

# Soros sets off 'coca revolt' in Bolivia

*The "native" coca-growers, fronting for George Soros's drug legalization mob, have declared war on the nation. Gretchen Small reports.*

An armed revolt has begun in the Chapare, the center of the drug trade in Bolivia. Led by the Andean Council of Coca Leaf Producers and its chief honcho, Evo Morales, the coca growers, or *cocaleros*, adopted the slogan, "Coca or Death," and vow they will wage war to stop the Banzer government from succeeding in its plan to drive the drug trade out of Bolivia within the next five years.

Morales, recently elected to Bolivia's Congress, declared President Hugo Banzer's anti-drug plan to be "illegal" and an act of "Hitlerian genocide." Since Morales's shock troops began organizing mass confrontations against government coca eradication operations in early April, more than ten people are reported to have died. At one point, the *cocaleros* shut down the highway which links the city of Cochabamba, the largest near the Chapare, with the capital, La Paz. They have threatened to assault military units and oil fields, and Morales announced, from the floor of the Congress itself, that he intends to help the *cocaleros* acquire modern weaponry, so they can fight "man for man, iron for iron" to defend "their" coca.

This is no spontaneous revolt, but a project carefully prepared over years. In 1996, Morales announced his intention to carve out a separate narco-state, declaring that the "Chapare will be a new version of the Mexican state of Chiapas, in the heart of South America." Now, his *cocalero* forces have made it an unconditional demand that the government pull the military out of Chapare entirely, an act which would hand the area over to the only other contending power there: the drug mob.

Bolivia's government has warned that what is at stake here, is the integrity of the national territory itself. "We must make very clear that this is one single country. There are no 'republicquettes,' or no-man's-lands. The government will not retreat in the face of threats which only are blackmail to violate the law," Government Minister Guido Nayar stated on May 2.

## London's Opium War in the Andes

International support for the uprising is well under way. Morales waved around in Parliament the fact that two dozen Swiss parliamentarians sent President Banzer a letter of "concern" over military and police intervention in the Chapare, as

evidence of the foreign pressure which he will mobilize against the government.

He also called a war council of the Andean Council of Coca Leaf Producers (CAPHC), held in Puno, Peru over the weekend of May 9-10, to coordinate actions in the Council's three major theaters of war: Bolivia, where the CAPHC uprising is supported by the Free Bolivia Movement party, which is a steering committee member of the Cuban intelligence-run continental terrorist apparatus, the São Paulo Forum; Peru, where CAPHC members overlap the old MRTA/Shining Path control networks; and Colombia, where CAPHC's ties are to the São Paulo Forum's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) itself. Morales himself, as *EIR* has documented, is an active member of the São Paulo Forum, serving as its public spokesman for drug legalization under the guise of "anti-imperialism."

The Puno meeting also began preparing a new theater of action: Representatives of Ecuadoran "peasants" attended as "special guests."

How was Morales able to mobilize so many Swiss parliamentarians to his cause so quickly? Why is he so confident of foreign support? Here lies the key to the actual strategic danger which the Chapare operation entails. The controllers of this war are not "American Indian natives," but work for London's Dope, Inc. itself. London has opened a new flank in its Opium War against the Americas, with the goal of destroying the Andean countries—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile—as a platform from which to launch a final assault on the United States itself.

Four years ago, a bunch of European-based drug legalizers working in the global legalization project whose chief financier is George Soros, set up a project called "Coca 95," as the cover under which an extensive international support structure was constructed to defend the Andean-wide coca revolt. The people running "Coca 95" are fanatical drug advocates, who wish to reestablish free trade in every narcotic on the face of the earth: cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetics—those invented, and those yet to be devised.

Even as Morales spoke of creating a new Chiapas in the heart of South America, Soros's European-based team bragged that they intend to line up the European Union with

the *cocaleros*, expressly as a geopolitical flank against the United States, through which to finally break the United States's refusal to accept London's global drug legalization plans. In August 1996, the Coca 95 newsletter, *Cocanews*, ran an editorial urging that "if Europe really wants to present an alternative to U.S. policy, it will have to summon up its courage . . . to confront U.S. economic and geopolitical interests in the region." In the same issue, CAPHC adviser Alex Contreras Baspineiro proposed that "the European Union . . . become a significant counterweight to the U.S. position, which is centered above all on the aspect of national security."

"Will the coca fields of the Chapare thus become battlefields between the EU and the U.S.A.?" he asked.

### 'With Dignity!'

Coca leaf, the raw material from which cocaine is extracted, is grown primarily in three countries of the Andes: Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. For two decades, Bolivia was the second-largest producer after Peru, but both countries have now been surpassed by Colombia. One of Dope, Inc.'s problems is that in the past five years, the Fujimori government has reduced coca cultivation in Peru by more than 40%, and the Bolivian President who took office in August 1997, Gen. Hugo Banzer (ret.), has committed Bolivia to total eradication during his five-year term.

When Dope, Inc. first established its base in Bolivia in the 1970s, the country's role was largely to simply grow coca. By 1997, the drug trade had invaded every aspect of national life, and posed, as the new government recognized, "a serious threat to national security, the health of society, and social peace." In January 1998, the Banzer government issued a 90-page report, in Spanish and English, titled *With Dignity!*, which outlines the government's strategy "to liberate the country from the drug traffic circuit within the next five years." The premise of the strategy is, simply, that either the drug trade is driven out of Bolivia, or Bolivia will not survive as a nation. And, in order to save itself, Bolivia needs the aid of the international community.

*With Dignity!* states: "The phenomenon of drug trafficking in Bolivia has reached a critical point: Either it is destroyed immediately, and once and for all, or Bolivian society will have to live with it forever, with all the internal and external connotations that that implies. . . . The government is aware that such a challenge is extremely complex and difficult to attain, but it is also aware that not taking this responsibility would mean failing future generations. The fight against this scourge should be a definite and frontal fight. Efforts that go halfway will not lead to positive outcomes," but, rather, "will divide Bolivian society, and such a rupture could lead to fatal consequences for Bolivia of the 21st century."

According to their (probably conservative) estimates, some 80,000 people are today involved in the coca economy

FIGURE 1  
Bolivia's coca-growing regions



in Bolivia, 57,000 directly and 23,000 as adjuncts. Ninety-five percent of the coca grown in the primary growing region, the Chapare, goes to the production of cocaine. No longer are the coca producers merely growers: The majority are now also involved in the refining and trade of coca paste (the intermediate product from which cocaine is then extracted). The national parks have become new centers of cultivation; cocaine laboratories are being established in Bolivian cities; drug use by Bolivians, especially the young, is increasing; and drug money is corrupting "major and minor institutions, from sports associations to all branches of the state," the financial system, and the judiciary.

The government argued that, to reverse this, the population must be mobilized, and a unified state policy adopted, which attacks drugs on all fronts: eradication of coca, and the provision of alternative development; interdiction, with a special focus on seizing the precursor chemicals without which cocaine cannot be produced; prevention and rehabilitation; passing laws against money-laundering, and the establishment of anti-drug courts, so that the ground gained in interdiction is not lost in the justice system.

With tens of thousands of families now involved in the drug trade, the war cannot be won without developing the country. The government designated the coca-growing areas, and so-called "expelling zones" (areas from which impoverished people migrate, in search of employment), as target

areas where basic services—energy, potable water, sanitation, health care, education—must be provided, and technical aid for irrigation systems and agro-industry made available. Among the goals set for these five years: building 3,000 kilometers of roads, laying 500 kilometers of electricity lines, providing 100% of the population with basic services. Overall, a modest program, relative to Bolivia's tremendous agricultural and industrial potential, and one which, the government estimates, will require \$190 million a year in foreign financial aid.

### Jeffrey Sachs's shock troops

One of the key individuals personally responsible for driving Bolivia so completely into the hands of Dope, Inc., is Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, the man whom George Soros would later hire to advise the governments of Poland, then Russia and other eastern European countries, to similar destructive effects.

Sachs directed the economic program implemented by the Paz Estenssoro government (1985-89), working through then-Planning Minister Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Sachs's program guaranteed debt payments by shutting down the national economy, most particularly, the state mining company, Comibol, to the benefit of the drug trade. In his 1988 study, *Bolivia: 1952-1986*, Sachs admitted that he knew exactly what he was doing: "To preserve fiscal balance, the government had to launch a brutal battle to reduce payrolls in Comibol. . . . Comibol has reduced its employment from about 30,000 workers in 1985, to just 7,000, as of 1987. Many of these workers are still unemployed, or only marginally employed, or have gone to the coca-growing region to find work. The mining towns themselves have been decimated" (emphasis added).

Some say 50,000 miners lost their jobs under the Sachs team, and that 30,000 of them migrated, primarily the Chapare, to become coca-growers.

The decimation of the economy reshaped the institutions of Bolivia, and directly created today's Chapare crisis. It was in 1988, that Morales first came to prominence as a *cocalero* leader in the Chapare. Historically, mining unions had formed the backbone of the Bolivian Labor Council (COB), but today, the former miners make up the majority of the *cocaleros*, and it is the *cocaleros* who politically dominate the COB.

In a 1997 analysis of insurrectionary potentials in Ibero-America, São Paulo Forum strategist James Petras identified this dramatic restructuring of Bolivia's labor movement as critical for the Forum's overall strategy. The "miners turned peasants" hitched their organizational skills to Evo Morales's indigenist agenda (land, cultural autonomy, and "traditional spiritual values"), to create a force in the heart of South America, which is united under the standard, "coca-growers versus the Empire." Their ultimate enemy is "the U.S. empire," with its anti-drug military and police aid, wrote Petras.

(Petras, based in the sociology department of the State University of New York at Binghamton, is a self-described "professional international agitator," regularly featured at Forum events.)

The miners brought more than "organizational skills" to the *cocaleros*: As Soros's Human Rights Watch/Americas admitted in a May 1996 report on the Chapare, the former miners are also experts in handling explosives.

### The arguments of the user . . .

Morales, for all his posturing as the leader of the poor peasants of Bolivia, proves to be but a front for an operation bought and paid for by the Queen of England's favorite speculator, mega-billionaire George Soros.

In June 1994, representatives from 15 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of 11 European countries met in Brussels, to establish a project called "Coca 95." Its goal, they claimed, was to stop global eradication programs against coca, and remove coca from the 1961 United Nations Single Convention's list of proscribed drugs, on the grounds that coca is allegedly a "traditional" product, central to "the Andean worldview," which contains "medicinal" properties. The Coca 95 project was financed in part by the European Commission.

The project still continues, now called "Coca 97/98," and it is run out of the Antwerp, Belgium headquarters of the European NGO Council on Drugs and Development (ENCOD). The NGO hydra which forms the project is detailed in the accompanying article and flow chart.

The Coca 90s project's express purpose is a fraud. Coca 95 was simply a new flank in the international drive to legalize the drug trade, designed, like the campaign to legalize "medical marijuana" and a hemp industry, to break the back of public resistance to drug legalization. And it is run by the same Soros crowd which runs those campaigns.

The chief "intellectual" strategist of Coca 90s is British anthropologist Anthony Henman. Henman, a founding member of the Soros-financed Drug Policy Foundation's International Anti-Prohibitionist League, consultant on drugs to the World Health Organization and the European Parliament, was paid by the French government and the European Commission to carry out "an investigative project" on cocaine in Europe in 1996.

Henman coordinates his coca/cocaine legalization project closely with Ethan Nadelmann, the chief honcho at Soros's personal dope center, the Lindesmith Center at the New York headquarters of Soros's Open Society Institute. Henman and Nadelmann both worked on the project, because as Nadelmann told this author in 1996, "it takes some savvy" to get through coca reform.

The Coca 90s team are fervent supporters of legalizing any drug around. In one of the project's early newsletters, CAPHC member Bartolomé Cáceres polemicized that coca

supporters must also support investigations into the benefits of opium poppy and cannabis, which have also been wrongfully “condemned and proscribed.” ENCOD’s October 1997 newsletter, for example, was ecstatic over the defeat of a Swiss referendum which sought to shut down a government heroin distribution program. The Swiss heroin program, the coca team wrote, had proved that “the providing of good quality heroin, in well-measured doses, made the [addict’s] physical health improve, because, as the project has shown, heroin can be consumed for long periods without causing health problems.” The time has come, they wrote, “to take steps towards the controlled legalization of drugs, which should also include mechanisms to regularize the obtaining of raw materials from the developing countries.” A January 1998 newsletter urged members to ensure that once “the universal right to production and consumption of all drugs” is recognized, then “the benefits of the traffic are distributed” fairly.

There is something perversely humorous about these coca “professionals.” One study on the “benefits” of coca promoted by the Coca 90s project, written by CAPHC member Rosa Urrunaga, claimed that coca is the Andes’ second greatest gift to the world after the potato, because, included in its long list of beneficial properties, it is an aphrodisiac, a hallucinogen, an “anti-stress” medicine, a narcotic, a psychedelic, and a great placebo for hypochondriacs!

The most lunatic of all is Henman, who insists that coca advocates drop the line that there is a distinction between coca and cocaine, and admit that coca and cocaine come from the same family, “and that their effects are distinguished not by class, but by intensity.” Traditional coca-leaf chewing in the Andes just shows that there are ways of absorbing small doses of cocaine that are “positively beneficial to the human organism.”

In *Drug Policy 1989-1990: A Reformer’s Catalogue*, published by the Soros-funded Drug Policy Foundation in 1989, Henman argued that there can be no “moral discrimination” over what form of cocaine is ingested, whether through chewing coca leaves, or ingesting coca paste or cocaine; individual users should simply decide what is the best means for rational use of these products, he wrote, citing his experience that coca paste as a daily stimulant is a disaster, but used as a complement to drinking binges, seems to work just fine.

“Put another way,” he wrote, “the prevention of drug problems in any society—whether traditional or modern—must of necessity go the route of proposing the ‘right’ way to use a drug, rather than attempting the futile task of scaring people away from using drugs at all. Within such a perspective, there is undoubted space for formulations which stress the relative advantages and disadvantages of different preparations of a given drug, or of different routes of ingestion. These are not moral arguments, however, nor even properly medical arguments. They are the arguments of maximal plea-

surable effect, or of minimal physical harm and psychic distress. They are, in short, the arguments of the user.”

### Where the dopers meet the ‘cocaleros’

The primary function of the Coca 90s project, however, has been to provide a cover for building up the CAPHC insurgency in the Andes, including logistics, financing, and political support. The newsletters of the Coca 90s project defend the FARC uprisings in Colombia, protest that the 1995 arrest of the Cali Cartel chiefs was really a “silent coup d’état by the U.S. against the Colombian state,” and even put in a good word for Peru’s (defeated) Shining Path terrorists, insisting that Shining Path has “radically modified” its policies, and is now “less authoritarian” toward the peasantry.

Since 1995, Coca 90s has financed at least six European tours for CAPHC leaders, where the *cocalero* crew arranged financing and political support, established networks, and put into place an international operation to crush any government which attempts to eradicate their business, the dope trade. Touring eight European countries in 1995, Evo Morales was built up into an “international name,” the best-known Bolivian “poor peasant” leader. (A Netherlands-based dope group, the Institute for Resource-Sharing on Drugs and Human Rights, even nominated Morales for a Nobel Peace Prize, for his “drug pacifism.”) In 1997, Morales turned to the Coca 90s project for help in financing an August 1997 meeting of the CAPHC in La Paz, ENCOD reports.

CAPHC and its backers told European governments that any aid to the Bolivian government would simply be used for repression, demanded help against the violation of their “human right” to grow coca, and demanded that the Europeans, unlike the United States, provide aid for the “peasants,” even if they did not eradicate coca.

Now, the showdown has begun. On April 1, the Banzer government implemented a critical measure of *With Dignity*’s eradication program: phasing out, over the course of 1998, the policy of directly paying *cocaleros* per hectare of coca eradicated. The policy had made coca-growing a doubly lucrative business, in which, according to the government, most of the \$85 million paid out over the years to over 34,500 *cocaleros* for eradication, was used simply to plant new coca bushes. Thus, no net reduction in the area under cultivation ever resulted. The Banzer government, therefore, ordered a three-stage phase-out of the system of individual compensation, and its replacement by one of community compensation, in which the amount subtracted from individual payments is invested in the development of the communities where the *cocaleros* live.

When that program began on April 1, the two flanks of the *cocalero* operation went into action: insurgency in the Chapare, and the mobilization of the foreign network, to cut off aid to the government, so that it will not have the resources to carry out its strategy.