

To understand the complexities of this situation, one must go back to no later than the strategic conflict between me and Vice-President George Bush, during the interval 1986-1988, especially during the period of October-November 1988,

when I issued my televised address on the prospects for the impending reunification of Germany.

In reading Scott Thompson's report, that follows, these background considerations must be borne in mind.

# An oily family: the Brzezinskis and the 'Great Game' in Transcaucasus

by Scott Thompson

In his book *The Grand Chessboard*, and in recent pieces in *Foreign Affairs*, former Carter National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has transformed geography into a religion known as "geopolitics." He has been propounding the same geopolitical doctrine as that of Britain's Halford Mackinder and Germany's Karl Haushofer, which was the figleaf for British orchestration of World Wars I and II to halt Eurasian economic integration. In his book and in his business dealings, Brzezinski is promoting the idea that there is a "zone of instability" that encompasses the Transcaucasus and Central Asia—in which his Hobbesian approach toward manipulating tribal and ethnic instabilities dating back to Lord Palmerston and the Oxford University-educated founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Afghani, might be the trigger for World War III.

Brzezinski has resurrected the "Great Game," which pitted, notably, Britain, Russia, and the declining Ottoman Empire in continual warfare against one another for control of this region. At the same time, Brzezinski and family have joined with Anglo-American oil interests for a Cecil Rhodes-style grab of the significant raw materials, including oil, natural gas, and gold, that the region offers. One of the central themes of Brzezinski's geopolitics is to deny any influence whatsoever over this former region of the Soviet Union to newly emergent Russia—no matter what the consequences are militarily.

For a more comprehensive treatment of the geopolitical lunacy of the Brzezinski doctrine outside the region of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Mad Brzezinski's Chessboard," *EIR*, April 2, 1999, and an article by this author, "A Lexicon of 'Brzezinskisms': Brzezinski Testifies Against Himself," *EIR*, April 9, 1999.

Both articles make clear that Brzezinski, who was known to some in the Carter administration as "Woody the Woodpecker," followed that school of British geopolitics identified with King Edward VII's soulmate, Halford Mackinder, which was designed to block the integration of the Eurasian landmass into an engine of scientific and technological develop-

ment. In *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski praises the geopolitics of Karl Haushofer, the Anglophile Thule Society mystic who personally conducted his idea of "*Drang nach Osten*" ("Drive to the East") into Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, where it was intended to pit Hitler's Germany as a marcher lord against the Soviet Union, in a drive for what Hitler called "*Lebensraum*" ("living space"). Once again, the geopolitical goal was to halt the unified development of the Eurasian landmass.

In *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski addresses, from the same geopolitical standpoint as that which underlay World Wars I and II, how to keep Russia from re-exerting hegemony over the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, while keeping the region destabilized and grabbing its raw materials.


## 'The Eurasian Balkans'

In *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski writes: "Russia's loss of its dominant position on the Baltic Sea was replicated on the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine's independence, but also because the newly independent Caucasian states—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—enhanced the opportunities for Turkey to reestablish its once-lost influence in the region. . . . The emergence of the independent Central Asian states meant that in some places Russia's southeastern frontier had been pushed back northward more than one thousand miles. The new states now controlled vast mineral and energy deposits that were bound to attract foreign interests. . . . Supported from the outside by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the Central Asian states have not been inclined to trade their new political sovereignty even for the sake of beneficial economic integration with Russia, as many Russians continued to hope they would. . . . For the Russians, the specter of a potential conflict with the Islamic states along Russia's entire southern flank (which, adding in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, account for more than 300 million people) has to be a source of serious concern."

According to Brzezinski, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia are, for Russia, the equivalent of the Balkan tinderbox for

FIGURE 1

**Brzezinski's view of 'The Eurasian Balkans'**



Source: *The Grand Chessboard*.

western Europe. In a chapter entitled "The Eurasian Balkans," Brzezinski discusses their volatility:

"In Europe, the word 'Balkans' conjures up images of ethnic conflicts and great-power regional rivalries. Eurasia, too, has its 'Balkans,' but the Eurasian Balkans are much larger, more populated, even more religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. They are located within that large geographic oblong that demarcates the central zone of instability . . . and that embraces portions of southeastern Europe, Central Asia and parts of South Asia, the Persian Gulf area, and the Middle East. [See **Figure 1**.]

"The Eurasian Balkans form the inner core of that oblong . . . and they differ from its outer zone in one particularly significant way: they are a power vacuum. Although most of the states located in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East are also unstable, American power is that region's ultimate arbiter. The unstable region in the outer zone is thus an area of single power hegemony and is tempered by that hegemony. In contrast, the Eurasian Balkans are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar Balkans of southeastern Europe: not only are its political entities unstable, but they tempt and invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom is deter-

mined to oppose the region's domination by another. It is this familiar combination of a power vacuum and power suction that justifies the appellation 'Eurasian Balkans.' . . .

"The Eurasian Balkans . . . are of importance from the standpoint of security and historical ambitions to at least three of their most immediate and more powerful neighbors, namely, Russia, Turkey and Iran, with China also signaling an increasing political interest in the region. But the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely more important as a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the region, in addition to important minerals, including gold."

**The race for 'black gold'**

At the time that he wrote *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski was a consultant on Caspian Sea oil matters for the oil giant Amoco. (He remained a consultant, for a fee that he will not disclose, at least until Amoco became the victim of a hostile takeover by British Petroleum last year.)

Amoco had played a major role in the formation of the Azerbaijan International Operating Co. (AIOC) consortium, set up after Heidar Aliyev took power in June 1993 after an armed insurrection had ousted the country's elected President, Abulfaz Elchibey. Aliyev was a 70-year-old former KGB chief who had served on the Soviet Politburo during the Leonid Brezhnev regime.

Starting on Oct. 4, 1998, the *Washington Post* began a three-part series entitled "Pipe Dreams—The Struggle for Caspian Oil." The first article, by Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway, "Azerbaijan's Riches Alter the Chessboard," discusses Brzezinski's and Amoco's role in Azerbaijan. According to the *Post*, despite initial suspicions that Moscow was behind the Aliyev coup, Western oil companies soon learned that Aliyev was the leader they had been waiting for.

Aliyev himself directed his minions to pursue a deal with Amoco's office in Houston, the heart of the U.S. oil industry, and he put in his son, Ilham Aliyev, as vice president of Azerbaijan's state oil company.

On Sept. 20, 1994, Aliyev and oil company executives gathered in Baku for the signing of what the Azerbaijani President called "the deal of a century." The AIOC consortium

agreed to spend \$7.4 billion to develop three major oil fields: Azeri, Chirag, and an adjacent patch, Guneshli. The avowed goal was to produce 800,000 to 1 million barrels a day by 2010.

Amoco (now British Petroleum) had been a major partner in the AIOC with McDermott, Unocal, and Pennzoil, which collectively held more than 40% of AIOC, by far the largest bloc. Exxon Corp. joined the consortium a year later. And, even before its takeover of Amoco, British Petroleum held a 17% share, through a deal apparently brokered by former British Prime Minister Lady Margaret Thatcher. The rest was divided up among the Azeri oil company and a variety of smaller foreign concessions, including a 10% share owned by the private Russian oil company, Lukoil.

By early 1995, the U.S. oil companies operating in Azerbaijan had set up a Foreign Oil Companies group, based in Washington. It met with National Security Council energy expert Sheila Heslin, and later with an interagency committee headed by her boss, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. These meetings had to do with what routes pipelines and ships would take to get the oil out of Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea basin. Although a Russian pipeline could be cheaply upgraded and expanded, allowing oil to be pumped out of Azerbaijan, such an arrangement would allow Russia in on the AIOC commercial dealings to an extent that Brzezinski and some people in the Clinton administration did not want.

Again, according to the *Washington Post*, Berger met with the AIOC companies twice in 1995, and he worked to convince Terry Adams, a BP executive who served as AIOC president, of the need for a new \$250 million pipeline that would export oil west, from Baku, to Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa, free of Russian control. BP favored the cheaper solution, of spending \$50 million to fix the pipeline through Russia. In September 1995, the AIOC agreed to use both the Russian line and to construct the new U.S.-backed western route.

Soon after the AIOC decision, then-National Security Adviser Anthony Lake privately asked Brzezinski to carry a letter from President Clinton to Aliyev. The letter stressed the U.S. preference for two pipelines, and, as an incentive, offered Washington's help in resolving Azerbaijan's dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Brzezinski, who became a consultant with Amoco on Caspian Sea oil shortly after this mission, said that at the time he was motivated by anxiety over Russian intentions in the Transcaucasus. Brzezinski carried the letter suggesting the two routes to Aliyev, and he spent the next several days in protracted talks. The Russians, Brzezinski learned, had demanded that all Azerbaijani oil go through Russia, and that Russian troops be based in Azerbaijan.

In October 1995, President Clinton, who had been won over to the perspective by Amoco's head of Eurasian operations, T. Don Stacy, called Aliyev to lobby for the double-

route plan; Aliyev gave his approval a week later. (According to the *Post*, President Clinton promised Aliyev that he would seek to lift the Section 907 sanctions that the U.S. Congress had imposed against Azerbaijan because of its war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, at the instigation of the Armenian-American lobby.) By early 1996, the Russians folded their hand, concluding that control over one of two pipelines was better than none at all.

In *The Grand Chessboard*, Brzezinski is quite clear about his reasons for trying to keep Russia out of Azerbaijan oil and gas development:

"In the Caucasus, Armenia's less than 4 million people and Azerbaijan's more than 8 million promptly became embroiled in open warfare over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a largely Armenian-populated enclave within Azerbaijan. The conflict generated large-scale ethnic cleansings, with hundreds of thousands of refugees and expellees fleeing in both directions. Given the fact that Armenia is Christian and Azerbaijan Muslim, the war had some overtones of religious conflict. The economically devastating war made it much more difficult for either country to establish itself as stably independent. Armenia was driven to rely more on Russia, which provided significant military help, while Azerbaijan's new independence and internal stability were compromised by the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.

"Azerbaijan's vulnerability has wider regional implications because the country's location makes it a geopolitical pivot. It can be described as the vitally important 'cork' controlling access to the 'bottle' that contains the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. An independent, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, with pipelines running from it to the ethnically related and politically supportive Turkey, would prevent Russia from exercising a monopoly on access to the region and would thus also deprive Russia of decisive political leverage over the politics of the new Central Asian states. Yet Azerbaijan is very vulnerable to pressures from powerful Russia to the north and from Iran to the south. There are twice as many Azeris—some estimate as many as 20 million—living in northwestern Iran as in Azerbaijan proper. That reality makes Iran fearful of potential separatism among its Azeris and hence quite ambivalent regarding Azerbaijan's sovereign status, despite the two nations' shared Muslim faith. As a result, Azerbaijan has become the object of combined Russian and Iranian pressures to restrict its dealing with the West."

Although Amoco (with Brzezinski as its consultant) had emerged as the number-one foreign institution in Azerbaijan, working out of a converted mansion in the old section of Baku, once Amoco was taken over by British Petroleum, the British emerged openly as the preeminent power there, just as they had been in September 1992 when BP sent Lady Thatcher with two checks totalling \$30 million, as a down payment on the proven field called Chirag, and for an unproven one known as Shak-Deniz.

## Bush family and Al Gore's ties to the pipeline wars

In January 1999, the London-based firm Enron International, a subsidiary of Enron Corp. in Houston, Texas that has \$13.5 billion in assets, undertook a feasibility study for the Turkmenistan government on the proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. In July, Turkmenistan awarded Enron International a Trans-Caspian feasibility study, and in the same month it awarded Enron a feasibility study for the Georgian section of the Trans-Caspian pipeline.

Enron boasts of its ties to Prince Charles, who is heir apparent to the British throne. In March 1999, Enron contributed £300,000 to the Prince of Wales Trust, European Program, and its total funding of the Prince of Wales Trust since it was inaugurated in 1991 approaches £1 million.

However, Enron has been aided in its search for new business by its connections to President Sir George Bush.

After Bush's electoral defeat in 1992, Enron brought former Bush administration officials onto its board, to assist the company's international grab for gas and electricity resources. These included former Secretary of State James Baker III, and former Bush-Quayle campaign chairman Robert Mosbacher, both tightly connected to Texas energy and banking. During 1991-93, Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly (ret.), who had served as director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Bush's Persian Gulf War, was on Enron's board.

These three men, according to journalist Seymour

Hersh, accompanied Sir George Bush on a trip to Kuwait in 1993, to help Enron secure a contract to rebuild energy plants that had been destroyed in the Gulf War. Not a bad "spoil of war," as Hersh describes it.

### Gore and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline

Vice President Al Gore, Jr. has also gotten involved in the pipeline wars, through his role as U.S. head of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Joint Commission, which he co-chairs with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This is one of five binational commissions to which President Bill Clinton appointed Gore. Perhaps the foremost emphasis of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Joint Commission has been energy resources, which Kazakhstan has in abundance.

The inaugural session of the Joint Commission occurred in the capital, Almaty, in November 1994. Whereas President Nazarbayev has no political bias against where a multiplicity of pipelines would go—including potentially to Russia, China, and Iran—Gore has apparently tried to armtwist the Kazakhstan President into accepting a route that would bypass Russia and Iran, which is known as the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This pipeline, which would be laid under the Caspian Sea, as would Enron's proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, would cost \$4 billion and add an additional \$4 per barrel for oil shipped through it.

The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is also a pet project of Commerce Department counselor and administration ombudsman for energy and commercial cooperation in the Newly Independent States Jan Kalicki, who is Gore's chief adviser on this matter, along with Gore's National Security Adviser Leon Fuerth. In the May 17, 1999 edition of *Oil & Gas Journal*, Kalicki pushes for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the principal one to be built.—*Scott Thompson*

This British takeover did not upset Brzezinski in the least. This British asset, the "Tweedledee" to Sir Henry Kissinger's "Tweedledum," goes to great lengths in *The Grand Chessboard* to protect ongoing British manipulations, by portraying the British empire as a "retired geostrategic player." "It [the British Commonwealth Empire] is America's key supporter, a very loyal ally, a vital military base, and a close partner in critically important intelligence activities," he writes.

### All in the family

On May 18, 1998, Brzezinski's son, Mark, wrote an article for the *Washington Times*, entitled "The Future of Azerbaijan," in which he makes a plea for the repeal of Section 907. Mark Brzezinski works for the law firm of Hogan & Hartson, which, he states, has major dealings (which he says he cannot reveal because of attorney-client privilege) in the Caspian Sea oil and gas basin. In his article, he contrasts the \$600 million

in foreign aid that the United States gives to the 4 million Armenians, to the \$100 million in foreign aid it gives to the 8 million people in Azerbaijan, while it is Azerbaijan that possesses the oil and gas riches to be tapped.

Mark Brzezinski writes, "Despite Section 907, the Azeri President, Heidar Aliyev, is pro-American, mainly because he is counting on the U.S. to protect him from pressures from powerful Russia to the north and from Iran to the south to restrict Azerbaijan's dealings with the West. Russian control of Azerbaijan would enable it to seal off Central Asia from the West, in particular from Turkey, thereby further increasing Russia's control over the oil-rich Central Asian states. Russian control of Azerbaijan would also guarantee Russian predominance of other states of the Caucasus, especially Armenia and Georgia."

He concludes: "Azerbaijan's location makes it a vitally important transportation corridor controlling access to the

riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. A strong and autonomous Azerbaijan, with pipelines running from it to Turkey, would guarantee Western access to the region and would deprive Russia and Iran of decisive political leverage over the policies of the new Central Asian states. Because of this and its highly pro-American foreign policy, Azerbaijan is one of the states deserving America's support. A first good step would be to repeal Section 907, and President Clinton should have the political courage and strategic vision to request such a repeal."

In a conversation with this author in July, Mark Brzezinski said that Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) had an amendment in the Silk Road Act that would have revoked Section 907, but it failed to pass. The amendment would have provided both "aid for a humanitarian disaster, plus infrastructure for oil and gas, particularly transportation."

Asked whether, like his father, he favored the Chinese becoming involved in Caspian Sea basin oil and gas exploitation, as a further buffer against Russia, Mark Brzezinski indicated that he approved of such a development so long as it was for this purpose:

"China has become a major investor in energy development [in the Silk Road region of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia] through its purchase of major exploration rights in several fields in Kazakstan. And, the idea now is to build a

pipeline to eastern China which would be a major 2,600 mile-plus pipeline, which would be just astronomical. But, the Chinese are serious about that. The Kazakstan Foreign Minister was in China last week talking with the Chinese President about this, and they appear to be still seriously discussing it. Now, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakstan, will be going to China in October. . . .

"Any development that can give a multiplicity of selling points for Central Asian energy and oil is a good thing, because at this point the only access is to Russia. And, Russia has shown itself not really to be a reliable partner in this regard. In other words, it will take and transport Central Asian gas and oil, but it won't give market value for that gas and oil, and these countries need more hard capital than that. Russia has been not exactly cooperative in transporting oil and gas from Baku to Novorossiysk."

The view that China could be allowed, according to the the British-Commonwealth-American financial oligarchy's view, to become a major power in Eurasia, so long as it follows Anglo-American rules, but not a global power, is congruent with the view put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski in *The Grand Chessboard*:


"A geostrategic issue of crucial importance is posed by China's emergence as a major power. The most appealing outcome would be to co-opt a democratising and free-marketing China into a larger Asian framework of cooperation. . . . Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an 'anti-hegemonic coalition' united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower. Averting this contingency, however remote it may be, will require a display of U.S. geostrategic skill on the western, eastern and southern perimeters of Eurasia simultaneously."

Interestingly, Zbigniew Brzezinski's nephew, Matthew Brzezinski, until recently a staff writer with the *Wall Street Journal*, wrote paeans about British-style, liberal free market reformers such as Anatoli Chubais, and about oil development in the former Soviet Union. He wrote about the privatization of the Russian oil and gas industry, as well as the potential alliances of privatized firms, such as Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky's Sibneft, to form one of the world's largest oil companies, AO Yuksi, an oil company with audited reserves larger than both Exxon and the Royal Dutch Shell Group [combined]. He also monitored efforts by such British-centered firms as British Petroleum and Royal Dutch/Shell, and the French firm Elf Aquitaine, to buy up Russian oil and gas assets on the cheap. And, he wrote frequently about Lukoil, which is the sole Russian partner with the British Petroleum-dominated AIOC in Azerbaijan.

Clearly, the Brzezinskis have found the oil to lubricate their geopolitical lunacy, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

## Treason in America

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
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FIGURE 12

The contesting oil and gas pipelines



Key to Figure 12

Conflicting schemes of oil and gas development of the Caucasus and Central Asia have been astutely used by the British to manipulate and enflame ethnic conflict. The basic thrust of British geopolitical strategy, is to ensure that both Russia and Iran be deprived of influence over oil and gas pipeline projects.

**Line 1** is an existing oil pipeline from the Baku Caspian oil fields, and the Tengiz fields in Kazakstan to Novorossiysk. A proposal is being studied by the Caspian Oil Consortium, which is developing the Tengiz, for possible construction of a \$2 billion 1,500 kilometer parallel new pipeline from Tengiz to Tihoretsk to Novorossiysk. The 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya, through which the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline runs, made this route impracticable. What was considered an alternative route, from Baku through Dagestan, has been jeopardized by the ongoing Dagestani insurrection.

**Line 2** is a pipeline running through Azerbaijan and Georgia, to the port city of Supsa. In April of this year, the first oil began flowing through the reworked Baku-Supsa pipeline, with Azerbaijan International Operating Co. (AIOC) reporting a flow of 115,000 barrels per day. The Supsa line was opened by SOCAR, the Azeri state oil company run by Aliyev's son, and AIOC, after the Grozny route had been sabotaged by warfare.

**Lines 3 and 4** are two proposed pipelines pumping Baku oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, viewed as alternatives to the existing line through Russia. Turkey wants a pipeline, which will cost \$3-4 billion, from Baku via Georgia to the Black Sea and then via a pipeline under the Black Sea to Turkey (not shown on the map), and across Turkey to Ceyhan. The Aliyev government in Azerbaijan also favors this route, because it outflanks Russia.

**Line 5** is a pipeline to pump natural gas from the Tengiz field in Kazakstan to Japan, via China. Another possible pipeline would go from Kazakstan's Uzen oil field on the east coast of the Caspian Sea, its second-largest field after Tengiz, believed to hold reserves comparable to the North Sea's largest field, Brent, of some 200 million tons. In August 1997, the Kazak government signed an exclusive contract with the China National Petroleum Corp. to develop the field. At the same time, China's CNPC signed a preliminary agreement to build a 1,300 mile pipeline to carry the Kazak oil to China across the formidable Tianshan mountain range, and through the Xinjiang province. This is where the Uighur insurgency would threaten the pipeline.

**Line 6** is a proposed pipeline which would pump natural gas from Turkmenistan via Central Asia and Xinjiang province. It is vulnerable to the same insurgencies.

**Lines 7 and 8** would pump natural gas from Turkmenistan