

The Drive For War Becomes A Diplomatic Disaster

by Michael Liebig

If one were to summarize the diplomatic developments of the second week of March, around U.S. and British demands for UN Security Council endorsement of an invasion of Iraq, one could say that the imperial war policy of the Bush Administration—currently focussed on Iraq—has functioned as a strategic catalyst for unprecedented cooperation in Eurasia, precisely as Lyndon LaRouche had forecast.

“The Americans have engaged in such spectacularly incompetent diplomacy . . . that they have guaranteed a groundswell of popular opprobrium around the world, if they go ahead and launch this war,” one leading British foreign policy expert told *EIR* on March 13. Those who have been so eager to blame German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the last weeks, for having “cast Germany into international isolation,” have suddenly become very quiet. It is the governments of U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair that are isolated, not to mention Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, who had been so eager to help out. And the other European supporters of the “Letter of the of Eight,” who endorsed Bush’s Iraq policy, have gone into hiding.

The UN Security Council’s session on March 7, made clear that there is no majority for an ultimatum resolution against Iraq. When 28 states spoke on March 11 at a special session of the UN Security Council, 26 spoke out against the American Iraq policy, and only Kuwait and Australia supported the war push.

The Anglo-American resolution, as well as the variation presented by the British on March 12, said the following: If, by March 17—or a few days later—the UN Security Council does not establish, with a majority and no veto, that Iraq, in a “full, unconditional, immediate and pro-active” manner, has eliminated its alleged weapons of mass destruction, then the

United States and Britain are authorized to go to war. It is no wonder that the so-called “undecided 6” in the Security Council did not want to have any part of this. And if the United States and U.K. were to succeed, with carrot and stick, to “turn” the three African members, as well as Pakistan, Chile, and Mexico, there would still be the French and/or Russian veto. In a televised speech on March 10, French President Jacques Chirac reconfirmed that France demands adequate time be given the inspectors for their work, and would not vote up any resolution which would merely endorse a war. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said almost the same thing that day.

As the “undecided” Council members made their compromise proposal on March 11—to postpone the ultimatum to April 17—White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer immediately declared it unacceptable. It appeared by March 13 that circles in Washington were no longer expecting they will get the UN’s blessing for a war. “The American people are losing patience with the United Nations,” Fleischer had pronounced on March 12. And a day earlier, he had said that if the UN were incapable of disarming Saddam Hussein, then the United States together with “another international body” would do so. One wonders who or what this other body might be, Maureen Dowd wrote sarcastically in the *New York Times*. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke even of a “formidable coalition,” whose numbers would be “in the substantial double digits,” who would move to war alongside the United States. When asked who these states might be, he demurred, most of them “prefer not to be named.”

Blair at the End of His Rope

The only reason work was continuing on a second resolution, it was being said in Washington, was for the benefit of



“A very powerful army, preparing to charge into a swamp”—so Lyndon LaRouche had characterized the Bush Administration’s policy proclivities even as it took office two years ago. That powerful army’s full deployment has now isolated the United States.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s political survival, with the older stalwarts in his Labour Party lining up against him. But even this seems not to be controversial in Washington. On March 11, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said it was “unclear” whether Britain would even participate in an Iraq war. Rumsfeld apparently wanted to express his frustration over Blair’s continuing attempts to use time-wasting, diplomatic twists to get a second resolution through the Security Council at any cost, and wanted to get Blair to say that he were ready to go along with a war, even without a second resolution.

For Blair to do this is exactly what could lead to the elimination of Britain as an ally. On March 10, British Minister for Overseas Development Clare Short stated that she would resign if Blair took that course. Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary, who is currently responsible in the cabinet for relations with the Parliament, joined her threat. The longest-serving member of the House of Commons, Tam Dalyell, called in several interviews for Blair to resign, and by March 12, some 40 Labour MPs had joined in such a call. Should Blair do what Rumsfeld implicitly demanded, a majority of the Labour Party would call for a special party congress, and the Prime Minister would have to reckon with being voted out.

Blair seemed aware of this danger, and intensified his consultations with the opposition Conservatives. The question is whether Blair is thinking about a split in the Labour Party, in order to bring into being a “national unity government” with the Conservatives, along the lines of what Ramsay MacDonald did in 1931 (see *EIR*, March 14; LaRouche has long forecast such a Blair move). But a national unity government for the war would enjoy no majority in the population or in the state institutions. In the British royal family, it ap-

pears that the tendency is against a war. In broad layers of the political establishment, the permanent government apparatus, the British military and intelligence agencies, Blair’s war policy is meeting with rejection.

A letter to the editor by Vice Adm. Sir Nicholas Hill-Norton, published in the March 13 London *Times* is indicative. Hill-Norton, who was Deputy Chief of Defense Staff from 1992-95, wrote: “It should be no surprise that our Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are unable to persuade their Russian, Chinese, French, German and other colleagues of the merits of U.K.’s arguments about how to proceed over Iraq when they have so significantly failed to persuade their own electorate of the threats posed by that evil regime to U.K. citizens, and the necessity for war. . . . Our brave and loyal men and women in the front line deserve more objective and persuasive evidence and analysis before they are committed to battle for this cause. So do the rest of us.”

Rush To War Catalyzes Eurasian Reaction

On this theme, a remarkable, hours-long program on the Iraq crisis was broadcast on the German-French Arte-TV channel on March 11. In it, the French political scientist Emmanuel Todd was interviewed, and said that the aggressive, imperial behavior of the Bush Administration in the Iraq question actually was to conceal the internal weakness of the United States. The real problem in America, he said, was its advanced economic and financial crisis, which is expressed in trade and current accounts deficits. The United States, as a result, requires more than \$1 billion investments a day to flow from the rest of the world. These capital flows have been thinning out, however, and the dollar’s weakness has become unpredictable. Whereas Europe produces more than it can consume, the United States consumes more than it can produce, covering this up by its superior military capabilities. The whole world sees through this now, and as a result the United States is increasingly isolated. Were America to boycott the UN, Todd pointed out, the UN would not be marginalized; on the contrary, its importance would be enhanced, even if its headquarters had to be moved from New York to Geneva.

Regarding American international isolation, dramatically evident over the past week, Lyndon LaRouche has repeatedly stressed that it is never too late to shift away from a foreign policy which is recognized as wrong. In the Iraq question, it is now a matter of finding an acceptable way out, but this is possible. The precondition is that the “hard core of the war party”—Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Libby—be removed from the Administration. As for the “war party inside the Democratic Party,” LaRouche himself is already moving against them: beginning March 9, his statement “What Secretary Powell Did Not Say” hit the United States with massive circulation. Then, the administration must concentrate fully on the devastating economic and financial crisis.