don’t accept the kinds of casualty rates that were normal during World War II. “It takes time to grow leaders, and to get equipment,” he said, not to mention the fact, that it takes time for the industrial base to produce the needed additional equipment. If Fastabend had been honest, he would have noted that the U.S. industrial base is no longer capable of being mobilized for a rapid expansion of the Army because it has been gutted by the post-industrial policies of the last 40 years.

Fastabend’s comments followed a discussion which ar-

Kerry: Iraq War A Crisis of ‘Historic Proportions’

Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry spoke at New York University on Sept. 20, where he hammered on the fact that since the U.S. invasion, Iraq is less secure and more destitute, than before, as Americans now count more than 1,000 of their own troops killed. Here are excerpts from his remarks, as delivered.

National security is a central issue in this campaign. . . . That means that we must have a great and honest debate on Iraq. . . . Invading Iraq has created a crisis of historic proportions. And if we do not change course, there is the prospect of a war with no end in sight. . . .

In June the President declared, “The Iraqi people have their country back.” And just last week he told us this country is headed toward democracy; freedom is on the march.

But the administration’s own official intelligence estimate, given to the President last July, tells a very different story. . . .

And so do the facts on the ground.

Security is deteriorating, for us and for the Iraqis. . . .

Forty-two Americans died in Iraq in June, the month before the hand-over. But 54 died in July, 66 in August, and already 54 halfway through September.

And more than 1,100 Americans were wounded in August—more than in any other month since the invasion.

We are fighting a growing insurgency in an ever-widening war zone. In March, insurgents attacked our forces 700 times. In August they attacked 2,700 times—a 400% increase. . . .

Violence against Iraqis, from bombings to kidnappings to intimidation, is on the rise.

Basic living conditions are also deteriorating.

Residents of Baghdad are suffering electricity blackouts lasting up to 14 hours today, unprecedented.

Raw sewage fills the streets, rising above the hubcaps of our humvees. Children wade through garbage on their way to school.

Unemployment is over 50%. Insurgents are able to find plenty of people willing to take \$150 to toss a grenade at a passing U.S. convoy. . . .

I know this dilemma first-hand. I saw first-hand what happens when pride or arrogance take over from rational decision-making. And after serving in a war, I returned home to offer my own personal views of dissent. I did so

gued that the Army does not need an increase in personnel end strength, despite its heavy reliance on National Guard and Army Reserve units (140,000 people on active duty as of Sept. 22), its calling up of members of the Individual Ready Reserve, and its resort to measures such as stop-loss, to keep soldiers in the Army beyond the end of their obligations.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has granted the Army permission temporarily to go over its statutory end strength of 482,500 by 30,000, for a period of up to three years. This is to provide what they call "head space," so that the Army can reorganize itself to carry out the perpetual war policy. That reorganization includes increasing the Army's combat brigades from 33 to 43, with a new "modular" organization. The new brigades, termed "units of action," will be somewhat smaller than the current brigade combat teams and they are intended to provide a larger rotation base for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which the Army figures will go on for some time. These modular brigades will be of only three types, light, heavy and a medium type based on the Stryker wheeled armored vehicle. These brigades will consist of two combat battalions and a battalion of reconnaissance and support troops, allowing divisions to be reorganized with four brigades instead of the more traditional three.

Whether the modular brigade plan will actually work is another question. Colonel Macgregor told the House Armed Services Committee, on July 15, that the modular brigade plan "is a dangerous action and unsupported by either contemporary battlefield experience or rigorous analysis." He argued that the new formations will actually require more support from division and corps level headquarters and "will not be capable of independent operations inside a joint expeditionary force as a result." He added that the concept "looks like an attempt to equate a near-term requirement to rotate smaller formations through occupation duty with the transformation of the Army into a new war-fighting structure," but the two missions, he said, are not the same.

In fact, that is exactly what the Army is attempting to do. As Army Vice Chief of Staff Cody described in his Sept. 17 remarks, the Army is trying to transform itself into a new, Information Age army, while at the same time fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and whatever future wars are imposed on it. That Army leaders have been so willing to "drink the Kool-Aid," rather than speak the truth as former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki did, shows that their institution is fast becoming another victim of the perpetual wars of Dick Cheney and the neo-cons.

because I believed strongly that we owed it to those risking their lives to speak truth to power. And we still do. . . .

If George W. Bush is re-elected, he will cling to the same failed policies in Iraq, and he will repeat somewhere else the same reckless mistakes that have made America less secure than we can or should be.

In Iraq, we have a mess on our hands, but we cannot just throw up our hands. We cannot afford to see Iraq become a permanent source of terror that will endanger America's security for years to come. . . .

First, the President has to get the promised international support so our men and women in uniform don't have to go it alone. . . .

Second, the President must get serious about training Iraqi security forces.

Last February, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed that more than 210,000 Iraqis were in uniform. . . . But two weeks ago, he admitted that claim was exaggerated by more than 50%. Iraq, he said, now has 95,000 trained security forces.

Well guess what, America? Neither number bears any relationship to the truth. For example, just 5,000 Iraqi soldiers have been fully trained by the administration's own minimal standards. And of the 35,000 police now in uniform, not one, not one has completed a 24-week field training program. Is it any wonder that Iraqi security

forces can't stop the insurgency or provide basic law and order? . . .

Third, the President must carry out a reconstruction plan that finally brings tangible benefits to the Iraqi people, all of which, may I say, should have been in the plan and immediately launched with such a ferocity that there was no doubt about America's commitment or capacity in the very first moments afterwards. But they didn't plan. He ignored his own State Departments's plan. He discarded it. . . .

Fourth, the President must take immediate, urgent, essential steps to guarantee that the promised election can be held next year. . . .

The UN has less than 25% of the staff in Iraq that it needs to get the job done, and whole communities are even inaccessible to the delivery of ballots or participation in an election.

If the President would move in this direction, if he would bring in more help from other countries to provide resources and to train the Iraqis to provide their own security, and to develop a reconstruction plan that brings real benefits to the Iraqi people, and take the steps necessary to hold elections next year, if all of that happened, we could begin to withdraw U.S. forces starting next summer, and realistically aim to bring our troops home within the next four years. That can be achieved.