

responders who worked the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings.

Latham stressed that the very overseas operations which currently engage the military increase the likelihood of terrorist responses against U.S. domestic targets. He used the example of the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, in response to the bombing of a disco in Berlin. Three days later, Libya purchased a U.S. hostage and executed him. In September 1987, less than a year later, Pan Am 73 was hijacked by a group working through Libya, and several Americans were killed. In April 1988, a group working for Libya bombed a USO in Naples. Then several people were arrested with pipe bombs in New Jersey, followed by the bombing of Pan Am 103 in December 1988 and a French airliner over Chad in 1989. Then we interdicted a Chicago street gang which had been approached to use shoulder-fired missiles to shoot down an airliner at O'Hare Airport. These were not isolated incidents, but a campaign.

Presently this is not seen as a DOD mission, and agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which should be in the forefront of developing such a defense, still see their mission as protection of U.S. forces in foreign offensive combat. One way to begin the necessary process of change would be for Congress to ask the Secretary of Defense to direct the National Defense University to conduct a study of the strategic, operational, and technical issues, in conjunction with relevant governmental agencies, academia, and industry.

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## Documentation

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# The recommendations of the Defense Science Board

*The following are excerpts from the keynote speech to the conference by Donald Latham, a member of the Defense Science Board.*

What I'd like to do this evening, is to give you a very short summary of the Defense Science Board's summer study that was just completed. It's called the 1997 Summer Study. The Defense Science Board is a board of 30 people that reports to the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. From academia, Josh Lederberg is on the Board. Some are from industry, like myself, and there are a few retired military officers. We do usually one major study a year, called the Summer Study. It starts in February and ends up in September.

The study report is on DOD's capabilities and response to so-called transnational threats. There was a very heavy

emphasis in the study on what to do about chemical, biological, and nuclear threats and their potential use against civil infrastructure, as well as military infrastructure. The report on this, the first volume, will be out, all unclassified, believe it or not, in about two weeks, and the second volume has to do with force protection, both CONUS [continental United States] and OCONUS [outside the continental U.S.], and then there's Volume 3, appendices that have detailed panel reports. . . .

I chaired a panel called DOD Capabilities and Response, which was the guts of the study and what we can do as heads of departments. We addressed both force and civil protection and the interfaces. We did not try to do a government-wide study. Obviously, this effort involves everybody that's anybody: FEMA, Justice, FBI, all had people on this study. In fact, we had a civil integration and response panel that included so-called first-responders. We had people that worked the World Trade Center bombing, people that worked the Oklahoma City bombing, etc., so we got a very good interface with the civil community, which brought up a lot of problems and issues and how to handle them.

## U.S. is no longer a sanctuary

Let me show you a little bit about what we called the so-called transnational threat. If you look at the Congressional bill that was put out in 1997, there's a formal definition of transnational threats. We're trying to make the point that these people are motivated very differently, and that with the technology that's available today, a very few people can cause an awful lot of trouble. How to deter them and control them is very difficult; some of them don't have any borders, they're all over the place. How do you respond to these people? It's very difficult in many cases, and the result is that the consequences of attacks, from these transnational people, could be as devastating as a major military conflict. . . .

The product of our times is proliferation of technologies and knowledge, with a lot of world actors. These people are getting fed huge amounts of money through narco-trafficking and global crime. They're not going to attack us directly; it's going to be an asymmetrical attack. We're becoming very vulnerable to these things. We've found a consolidation of terrorist infrastructure, a very strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international operations, and these threats against the U.S. It's not a sanctuary here anymore, as I'll show you in a second, and clearly, mass destruction and casualties are a goal [of the terrorists].

Now let me walk through three examples. We had strong input from the FBI on this.

When the Libyans hired the people to go bomb that disco in Berlin, the U.S. response was to retaliate and bomb Libya. A big deal. We sent in F-117s, so on, if you recall. Everybody thought that put them in their place, nothing more is going to happen. Three days later, they bought a U.S. hostage and killed him. In September '87, hardly a year later, the Pan

Am 73 was hijacked by a group working through Libya and several Americans were killed. In April '88, again, a group working for Libya bombed a USO in Naples. We arrested some people in New Jersey with a number of pipe bombs that were targetted on New York City, and then the infamous Pan Am 103 in December '88, and by September '89, the French airliner was destroyed over Chad by the same people. Fortunately, we interdicted a Chicago street gang who they were trying to hire and equip with shoulder-fired missile systems to shoot down commercial aircraft at O'Hare Airport.

This was a campaign, not an isolated incident. This was a series of incidents called, in our terminology, a campaign. The next one was the World Trade Center.

First, they assassinated a rabbi [Meir Kahane] in New York City: The guy who did it was caught running out of the hotel where he assassinated the rabbi, immediately, and put into custody by the Feds. He ran right into the arms of a New York postal officer.

It was treated as a homicide, not a national security issue. They went to this guy's house, and they found all kind of documentation that was not translated. People visited this guy in jail; the people who visited him in jail over the period from 1990 to February '93 are the guys who bombed the World Trade Center. There was never a connection made.

So, these people bombed the World Trade Center, and they had a July 4 follow-up plan that was interdicted because the law enforcement and the national security people finally got involved and figured it out.

You see, the actuals were six killed and 5,000 injured, and the guy that masterminded this, when they arrested him overseas a couple of years later, admitted that his goal wasn't what we've shown here; it was more like 250,000 people he wanted to kill. He admitted this, and it came out in testimony in his trial two or three weeks ago. This, again, was a campaign.

They miscalculated where to put the truck bomb; they thought the bomb would be more efficient. They considered putting radioactive material or chemical materials in this bomb, but they didn't have money to do it, and probably didn't have the knowledge, but this was a very dangerous bunch of people.

You turn to Aum Shinrikyo, which is an organization that has not died. At the time they were taken down, they had an estimated 30,000 members in five different countries; their assets were better than a billion dollars, in fact. In Secretary Cohen's report that was issued last week on proliferation and counterproliferation, there's a little vignette about these people, a special page-and-a-half discussion of them. They estimate in there \$2 billion in assets, but, put it at whatever number you want. They were very skilled at Sarin and anthrax and so on. They did a little exercise in June of '94, then the big release in the Tokyo subway. Actuals were 12 killed and 5,000-plus injured; planned was tens of thousands. Again, this was a series of things; it wasn't an isolated incident.

Every one of these three had some serious political motivation behind it: us being the Great Satan, break down the government of Japan, what-have-you. So, there are motives and ideals pushed by these people that are very serious.

### **The mission of the DOD**

So, why should we be engaged? It's really DOD's core business, because of force protection issues, overseas and in the United States. You look at the assets that DOD can bring to bear on a problem like this, especially: You need WMD experience, extensive capabilities in building complex systems, etc., and, of course, if you look at the laws that have been put into place, we've been told to do it. So, there's no way for DOD not to be involved in this kind of problem. It transcends the Department of Defense, and reaches into many other departments, so this is a government-wide issue, and it's also a major state and local government issue.

We said there are six elements to a DOD response strategy, and these are the six elements in the briefing that we gave the Secretary, and it goes on for well over an hour. We went down through each one of these in detail. In the final report, we addressed all of these six with a lot of backup data. The appendices have a lot more supporting technical material and other things that go into why we said this and how we would execute it.

The first thing is that it's treated as a major DOD mission. We keep the current security structure, and don't try to create a czar, and so on.

We were asked to evaluate DOD's capabilities today. In '96, we stood up the Marine Corps Chem Bio Response Force, about 350 people, down in North Carolina. The Army's technical escort unit has been out 200 days a year this year. We've had some ACTD [advanced concept technology demonstrations], and more planned; DARPA has a BW defense R&D initiative and is currently spending about \$50 to \$60 million a year. That will grow as soon as they can find places that make sense to put more effort into a whole variety of BW defenses and technologies.

As you know, perhaps, Secretary Cohen, during the current quadrennial defense review, proposed adding a billion dollars over the next five years, or \$200 million a year, let's say, to BW defense.

Even so, what's happening is the Army, in terms of their broad reduction of force structure, is being hit in places where it really hurts. We've had changes in the tech-escort unit, for example, with more civilians rather than military. They're stretched thin, and there are pressures on our expertise in the CW base, with people being taken out of the force by downsizing. For example, in the active Army, with R&D and medical reductions . . . there are only six physicians still up there working this problem. In the bio-area, big problem. Fragile base. We can't keep taking it down like everything else is taken down. The good news is, this has now been understood inside the building [Pentagon]. There is a direct

mandate to the Army to go back and look at all of this and see what can be done to reverse it. . . .

### Response to the biowarfare threat

Let me just talk about the BW threat. We're saying two things here. There is a huge, extensive biotechnology expertise out there, and I'm talking to the crowd here tonight in industry and universities. Why don't we tap into that? We have a small effort in DOD and DOE reaching out to this community today, not very big dollars. It could be a lot more. We've got these biotechnology people that are doing all these great things, and could maybe help us with BW defense, but the commercial sector would need to know from the Department, what in the heck is it you really want and how do you motivate? So, instead of having dear Vice President Gore today spend all day long talking about pornography on the Internet, why don't we have Vice President Gore talk to the biotechnology industry in the universities, and so on, and say, "Let's get involved," and get them to do that. This thing is a serious national problem, more than pornography on the Internet.

If you read Cohen's report from last week, he says, on the very first page, that in a BW or CW attack, we'll see major consequences in this country or some place. It's not *if*, it's just *when*, and I really believe that. The second thing he said is, the Russians have a huge program. Estimate 40,000 people, roughly 9,000 scientists, and huge facilities, monstrous facilities. There is one facility that we visited, which is over a hundred buildings, world-class labs, really extensive. But they've kept a lot of it under cloak and dagger. There are three small pilot projects that have been under way. We said, "Extend those." The goal is to get the Russian scientists, like we've done with Nunn-Lugar and the nuclear materials and nuclear weapons effort, to do the same thing in BW. So, what we're recommending here is to extend Nunn-Lugar to the nuclear and BW. Costs are minimal to get this going; details are in the report on what we proposed in the nuclear area; there are a number of initiatives that DOE needs to do with DOD. They need to get this thing up to a higher level of awareness.

Number six is, what do you do about integration and leverage of force protection and civil protection? If you look at something that happens, some sort of an event, these are the people—law enforcement, fire, rescue, and so on—who are the so-called first-responders. . . . We had about a dozen people, MDs, fire, rescue, what-have-you. These people have actually had hands-on experience. Interestingly enough, not one of these people could participate in the study when we first asked them to, because none of them had ever had a DOD secret clearance, even the guys who had worked the Atlanta Olympics. We had to get every one of these people interim secret clearance, which took a few days, and so on, to get them to be able to participate at a DOD secret level, because a lot of these briefings and material were secret.

One of the things that's got to get broken down in this interface to the civil responder community, is this issue of

sharing of information and clearances. Not one single person—the number-two guy from New York, the number-one guy from Miami, who has all of Dade County, and so on—none of them had clearance. There is this infamous thing called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, which was passed in fiscal '97. It gave DOD about \$90 million and said, go do a whole bunch of things. It said, start with doing planning and coordination and continuously exercise; it said, get ready for crisis, crisis management, and consequence management. These are the things it said for DOD to go and do. Establish hotlines, web pages, exercises, training, loans of equipment. There are 120 cities that are being systematically walked through in a training from the Army chemical-biological command, and some contractors helping them. This is at the initial stage; it has not anywhere near been completed yet; even at the end of '98 it will not be completed. The bill was written to cover '97 and '98 only, and gave the President the option, in October '99, to give the program to some other agency, As some people have said, let's give it to FEMA; so, it's not clear what's going to happen.

Our recommendation is to institutionalize Nunn-Lugar-Domenici in the Department of Defense. Do not give it to FEMA. Task the Army to put more money into it. Expand the training, use distance learning, and use this money to fund development of that global information network. . . .

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long before Monica Lewinsky,  
there was a conscious decision, made in  
London, that there would be a full-scale  
campaign to destroy Bill Clinton,  
and to destroy, once and for all,  
the credibility of the office of the  
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—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.



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