
Book Review

What the Eulogists Didn't Tell You About Katie Graham and the Post

by Edward Spannaus

Katharine The Great: Katharine Graham And Her Washington Post Empire

by Deborah Davis

New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1991 (third edition)

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It would be hard to exceed the hypocrisy of the days following the official announcement of the death of Katharine Graham on July 17. Even in death, Graham still had the power to make those, otherwise considered powerful in their own right, grovel at her feet.

Eulogy after eulogy cited Graham's alleged courage, and even gutsiness, with respect to two publishing events: the Pentagon Papers, and Watergate. In both cases, the truth is directly contrary to the legend. In both cases, the Post was spoon-fed material from a section of the U.S. intelligence community, designed to discredit President John F. Kennedy in the first instance,¹ and to bring down President Nixon in the second. Neither involved the least bit of courage on the part of Graham and her partner Ben Bradlee.

The second, related area of stomach-churning hypocrisy was the stream of adulations of Graham as a champion of free speech and freedom of the press. In truth, Graham and the *Post* stood for censorship, suppression, and distortion of the news; her expressed view was that there are certain things that the public does not have a right to know.

1. According to Fletcher Prouty's 1992 *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*, the so-called "Pentagon Papers" are very misleading, only marginally from the Pentagon, and were carefully selected to paint JFK as the villain of the story, and to shield the role of the CIA.

The decision by Graham and Bradlee to publish the Pentagon Papers, after the *New York Times* did so first, was primarily a business decision; it was widely known at the time that the *Post* had the Papers, and other newspapers also had them and were prepared to publish; had the *Post* failed to publish, the *Post's* reputation would have been seriously damaged, according to the thinking of Graham, Bradlee, and their advisers at the time.

A most useful antidote to this falsification of history, is the book *Katharine the Great* by Deborah Davis. Two aspects of it must be considered. First, what Davis wrote about the *Post* and its relationship to U.S. intelligence community. And second, what happened when Davis tried to first publish the book in 1979.

In her preface to the third edition, Davis writes: "This is the third edition of a book originally written shortly after President Nixon resigned as a result of the *Washington Post's* investigation of the Watergate scandal. The conceptual center of the book is the question: Could Katharine Graham, as publisher of the *Post*, have been in the position to end the Presidency of Richard Nixon by chance, or was that ability the result of something deeply rooted and systemic?"

Davis goes on to note that such an idea is at odds with the conventional versions of Watergate, "in which *Post* reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein are portrayed as finding out about Nixon's crimes essentially by accident."

As she researched Katharine Graham's power, Davis continues, she found that both Katharine's late husband Philip Graham, and Ben Bradlee, whom Katharine hired as executive editor in 1965, had handled strategic intelligence during World War II, and that "they had gone on to use their skills in propaganda or intelligence to create and reinforce peacetime definitions of patriotism."

We will describe Davis's findings — and add a few of our own — in the course of this review. But meanwhile, let's jump



ahead, to the story of how Katharine Graham and Ben Bradlee set out to stop the publication and circulation of this book — ultimately resulting in the shredding of 20,000 copies of the first edition.

Champion of Free Press?

The mainline New York publisher Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (HBJ) bought the rights to *Katharine the Great* in early 1978, and announced publication for the Fall of 1979. HBJ's chairman William Jovanovich had reviewed the final manuscript and declared that Katharine Graham was not going to tell him what he could publish. He lined everything up to make the book a best-seller, including selling rights to the Literary Guild, and selling an excerpt to *New York* magazine.

Just before *New York* magazine went to press with the excerpt, Ben Bradlee went bananas and threatened to sue, and succeeded in stopping the publication of the excerpt. Two weeks later, *Wall Street Journal* intelligence reporter David Ignatius called Davis, lying to her that he was going to say that she was right about "Deep Throat." (Davis had hypothesized that the *Post*'s mysterious source was actually Richard Ober, the CIA's deputy chief of counterintelligence, and the author of the Agency's "Operation CHAOS," who had been working in the White House basement for Henry Kissinger at the time of the Watergate revelations. Ober was ideally situated: Bradlee had known him at Harvard, and Woodward knew him when Woodward was a Navy intelligence and communications officer.)

Ignatius demanded that Davis come to his office immediately, and that she bring her interview notebooks with her, so he could be sure of the facts. However, when she answered his summons, Ignatius proceeded to grill her in an aggressive, hostile manner. His subsequent review in the *Wall Street Journal* ridiculed the book as "rubbish," claiming it was full of errors and wild conclusions. The *Journal* neglected to tell its readers that its reviewer, David Ignatius, was the son of Paul Ignatius,² the former president of the Washington Post Co.!

Bradlee didn't stop there. He sent a list of 26 alleged inaccuracies to HBJ, and advised the publishing house that he probably wouldn't sue for libel (no wonder, since he could have been subject to court-ordered discovery), but Bradley threatened HBJ that he was prepared "to brand you as completely irresponsible, to tell author friends to steer clear of you as though you had the plague, to brand Miss Davis as a fool, and to put your company in that special little brand of publishers who don't give a shit for the truth."

Davis's editor at HBJ came unglued, saying later, "I was

quite scared," being up against "*Ben Bradlee*, the hero of American journalism. . . ."

In addition to his threat to sue *New York* magazine, Bradlee also got the *Washington Journalism Review* to schedule an article attacking the book. Soon thereafter, HBJ "unpublished" Davis's book, recalling all unsold copies and shredding them—even requiring affidavits to ensure that no unsold copy of the book survived.

In 1982, Davis sued Harcourt in Federal court in New York. The court granted her request for discovery, to see HBJ's internal documents concerning the book. At that point, a new law firm (Fried Frank Harris Shriver and Kampelman—no strangers to intelligence matters themselves) entered the case for HBJ, and offered Davis a \$25,000 settlement if she would waive her right to see the HBJ documents. She declined the offer, and she got some of the documents. Among them, were letters from Katharine Graham to Jovanovich, appealing to their personal friendship, and deriding Davis's "CIA fantasy" about "Ben, Phil and others." In a later letter to Jovanovich from Katharine, that free-press champion gushed, "I was full of admiration anyway for what you did and how you did it."

Ultimately, HBJ admitted that they knew of no specific misstatements in the book, and they settled the case with Davis out of court.

The Bradlee Puzzle

What really bothered and intrigued Davis, was Bradlee's hysterical reaction to the book. Why had he cared so much about what she wrote about him? He seemed most upset about the charge that he had done propaganda work for the CIA in the 1950s—one sentence out of the entire book. So Davis went to work to see what more she could find out, including from the FBI's files on the espionage case against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The product of a Boston Brahmin banking family, Ben Bradlee had come to work for the *Post* around 1948; in 1951, Phil Graham sent him to Paris to become the press attaché at the U.S. Embassy. Soon, Bradlee was on the staff of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange, the predecessor of the U.S. Information Agency, which was utilized as a propaganda arm by the CIA and the State Department.

The documents examined by Davis described a massive overseas propaganda campaign run by the U.S. government around the Rosenberg espionage case, to attempt to counter what the U.S. government considered Communist propaganda defending the accused spies. Bradlee played a key role in this, from his position in Paris. In December 1952, Bradlee flew from Paris to New York and appeared at the U.S. Attorney's office. According to a Justice Department memorandum, Bradlee said that "he was sent here to look at the Rosenberg file in order to answer the Communist propaganda about the Rosenberg case in the Paris newspapers." The memo also

2. Katharine Graham had hired Paul Ignatius, who had served as Secretary of the Navy and in other high civilian Pentagon positions, upon the advice of her close friend and adviser Robert McNamara in 1969. His son David later went from the *Wall Street Journal* to the *Post*, where he still works today.

states that Bradlee “advised that he was sent here by Robert Thayer, who is head of the CIA in Paris.” (Thayer was in fact the CIA station chief in Paris at the time.)

When Bradlee returned to Paris, he wrote a lengthy dossier defending the prosecution of the Rosenbergs. Embassy personnel provided the Bradlee report to a number of French editors, and it was used as the basis for a number of articles and editorials. After distributing Bradlee’s analysis in France, the State Department then circulated it to its embassies worldwide, to counter the global protests against the pending execution of the Rosenbergs.

It was in Paris that Bradlee met the Pinchot sisters: Tony Pinchot Pittman and Mary Pinchot Meyer. Mary was married to the CIA’s Cord Meyer, who was running covert operations in Europe for Phil Graham’s friend Frank Wisner. Bradlee immediately began an affair with Tony, whom he later married.

A decade earlier at Vassar, the Pinchot sisters had become close friends with Cicely d’Autremont, who then married James Jesus Angleton at the time Angleton was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Angleton later became the CIA’s chief of counterintelligence. It was all a very tight circle.

In 1961, a few years after Bradlee had returned to the U.S. to work at *Newsweek*, he learned from CIA official Richard Helms that *Newsweek* magazine was for sale. Bradlee contacted Phil Graham, who gave Bradlee a \$1 million check to convey to Helms’s grandfather as a down payment.

Then, in 1965, at the urging of Walter Lippmann, Katharine Graham brought Bradlee into the *Post*, to become executive editor, where he more or less became Katharine’s alter ego for the rest of his career.

Washington’s Version of the London ‘Times’

Ben Bradlee was not an anomaly. To understand how Bradlee and Katharine Graham were able to shape the *Post* in the ’60s and ’70s to play the role that it does today, it is essential to understand how Phil Graham molded the *Post* in the post-World War II period into a propaganda organ for U.S. intelligence.

The key to Phil Graham, as the late Col. Fletcher Prouty advised *EIR* some years ago, is that Phil was hand-picked by his father-in-law Eugene Meyer to run the *Washington Post*, because Bradlee was part of the Wall-Street/intelligence circles in which Meyer himself was ensconced.

In the late 1940s, the *Post* under Phil Graham became part and parcel of the “old-boy” intelligence network that coalesced, during World War II, around military intelligence and the OSS. But, as a caveat, we would note that what these networks represented under Franklin Roosevelt’s leadership during the war, and what they became after FDR’s death, under conditions of the British-inspired Cold War, are not necessarily the same thing.



Philip Graham’s model for the Washington Post was The Times of London, the establishment mouthpiece for the British Foreign Office.

One of the most revealing anecdotes about Phil, is found in the book *The Imperial Post*, by Tom Kelly. Graham handed Wes Barthelmes of the Newspaper Guild a two-volume history of the *Times* of London, and told him, “That’s the kind of the paper I want the *Post* to be.” Said Barthelmes, “the significant thing . . . was how close the alliance of the *Times* and the British Foreign Office had been all through the height of imperial power. The *Times* was always covering up stories. I think Phil wanted me to understand that he wanted the *Post* to be accepted, established, like the *Times*.”

And that is what Phil did. Certainly since the late 1940s and early ’50s, if not before, the *Post* has been a mouthpiece

and propaganda organ for the increasingly corrupted U.S. intelligence community; and, in the period of the 1950s and ’60s—before the 1970s exposure and dismantling of the CIA—the *Post* was virtually the house organ in the nation’s capital for the CIA and related intelligence circles. That is simply a fact, without which one cannot understand the *Washington Post* to this day.


Exemplary of the character of the *Post*, is the policy announced on its editorial pages in 1976 toward Lyndon LaRouche and his associates. “We of the press should be chary about offering them print or air time. There is no reason to be delicate about it.” Don’t cover LaRouche, unless you present him as a violence-prone fascist, was the line which went out, and has been followed by the *Post* and its camp-followers in the media to the present day.

Wisner’s Wurlitzer

Deborah Davis’ book provides much essential background on the *Post*’s intelligence ties, and role as a propaganda mouthpiece, which is not found, in as an elaborated of form, in any other published source.

Starting in the late ’40s, Phil and Katharine Graham ran a salon in their Georgetown home frequented by top CIA officials such as Frank Wisner, Richard Helms, Desmond Fitzgerald, and Allen Dulles. Of these, Frank Wisner, the head of CIA covert operations, and his wife, were the closest to the Grahams.

“It was widely known that Phil Graham was somebody you could get help from,” said a former deputy director of the



Allen Dulles, Wall Street lawyer, OSS operative and later CIA Director, was part of the social circle of Phil and Katharine Graham, as well as Eugene Meyer; he personally directed much of the CIA's news media operations.

Agency. “Frank Wisner dealt with him.”

Wisner, probably Phil’s closest friend, ran “black operations,” and he described his widespread covert propaganda network as “mighty Wurlitzer”—an instrument which he built and played.

At the Graham salon Sunday gatherings, Wisner would discuss with Phil Graham which journalists were for sale and at what price; how to handle them, what stories to place, and so on, according to a former CIA officer interviewed by author Davis. “You could get a journalist cheaper than a good call girl,” the former Agency officer said, “for a couple of hundred dollars a month.”

Graham helped Wisner to create Operation MOCKINGBIRD, a CIA program to manipulate and control friendly journalists; this was conceived of as a counter to the pro-Communist journalist groups. This was first comprehensively described in a 1977 article “The CIA and the Media,” by Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame, who had left the *Post* by that time.

Bernstein’s piece was in part intended to expose, what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the “Church Committee”) had covered up. Bernstein reported that CIA contacts with the heads of news media organizations were handled directly by Allen Dulles and other top officials, such as Frank Wisner, Cord Meyer, Jr., Richard Bissell, Desmond Fitzgerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Karamessines, and Richard Helms. (All of these were in the circle of friends and associates of the Grahams.)

Bernstein’s description of how this worked, is important

to note, to dispense with Romantic “cloak and dagger” notions of such things, popularized, for example, by the *Post*’s Bob Woodward.

“Within the CIA,” Bernstein writes, “journalists were accorded elite status, a consequence of the common experience journalists shared with high-level CIA officials. Many had gone to the same schools as their CIA handlers, moved in the same circles, shared fashionably liberal, anti-Communist political values, and were part of the same ‘old boy’ network that constituted somewhat of an establishment elite in the media, politics and academia of postwar America.”

The Agency’s relationship with editors, publishers, and broadcast executives, says Bernstein, was fundamentally different than that with working reporters and stringers. The former did not need formal understandings or secrecy agreements; these relationships were usually social, “the P and Q Street axis in Georgetown,” as one source put it.

Bernstein reported, for example, that CIA files contain documents pertaining to the Agency’s relationship with Stewart and Joseph Alsop (the latter a *Post* columnist). Joseph denied that his brother was a CIA agent, telling Bernstein, “I was closer to the Agency than Stew was, though Stew was very close. I dare say he did perform some tasks—he just did the correct thing as an American. . . . The Founding Fathers [of the CIA] were close personal friend of ours. Dick Bissell was my oldest friend, from childhood. It was a social thing, my dear fellow. I never received a dollar. I never signed a secrecy agreement. I didn’t have to. . . .”

Cravath, Swaine and Moore

At this point, we should delve a bit more deeply into the institutional networks, centered on Wall Street, in which both the Graham operations, and the intelligence agencies themselves, were embedded.

Davis outlines this in *Katharine the Great*, and to her credit, notes what many writers on intelligence matters ignore: the crucial importance of the Wall Street law firms. Davis brings this up in the course of describing how Graham’s CIA friends, Wisner and Allen Dulles, as well as *Post* executives Wayne Coy³ (then chairman of the Federal Communications Commission) and John Hayes⁴, had assisted Graham in

3. Phil Graham worked for Wayne Coy, a friend of Eugene Meyer, in the Office for Emergency Management in 1940. In 1944, Meyer hired Coy as assistant to the publisher at the *Post*. In 1947, Coy left the *Post* to become chairman of the FCC. In 1949-50, Coy was instrumental in setting up Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, working closely with the CIA and State Department.

4. John S. Hayes, *Post* executive vice-president for radio-television, had worked in the OSS with CBS’s William Paley, and then headed the Armed Forces Radio Network in Europe. Later, Hayes was instrumental in convincing Paley to sell WTOP to the *Post*. In 1964-65, Hayes served on a “supersecret CIA task force” along with Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Richard Salant of CBS, the CIA’s Cord Meyer, McGeorge Bundy, Leonard Marks of the USIA,

making the *Post* the dominant news vehicle in Washington. They facilitated the *Post*'s acquisition of the rival *Times-Herald* in 1954, and the purchase of the WTOP radio and television stations from CBS's William Paley in 1949.

Allen Dulles, Davis observes, had been a director of the Hitler-financing Schroeder Bank; and through his involvement in the merchant-banking community, Dulles was well-acquainted with Lazard Frères and Eugene Meyer. From his law firm Sullivan and Cromwell, Davis reports, Dulles had become close to the key attorney for the Washington Post Co., Frederick Beebe, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore.

Beebe, Davis reports, had been recruited out of Yale by Cravath senior partner Roswell Gilpatrick, who was later to become Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War under Robert McNamara; McNamara, of course, was to become known as one of Katharine's closest friends and advisers.

"Fritz" Beebe was the chief corporate counsel, as well as personal counsel, for the Meyer family, from the 1940s until the early 1970s. He was involved in every significant transaction of the Meyer family, and the *Washington Post*, for three decades.⁵

Going beyond what Davis reports, it is obvious that Cravath Swaine and Moore, one of the oldest and most powerful Wall Street law firms, was the key institutional control point for the *Post* during this entire period. Cravath, along with Allen Dulles's Sullivan and Cromwell, largely controlled both civilian intelligence (the OSS), and military intelligence, during World War II. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War from 1941-45; then president of the World Bank; then High Commissioner for Germany; was a Cravath

and others, to explore methods of beaming American propaganda broadcasts into the People's Republic of China. Hayes said he cleared his participation in the project with Fritz Beebe, chairman of the Washington Post Company.

5. After Eugene Meyer's death in 1959, Beebe became the guardian of the Meyer-Graham family interests, and he sat on the board of every company in which the Meyer family, or the Graham family in Florida, was involved. In 1961, at Phil's request, Beebe resigned from Cravath, to become chairman of the board of the Washington Post Company.

After Phil's death in 1963, Beebe guided and trained Katharine. Beebe cautiously gave Katharine the go-ahead to publish the Pentagon Papers in 1970. A year later, Beebe advised Kay Graham that the Washington Post Co. should go public; the offering was handled by the family financial firm Lazard Frères, and it was crafted by Cravath partner George Gillespie III.

It is reported that Beebe was the only person who knew everything around Phil's affair with Robin Webb and Phil's mental illness. When Phil had a bizarre episode in Phoenix, in which he took the podium at a newspaper editors' convention and started babbling about JFK's affair with Cord Meyer's former wife (and Ben Bradlee's sister-in-law), Mary Pinchot, Beebe flew out to Arizona with Katharine to get Phil, and bring him back to Washington.

The late Fletcher Prouty, a preeminent specialist on the intelligence community and on the Kennedy killing, once suggested to *EIR* that Phil Graham's removal from the *Post* by his death should be seen in the context of the assassination of JFK three months later. Prouty pointed out that Graham was too unstable to cooperate in the coverup of the assassination which followed, a coverup in which the *Post* played a crucial role.

partner from 1924 to 1946.

Nor is it irrelevant for our purposes, to note that the chief counsel to the Church Committee, which among other things, largely suppressed its findings on the CIA's relation to the news media, was Cravath partner F.A.O. Schwartz, Jr.

Interestingly, the firm was previously known as Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood. Carl de Gersdorff was Ben Bradlee's grandfather.

And, as we will see, the man who recruited Phil Graham into his active assignment in military intelligence in World War II, was Cravath partner Alfred McCormack.

Phil Starts His Intelligence Career

After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1939, Phil went to Washington and clerked at the U.S. Supreme Court, first for Justice Stanley Reed, and then for Justice Felix Frankfurter, whom Phil knew very well from Harvard. Frankfurter was also a long-time friend of Eugene Meyer, going back to the period around World War I.

After Phil finished clerking for Frankfurter in June 1941, he went to work in the Lend-Lease Administration. He was soon transferred to the Office of Emergency Management, under Wayne Coy, working with, among others, Joseph Rauh. Phil would remain closely associated with Rauh, in the liberal anti-communist Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and elsewhere, for the rest of his life.

After Pearl Harbor, Phil applied to join the Army Air Corps, and he asked Felix Frankfurter to write a letter of recommendation for him. After basic training, Phil went to Army intelligence school in Harrisburg. One instructor there was Alfred Friendly,⁶ a long-time family friend of the Meyers, who had been hired by Eugene Meyer at the *Post* in 1939. It is likely that Eugene Meyer arranged through Friendly, for Phil to attend the intelligence school.

Another instructor at the Army Intelligence School was James Russell Wiggins, who was later to become managing editor of the *Post*.

After intelligence school, according to Katharine's autobiography *Personal History*, Phil went to OSS school, but he left after a week or so, and shortly thereafter he was recruited

6. Friendly had been hired by Eugene Meyer at the *Post* in 1939, and he listed himself as an employee of the *Post* from 1939 to 1951, although he was in government service much of that time. He served in Army Air Force intelligence (1942-45), and was posted to Britain's Code School at Bletchley Park in 1944. Friendly ran the public information campaign for the Marshall Plan under Averell Harriman, and was director of overseas information for the Economic Cooperation Administration, created by the anti-communist Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 to promote "worldwide cultural information."

It is also reported that during the 1965 U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, LBJ was furious with the *Post*'s coverage, and Friendly ordered the coverage changed to conform to the Administration and State Department line. Friendly encouraged *Washington Post* staffers to cooperate with the CIA, and he was regarded as a pipeline to the Agency; reporters who interviewed Soviet diplomats had to file a copy for Friendly to pass on to the CIA.

by Alfred McCormack⁷ of Cravath Swaine and Moore, into the Special Branch of the Army's Military Intelligence Service (MIS). McCormack was extremely selective as to his officers. In his April 1943 report on the creation of the Special Branch, McCormack said that cryptanalytic intelligence "could be done effectively only by persons with very special qualifications . . . only individuals of first-rate ability and suitable training should be taken into the work."

In the middle of 1944, Phil was transferred to the southwest Pacific, as an intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. George Kenney, commander of the Army Air Corps in the Pacific, directly under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Phil made himself the expeditor for Generals Kenney and MacArthur, and reportedly facilitated FDR's approval of MacArthur's plan to attack the Philippines and destroy the Japanese fleet — which plan was opposed by the Joint Chiefs. Phil pulled together intelligence on the Philippines and supposedly delivered it directly to FDR, who gave MacArthur the go-ahead. For his role in the Leyte and Luzon campaigns (as a non-combatant), Phil was made a commissioned officer and awarded the Legion of Merit.

Eugene Meyer had already arranged, during the war, that Phil would come back and work at the *Washington Post* after his military service. Once back at the *Post*, Phil brought in a number of men with intelligence backgrounds, including: Al Friendly and Russell Wiggins, whom he knew from the Army Intelligence School; Alan Barth from the Office of War Information; and OSS veteran John Hayes. Phil Geyelin, who was urged upon Phil by Walter Lippmann for the editorial page, and who later became editorial page editor, had worked di-

7. Alfred McCormack was a litigator at Cravath, when he was tapped by Secretary of War Henry Stimson — after Stimson had consulted with Cravath partner John J. McCloy — to investigate the handling and use of signals intelligence intercepts. McCormack's recommendations led to the creation of the Special Branch (SB) of MIS, of which McCormack, newly commissioned as a Colonel, was made deputy chief.

McCormack led a delegation to Bletchley Park in April 1943, consisting of Col. Telford Taylor of MIS, and cryptologist William Friedman; they conducted a two-month study of British signals intelligence operations.

In May 1943, McCormack's work led to the signing of the "BRUSA" agreement on signals-intelligence sharing; later updated as the 1947 "UKUSA" agreement, this provided the basis for the subsequent intimate cooperation between the United States and Britain which has continued to the present day. (See "British Key in 'Echelon' Controversy," *EIR*, April 14, 2000.)

In 1944 McCormack became Director of Intelligence for MIS. In 1945, when Truman split up OSS, and put the Research & Analysis section of OSS into the State Department, McCormack became Special Assistant to Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes, in charge of Intelligence and Research. He was tasked with developing a plan for a post-war intelligence organization, and was even under consideration to be the first director of what became the CIA. McCormack opposed the creation of an independent intelligence agency, and preferred it to be under an inter-agency committee, with the State Department in the lead. He was at odds with the military, which promoted an independent agency, and ultimately, McCormack lost out. He was later forced out of the State Department in a Senate-instigated purge of "liberals" alleged to be soft on Communism.



John J. McCloy (center) was a partner in Wall Street's Cravath, Swaine and Moore law firm, which controlled Meyer family affairs and the Washington Post Company for decades.

rectly for the CIA before going to the *Post*.

This has taken us a considerable distance beyond what Davis has in her book, but there is much more that we still haven't covered, including her detailed descriptions of what actually happened around the "Pentagon Papers" and "Watergate" episodes, as well as a new postscript on "Katharine Graham and the Years after Watergate," which brings the story more up to date.

It is here that the "liberal" Katharine Graham is quoted, when asked if she would be voting for Jimmy Carter in 1976, as responding, "Why no. Meyers have always voted Republican."

Here also, another anecdote is reported, indicating that Graham knew that the *Post's* editorial line had a role to play, but shouldn't always be taken that seriously. Shortly after President Nixon was forced out of office, largely due to the *Post's* orchestration of the Watergate scandal, Katharine told an interviewer that "very sophisticated people knew enough to disregard" the criticisms of them in her newspaper, and not to let this interfere with their friendship with her. She pointed out, for example, that Henry Kissinger had never let the *Post's* investigation of the President he allegedly served, Richard Nixon, come between himself and Katharine. Kissinger himself echoed this point in his eulogy at Katharine's funeral on July 23, praising "Kay of the permanent establishment" and Kay as "a symbol of the permanent Washington that transmutes the partisanship of the moment into national purpose. . . ."

Deborah Davis's book sheds a lot of light, on the *Post's* place in this "permanent establishment."

Katharine the Great can be ordered at a cost of \$15 plus \$2 shipping from: Deborah Davis, P.O. Box 27323, Washington, D.C. 20038-7323.