
Interview: Juan Enríquez Cabot

Oligarchic lackey sees 'too many flags'

by Scott Thompson

As the preceding article highlights, lackeys of the global oligarchy, such as Juan Enríquez Cabot, are now talking openly about how large nation-states ranging from Russia to China to the Americas are on the verge of splintering into smaller "statelets." In the Sept. 4 issue of *EIR*, Jeffrey Steinberg reported that Martin Palmer, who is the "spiritual adviser on ecology" to the British Royal Consort, HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, outlines a British Commonwealth strategy to "divide and conquer" such competing "empires" as Russia, China, and the United States.

Juan Enríquez Cabot's father was Mexican, and his mother was a member of the "Boston Brahmin" Cabot family, who were historically Tory lackeys of the British Empire. He is also a second cousin of the Boston-based Cabot Lodges, who trace their roots to this same party of treason in America. Enríquez was raised in Mexico, where he became chief executive officer of Mexico City's Urban Development Corporation; he is now at Harvard University.

According to *EIR*'s book *Dope, Inc.*, the Cabots, Lodges, and other Boston Brahmin Tories made their fortunes as lackeys of the British East India Company, through its affiliated Russell and Company, whose China clippers dealt in the opium trade during the 19th-century British Opium War against China. Another addition to their fortune was the slave trade from Africa to the U.S. southern plantation owners, whom they later urged to revolt against the Union. Thus, the Boston Brahmins have long been servants of the British effort to "divide and conquer" the United States. So, when Enríquez, as in his recent *Foreign Policy* article, "Too Many Flags?" speaks of how nation-states may fracture if present trends continue—i.e., trends such as globalization, which he supports—this is no mere academic exercise.

The following are excerpts of an interview with Juan Enríquez Cabot, which was conducted by this author on Sept. 21, 1999:

Q: An associate of mine had the opportunity to speak with Martin Palmer, who's the spiritual adviser to Prince Philip. And, Palmer said that the time had come to break apart the empires that had come into existence: Russia, China, the

United States, Indonesia, and so forth. I was wondering what your thoughts along those lines were, whether or not these are sort of super-conglomerates, that don't really hold together? . . .

Enríquez: The first premise is that three-quarters of the states that sit around the United Nations today are flags that did not exist 50 years ago. The only area of the world where that has not changed is the Americas, particularly the continental Americas. The last nation we generated here, I think, was pretty artificial, which was Panama in 1903. And, before that, you have to go back to Salvador in 1841. That's a really odd record. Hence, the question is: Given that borders in Asia, and Africa, and Europe, and the Middle East have transitioned, why haven't the borders in the Americas changed positions too? That's the question that I'm interested in. And, to answer that question, I started looking into, why are nations stable or not stable? And, there's a series of things which have changed, one of which is the sort of global market place and open borders. . . .

Q: You're talking about the process of globalization?

Enríquez: Right, and open markets. Taking two specific examples, the way that Latin America developed was on the basis of import substitution. So, what you were trying to do, is you were trying to shut the borders—shut the foreigners out of your borders—and grow your own national manufacturing structures. Now, as long as you were trying to do that, it made absolutely no sense to split your state, because you wanted a bigger market. Now, as soon as you open your borders, then the elites in the richer parts of Brazil, and Mexico, and Ecuador, and Chile, don't really care what size the national market is, because most of their market is global. . . .

And, so one of the consequences, is that all of a sudden the people who are generating most of the wealth in your country, are not focussed on the internal markets of the country, they're focussed on the external market. And, the size of the country itself matters much less. So, you start getting these odd patterns of growth, where some of the richest and fastest-growing countries in Latin America are actually small countries. You start getting Costa Rica and Uruguay developing on a par or faster than the large countries, in terms of economic growth rate.

Q: Uruguay I know has a large banking and financial services sector. It's always had ties with Europe, since as long as I can remember.

Enríquez: Yes. So, the whole point is that you don't have to be big to do well. . . .

The second thing that's changed, is that if you used to talk about racial differences—in Latin America if you talked about the differences between Mayans and Aztecs, if you talked the difference between Northern Brazilians and Southern Brazilians—you were likely to get shot. In a conti-

ment of dictators, anyone talking about ethnic differences, regional differences, religious differences, was suppressed. One of the consequences of democracy and of the continent democratizing, is that a whole series of issues that may not have been discussed for 100 years, 200 years, 500 years, are going to start being discussed.

Q: You mean since the Evangelization?

Enríquez: Sometimes since the “Great Conquest,” sometimes since independence, sometimes in the past 100 years. I mean, nations accumulate. . . . Nations do a series of things to their citizens, and citizens have a historical memory. . . .

So, anyway, there’s a series of trends that have changed in Latin America, that may make Latin America’s borders more unstable. Now, countries that wish to keep their borders together, and I’m assuming that most governments would like to keep their current borders intact, have to start treating their citizens like shareholders. . . . If you assume that borders can and do shift, then you’re in a very different world, because then your citizens start acting like shareholders and they can migrate. They can split into regional units. And, sooner or later, you may find that you are buried under a different flag from the one you were born with. And, that is quite common in Europe. It is so far very uncommon in the Americas. . . .

Q: Now, it seems from what you’ve said so far, you haven’t looked at this question as much in terms of Russia, which has already had its border on the south pushed back 1,000 miles. New states have come into being. Or China, where you have Muslim pressures, Taoist pressures, and so forth and so on. But, also, in Latin America, you have a couple of situations that come to mind. One is Chiapas; it seems to me that it might be the southern border of Mexico that is near breakaway. The other is the FARC in Colombia. Are there other examples you can think of?

Enríquez: Well, let’s take them one by one.

The Soviet Union is now back to the borders it had, or Russia is back to the borders that it had, in the 1740s. And, I suspect that they are going to continue cleaving new states until there is a clear value added to the central government. When you look at the distances in the Soviet Union, Moscow is closer to New York, than it is to Vladivostock. And, the only reason why you would want to have or should have a single country across 13 time zones, is if there is a clear value added to the whole.

Q: So, you believe that the breakaway of Dagestan, Chechnya, and so forth would sort of be the wave of the future?

Enríquez: Well, they’re symbols of what will happen unless that country is able to generate a common sense of purpose, and start delivering something—

Q: Have you thought at all in terms of Samuel Huntington’s

thesis along these lines, that the whole Muslim South might become a point of conflict with Russia?

Enríquez: It seems to me that most of that has already split away. What you’re looking at now is sort of the remaining edges of that. But, that’s not the big question. I mean, if Chechnya or Dagestan separates, that isn’t the critical issue for the Soviet Union [sic]. It’s whether the Soviet Union—Russia—splits east-west.

Q: Right. So you are talking about the potential for the Siberian region, with all its mineral riches, to break away from the rest of Russia?

Enríquez: That is really the big question. And, that may not happen along strictly Christian-Muslim structures, but it may happen along ethnic structures or it may happen along regional structures.

Part of the thesis that I’m saying is: One of the things that splits countries is definitely culture, ethnicity, and religion. But, you can get splits in states that share those things. And, those happen when the state doesn’t deliver what it promises over a long period of time. And, that seems to be the case in Russia.

It also seems to be the case in parts of China—

Q: Which parts are you thinking of?

Enríquez: Tibet. Uighur regions. There is a very substantial difference in income between people living on the southern coast, that tend to be of Cantonese speech, and those living in the north.

Q: Are you referring to the free trade zones in the south?

Enríquez: Yes. The economic growth and the ability and willingness to trade in places like Guangdong, is very different from the north and the language is different. And, China at various points in its history has been divided. And, a substantial part of China has left, which is Mongolia. It became an independent country.

Now, specifically in Latin America: You already have a de facto split in Colombia. An area the size of Switzerland has no governmental authorities in it.

Q: You’re talking about the region controlled by the FARC and the narco-traffickers?

Enríquez: Yes, which is about 40% of the national territory. And, there’s a series of other states where you could develop very significant regional differences: in northern and southern Mexico; the coast of Ecuador and the highlands of Ecuador; central Chile and southern Chile; northern Brazil and southern Brazil; the highlands of Bolivia and the lowlands of Bolivia; Venezuela as a whole. So, actually, I think there is the potential. I’m not predicting this stuff is going to happen; I’m simply saying it is not unthinkable, given current trends of governments, that several people could decide to go at it alone. . . .