

mercenaries: They're right. That's what's happening. That's what the competent general officers have been resisting. That was the issue between Rumsfeld and the military, on the issue of going into Iraq—the key to that. They're saying, "You're stupid!" We did not have a military capable, of dealing with an Iraq operation, that is, the occupation of Iraq. We didn't have it. We still don't have it.

My view: Get our military out of there! Get them back to the States. Go through a reconstruction of our military, based on a Classical, strategic-defense conception. Go back to integrate the development of our military, as some people in the Congress are also thinking, on the basis of something like the CCCs. Let's take our unemployables, as we did back under Roosevelt. Let's put them out in work, employ them in work, and training and education, to make them something. Remember, we had a division that came out of Michigan, for World War II: They were CCC kids, who were taken in, practically right into the military, and became one of the important fighting divisions in World War II.

Q: Sure did.

LaRouche: My view is, let's go back to our tradition of a high-grade, highly-educated, scientifically-oriented military, where you train people; they're delighted to be in, say, two-year service, in training, as reservists; *proud* to be part of that, proud to be part of the National Guard; proud to be the people who have engineering capabilities, who turn out, when the governor has an emergency on his hand. *That* kind of people. We want people who are in military, not as against the population. We want the people to see the military *as* part of the population, and to be *part of it*. That way, the people, then, are implicitly, spiritually and otherwise, controlling their own military.

Q: And needless to say, the bottom line—for me, one of the major red flags in my own thinking, was the moment that we apply profit motives to warfare, we've totally lost it! We've transcended the need for military to solve and address social issues, as opposed to just simply going to war for a profit motive.

LaRouche: [laughs] We won World War II, not with our

Eisenhower on Strategic Defense

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in January 1953, was faced immediately with demands from the French, and from the synarchist circles within his own administration and military, to deploy militarily into Vietnam in defense of the French colonial forces, against the war of independence led by the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh. Eisenhower provided support to the French, but refused to intervene. When the French under General Henri Navarre chose to make a stand at the isolated valley outpost of Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower wrote: "Finally, they came along with this Dien Bien Phu plan. As a soldier, I was horror-stricken. I just said, "My goodness, you don't pen troops in a fortress, and all history shows that they are just going to be cut to pieces. . . . I don't think anything of this scheme."

Militarily, Eisenhower accepted the "domino theory," and knew what it would take to win such a colonial war, but he also knew the consequences: "If they [the French] quit and Indochina falls to the Commies, it is easily possible that the entire Southeast Asia and Indonesia will go, soon to be followed by India. That prospect makes the whole problem one of interest to all. I'd favor heavy reinforcements to get the thing over at once; but *I'm convinced that no military victory is possible in that kind of theater*. Even if Indochina were completely cleared of Communists, *right across the border is China, with inexhaustible manpower.*"



Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower with U.S. troops in France in 1944.

Encouraged by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "air-power" advocate Adm. Arthur W. Radford, to both defend the French and wage a "preventive" war against China, Eisenhower said: "If the U.S. took action against Communist China, there should be no halfway measures or frittering around. The Navy and Air Force should go in with full power, using new weapons, and strike at air bases and ports in mainland China," adding that this would likely lead to war with Russia as well. Eisenhower told Radford: "I want you to carry this question home with you. Gain such a victory, and what do you do with it? Here would be a great area from Elbe to Vladivostok, torn up and destroyed, without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it? I

military capabilities—I was involved in training people at that time: We were taking people out of the swamps, and in 16 weeks trying to get them to be soldiers. These were not the best fighters in the world! They were no match, man for man, with the German soldier. *But*, we had logistics. We had logistics like nobody else had. This was Roosevelt’s achievement. We had *sheer tonnage* per manpower of logistical capability, which overwhelmed anything, any opposition. And we won it with that. The soldier went out, as an instrument of the logistical capability, *he represented*. He was able to do an impossible job, beyond the capability of better-trained opponent forces, because of that.

That’s the way I think about military capabilities.

Q: Okay, so for those who had any doubts, that you want to negotiate your way through everything—because, I have heard that from people; you have detractors, as you are well aware. What I’ve heard here, is a return to the true basis of how we’ve gotten this far, in this nation, militarily. And I applaud you for it.

repeat there is no victory except through our imaginations.”

‘No Such Thing’ as Preventive War

Asked at a press conference to comment on the idea of preventive war, Eisenhower responded: “I don’t believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.” He was asked, if his answer was based on military or moral considerations? “It seems to me that when, by definition, a term is just ridiculous in itself, there is no use in going any further,” Eisenhower replied.

On unilateralism: “To go in unilaterally, in Indochina or other areas of the world which were endangered, amounted to an attempt to police the entire world. If we attempted such a course of action, using our armed forces and going into areas whether we were wanted or not, we would lose all our significant support in the free world. We would be everywhere accused of imperialistic ambitions.”

Eisenhower accused the French of using “weasel words in promising independence; and for this one reason as much as anything else, [they] have suffered reverses that have been really inexcusable.” He further accused the French of alienating even the non-communist Vietnamese, in the same way the British had lost the War of American Independence by treating the majority of Loyalist Americans as “colonials and inferiors.”

Quotes taken from: Decision Against War, Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, by Melanie Billings-Yun; and Eisenhower: Soldier and President, by Stephen E. Ambrose.

—Gail Billington

Lessons of De Gaulle’s Algerian Exit-Strategy

by Pierre Beaudry

The dramatic situation facing President Bush in Iraq, is similar to what French President Charles de Gaulle faced on April 23, 1961, when he was forced to take the crucial decision of putting a stop to the military insurrection in Algeria, and decided to pull French troops out of that country. Just as today’s quagmire in Iraq is under the control of the Synarchist International, so, too, was the French Algerian mess.

The Algerian War began on Nov. 1, 1954, when the National Liberation Front (FLN) guerrillas launched a series of attacks against French military installations and police posts throughout Algeria. The French Minister of the Interior, François Mitterrand, responded with this infamous apostrophe: “The only possible negotiation is war.” A cycle of revenge and counter-revenge went into effect, a seemingly unstoppable escalation of violence.

But then, in February 1959, Charles de Gaulle was elected President of the Fifth Republic. He started to use the words “self-determination,” which he said was going to lead to independence, majority rule, and general welfare for a sovereign Republic of Algeria. This sparked a French Army insurgency in January 1960, by right-wing renegade generals and colonels, altogether about 8,000 men, who started to mobilize the *pieds-noirs* population of Algeria in support of a military coup against the government of President de Gaulle, in favor of maintaining the colonial status of *Algérie française* (“French Algeria”). The *pieds noirs* (“black feet”) represented about a million French citizens whose families had lived in Algeria for several generations, and wished to keep their colonial heritage and maintain the native Arabs and Kabyls under French rule. The renegade officers and men were led, among others, by Gen. Jacques Massu, who became openly defiant, attempting to take control of the military forces against de Gaulle’s leadership. Massu made a public announcement that he would “never abandon French Algeria”; de Gaulle fired him on the spot. (Massu became de Gaulle’s ally; the insurrection’s real ringleader was Gen. Raoul Salan.)

After a revolt broke out in the capital city of Algiers where 22 *pieds-noirs* were killed, for which the French Army was blamed, de Gaulle decided to address the nation in very stark terms. Appearing on French television, he told the nation: “So! My dear and old country, we are again facing a heavy ordeal. By virtue of the mandate that the people have given me, and because of the national legitimacy that I have embodied for 20 years, I ask each one of you to support me, and to support me regardless of what might happen.”