

When America Let Britain Run, And Ruin, U.S. Asia Policy

by Michael Billington

The legacy of the Vietnam War in the United States, and the interrelated “red-scare” anti-Chinese hysteria of the 1950s through the 1970s, have left deep scars on the American psyche. But the angst over the horrors of the Vietnam War would serve a more productive purpose, if it were directed toward America’s failure to implement a truly American System policy in Asia, such as that proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, rather than the disasters which flowed naturally from that failure.¹ If America refuses to learn the lesson of that failure today, we will soon find ourselves in an era of general bloodletting even worse than that of the last century.

Over the 1980s and 1990s, there were significant efforts made to reestablish diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam and China, although U.S. progress toward rectifying the destruction imposed on the Indochinese nations has been so feeble as to be considered shameful. Despite the effort to put this dark page of U.S. history behind us, we are now confronted with the even more obscene perspective of an administration which is promoting a return to a Cold War division of the world—and of Asia in particular. Elements within the G.W. Bush Administration have rejected the policy of “engagement” with China pursued by the Clinton Administration (and even by the senior Bush), in favor of confrontation and containment. This policy has taken a more ominous direction with the proposal by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell, made in Australia on July 30, for a strategic partnership among the United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. The proposal provoked an immediate objection from China (the obvious target of the proposed partnership), and a great deal of nervousness among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose members remember being told that they had to take sides in the last U.S.-China conflict in the 1950s, and want nothing to do with such a choice today (see article in this section).

This new attempt to divide Asia has the same intention as

1. According to FDR’s son Elliott, in *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, first edition), Roosevelt informed Churchill that the United States was not fighting World War II with any intention of allowing the return of European colonialism to their former colonies in Africa and Asia. With Roosevelt’s early death, Truman reneged on that intention, helping the colonial powers regain their “possessions.”

NATO’s instigation of yet another war in the Balkans, and the Bush Administration’s approving nod to the war faction in Israel—the playing out of Samuel Huntington’s evil vision of a *Clash of Civilizations*, in a frantic effort to hold off the global collapse now sweeping the world economy.

Nonetheless, there is significant opposition to such madness. Within the United States, LaRouche has emerged as the leader of a faction in the Democratic Party aimed at returning the party to the policies of FDR. Asian leaders, meanwhile, are moving forward in constructing alliances, based on securing the region against international terrorism, and preparing new institutions to replace the discredited globalization process.

For these efforts to be successful, it is necessary to examine the *failure* of the last generation to realize the vision of FDR, who intended to build a post-World War II world using American System science and technology, free of the European colonial looting which kept most of the world in backwardness throughout the last centuries. This failure can be seen in three disastrous developments in Asia during 1965 and 1966:

- The U.S. war against Vietnam;
- The Anglo-American orchestration of a coup against Indonesia’s Founding Father, Sukarno; and the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of his supporters; and
- The bloody nightmare known as the Cultural Revolution in China.

This report will examine these developments as they were reflected in the life-and-death struggle within the United States itself, as the American System finally gave way to British imperial methods and control. I will review briefly the attempt by key Third World leaders of Asia and Africa, in particular Indonesia’s Sukarno, China’s Zhou Enlai, and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, to short-circuit the Cold War itself, through the historic Conference of Asian and African Nations (the Bandung Conference), which led to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).² I will also review the systematic destruction of Sukarno’s movement and his nation, through Anglo-American subversion between the late 1950s

2. Michael Billington, “Britain’s Cold War against FDR’s Grand Design: the East Asian Theater, 1943-63,” *EIR*, Oct. 15, 1999.



Indonesian President Sukarno with U.S. President John F. Kennedy, in Washington, April 1961. After Kennedy's assassination, American policy toward Vietnam, China, and Indonesia came under control of the British, with disastrous consequences.

and the mid 1960s, stalled only briefly by President Kennedy and his Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, before Kennedy's assassination.³

The major focus of this report will be an examination of the collapse of American policy in regard to Vietnam and China following President John F. Kennedy's assassination, leading to the otherwise avoidable horrors of the Indonesian massacre, the Vietnam War, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

It must be remembered that the world was still held together at that time by the massive buildup of the U.S. economy under Roosevelt during the war, and by the effects of the Bretton Woods policies and the Marshall Plan, which extended U.S. industrial power into Europe. (The fact that the Third World was left out of that reconstruction process was yet another result of Roosevelt's early death and Truman's capitulation to Churchill's recolonization of Asia and Africa.) Today, however, the entire world is in a state of terminal economic decay and financial collapse. Another failure to implement an American System solution, another division of the world by British methods, will mean a descent into a new Dark Age.

The Spirit of Bandung

Dramatic changes were taking place around the world in 1953 and 1954. The British postwar plan called for a Thirty Years' War scenario in Asia, aimed at the destruction of FDR's plan for international collaboration in world development. The Cold War was the British means to those ends. In the United States, the Eisenhower Administration's foreign

policy was in the hands of would-be colonial lord and Cold Warrior John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State, and his brother Allen as CIA director. Although Stalin's death in 1953 led to proposals for easing tensions from the new Soviet leaders, and these proposals were welcomed by Eisenhower, including even a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. development program for China, John Foster Dulles was violently opposed to such ideas. He tried to sabotage the armistice ending the Korean War, by placing impossible demands on the Chinese. Eisenhower reined in his Secretary of State, at least in regard to Korea, in order to carry out his election campaign pledge to end the Korean War.

Dulles was extremely unhappy that the Chinese were even "allowed" to participate in the Korean armistice talks. In 1954, when the French were searching for a way out of Vietnam, Dulles reacted even more vehemently against the proposal for a conference in Geneva on Vietnam with China's participation. He even proposed that the United States use its nuclear arsenal to aid the French in their failing battle to save their Empire. But Dulles was again overridden by Eisenhower, and the 1954 Geneva talks proceeded. Despite Dulles' efforts to isolate the Chinese at the Geneva Conference—including his ostentatious refusal to accept Chinese emissary Zhou Enlai's outstretched hand—Zhou nonetheless established contacts within the U.S. delegation to the conference. As a result, the United States and China set up a process for regular formal (if unofficial) meetings in Geneva, beginning in August 1955 and lasting into the Kennedy Administration.

China had paid a huge cost for its engagement in the Korean War, and was anxious to avoid another confrontation with the United States, in Vietnam or elsewhere. Establishing peace in the region was crucial. Zhou Enlai led this effort, initiating bilateral agreements with India and with Burma

3. Michael Billington, "Attempt To Break Up Indonesia: British Policy of 40 Years," *EIR*, June 8, 2001.

in 1954 which established the first expression of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These declared mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs. This initiative by Zhou, Nehru, and Burma's U Nu, would become a central concept motivating the Spirit of Bandung.

The day before the opening of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Army under Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap overran the French position at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles' position—his "brinkmanship"—was essentially defaulted on the field of battle. Zhou Enlai, rather than gloating, used his influence to persuade Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh to accept a compromise, allowing a continued French presence in South Vietnam pending a national election within 24 months. Zhou believed that any more militant stance would push the United States toward the Dulles policy, and U.S. forces would simply move in to replace the French. He hoped that a temporary peace based on a divided Vietnam and neutrality in Cambodia and Laos, as was established at Geneva, would allow time for broader agreements on regional and international development, even though the Vietnam settlement itself was full of loopholes and uncertainties, and wasn't even signed by most of the participants. The stage was set for Bandung.

The original idea for an Asian-African Conference came from Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, at a meeting of the Colombo group, comprising India, Pakistan, Ceylon [Sri Lanka], Burma [Myanmar], and Indonesia—all formerly colonized nations. The proposed conference was to be the first time that nations of the Third World had met together, without the Western powers present. Sukarno described it in his opening speech as "the first international conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind."⁴

Homage to the American Revolution

The unifying principles were anti-colonialism and the commitment to peace and development in nations which had won their independence. But the most crucial strategic issue in the minds of the conference initiators was the threat of a U.S.-China war. The initial statement calling for the conference to be held in Bandung in April 1955, included a reference to "the desire of the five sponsors to lay a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the West, but equally with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia peripheral to China." This was hardly a "pro-Communist China" grouping, but, as Nehru told his Congress Party after the 1954 China-India agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China should have a chance to prove itself.

Indonesian President Sukarno, opening the conference in the city where he had first established himself as a revolution-

ary leader against the Dutch colonialists, called on the nations of Asia and Africa to take world leadership, to project reason and moral strength into a world of chaos. He referenced Franklin Roosevelt, without needing to speak his name: "We are living in a world of fear. . . . Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself."

Sukarno's tribute to the American Revolution was a stirring call to arms:

Today is a famous anniversary in that battle [against colonialism]. On the 18th of April, 1775, just 180 years ago, Paul Revere rode at midnight through the New England countryside, warning of the approach of the British troops and of the opening of the American War of Independence, the first successful anti-colonialist war in history. About this midnight ride the poet Longfellow wrote:

"A cry of defiance and not of fear,
"A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door,
"And a word that shall echo for evermore. . . ."

Yes, it shall echo forevermore. That battle which began 180 years ago is not yet completely won.

He identified neo-colonialism at its roots—the free-trade dogma of the British colonial system:

Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. . . . It behooves us to take particular care to ensure that the principle which is usually called the "live and let live principle"—mark, I do not say the principle of *laissez-faire*, *laissez-passer*, of Liberalism, which is obsolete—is first of all applied by us most completely within our own Asian and African frontiers.

The resistance to non-alignment came primarily from the Asian members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO was put together by the British and John Foster Dulles, immediately after the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, as an anti-Communist bloc. It served to place the United States in a direct military alliance with the colonial powers in Asia—Britain, France, along with the British Commonwealth countries Australia and New Zealand. The only Asian members were Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

There were legitimate fears in Southeast Asia that the new People's Republic of China would overwhelm them in any major war, and that Beijing was sponsoring insurgency movements in the region. At Bandung, Zhou Enlai did not try to deny that such concerns were legitimate. His critical contribution to the conference was the pursuit of solutions to such problems based on the common interests of all nations—in-

4. All quotes from the Asian-African Conference are from George M.T. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference; Southeast Asia Progress* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1955).

cluding the Western powers. He appealed directly to participants to “facilitate the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means,” and insisted, “We have no bamboo curtain.” He said that China’s “struggle against colonialism lasted more than 100 years,” and he pledged that China would not do anything for the expansion of Communist activities outside its territory. He quoted Confucius, who said, “Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire.”


Zhou met privately with Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Thailand’s Prince Wan, as well as the delegates from Pakistan, the Philippines, and Laos, assuring them that China was anxious to reach agreements based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He invited Prince Wan to visit China, and to inspect the newly established Thai ethnic autonomous region of Sipsongpanna in Yunnan Province, to confirm that there were no subversive activities or intentions there.

Eisenhower was not entirely opposed to the idea of a neutral alliance of Third World nations, and even sent a message of greeting to Bandung. To John Foster Dulles, on the other hand, the idea of neutrality had “increasingly become an obsolete conception, and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.” In fact, Dulles soon set to work with his British allies to eliminate those guilty of such “immoral” neutrality.

Anglo-American Subversion

To undermine the Spirit of Bandung, the Dulles brothers joined forces with British intelligence to implement a widespread campaign to balkanize the nation of Indonesia. In 1957, John Foster Dulles formed the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia, composed of the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Defense, which issued a special report calling for covert operations to “exploit the not inconsiderable potential political resources and economic leverage available in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi,” and to “strengthen the determination, will and cohesion of the anti-communist forces in the outer islands . . . to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java.”⁵ Of course, neither the British nor Dulles were waiting for any imagined Communist takeover, but were intent on destroying Sukarno as fast as possible. CIA Chief Allen Dulles gave the green light for covert military operations, dubbing it Operation Hike.⁶

The Anglo-American subversion only barely maintained the usual “plausible deniability.” Military supplies poured into Sumatra and Sulawesi by air and by submarine, while



CIA director Allen Dulles gave the green light for covert military operations against Indonesia. Here, he is shown in Thailand in 1956, reviewing mercenaries hired for combat against China.

training camps were established in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Singapore. U-2 plane spy missions were deployed over the entire archipelago. A fleet of B-25 and B-26 bombers and F-51 fighters was turned over to the CIA’s “civilian” airline, Civil Air Transport, and a team of crack U.S. Air Force pilots were given “leave” to become mercenaries in support of the rebellion. Singapore served as a command center and meeting place for the various rebel leaders, who were provided with bank accounts in the British colony. In February 1958, a “Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia” was created. Currency for the new “government” was to be printed in London.

On March 11, 1957, a meeting of SEATO was held in Manila, attended by an official representative of the rebels’ “Revolutionary Government.” The British and American delegates advocated granting “belligerent status” to the rebel forces. The balkanization of Indonesia was nearly accomplished, and virtual recolonization was a distinct possibility.

However, to the surprise of the Cold Warriors, the Indonesian military overwhelmed the rebels, leaving U.S. and British subversion exposed for the world to see. John Foster Dulles held an emergency meeting with the British and Australian Foreign Secretaries. Rather than cutting their losses, Australian Foreign Secretary Sir Richard Casey cabled Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies that “it is agreed between U.K. and U.S. that all help that is possible to provide should

5. Audrey R. and George M.T. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: New Press, 1994).

6. Peter Grove, *Gentleman Spy—The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994).

be given to the dissidents although every possible care should be given to conceal origins.”⁷

Then, on May 18, the CIA’s “plausible denial” was blown to bits, when a B-26 was shot down after bombing the port city of Ambon in the Moluccas. The American pilot was captured, complete with U.S. Air Force identification and passes to Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

Within two days, John Foster Dulles was making speeches about the terrible civil war in Indonesia, his hopes for peace, and the need to prevent “outside interference”! The rebellion soon collapsed, and the United States restored military aid to the government in Jakarta, hoping to salvage some credibility. The claim that Indonesia would collapse into Communism if the rebellion failed was shown to be a total sham.

However, the Spirit of Bandung, as far as the prospect for U.S. participation in an anti-colonial alliance, was shattered. The Dulles brothers’ belligerence toward China was stepped up at the same time. In June 1957, John Foster Dulles described the Chinese Communist regime as a “passing phase,” calling on the United States and its allies to “do all that we can to contribute to that passing.”⁸ After 70 meetings between the United States and China in Geneva following the Bandung Conference, the talks were suspended at the end of 1957.

The Pugwash ‘World Government’ Doctrine

In 1958, British intelligence consolidated its control over the direction of strategic policy on both sides of the Cold War divide, through the creation of the Pugwash Conferences. Pugwash was set up by networks run by Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells, as an alliance of scientists and political representatives from both the U.S.S.R. and the West, committed to the British utopian policy of world government. The keynote speech at the founding conference in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, was given by the U.S.-based physicist Leo Szilard. Szilard had become a protégé of H.G. Wells while a student at Oxford, and his Pugwash speech presented Wells’ version of nuclear terror as a basis for establishing world government. The policy became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

The Russell-Szilard Pugwash doctrine, which became U.S. policy under SALT I and the 1972 ABM treaties, was set forth in lurid detail in what came to be known as Szilard’s “Dr. Strangelove” address, delivered at the Quebec Second Pugwash Conference of 1958. This “Dr. Strangelove” dogma was supported by Wall Street’s John J. McCloy and McCloy’s agents, such as McCloy’s New York Council on Foreign Relations subordinates McGeorge Bundy and Henry A. Kissinger. This MAD doctrine called upon the two superpowers to amass enough nuclear firepower, targeted against each

other, to assure mutual annihilation in the case of full-scale war—supposedly assuring that such a global holocaust would never occur.

However, the scenario required the instigation of wars in the Third World between surrogates for the superpowers, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. These regional wars would “let off steam,” while keeping up the environment of terror, so that nations would willingly relinquish their sovereignty to a world government, in order to avoid destruction. The underlying thesis, however, was that in the thermonuclear age, *the constant upgrading of military and industrial technology was no longer necessary for security purposes*, since MAD supposedly eliminated the possibility of global war.

Thus, the sponsors and dupes of MAD hoped that the New Age, post-industrial-society paradigm shift would end the American System of scientific and technological progress. The Orwellian New Age of post-industrial, world-government utopianism, could be safely ushered in by its London creators.

The Cuban missile crisis in the Fall of 1962 set the New Age process toward world government into motion. With Pugwash creator Bertrand Russell providing guidance and backing to Pugwash supporter Nikita Khrushchov along the way, the world was brought to the brink yet again—but this time, far closer to the physical and psychological environment of the American population.

The stage was set for a surrogate “Pugwash” war in Asia—although the problem of the resistance coming from America’s new President, John F. Kennedy, and his Ambassador to Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, had to be overcome first.

Vietnam: ‘From Trust to Tragedy’

Former CIA director William Colby, who was CIA Station Chief in Vietnam in the early 1960s, wrote the foreword to Ambassador Frederick Nolting’s memoirs on his 1961-63 tour of duty in President Ngo Dinh Diem’s Vietnam, called *From Trust to Tragedy*.⁹ “Nolting’s task,” wrote Colby, “was to support the Southern government, and to understand its need to assert its nationalist credentials, *even against the U.S., on whom it depended*” (emphasis added). This was, in fact, the mandate given to Nolting by President Kennedy when he appointed him in 1961. Kennedy particularly wanted Nolting to appraise the character of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Nolting, who was a student of philosophy, found President Diem’s character to be grounded both in his Christian, Catholic faith, and in the Confucian culture of Vietnam’s antiquity. While Diem, Nolting, and Kennedy shared a commitment to preventing what they perceived to be a Communist-led takeover of South Vietnam, none of the three were

7. Op. cit., Kahin, *Subversion*.

8. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

9. Frederick Nolting, *From Trust to Tragedy—The Political Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1988).



South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in 1963, because of his refusal to give up national sovereignty to the Averell Harriman crowd in the United States, and his effort to prevent a full-scale war in Vietnam. He is shown here in 1955.

willing to see the United States become directly engaged in a war in Vietnam, nor repeat the colonial practice of the French and the British, by taking over either the military or the government institutions of the nation. In their first meetings, Nolting and Diem agreed that the United States could provide both economic and military aid to Vietnam, but that “no foreign country could unify Vietnam except by force and occupation,”¹⁰ which was not an acceptable option. Beyond that, although the terrorist methods of the Vietcong insurgents were denounced, Nolting openly protested the simplistic characterization of North Vietnam’s leader, Ho Chi Minh, as a “tool of Soviet-inspired world Communism.” Nolting knew Ho Chi Minh’s history — that he considered himself a nationalist first, and a communist second; that he had admired the United States, and had appealed after World War II to President Harry Truman for the United States to replace the French colonial administration, making Vietnam a Philippines-style “protectorate” in preparation for subsequent independence — a request rejected by Truman in favor of support for British and French recolonization.

Nolting wrote: “The struggle between Ngo Dinh Diem and Ho Chi Minh was essentially that of two nationalists, one a believer in individual self determination, the other in communist regimentation.” He quoted Diem from their conversations: “If we cannot win this struggle ourselves, with the valuable help you are giving, then we deserve to lose, and we will lose.” Diem told Nolting that Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces were absolutely correct when they told him that “if you bow down to the U.S., then you’re

going to find yourself an American colony.”¹¹

Diem’s self-perception as a nationalist has been portrayed in most popular accounts as a flimsy cover for him and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, to cling to power under the American neo-colonial umbrella. However, as we shall show, Diem’s determined refusal to allow the United States to take over either the political or military controls in Vietnam, and his effort to *prevent* a full-scale war — with Nolting and President Kennedy in full agreement with him on these efforts — were the ultimate cause of his assassination at the hands of the traitors within the Kennedy Administration, centered around Averell Harriman.

Even Ho Chi Minh recognized this in Diem’s character. Bai Tin, a North Vietnamese political officer throughout the war, wrote in his 1995 book, *Following Ho Chi Minh—Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel*: “In fact, although we criticized Ngo Dinh Diem publicly as an American puppet, Ho Chi Minh adopted a more sober appraisal. He realized that Diem was a patriot like himself but in a different way. . . . [Ho Chi Minh and others] valued Diem as a leader who was imbued with the spirit of nationalism, and who lived an honest and clean life and, like Ho Chi Minh, was unmarried.”¹²

Nolting’s fierce defense of Diem against his American detractors was not without a recognition of Diem’s weaknesses, but he knew that Diem was “no dictator, in the sense of relishing power for its own sake,” while “he believes (in my judgment, with some justification) that he can govern in South Vietnam, in general and in detail, better than anyone else now available.”¹³ Nolting quickly came to recognize that Diem’s detractors — especially Harriman’s circle in the administration and the U.S. press, centered in the *New York Times* — had absolutely no alternative to put forward *except a military dictatorship*, which they knew would be entirely under U.S. control. In other words, the choice was between, on the one hand, a sovereign government under Diem, with U.S. military assistance for the South Vietnamese Army to combat Vietcong insurgency, win or lose; or, on the other hand, *a full-scale war between the United States and the combined forces of the Vietcong (the South Vietnamese insurgents), North Vietnam, and possibly China*. Both Diem and Nolting believed that if U.S. assistance to a sovereign South Vietnam failed to prevent a Communist takeover, then this were preferable to the United States’ becoming a neo-colonial power, waging a colonial war against nationalist forces in the Third World. In Nolting’s memoirs, he wrote: “Some say there was no other alternative [to the 1963 coup against Diem and the U.S. war which began in 1965]. . . . This is not correct. It was

11. Ibid.

12. Bui Tin, *Following Ho Chi Minh; Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel*, trans. by Judy Stowe, Do Van (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).

13. David Kaiser, *American Tragedy; Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

10. Ibid.



Ho Chi Minh (second from left) in 1954. U.S. Ambassador Nolting recognized that Ho admired the United States, and that he considered himself a nationalist first, and a communist second. Getting Nolting out of the way was a top priority for Harriman and company.

clearly possible to continue our support of South Vietnam through its legitimate constitutional government *or to withdraw*.”¹⁴

Nolting despised Averell Harriman, holding him primarily responsible for the disaster in Vietnam. Nolting does not appear to have understood, however, that Harriman and his backers were guided by a British strategic outlook which *required* a surrogate war—the Pugwash doctrine.

If Nolting was unfamiliar with Harriman’s motivation, he nonetheless concurred with President Kennedy’s view, which contained an implied understanding, and rejection, of the Pugwash ideology, as expressed in the following statement by Kennedy appealing for more U.S. support for Third World development: “It is hard for any nation to focus on an external or subversive threat . . . when its energies are drained in daily combat with the forces of poverty and despair. It makes little sense for us to assail . . . the horrors of Communism, to spend \$50 billion a year to prevent its military advance—and then to begrudge spending less than one-tenth that amount to help other nations . . . cure the social chaos in which Communism has always thrived.”¹⁵

Harriman, Hilsman, and Halberstam

For our purposes here, the developments in Vietnam, leading up to the assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu on Nov. 2, 1963, and President Kennedy’s assassination less than three weeks later, will be covered by tracing the conflict between Ambassador Nolting and the treasonous Averell

Harriman,¹⁶ together with his cohort Roger Hilsman, within the Kennedy Administration, and their incestuous relationship with the U.S. press—especially the *New York Times* Vietnam correspondent David Halberstam.

Harriman, a Democrat, did not support Kennedy’s candidacy in the 1960 primary elections, but desperately wanted to be Secretary of State in any Democratic administration. Throughout most of 1959, he partook of a grand world tour, on his own, aimed at making himself indispensable in 1960s Cold War diplomacy. He went back to Moscow for the first time since his ambassadorship during World War II, where he met with Khrushchov for ten hours—the first such extended meeting by a leading Western figure. Harriman stoked the flames of the emerging Sino-Soviet split, then went on to India to continue the process. “The best news out of India today,” he reported, “is that her leaders are finally aware of the menace of Communist China.”¹⁷ When Khrushchov visited the United States in the Fall of 1960, Harriman hosted a meeting in his living room between Khrushchov and John D. Rockefeller, John J. McCloy, Dean Rusk, and other leading lights of the Eastern Establishment.

Harriman did not get State, but was appointed Ambassador at Large, and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. His first special assignment was to head negotiations in Geneva concerning Laos, in the Summer of 1961. Harriman had originally called for U.S. troops to be sent into

14. Op. cit., Nolting.

15. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Konechy and Konechy, 1965).

16. Harriman’s Nazi pedigree extends from, among other things, his direct involvement (with Prescott Bush, the grandfather of the current U.S. President) in putting Adolf Hitler in power in the 1930s, to his sponsorship of the racist eugenics movement, centered in the United States, which provided the Nazis with their racial purity laws.

17. Rudy Abramson, *Spanning the Century; The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1861-1986* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992).

Laos, following the Dulles policy, but Kennedy, already burned once by his advisers at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, chose to follow French President Charles de Gaulle instead, insisting on a neutral settlement. Harriman, as U.S. negotiator, then proceeded to sabotage the *idea* of neutrality, by negotiating a nominally neutral treaty which simply transferred the desired “Pugwash showdown” from Laos to the more dangerous battleground in Vietnam. Harriman struck a deal with the Soviets and the British for a neutral Laotian government, but convinced Kennedy to drop the demand for an International Control Commission capable of travelling freely in Laos, to assure that all foreign troops (U.S. and Vietnamese) were withdrawn. The Soviets, Harriman argued, could be trusted to assure that the North Vietnamese troops would not use eastern Laos as a route for supplying arms to South Vietnam. Thus, the “neutral” solution was effectively to *partition* Laos, with the strategic eastern portion along the Vietnam border under Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese control. This facilitated the subsequent development of the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, which was known to many as the Averell Harriman Memorial Highway.

Following the deal in Laos, Harriman travelled to Saigon, where he met with Ambassador Nolting and President Diem. Nolting later described how Diem patiently explained his understanding of Vietnam’s history, and why he did not believe that Moscow and Hanoi could be trusted to enforce the proposed treaty in Laos. “But Harriman had turned off his hearing aid,” wrote Nolting, “and closed his eyes.” Characteristic of his colonialist and patronizing attitude toward Vietnam over the coming years, Harriman threatened Diem: “We can not give any guarantees, but one thing is clear: If you do not sign this treaty, you will lose American support.” The stage was thus set for U.S. military intervention into both Laos and Cambodia to stop the arms flow set up by Harriman’s deal.

Harriman vs. Geneva Conference

In late 1961, Kennedy called on his Ambassador to India, the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, to visit Vietnam and evaluate the situation. Galbraith had proposed calling on Indian Prime Minister Nehru to approach Ho Chi Minh on behalf of the United States with a proposal for neutrality in the South, including the withdrawal of both U.S. and North Vietnamese military forces. Following his visit to Vietnam, Galbraith recommended reconvening the Geneva conference to find a new groundwork for neutrality, while strongly warning the President against the introduction of U.S. ground troops, and against the continued use of defoliants or the relocation of peasants into strategic hamlets. Harriman opposed Galbraith’s proposals, but Kennedy told Harriman to prepare instructions for Galbraith to proceed with the appeal to Nehru. According to historian David Kaiser: “Although Harriman agreed, such instructions do not seem to have gone out.”

Harriman had two acolytes within the administration: Roger Hilsman, the director of the State Department’s Bureau

of Intelligence and Research, who later replaced Harriman as Undersecretary for the Far East; and Michael Forrestal, the National Security Council staffer for Southeast Asia, who had practically been Harriman’s adopted son since his own famous father, Adm. James Forrestal, had committed suicide. While Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and the Bundy brothers, McGeorge and William, were critical players in dragging the United States into the neo-colonial slime in Vietnam, their efforts only came to fruition after Kennedy’s assassination, and would have been impossible without the systematic destruction of nationalist policies on both sides of the Pacific by Harriman and his underlings during the Kennedy years.

Within Vietnam, Harriman set about to get rid of President Diem and place the country in the hands of a military clique which would wage London’s surrogate war on behalf of controllers in Washington—so-called “cabinet warfare.” As Robert McNamara so aptly explained to the U.S. Joint Chiefs, he wanted to wage a war in Vietnam as “a laboratory for the development of organization and procedures for the conduct of sub-limited war.”¹⁸

Harriman quickly recognized that removing Diem would require removing Ambassador Nolting first, as well as the CIA’s William Colby and John Richardson (who replaced Colby as CIA Station Chief in Saigon in 1962, when Colby became Deputy Chief of the Far East Division at CIA in Washington), all of whom believed that the only alternative to Diem was a U.S.-controlled military dictatorship and war, and that such an alternative was unacceptable.

Nolting’s first encounter with the role of the American press in implementing Harriman’s plan came in March 1962, when President Diem ordered *New York Times* reporter Homer Bigart and another reporter from *Newsweek* to leave the country, due to their articles attacking Diem and lending support to dissident military officers who had tried to mount a coup. When Nolting spoke to Diem on Bigart’s behalf, and succeeded in getting his visa renewed, he received a call from Bigart expressing annoyance with Nolting’s interference! “He had wanted to get away from his Vietnam assignment for some time,” wrote Nolting, “and his expulsion would have made his exit sensational.”

When Bigart did leave Vietnam, a few months later, he was replaced by David Halberstam, who took over the leadership of the “Get Diem” campaign within the U.S. press corps. Nolting noted that Halberstam “catered to the *Times* editorial line. . . , influenced by his bosses. . . I wondered then, and now, who really sets the ideological line of the *New York Times*.”

Lodge’s Coup d’État

Nolting quoted some of Halberstam’s “objective reporting,” which displays both a pompous, colonialist attitude and

18. Op. cit., Kaiser.

a total disregard for facts. Halberstam and UPI reporter Neil Sheehan would subsequently write some of the most popular books and articles about Vietnam, taking credit for bringing about the anti-war movement by “exposing” the corrupt Diem regime. What screams out from just under the surface of their accounts is that these “anti-war journalists” actually knew precisely what would emerge after Diem’s demise, and are therefore, to a significant degree, themselves *responsible* for the transformation of Vietnam into a U.S.-run military dictatorship, with the United States waging a full-scale conventional (“limited”) war over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal made no effort to hide their collaboration with Halberstam, Sheehan, and others, in spreading lies and disinformation as part of their drive for subversion and war. All three proudly identified themselves as the source of leaks, even when the leaks were known to be false. The most egregious case came in August 1963, after Nolting had already been replaced as ambassador by Harriman’s Republican cohort, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the coup-plotters in Washington were running amok. When the Vietnamese Army cracked down on Buddhists who had been holding anti-government demonstrations, Hilsman and Harriman used *Halberstam* as their “authoritative source” for their *official* reports to President Kennedy, claiming that Diem’s brother Nhu had engineered the crackdown, and that Nhu was “effectively in charge,” while the head of Nhu’s palace guard, Colonel Tung, had taken over the military. All these reports were false, as U.S. intelligence sources on the ground would confirm, and yet the false reports facilitated Hilsman’s scenario, that the military must be encouraged to depose both Diem and Nhu, and to take over. Hilsman immediately drafted the infamous telegram to Ambassador Lodge declaring official U.S. support for a coup against the sovereign government in Saigon. Hilsman began his telegram: “*It is now clear* that . . . Nhu took advantage [of Martial Law] to smash pagodas with police and Tung’s Special Forces loyal to him. . . . *Also clear* that Nhu has maneuvered himself into commanding position. U.S. can not tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu’s hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie. . . . If in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved” (emphasis added). That the premises of this coup order were false, was known to Harriman and Hilsman, but nonetheless they proceeded to bypass normal vetting procedures, misleading even President Kennedy, who was at Hyannisport for the weekend, by telling him the telegram had been approved by the necessary civilian and military officials. And then *leaked this explosive coup order to one of Hilsman’s pals at UPI!* Hilsman brags about this entire treasonous process in his memoirs.¹⁹

19. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation—The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

President Kennedy was furious when he discovered the truth behind the telegram. He reprimanded Harriman directly, and specifically warned that Halberstam’s lies in the *New York Times* must not serve to direct U.S. policy. But the damage was already done. Lodge, who was arriving in Vietnam to take over as ambassador on the very day of the telegram, was greeted by Voice of America over Vietnam radio, reporting the leaks from Hilsman concerning the U.S. threats to President Diem. Lodge not only deferred any meeting with Diem, but immediately met instead with Halberstam and Sheehan, and then with the rebellious Buddhist leaders, encouraging them to continue their revolt, and inviting them to set up their headquarters at the U.S. Embassy!

Lodge soon discovered, however, that there was no coup in the works—in fact, the key generals had recently established a new understanding with Diem. This would not daunt Lodge, who telegrammed Washington: “We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. . . . There is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration, still less that Diem or any member of his family can govern the country in a way to gain the support of *the people who count, i.e., the educated class in and out of government service, civil and military—not to mention the American people*” (emphasis added). Thus, as Nolting later wrote in regard to Lodge: “His messages indicated that he was acting more like an American pro consul than an Ambassador.”²⁰

Kennedy sent William Colby and others to Saigon to provide another view than that of Lodge. However, as Colby bitterly reported in his memoirs of the war: “Ambassador Lodge, knowing of my close contacts in the past with Ngo Dinh Nhu and the President, informed me that I was not to contact them, since he did not want the Palace to gain any false impression that I offered a potential way around his declared policy of waiting for Diem to come to him with the concessions Lodge thought necessary.”²¹

Defending South Vietnam’s Sovereignty

Both President Diem and his brother Nhu had refused, from the beginning, to allow the United States to either take control of any government functions in South Vietnam, or to directly wage war within their country. As early in the Kennedy Administration as November 1961, when the U.S. suggested that continued military assistance might require the placement of U.S. personnel in both civilian and military advisory positions, President Diem characterized the demand as an attempt to make Vietnam a U.S. protectorate, and his brother Nhu denounced the proposal through the Vietnamese

20. Op. cit., Nolting.

21. William Colby, with James McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s 16-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (New York: Contemporary Books, 1989).

press as a direct attack on Vietnamese sovereignty. The U.S. proposal also called for a contingent of U.S. combat engineers to be deployed into the Mekong Delta region, under the pretext of flood control. Ambassador Nolting joined Diem in strenuously opposing any U.S. troop deployments, as a breach of sovereignty, and blatantly contrary to the 1954 Geneva Accords. President Kennedy concurred, and ruled out any combat troops, although non-combat advisers were deployed in significant numbers.

A key bone of contention between Diem and certain U.S. officials regarded the role of U.S. personnel operating in rural areas. Both the U.S. military and the Harriman group demanded that the United States directly administer U.S. economic and military assistance in the provinces, and that a unified chain of command be established, bypassing provincial leaders and regional generals. Diem insisted that the highly visible presence of Americans in the countryside was unacceptable. He also knew that weakening the regional command, both civilian and military, who answered directly to the President, would put far too much power in the hands of the military.

President Diem told Ambassador Nolting that he wanted a commitment in writing from President Kennedy, stating that the ultimate authority in Vietnam was in the hands of the Vietnamese government, not in Washington. Kennedy obliged.

Ambassador Nolting, at the same time, objected to the assignment of the U.S. Defense Department, under McNamara, to head the task force on Vietnam, since he believed the Vietnam crisis must be viewed as “more of a political than a military problem.” McNamara, however, was granted his wish, to control the Vietnamese “laboratory” from his Pentagon office.

While Diem and Nhu firmly rejected the deployment of U.S. combat troops, they also believed that the guerrilla war they were facing from the Vietcong could only be defeated through the mobilization of the largely peasant population in the countryside. Much has been made of the fact that Nhu directed the infamous strategic hamlet program in the provinces, creating thousands of villages protected by armed militia against Vietcong attack. The strategic hamlets were introduced into Vietnam by Harriman and Hilsman, who brought in the British counterinsurgency expert from colonial Malaya, Sir Robert K.G. Thompson. Their concept was to transplant entire villages into concentrated areas with an “iron grid of security . . . to control the movement of both goods and people, of rice and recruits” (as Hilsman put it), while areas outside the barbed wire encampments became “free fire zones” for napalm and defoliants.

However, as pointed out by historian David Kaiser, based on reports from meetings between Ngo Dinh Nhu and Gen. Maxwell Taylor in September 1962, “Nhu’s concept of the program differed fundamentally from Thompson’s or Hilsman’s. . . . Nhu had a clear concept of his goal: to build up

an enthusiastic network of government supporters within the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam, which could expel the Vietcong from the villages and undertake a ‘guerrilla war’ of its own to hunt them down, . . . moving from the present ‘counter-guerrilla’ strategy to a true ‘political and social revolution’ and a more offensive spirit.” Whether or not the Diem government had the capacity to succeed in such an effort, is an open question, but it is clear that they intended to win or lose on their own, through the Army and an armed militia, without permitting a U.S. takeover of government or military operations.

Murders of November 1963

Kennedy determined in early 1963 that he would withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel in Vietnam by the end of 1965, beginning with 1,000 to be withdrawn by the end of 1963. While McNamara accepted this framework, the Harriman group, and the military, argued that only *more U.S. control* of both civil and military operations would permit any eventual pullout. To that end, Harriman instructed Nolting in February 1963 to “cultivate the opposition to Diem,” just after Diem had been re-elected as President.

Diem, Nhu, and Madam Nhu (as Nhu’s outspoken wife became known to Americans), beginning in the Spring of 1963, went public with the fact that they preferred a U.S. withdrawal to any further “Americanization” of South Vietnam or the war effort. Diem told Nolting that the large number of Americans made many Vietnamese believe the country was a protectorate, that too many American advisers insisted on running things their own way, and that cutbacks should begin immediately.²² Nhu publicly demanded the withdrawal of half the American personnel, and an end to U.S. control over spending on counterinsurgency programs. Madam Nhu was the most blunt. Speaking to a women’s organization which she had founded, she said: “Don’t let the Americans take over our country! Resist American pressure! Beware of American culture and moral values, especially you women of the Solidarity Movement.”

Averell Harriman, on reading one of Madam Nhu’s anti-American speeches, asked Nolting, “What are you going to do about this bitch?”

While Diem’s defense of his nation’s sovereignty was deemed by Harriman and Hilsman to justify open plans for a coup, the final straw was the effort by Diem and Nhu, with significant assistance from French President de Gaulle, to come to terms with Hanoi and the Vietcong, to prevent the outbreak of full-scale war. Hilsman’s memoirs admit that these initiatives toward a neutral peace, threatening the British Pugwash surrogate-war scenario, were the immediate cause for the coup.

Getting Ambassador Nolting out of the way was a top

22. Op. cit., Kaiser.

priority. A series of Buddhist confrontations with the police in the Spring of 1963 had been brought under control through negotiations, just as Nolting was scheduled for a vacation with his family. (Nolting reports in his memoirs that, behind the relatively minor issues which supposedly provoked the conflict with the Buddhists, lay the fact that many wealthy Buddhist landowners were furious with the Diem government's land reform policies, which had distributed large tracts of their land, albeit with remuneration, to the peasantry.) Although Nolting called in regularly from his vacation in case of emergencies, Harriman instructed the State Department personnel not to inform the ambassador about the Buddhist crisis as it re-erupted over the following weeks, including the gruesome self-immolation of several monks, broadcast on television around the world. Wrote Nolting: "It is still incomprehensible that my deputy in Saigon and my colleagues in the State Department allowed this crisis in U.S.-Vietnam relations to develop without letting me know what was happening. . . . I believe I could have helped to prevent the tragedies that followed. . . . I suspect that I had not been notified during my vacation because the anti-Diem forces in Washington had not wanted me to return to Vietnam. Seeing in this crisis a chance for a fresh start, [they] wanted it to come to a head, to make a change in government in Saigon inevitable."

In fact, Harriman's men convinced Kennedy, against the President's better judgment, to appoint the Republican, Eastern Establishment stalwart Henry Cabot Lodge, to replace Nolting. Nolting did return briefly to Vietnam, and helped calm the waters, but his request to be given an extension as ambassador, or just to stay in the country temporarily to deal with the Buddhist crisis, was denied. Indeed, he was ordered by the State Department to leave even before Lodge was scheduled to arrive in August. The coup plot then took its course.

Nolting continued to participate, at Kennedy's request, in executive meetings in Washington concerning Vietnam, while Harriman and his underlings would repeatedly counter his assessments, with appeals to "public opinion" and "world opinion," demanding that Diem be dumped, with no consideration of the consequences. Nolting wrote: "Who made that world opinion, I asked? How valid was it?" Sensing that an undefined *vox populi* was being used as subterfuge, he wrote: "Thus 'world opinion' joined American 'public opinion' in overwhelming any sense of fairness or fidelity toward an ally."

Harriman, in one meeting with the President and Nolting, shouted at Nolting to "Shut up! We've heard you before!" President Kennedy told Nolting to continue, that he wanted to hear what the ambassador had to say.

Nolting's final analysis, however, did not totally vindicate the President's role. "In 22 years of public service," he wrote, "I never saw anything resembling the confusion, vacillation, and lack of coordination in the U.S. government. While I had sympathy for President Kennedy in his dilemma, one cannot

admire his failure to take control. The Harriman-Lodge axis seemed too strong for him."

On the day Diem and Nhu were murdered, Nov. 2, 1963, Nolting, William Colby, CIA Saigon Chief John Richardson, and their wives, met for dinner in Washington, to grieve over America's crime, concluding, in Nolting's words, that America "would suffer the consequences in one way or another."

Less than three weeks later, Kennedy was dead.

Global War in One Country

With Kennedy's death, the United States moved inexorably toward carrying out the British Pugwash division of the world and the recolonization of the former European colonies "by other means." It is particularly tragic to counterpose this march toward war and neo-colonialism to the simultaneous, historic victories of the civil rights movement within the United States, and President Lyndon Baines Johnson's crucial role in both. While Johnson's fervent desire was to carry on the tradition of his mentor, Franklin Roosevelt, his understanding of Roosevelt's legacy did not include FDR's global strategic vision. While implementing crucial civil rights legislation and other policies in the interest of the general welfare, his foreign policy, especially in regard to the formerly colonized areas of the world, was defined by his Eastern Establishment advisers, and thus by British geopolitics. Vietnam and Indonesia exemplified that failure, and the ultimate demise of the FDR vision for at least another generation.

Johnson was handed a rapidly unravelling disaster in Vietnam. The militia forces in the villages and hamlets across the Vietnamese countryside, which had been organized and directed by Ngo Dinh Nhu, collapsed soon after Nhu and Diem were killed. Their number declined by 60% in several key provinces, and new recruits were so scarce that training ceased altogether.²³ The new military leader, Gen. Duang Van "Big" Minh, proved to be just as unwilling to allow a U.S. war in Vietnam as Diem had been. When McNamara learned that General Minh was talking with Hanoi and the Vietcong about a neutral solution, again with input from de Gaulle, another coup was quickly arranged, bringing in a more pliant general, and then later another, and another, and so on.

McNamara's Cabinet Warfare "control room" at the Pentagon, working in tandem with the Bundy brothers in the White House, proceeded to impose his perverted fantasy-life upon the real-world nations of Southeast Asia. Within a month of Kennedy's assassination, McNamara had drawn up proposals for phased bombing raids and covert operations against North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A December 1963 memo from McNamara explained that an offensive against the North was necessary to demonstrate to Hanoi "that we will escalate the conflict to whatever level is required to

23. Ibid.

insure their defeat.”²⁴

President Johnson had opposed the coup against Diem, but he held a simplistic, Cold War-induced view of Vietnam and the Third World generally, not much different from that of John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration. He cabled Ambassador Lodge that “nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk by whatever means we can,” and he was determined not to be remembered as the President who “lost” Vietnam. At McGeorge Bundy’s bidding, he mandated William Bundy to review the various options for the expected war, and the actual war plan eventually emerged. The proposal put forward three options: one by the military for a full-scale war against the North and South, including the possibility of a war with China if it intervened, as it had in Korea; the second was the existing policy of aid and advisers only. The Kennedy plan for withdrawal was not even included as an option. With the “extremes” thus balancing each other out, Bundy’s “moderate” third alternative called for phased, escalating bombing across North and South Vietnam, and troop deployments in the South—a perfect “limited” war aimed at expanding the conflict, while always falling just short of direct superpower confrontation—or of victory. Each escalation was supposed to solicit a “peace agreement” from Hanoi, and the Vietcong, or be met with further escalations.

War Planned To Fail, But War

In convincing LBJ to proceed with the war, both William and McGeorge Bundy expressed openly their “higher understanding” of the war: “Even if it fails,” said McGeorge, “the policy will be worth it. At a minimum, it will dampen down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own.”²⁵ William, in his original proposal, stated that the war would send a message to President Sukarno in Indonesia, and later, after the 1965-66 massacre in Indonesia, he credited this one “bright spot” in Asia to U.S. willingness to use massive power in Vietnam. In the days preceding Operation Rolling Thunder, which marked the beginning of the war in March 1965, McGeorge Bundy appraised the war plan, which would eventually kill millions and lay waste to three countries, as having only a 25-75% chance of success—but added that it was worth it, nonetheless.

On April 7, 1965, just a month after launching the war, President Johnson displayed the contradictory and tragic nature of his Presidency, in a speech which he intended to be one of the most important of his career. He was responding in part to the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on April 1, where the 17 member-nations called for negotiations to begin immediately in Vietnam, without preconditions. Johnson decided to propose the

24. Ibid.

25. Kai Bird, *The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms, A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998).

extension of his “Great Society” into the Third World. He would reach back to his own roots, when, as a young Congressman in the 1930s, he had championed Roosevelt’s great projects, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), which had transformed his home state of Texas. Speaking at Johns Hopkins University, on national television, Johnson offered to put up \$1 billion to develop the Mekong River Delta, and to collaborate with North Vietnam in transforming Southeast Asia, using the technologies and the expertise of the TVA. “Our generation has a dream,” he said. “It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true. . . . In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA.”²⁶

Beautiful sentiments, and undoubtedly sincere—but bombs were falling across Vietnam, and U.S. troops were landing in force, even while the speech was being made. McGeorge Bundy had convinced Johnson that to offer a bombing halt, or to agree to negotiations with the Vietcong, would be appeasement, and would encourage escalation by the North Vietnamese, urged on by Beijing. Bundy wrote into the speech a piece of sophistry meant to fool the population into thinking the proposal was serious: Johnson was to offer “unconditional discussions,” rather than unconditional *negotiations*. Johnson’s speech essentially said to the insurgents: We’ll bomb you until you surrender, and then our troops will run things, but we promise to do very good things. Ho Chi Minh was not impressed. He recognized, in fact, that the speech ultimately demonstrated that the bombing was *not* seen by the U.S. administration as a prelude to negotiations, but that the war was on for the long run.²⁷

Showing his ignorance of the importance of the concept of national sovereignty, Johnson told his assistant, Bill Moyers: “My God, I’ve offered Ho Chi Minh \$100 million to build the Mekong Valley. If that had been George Meany [the head of the AFL-CIO], he’d have snapped at it!”²⁸

It would take another 30 years for the nations of Southeast Asia to make peace among themselves and their larger northern neighbors, and to begin the implementation of the Mekong River Project as the foundation of that peace.

It was also 30 years later, in the 1990s, that Robert McNamara, who was still trying to justify his role in the American misadventure in Vietnam, arranged a series of meetings between senior officers of both the American and the Vietnam-

26. Lloyd C. Gardiner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the War for Vietnam*, 1995.

27. Op. cit., Kaiser.

28. Op. cit., Gardiner.



U.S. Ambassador Howard Jones with Indonesian President Sukarno. Jones had an appreciation of Indonesia's history and culture, and for Sukarno personally, whom he (and President Kennedy) considered to be the "George Washington of Indonesia."

ese side of the war. An extremely useful and revealing dialogue ensued.²⁹ McNamara, however, desperately tried to distort the original global purpose of the war, by insisting that it was all simply a terrible mistake, a tragedy, based purely on misperceptions, by both sides, of their adversary's true goals and intentions. Vietnam's hero of both the French and the American colonial wars, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, although equally unaware of the global Pugwash motivation of the American war, most eloquently refuted "Mr. Body Count" McNamara's perspective: "You are wrong to call the war a 'tragedy'—to say that it came from missed opportunities. Maybe it was a tragedy for you, because yours was a war of aggression, in the neo-colonial style or fashion. . . , so, yes, it was tragic, because they died for a bad cause. But for us, the war against you was a noble sacrifice. We did not want to fight the U.S. We did not. But you gave us no choice. . . . There were no missed opportunities for us. . . . I think we would do nothing different, under the circumstances."

Indonesia's Holocaust

Howard Palfrey Jones, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from 1958 to 1965, was, like Frederick Nolting, a man shaped by the Cold War strategic environment in which he was employed, but who retained an internal belief in and dedication to Franklin Roosevelt's idea of global peace and development, through the application of America's scientific and industrial capacity to the development of the former European colonies in the Third World. While the failure of the cause of men like

29. Robert S. McNamara, et al., *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).

Jones and Nolting can be traced in part to their inability or unwillingness to recognize that the British-created Cold War structure was inherently inimical to the fundamental interests of the United States, it is most important for our purposes here to demonstrate that such moral individuals posed a mortal threat to the Anglo-American oligarchy, and had to be removed, along with President Kennedy.

In his memoirs, *Indonesia, The Possible Dream*, Ambassador Jones reflects the influence of the ideas of Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and John Kennedy: "The world cannot exist half-poor and half-rich. Yet the gap between the developed and the less developed nations is year by year becoming greater rather than less. There is an alternative to accepting today's world conflicts merely on a political level: to explore and to understand the social and economic pressures that are the source of the conflicts and have their roots in a contrasting culture."³⁰

Jones was appointed by President Eisenhower as Ambassador to Indonesia in February 1958, just at the peak of the covert Anglo-American sponsorship of a subversive movement within Indonesia, aimed at splitting the country and bringing down Sukarno. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, like the British, had made clear his "sympathy" for the rebel forces, but instructed Jones to inform President Sukarno that the United States had no involvement. In fact, as Jones wrote later, "numerous published accounts lend credence to the assumption [of a CIA hand in the rebellion]. In May 1958, however, neither the fact nor the extent of such support was known to us in the Embassy." Jones' own view, after careful analysis of the situation within Indonesia, was that, if the United States engaged in supporting the separatist movement, "U.S. pretensions to non-interference in internal affairs of Asian nations would have been completely discredited, and the moral quality of our leadership, so recently established in Asia by our voluntary act in granting independence to the Philippines, would have been lost."³¹ Jones believed that both Dulles brothers, and others in Washington, were acting in Indonesia in a manner harmful to the needs of the country, and contrary to U.S. interests. He described the subversion as "another case of predelictions blinding us to facts, of prejudices blocking judgment, of the wish being father to the thought. . . , and unmovable objects, preconceptions in the minds of the readers [of my reports to Washington]."

Jones was worried about the growing strength of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), but recognized that London and Washington's identification of a nationalist like Sukarno

30. Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

31. *Ibid.*

as a Communist was ludicrous. Sukarno once asked Jones why the United States was so concerned with the large PKI vote in Indonesian elections. “You aren’t worried about France and Italy’s Communist votes, yet theirs is higher,” said Sukarno. Jones responded: “We were worried about Communism in these countries. That is what the Marshall Plan was all about.” He pointed out that the Communist votes in Europe were decreasing as a result of economic development. Like Kennedy, he belittled the facade of “fighting Communism” if there were no true effort to foster economic development.

Real Anti-Communism

Jones studied Indonesia’s history and culture, and confessed a deep love for the country. His equally deep admiration for President Sukarno grew from his appreciation for the richness of Indonesia’s past, and the perfidy of colonialism which Sukarno had battled to overcome. He also agreed with Kennedy that Sukarno deserved the title of the “George Washington of Indonesia.” Although appointed by a Republican administration, Jones showed his admiration for Kennedy during the 1960 electoral campaign by presenting Sukarno with a copy of Kennedy’s book, *Strategy of Peace*, a collection of his Senate speeches. Sukarno later told Jones: “If President Kennedy means what he says in these speeches, then I agree with him completely.”

Jones’ anti-Communism was constrained by his Roosevelt/Kennedy-like appreciation for the legitimate national aspirations of the former colonial peoples. He took Sukarno seriously when the President told him PKI leader Aidit was an “Indonesian Communist” rather than simply a Communist, and that he was “Indonesian first, a Communist second”—just as Ho Chi Minh had described himself as a “nationalist first, a Communist second.” Jones believed that “Aidit and his associates were confident of riding the democratic road to power.” While he considered it a legitimate U.S. policy to oppose that rise to power, he thought that such an effort must be accomplished by proving the superiority of republican methods of economic and social development. Jones highlighted a quote from a Sukarno speech from 1958: “Indonesia’s democracy is not liberal democracy. Indonesian democracy is not the democracy of the world of Montaigne or Voltaire. Indonesian democracy is not à la America, Indonesia’s democracy is not the Soviet—No! Indonesia’s democracy is the democracy which is implanted in the breasts of the Indonesian peoples. . . . Democracy is only a means. It is not an end. The end is a just and prosperous society.”

Sukarno pursued what he called “guided democracy,” whereby the political parties continued to function in the society, but the cabinet was composed of all the major parties (including the Communist PKI), while a National Council, under Sukarno’s leadership, included both party representatives and others from the “functional groups” in society (labor, peasantry, military, religious, business, etc.).

John Foster Dulles found “Guided Democracy” to be adequate evidence to prove that Sukarno was taking Indonesia into Communism.

With Kennedy’s inauguration in 1961, U.S. relations with Indonesia improved radically. Sukarno was warmly received on a visit to the White House and the Congress, and Kennedy delegated his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to convince (or coerce) the Dutch to give up Irian Jaya (a province the Dutch had held back from their recognition of Indonesian independence), which he accomplished in short order. At the same time, the last holdouts of the 1957-58 rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi were finally subdued, and the Darul Islam, a movement dedicated to making Indonesia an Islamic state, put up their arms—all due in great part to the publicly acknowledged termination of all U.S. backing for subversion. In 1962, for the first time since 1945, there was peace throughout Indonesia.

Sukarno also initiated a process aimed at the integration of the three nations composed primarily of the Malay people—Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia—to be called “Maphilindo.” Potentially included in the union were the three British colonies of northern Borneo: Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak (the larger, southern portion of Borneo is part of Indonesia). President Kennedy supported President Sukarno’s Maphilindo project, much to the consternation of the British.

Ambassador Jones openly expressed his anger at the British manipulation of the situation, aimed clearly not at finding a peaceful solution, but at the removal of Sukarno from power. In late 1963, Ambassador Jones returned to the United States for consultations, meeting with President Kennedy at some length on Nov. 19 (just three weeks after President Diem’s assassination). He briefed the President on the British duplicity, urging “empathy” for Indonesia, despite Sukarno’s intransigence and the mounting anti-Anglo-American sentiment within Indonesia. The President concurred, and *agreed to schedule a personal trip to Indonesia in early 1964*, pending only a peaceful settlement to *Konfrontasi*, while also agreeing to ship emergency rice to Jakarta, to resuscitate a stalled aid program, and to facilitate the process of creating the Maphilindo alliance among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Three days later, President Kennedy was killed.

The British and Suharto

Jones met with the new American President, Lyndon Johnson, a few days later. Indonesia was not foremost on the President’s mind, and nothing was concluded. Almost immediately, however, Johnson submitted to the British approach, supported by the advisers left over from the Kennedy Administration, as well as most of Johnson’s friends among the Southern Democrats, to punish Indonesia for allowing the existence of a strong Communist Party, daring to challenge England.

Jones was convinced that Sukarno was prepared to call

off the *Konfrontasi* if the British would stop intentionally humiliating his country, and allow the development of relations within the Maphilindo framework. However, wrote Jones, "Part of the trouble was that the British and Malaysia had no intention of supplying Sukarno with an easy solution. They felt they had this troublemaking Asian leader on the run."

The British, in fact, welcomed *Konfrontasi* as the opportunity to destroy Indonesian nationalism once and for all. The British Chief of Staff had already prepared a staff report, at the time of the September 1963 provocation which led to the *Konfrontasi*, which proposed covert operations to achieve their goal. Lord Louis Mountbatten, who had led London's effort during and after World War II to recolonize Asia, was now Chief of the British Defence Staff in charge of operations. The British had lost patience with President Kennedy, who had refused British demands to cut off all aid, to undermine Sukarno. Once Kennedy's removal was accomplished through an assassin's bullet, the British rushed into action. At Kennedy's funeral, the new British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who agreed to take punitive action in Indonesia. In December, Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys met with Rusk to go over the details.³² McNamara, preoccupied with preparing a war in Vietnam, was delighted to have the British take the lead in covert operations against Sukarno.

Beginning in August 1964, the British established secret contacts with the general in charge of the military side of Indonesia's *Konfrontasi*, General Suharto (the subsequent Indonesian President for over 30 years), who deployed his intelligence chief, Col. Ali Murtopo, to meet with British and Malaysian leaders in Malaysia.³³ The details of those contacts have never been revealed. Any competent analysis of the 1965-66 mass slaughter must examine the timing and content of those meetings in relation to the simultaneous British determination to cultivate Indonesian military opposition to Sukarno and the PKI.

Jones continued his efforts to settle *Konfrontasi*, but got no support from the British. In January 1965, he asked President Johnson to meet with Sukarno, a proposal which Marshall Green, who had just been appointed to replace Jones as Ambassador to Indonesia, proudly admitted to have sabotaged. Then, the combination of "Rolling Thunder" in Vietnam, and the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in April 1965, "sent tidal waves that rocked the Indonesian boat," as Ambassador Jones put it.

In July, Green arrived in Jakarta to replace Jones as Am-

bassador. Like Ambassador Lodge in Vietnam, Green's explicit intention was to eliminate the host nation's President by whatever means necessary. "To leave without having a real showdown with Sukarno," wrote Green, "would, in my opinion, be a mistake."

Jones, after years of intimate collaboration (and conflict) with President Sukarno, described him as "a human being of great warmth and magnetism, a leader of vision who . . . stuck by his precepts of unity in which he had always believed, even though this meant pulling the pillars of his temple down upon his head." Jones believed Sukarno had a tragic flaw, that he "lost himself in self-glorification, forgetting that the truly great are humble, and in so doing, betrayed his people."

Whatever the truth of this judgment, compare it to that of Green, who knew nothing of importance regarding either Indonesia or Sukarno, but nonetheless proclaimed Sukarno to be "a vainglorious man—a dangerous man, to be sure, but not a very serious man," who merely wanted to "get into the world spotlight," and who had "a striking resemblance to Mussolini." Here we see clearly the degeneration in American statecraft in 1964-65.

The Slaughter of the Indonesian Innocents

On Sept. 30, 1965, there was an aborted coup by a group of military officers, killing six leading generals before the operation was crushed by forces under General Suharto. As I have shown elsewhere (see footnote 3), the generals killed were those most sympathetic to President Sukarno, and more willing to tolerate the PKI under Sukarno's national leadership. And yet, the coup was immediately blamed on the PKI, without any attempt at providing any evidence, and used as justification for instigating the bloodlust and hysteria in the population, leading to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocents, mostly supporters of Sukarno. The PKI membership base was never mobilized or activated to support the coup in any way, and, except for a few localized pockets of resistance, never even mobilized to defend itself against the slaughter that followed.

The direction for the campaign to blame the PKI, it has now been proven, came from the British, the Australians, and the U.S. Embassy under Ambassador Green, who directly promoted and urged on the subsequent massacre. In July 2001, the U.S. government released the official correspondence from the period, called "Foreign Relations, 1964-1968," which contains the damning evidence (although much of it had been leaked two years earlier in the *Sydney Morning Herald*).

Green wired Washington on Oct. 5, 1965: "Muslim groups and others except Communists and their stooges are lined up behind army. . . . Army now has opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly. . . . In short, it's now or never. Much remains in doubt, but it seems almost certain that agony of ridding Indonesia of effects of Sukarno . . . has begun. . . . *Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality—This*

32. David Easter, "British and Malaysia Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the Confrontation, 1963-66," in Ed Richard, J. Aldrich, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65, Western Intelligence Propaganda and Special Operations* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000).

33. Ulf Sundhausen, *The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-67* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

priority effort is perhaps most needed.”³⁴

Australian Ambassador Shann echoed this sentiment: “Now or never. . . ; if Sukarno and his greasy civilian cohorts get back into the saddle it will be a change for the worse. . . . We are dealing with such an odd, devious, contradictory mess like the Indonesian mind.”

The British-American-Commonwealth leadership knew of the killing from the beginning. Under the direction of the military, much of the slaughter was carried out by enraged Muslim youth, armed and turned loose against any and all supporters of the Sukarno/PKI programs.

Ambassador Green’s cables as early as Oct. 20 referred to hundreds of summary executions, but warned that the PKI was “capable of recovering quickly if . . . Army attacks were stopped.” He praised the Army for “working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organization in carrying out this crucial assignment.” A cable from the American consul in Medan, in Northeast Sumatra, is most revealing: “Two officers of Pemuda Pantjasila (a Muslim youth group) told consulate officers that their organization intends to kill every PKI member they can catch. . . , much indiscriminate killing is taking place. . . . Attitude Pemuda Pantjasila leaders can only be described as bloodthirsty. . . . Something like a real reign of terror against PKI is taking place. The terror is not (repeat) not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party.” He added that there was “no meaningful resistance.”

Knowing full well the extent of genocide taking place across the country, Green telegraphed the State Department with a request that covert funds be provided for the explicit purpose of arming the youth movements who were doing the killing. The Army, he wrote, “is training Moslem youth and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the PKI.” The small arms he requested were for an “army-inspired but civilian-staffed action group [which] is still carrying the burden of current repressive efforts targeted against PKI.”

Approximately one-half million Indonesians were murdered in cold blood over the next several months.

Green concluded in his memoirs that “the bloodbath . . . can be attributed to the fact that Communism, with its atheism and talk of class warfare, was abhorrent to the way of life of rural Indonesians, especially in Java and Bali.” Ambassador Jones concluded otherwise: “I have witnessed what occurs when reason is replaced by fear and suspicion, when decisions are based on prejudice, rumor and propaganda.”³⁵

Only one person of stature in American politics questioned U.S. support for the mass killing in Indonesia. Robert

Kennedy, in 1966, said: “We have spoken out against inhuman slaughter perpetrated by the Nazis and the Communists. But will we speak out also against the inhuman slaughter in Indonesia, where over 100,000 alleged Communists have not been perpetrators, but victims?”³⁶

China’s Holocaust

The years 1963-65 marked a phase-change in history, and, as in a phase-change in any physical system, the existing structures and relationships underwent maximum stress and rapid transformation. Just one month before the Kennedy assassination, British Prime Minister (and Kennedy friend) Harold Macmillan was forced to retire by the Profumo Affair, leading to the election of the disastrous Harold Wilson in October 1964. The internal situation in the Soviet Union also reached crisis proportions in 1964, resulting in the downfall of Nikita Khrushchov in October. Within the United States, the historic civil rights movement brought hope to the nation and the world, but the so-called “Best and the Brightest” of the Eastern Establishment, left in power following Kennedy’s death, were busy plotting with the British to implement colonial wars, the “post-industrial society” destruction of U.S. technological progress, and the creation of a drug-infested counterculture to facilitate their utopian vision.

In China, Zhou Enlai’s influence had waned. His Bandung diplomacy had exemplified his dedication to the legacy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of China’s republican revolution in 1911, and an adherent of American System policies. Dr. Sun was dedicated to the principles of the general welfare, and of international development, as promoted by President Abraham Lincoln and his followers in the late 19th Century. Zhou Enlai was educated in the tradition represented by Sun Yat-sen, while his own chosen philosophical outlook drew upon the 17th-Century Confucian philosophers Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi, who had blamed the decadence and the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644 on the destructive influence of China’s “Enlightenment” philosopher, Wang Yangming.³⁷ Wang Yangming and the several divergent schools which his work inspired, all converged on the rejection of the “tyranny of reason,” in favor of either a pragmatic, or outright anarchistic, glorification of action. Gu and Wang, and Sun Yat-sen after them, rejected this existentialist outlook, insisting on a return to the Classical principles of knowledge, derived from Confucius and Mencius, as the basis for good statesmanship and a virtuous state.

Zhou Enlai’s study of Western ideas, including Marxism, was grounded upon this moral foundation, as were his concepts of international statecraft.

34. This and the following quotes are from “Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXVI,” released by the U.S. government in the Summer of 2001, although most of them were leaked in an article by David Jenkins in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 12, 1999.

35. Op. cit., Jones.

36. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).

37. Kuo-Kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). And Michael O. Billington, “The European ‘Enlightenment’ and the Middle Kingdom,” *Fidelio*, Summer 1995.



Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (second from left) with other members of the Chinese leadership (Mao Zedong is second from the right). Zhou was educated in the tradition represented by Sun Yat-sen, and his own philosophical outlook drew upon the 17th-Century Confucian philosophers Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi. His study of Western ideas, including Marxism, was grounded upon this moral foundation.

But when Zhou's 1954-55 initiatives, and the promise of the U.S.-China discussions following Bandung, were countered by increased covert and overt Cold War operations by London and Washington against China and her allies in Indonesia and elsewhere, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong's reaction was to adopt a Romantic revolutionary posture, a process repeated several times during the long and contradictory era of Mao's leadership over the CCP and the Chinese nation. The Great Leap Forward, for instance, launched in 1958, attempted to extend the ideas associated with Mao's concept of "People's War" into running the economy. People's War depended upon the mobilization of the population, the "masses," for highly localized guerrilla warfare, rather than the conventional concentration of professional forces for offensive operations. Through a protracted defense, People's War aimed to submerge a larger and better equipped adversary in the "sea of the people." The collectivization of agriculture, the infamous backyard steel plants, and similar Great Leap schemes, were meant to demonstrate that a People's War approach to economic policy would prove that China could industrialize and modernize without foreign assistance, dependent only on the spiritual and physical will of a politically mobilized population. It was a colossal failure.

Mao also adopted a confrontational policy toward the West, ending the tentative steps toward regional and international cooperation, identified with Zhou Enlai and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Mao declared that "the current situation is that the East Wind prevails over the West Wind, that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism." The promotion of armed liberation struggles

was to take precedence over the apparently failed appeal to the West for collaboration in bringing about the peaceful transformation to independence and sovereignty in the former colonies. In fact, it is clinically true that the Anglo-American rejection of the Spirit of Bandung was the primary *cause* of Mao's turn to a Romantic revolutionary mode of leadership—a process which was not entirely unexpected, nor undesired, in British intelligence circles.

Bertie Russell's Role

Mao's occasional flights into irrational, Romanticized glorification of the will of the masses³⁸ had a precedent in Chinese history, one well known to British strategists. Qin Shihuang, the "First Emperor" of a unified China, who consolidated power over all of China in the Third Century, B.C., followed the philosophical current called "Legalism," rejecting the Confucian worldview of man born with the divine capacity for *ren* (*jen*, comparable to the Platonic/Christian notion of *agapē*), in favor of a conception of man as a beast, controllable only through "two handles": punishment and reward. Like 20th-Century fascism under Hitler or Mussolini, or the similar worldview of the Tony Blair-George Bush-Al Gore globalization warlords of today, those who submitted to the absolute authority of the leader were permitted to share in the spoils (while they lasted), while the population was held in line through mass mobilizations for war, forced-work proj-

38. The mass purges during the Rectification Campaign in Yanan in the 1940s, under the direction of Kang Sheng, were the prototype for the later episodes, leading ultimately to the Cultural Revolution.

ects, and the promotion of irrational cult beliefs. During the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the ultra-Maoist Gang of Four championed Emperor Qin as China's greatest hero, praising even his infamous burning of the Confucian texts and burying alive the Confucian scholars.

But the Romantic, irrational mode had Western roots as well. Following World War I, when the British and Americans sold out their supposed "ally," China, at the Versailles Conference, China exploded into a social upheaval known as the May 20 Movement. The Anglo-American financial oligarchy deployed their top gun, Bertrand Russell, into the social cauldron, with vital assistance from a parallel deployment by American "pragmatist" John Dewey, an asset of the House of Morgan. Russell and Dewey, over a period of nearly two years, gave classes to the emerging Communist Party leadership (including Mao) and others, teaching a mixture of Marxism and the racist belief structure of the "noble savage," peddled by British colonialism everywhere, that colonial subjects are far better off in their "natural" state of backwardness than by adopting modern technology and rapid industrialization. Russell glorified Emperor Qin, and Legalism, as the proper model for revolutionary change, labelling Qin as "something of a Bolshevik," especially in his efforts to destroy Confucianism. Confucianism, argued Russell in his *The Problem of China*,³⁹ perverted the natural qualities of the Chinese by promoting ethical values over pragmatic realism. Such Confucian beliefs as respect for education, family, and the welfare of the society as a whole, were holding back China's progress, said the good Lord Russell. U.S. influence (meaning specifically the leadership of Sun Yat-sen), warned Russell, would provide "a shell of freedom, but bondage beneath it." Instead, Russell proposed that "China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation." In fact, such a policy of planned anarchy, rejecting all authority, both family and government, and withdrawing from international collaboration, with both the Soviets and the United States, would come to pass in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Sino-Soviet Split

The close relations between China and the Soviet Union began to chill after the 1956 "de-Stalinization" process in Russia under General Secretary Khrushchov. Mao resented the fact that such a monumental shift in international Communist dogma was taken without consideration for the opinions of the Chinese. More importantly, Khrushchov was a crucial participant in the Pugwash process, which was reflected in the fact that the Soviets began to withdraw from their commitment to foster the industrial and scientific development of the Third World, and China in particular. During the early 1950s, under Stalin, the Soviet Union was the driving force in building the heavy industrial infrastructure in China, and in providing technology and educational training to broad layers of

the Chinese population. With Khrushchov, and Pugwash, the massive industrial and infrastructural programs were de-emphasized as "Stalinist megalomania." In league with the Pugwash MAD doctrine of "non-proliferation," the Soviets reneged on their agreement to provide China with nuclear technology and hardware, and generally pulled back from economic and military assistance.

The de-Stalinization process had a parallel within China's internal affairs. The first Party Congress in 11 years was convened in 1956, at which Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi criticized the existence of a "cult of personality" — a clear attempt to draw a comparison between Mao and Stalin. Under intense criticism, Mao resigned as President (but not as party chairman) in late 1958, withdrawing somewhat into the background.

The economy, under Deng's and Liu's direction, recovered slowly from the collapse brought on by the Great Leap Forward, by easing collectivization, renewing technical education, and introducing incentives in production. But tensions with Moscow increased. Chinese Army Chief of Staff Peng Dehuai, who tried to prevent a split with Moscow, was purged in 1959. The Chinese accused Khrushchov of "revisionism," and Khrushchov, after a visit to Beijing in the fall of 1959, accused China of being "keen on war like a bellicose cock. . . . It is not reasonable."⁴⁰ By the Summer of 1960, Soviet advisers and equipment in China had been withdrawn.

The foreign policy dynamic of the emerging Sino-Soviet split also had a dramatic impact upon the ongoing development of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Chinese believed that the détente process developing between the United States and the Soviet Union was selling out the liberation movements in the former colonies, and suspected that Moscow and Washington were plotting against China. As we shall see, this was indeed very much on the minds of the Pugwash crew — Averell Harriman, in particular.

The Bandung leaders, meanwhile, were being torn between a pro-détente faction, lead by Nehru and Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, and, on the other side, those who emphasized, with China, the necessity of anti-imperialist struggles, especially the support of armed liberation movements. President Sukarno was a spokesman for this faction. While both sides believed in non-alignment in regard to the East-West conflict, and an end to the Cold War, they increasingly lined up on one side or the other of the Sino-Soviet divide.

When President Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961, the Cold War-nurtured threefold division of the world, the "Free World" in the West, the Soviet Union, and China (not accidentally, very similar to British intelligence operative George Orwell's scenario in his novel *1984*, of three superpowers cyclically ganging up on each other to maintain controlled instability), virtually assured there would be no resistance to the utopian world-government schemes of the

39. Bertrand Russell, *The Problem of China* (New York: The Century Corp., 1922).

40. Sergei N. Gancharov, John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993).

Anglo-American financial oligarchy over a “post-industrial,” neo-colonial world economy.

Pragmatic policies dominated China’s national economy in the aftermath of the Great Leap. Beijing expanded its trading relations with the Western nations — except for the United States, which refused. At the same time, the break with the Soviet Union became increasingly acrimonious. The Chinese learned that Averell Harriman, who negotiated the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, had proposed to Khrushchov that the three powers collaborate in the military destruction of China’s nuclear research facilities, and they suspected that Khrushchov had responded positively. In fact, Harriman had proposed to JFK in January 1963, that the United States reach an “understanding” with the Soviets to prevent the development of any nuclear capacity in China or in Germany (!), adding that, if an agreement with Moscow could be reached, “together we could compel China to stop nuclear development, threatening to take out the facilities if necessary.”⁴¹ McGeorge Bundy even advised President Lyndon Johnson to give up plans for a Multinational Force in Europe as a bargaining chip to win Soviet cooperation in taking out the Chinese nuclear program.⁴² Although it appears that Khrushchov never agreed to these proposals, he himself publicly threatened the use of Soviet “up-to-date weapons of annihilation” against China in September 1964. (LBJ ultimately decided to take no action to prevent the expected Chinese nuclear test, which occurred in October 1964.)

Seeing themselves surrounded by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., many Chinese leaders believed war was inevitable. The question became, what kind of war should China prepare to fight?

‘People’s War’

The military leadership expected an early confrontation with the United States coming out of the Vietnam conflict. Even before the U.S. Operation Rolling Thunder in Vietnam in March 1965, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Lo Juiqing argued that China’s need for a modern army required the reestablishment of Soviet assistance, and that U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons required the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The urgency of the war called for a “unity of action” with the Soviets, said General Lo, who argued that the Khrushchov “revisionist clique” could not prevent the U.S.S.R. from acting on behalf of the anti-imperialist cause in league with China.

The Liu Shaoqi/Deng Xiaoping leadership in the government and in the Communist Party, generally agreed with General Lo. They believed that not only the military, but also the economy, needed Soviet help to achieve modernization in the

face of the U.S. threat, and therefore advocated a limited rapprochement with Moscow.

Mao was not playing a public role in these debates. The primary opposition to General Lo and his political allies Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, centered around the Minister of Defense, Lin Biao, a military hero of the Chinese Revolution. Lin Biao argued that war with the United States was unlikely if China stayed out of Vietnam, and that if war came, it were not modernization and technical capacities which would determine the outcome, but the will of the Chinese masses. People’s War would make it possible to “drown the enemy in the sea of the people.”

In 1964, these debates were intense, and, to some extent, out in the open. The Indonesian Communist Party leader, Aidit, gave a speech in China proposing an “insurrection in the countryside of the world,” thus globalizing the People’s War concept of surrounding the cities by controlling the countryside. The Third World countries were the equivalent of the “countryside,” and would be the battlefield for the global People’s War against the “cities” of the imperialist nations. This concept became a staple in Lin Biao’s works, and ultimately in the Cultural Revolution. It should be noted, however, that this was not a proposal to *export* revolution, from China or from anywhere else, but a call for revolutionary organizations in each country to wage People’s War. In the case of Indonesia’s Aidit, he was not even proposing armed struggle, but a political organizing process aimed at coming to power through peaceful means.

The year 1964 in China witnessed two processes marking the beginning of a phase-change. In October, China exploded its first nuclear weapon, a project overseen by Zhou Enlai, relying entirely on Chinese scientific capabilities after the Soviet pullout in 1960. Although China did not have, nor desired to have, a nuclear offensive capacity, this achievement undermined those who argued that the Soviet nuclear umbrella was necessary to counter U.S. nuclear threats. Also, as Foreign Minister Chen Yi had said to the project scientists in 1961, “If you succeed in producing the atomic bomb and guided missiles, then I can straighten my back.”⁴³

Simultaneously, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao escalated an initiative which had been introduced in 1962, the Socialist Education Campaign. The campaign was called “the spiritual atomic bomb,” with the purpose of mobilizing the spirit and enthusiasm of the masses to meet the threats to the Chinese nation, economic and military. It was accompanied by the mass distribution of the *Little Red Book*, first published by the Army in May 1964, and championed by Lin Biao, containing aphorisms and short, conclusionary quotes from Chairman Mao. U.S. analyst Chalmers Johnson characterized the Socialist Education Campaign as a “second Yenan period,” a Romantic attempt to revolutionize the population, especially the youth, who had become complacent due to the corrupting

41. Letter, Harriman to Kennedy, Jan. 23, 1963, Library of Congress, W. Averell Harriman Papers, quoted in “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, in *International Security*, Winter 2000-01.

42. Ibid.

43. Op. cit., Gancharov.

influence of “modern revisionists,” linked to the “revisionists” in the Soviet Union, who, they believed, had joined forces with the United States against China. The revisionists, the “enemies of the people,” had to be rooted out and reeducated in order to liberate the revolutionary spirit of the masses. The Socialist Education Campaign attempted to provide an explanation (or an excuse) for the failure of the Great Leap Forward, implying that the population had not been properly revolutionized to carry out the application of People’s War tactics to politics and the economy.⁴⁴

In a conversation with the French Minister of Culture, André Malraux, in August 1965, Mao told Malraux: “The survivors of the old guard have been molded by action, like our state. Many of them are empirical, resolute, prudent revolutionaries. On the other hand, there is a whole generation of dogmatic youth, and dogma is less useful than cow dung.”⁴⁵

The Socialist Education Campaign had set the stage for the Cultural Revolution. The coming holocaust was not carved in stone, however. In late 1964, Zhou Enlai reported to the National People’s Congress on the serious debates taking place over the Third Five-Year Plan, indicating that many party leaders were still advocating closer relations with the Soviets and/or the United States! Mao was still keeping himself somewhat in the background, while the various factions fought for their policies. As late as January 1965, after the first U.S. “retaliatory” bombing of North Vietnam, but before Rolling Thunder, Mao told Edgar Snow that he believed the United States would not attack North Vietnam, and would withdraw from Vietnam altogether within a year or two. Others, including Zhou Enlai, were worried that Vietnam could become another Korea, in the sense that the Soviets would escalate the conflict by supplying North Vietnam with sophisticated arms, leading to an American retaliation, and eventually drawing China into another war with the United States.⁴⁶

When the United States launched the Vietnam War in March 1965, the crises within China quickly came to a head. China had forbidden the Soviets to use Chinese railroads for weapons shipments to North Vietnam, but after Rolling Thunder, the ban was lifted. In May, the Army eliminated all designation of rank. Besides the utopian, egalitarian aspect of this move, it facilitated the rise of Defense Minister Lin Biao over the leading active generals in the Army. The public government pronouncements regarding Vietnam stopped threatening a Chinese intervention, but instead strengthened the warn-

ing that any attack on China itself would result in a People’s War which would “have no boundaries.”

The Cultural Revolution

The debate between Lin Biao’s People’s War and those committed to strengthening the economy and improving relations with the Soviet Union intensified. Deng Xiaoping, speaking in Romania in July 1965, spoke of a “common struggle against imperialism headed by the U.S. . . . The Chinese people will always march hand in hand . . . with the fraternal peoples of the Socialist camp and with the oppressed peoples and nations throughout the world. . . . The Chinese people are determined to build their country into a peaceful Socialist state with modern agriculture, modern industry, modern international defense and science and technology in not too long an historical period.”

Similarly, Gen. Lo Juiqing, speaking at a meeting on Sept. 3, 1965, proposed solidarity with Moscow against the war in Vietnam, and described the “Johnson Doctrine” as “neo-Hitlerian—it means war. . . . We must . . . strengthen our preparations . . . and give more effective support to the Vietnamese.”

However, at the same September meeting, Lin Biao introduced his anti-Soviet paper, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” which was to become the determining military and foreign policy document leading into the Cultural Revolution in 1966. America’s war-mongering was only possible because of Moscow’s revisionists, he said, who have “demoralized revolutionary peoples everywhere,” and “greatly encouraged U.S. imperialism in its war adventures.” Lin described People’s War as “luring the enemy in deep and abandoning some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way, so as to lure him in. It is only after letting the enemy in that the people can take part in the war in various ways and that the power of a people’s war can be fully exerted.” The primary method to counter U.S. imperialism, Lin wrote, “is still mobilization of the people, reliance on the people, making everyone a soldier and waging people’s war. We want to tell the U.S. imperialists once again that the vast ocean of several hundred million Chinese people in arms will be more than enough to submerge your few million aggressor troops.”

Over the coming months, Indonesia’s PKI, the largest Communist Party outside of China and the U.S.S.R., and China’s premier fraternal party, was dismembered, with hundreds of thousands slaughtered, while the British and the Americans openly declared their approval and support. The U.S. bombing in Vietnam expanded to include the rail and road connections between China and Vietnam. U.S. pronouncements warned that China would not be allowed to serve as a “sanctuary” for the war in Vietnam—the same warning issued earlier against North Vietnam, just before the bombing started. Then, in March and April of 1966, the U.S. war in Vietnam was dramatically escalated.

In April and May, the Cultural Revolution exploded

44. Chalmers Johnson, “Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period,” in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

45. André Malraux, *Anti-Memoirs*, trans. by Terence Kilmartin (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1968).

46. Andrew Hall Wedeman, *The East Wind Subsides, Chinese Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (Washington Institute Press, 1987).

across China. Eventually, nearly every military or party leader who had resisted in any way the go-it-alone, Romantic revolutionary reaction to the new Anglo-American offensive was purged, and many were killed or imprisoned, while Lin Biao replaced the disgraced Liu Shaoqi as Mao's heir apparent. Mao reasserted his dominance at the famous mass rally of Red Guard youth in Tiananmen Square, each waving a copy of the *Little Red Book*, promoted by Lin Biao.

Mao called on the youth throughout the land to directly attack government and party headquarters: "Whenever people in the central government carry on tricks and deception, I call upon the local areas to rise up and attack them, I call upon them to vigorously create a disturbance at the palace of the King of Heaven." And, indeed, they raised havoc across the land, living out the utopian fantasies which Bertrand Russell and John Dewey had proposed 45 years earlier: rejecting all authority; breaking all family ties; closing the schools in favor of "learning by doing"; sending the educated, both youth and adult alike, into the countryside to "learn from the peasantry"; and the arrest and torture, both psychological and physical, of millions of citizens. Only the intervention of Zhou Enlai and nuclear project director Nie Rongzhen prevented a Red Guard brigade of students from taking over the Lop Nur nuclear research facility, just months before the scheduled test of the first Chinese hydrogen bomb in June 1967. Most scientific and technological progress ground to a halt, along with the entire educational establishment.

For the ten years following May 1966, China experienced a Romanticized version of "Permanent Revolution," which is remembered by the Chinese today with the same horror as do the Germans in recalling the Nazi era. The "Gang of Four" who emerged to run the holocaust, rewrote Chinese history, glorifying none other than the Qin Emperor, and his adopted doctrine of Legalism, while declaring Confucianism to be the enemy of the people, on a par with European culture and Soviet revisionism. Classical culture of any variety, Chinese or Western, was expunged in favor of unbridled Romanticism.

Although the direct war with the U.S. never materialized, the geopoliticians in London looked on with pleasure as China waged People's War against itself.

It is pertinent to note that the British intelligence agent Uri Ra'anana of Israel, who implanted himself within the U.S. establishment as a foreign policy expert during the 1960s, expressed in his writings the actual policy of London and London's allies in the Eastern Establishment of the United States at the time of the Cultural Revolution. Ra'anana referred to the "fanaticism of Mao's followers," but nonetheless insisted that the United States should support the "fanatics" running the self-destruction in China, rather than the "pragmatists" such as Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, who opposed the Cultural Revolution, but who promoted unity with Moscow in regard to the Vietnam War. "The domestic fanaticism of Mao's associates," wrote Ra'anana, "has little or no bearing on their foreign policy—which, to say the least, is extremely cautious and isolationist rather than intervention-

ist." The Chinese were justified in feeling that Soviet-influenced "modern revisionists" were attempting to influence China's domestic affairs, he wrote, "so it would seem that it was the pragmatists and not the fanatics who were the larger menace to peace and to the West." After all, Ra'anana concluded, the West should appreciate the change in China, since "it is barely ten years since Peking was propagating the 'Spirit of Bandung.'"⁴⁷

America's Decline

Between November 1963 and the Summer of 1966, the United States: took over and revamped a British-French colonial war in Indochina; acquiesced to, and participated in, British policy in Indonesia, leading to one of the most brutal acts of official mass murder in history; and, both directly and through sins of omission, drove an isolated and threatened Chinese nation into an orgy of self-destruction very much to the benefit of British geopolitics. The death toll across Asia amounted to several millions of souls.

Perhaps even more deadly was the impact on America itself—a result not unintended by the British monarchy's minions. Lyndon LaRouche wrote recently, in reflecting upon the horror of the Thirty Years' War in Europe in the 17th Century: "In the instance of such follies as these, like the outcome of the recent, protracted U.S. war in Indochina, there is crucial evidence embedded within the quality of the result itself, which attests conclusively to the depraved quality of the deed, and of the policy which brought about such an effect. In those referenced cases, the apology for the protracted war is perhaps an even greater crime, with effects continued even to the present day, than the protracted war itself. An evil war occurs, but apologies for that evil, like the version of 'cabinet warfare' doctrine of Hobbesian perpetual warfare, which infects deranged and decadent British-influenced U.S. military officers and others today, infects the future with yet more, perhaps even worse evil than it has either in the past or the present. Over the course of known history, to date, such apologies are most common among the doctrines which pre-shape and usher in a new dark age of humanity."⁴⁸

The point is not to extract vengeance—too often falsely called "justice" by would-be world-governors—but to seek out truth as the indispensable guide to our current and future actions. The model must not be that of the current World Court in The Hague, in which the powerful pass judgment over defeated subjects, but rather, the model of the Peace of Westphalia, in which the opposing sides agree that there must be an end to revenge, with a joint dedication to honoring the sovereign nation-state, and to fostering the collaboration of nations in advancing the general welfare of mankind as a whole.

47. Uri Ra'anana, "Peking's Foreign Policy Debate, 1965-1966," in *China in Crisis*, op. cit.

48. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Jesus Christ and Civilization," *EIR*, Oct. 6, 2000.