Book Reviews

Former U.K. ambassador spews big lies about U.S.-British relations

by Mark Burdman

Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War

by Sir Robin Renwick Random House, New York, 1996 450 pages, hardbound, \$35

On the back jacket of *Fighting with Allies*, there are three individuals given place of rank, to lavish what is called "advance praise" on Sir Robin Renwick's book. The three are George Bush, Henry Kissinger, and Margaret Thatcher. Bush, who once stated, "I am an anglophile, we should all be," and who proclaimed, "We salute to you the Mother Country," when Queen Elizabeth II came to the United States, lauds it as "a great book." Kissinger, who like Bush has been knighted by the Queen, finds it to be "superb. . . . I greatly enjoyed this book." Her Baroness Thatcher delights in this "absorbing book."

It is lawful that a book on Anglo-American relations that this ghoulish trio would find "great," "superb," and "absorbing," would be published by Random House, the publishing giant which plays a leading role in British black propaganda operations in the United States. The firm's president, Briton Harold Evans, is former editor of the London Times, an important house organ for key figures in the powerful Queen's Privy Council. Evans's wife, Tina Brown, also British, is editor-in-chief of New Yorker magazine. Random House is at the forefront of Britain's scandal-mongering dirty tricks against President Bill Clinton, including publishing the scurrilous anti-Clinton political "fiction" Primary Colors, by "Anonymous," later revealed to be Joe Klein of *Newsweek*. Random House is also releasing in January 1997, Behind the Oval Office: Winning the Presidency in the '90s, by the highly disreputable former Clinton campaign strategist Dick Morris.

These factors alone should set off alarm bells in the mind of the reader, that he is going to get a heavy dose of British imperial disinformation from *Fighting with Allies*. Sir Robin

Renwick doesn't disappoint, in this respect. His book provides a useful lesson, in how the British Foreign Office and its school of diplomats manipulate, brainwash, and, to a significant extent, control those Americans caught, by their own choice or as unwitting victims, in the British conceptual trap. Renwick is very good at doing what British diplomats are trained to do—namely, lying.

The author is a professional "handler" of the American policy establishment. From 1991-95, he was ambassador in Washington, coming to D.C. from his earlier posting as British ambassador to South Africa. During his ambassadorial tenure in D.C., he ran a social salon, with huge embassy parties and receptions, that were attended by many of Washington's movers-and-shakers. Throughout those years, Renwick cultivated a vast array of contacts, and developed and maintained extensive inroads to various parts of the federal government. Such activity built upon earlier experience in Washington; in the 1980s, he had been counselor in the British embassy, and by his own description in the book's prologue, "I was involved in the effort to secure support for Britain in the Falklands War" of 1982. He had earlier been a senior figure in Her Majesty's Foreign Service, having served, in the 1960s, in the British embassies in Dakar, Senegal, and New Delhi, India, and then becoming the private secretary to the Minister of State, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, from 1970-72.

Was there ever a Declaration of Independence?

Perhaps the passage that most usefully defines Renwick's point of view is the following: "That there has been an extraordinarily close relationship between Britain and the United States since the desperate summer of 1940 is beyond dispute. The relationship was frequently marked by fierce disagreements, often with good cause, over Suez and real clashes of national interest. But to a remarkable extent, these were regarded as something akin to family quarrels, and despite the tensions that marked successive (British) prime ministers, . . . the underlying strength of the relationship always seemed

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to reassert itself" (emphasis added). He continues, with confidence: "The demise of the 'special relationship' has been pronounced on many occasions, most recently because of the differences over Bosnia and Northern Ireland. Yet it has shown a Lazarus-like tendency to survive."

Insofar as the differences that separate the United States of America and imperial Britain are "regarded as something akin to family quarrels," the British have won the game, hands down. If we accept that premise, we are in the realm of soap opera, with the script written in London. As in any soap opera, so with Renwick's book, there are dramatic episodes, clashes among the actors, titillating scandals, and juicy tidbits of gossip, but all occurring in the realm of fantasy, or virtual reality. So caught up might the reader become, in the accounts of pairwise interactions involving British prime ministers, foreign secretaries, and others, with American Presidents, secretaries of state, and others, that he or she might lose sight of the fact, that this has nothing to do with a real world in which a British imperial system seeks, relentlessly, to subvert, and destroy a United States constitutional republic that was formed on the basis of a revolutionary war of independence against that same British empire.

Which gets us to the crux of the matter. In a book presumably detailing the history of American-British relations, the American Revolution is *never mentioned*. The reader can thumb through the index and never see the names Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, nor that of any other American Founding Father. Sir Robin's only use of the term "Founding Fathers," is in his foreword, to refer to those individuals, on both sides of the Atlantic, who created the Anglo-American "special relationship," and who "did their work well, in creating ties deep and strong enough to cope with the vagaries of governments on both sides of the Atlantic."

Renwick is like a doctor giving a course in human anatomy, and deciding not to discuss the heart. His omission can not be explained as a matter of expediency, by an author restricting himself to the 20th century. Renwick's narrative, in fact, begins with an account of the British burning of the White House, in the War of 1812. In that short account, he acknowledges that British military chiefs and diplomats were often brutal in their attitudes toward Americans, but conforming with his overall "paradigm," he quotes Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh, that the 1812 conflict was "a sort of family quarrel."

By eliminating the Declaration of Independence and 1776-83 American war against the British Empire, the author eliminates, axiomatically, the single most important reality defining British-American relations, from 1776 to the present day. Dealt with honestly, that reality requires changing the characterization of the relationship from that of "allies" to that of "adversaries."

The American revolutionaries' war against the British Empire was not one of expediency, pragmatic self-interest, or class warfare. It was, rather, motivated by a fundamental philosophical great divide, with Franklin and allies grouped in the Christian humanist camp of the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, against the radical empiricist ideologues of the British Empire, typified by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Isaac Newton, and Adam Smith. As codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the American Constitution, the former individuals upheld the notion that the basis of statecraft was to promote the development of man as "in the image of God." The latter Brutes, by contrast, saw man as a beast, and justified an imperial system that treated 95% of mankind as such. It was this philosophical great divide, which underlay Franklin et al.'s abhorrence of British imperial "free trade" looting policies. To the present day, the republican constitutional structure of the United States, as well as the often suppressed, but nonetheless underlying, cultural impulses of much of the American population, are irreconcilable with Her Majesty's imperial system.

It can be surmised that Renwick's willful omission of the American Revolution, and the philosophical antagonism between the American and British systems that it involves, is motivated by the following consideration. We are in a period, now, when the axiomatics of "normal life" are being called into question, by the onrush of a crisis of historical proportions, both economic-financial and cultural-philosophical. Under such conditions, increasing numbers of Americans, including elements within policy-influencing circles, will be open to questioning the media-promoted shibboleths of recent decades, and to reflecting on the more profound roots of the American republic. This is all the more the case, given that a substantial part of the population is cognizant of the efforts of the LaRouche movement to revive the anti-British "American System" tradition, and/or are familiar with writings by LaRouche and his collaborators, documenting the history of British imperial infamy against the American republic.

Ever sensitive to potential shifts in moods in the United States, the British feel they have to contain, coopt, and deflect this potentiality, by admitting, at times, that tensions have prevailed in British-American relations, and even publishing the more volatile features of this relationship, e.g., the 1921 comment by British Ambassador Auckland Geddes, that the U.S. and Britain were "drifting toward war." It is all right to publish such tidbits, as long as the taboo is maintained on discussion of the fundamental philosophical issues. In any case, even the more explosive anecdotal material Renwick reports, is relatively anodyne and "controlled," compared to the material *EIR* has published on the British-American brawls of the 1920s and other periods.²

Who killed Abraham Lincoln?

Renwick's omissions define the axiomatics of the book. For example, Renwick's summary of the Civil War is frivolous, to the point of inanity. On the one hand, he reports the

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evaluation of Lord Lyons, British minister in Washington, in 1864, that "three-fourths of the American people are eagerly longing for a safe opportunity of making war with England," so much so that Queen Victoria "took the threat to Canada seriously." On the other hand, no reason is provided for this dire assessment, except that there was "outrage" among "northerners" over "the construction in British yards of warships for the South." There is no further evidence provided of British subversion, except for the oblique comment that British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston "was not alone in being suspected of hoping" that the "serious differences [that] have arisen among the states of the North American Union . . . might lead to the dissolution of the Union." And even that contention is immediately cushioned by the protest that "there was unanimity in Britain that slavery must be abolished," and that, "The British Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, declared that Britain was not involved, in any way, in the Civil War.... Confederate envoys were dispatched to Britain to seek recognition of the secession of the South. To their indignation, this was denied them. ... Confederate hopes were pinned on Lancashire's dependence on cotton from the southern states, but this made no difference to the British policy of non-recognition."

In fact, the Confederate insurrection was supported and promoted, on all levels, by Palmerston and his French puppet Emperor Napoleon III. The issue in the Civil War remained the same issue as that in 1776, which Renwick is too frightened to discuss: the opposition of American System proponents, including Lincoln and his adviser Henry Carey, to British imperial "free trade" policies, which were enslaving peoples across the globe. So much for "unanimity in Britain that slavery must be abolished"!

So fearful is he of telling the truth, that Sir Robin cannot bring himself to mention that Lincoln was assassinated. That might pose the uncomfortable question, "Who did it?" with the investigative tracks leading to some familiar places in London.⁴

Killing FDR, retrospectively

It is a lawful progression, from the omission of 1776, and the distortions of 1812 and the 1860s, to the travesty of Renwick's treatment of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his relationship to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Aside from the interesting evidence of British Field Marshal Montgomery's sabotage of effective Allied military strategy, this section is dominated by pure sentimentality and historical revisionism. The burden of the argument is that FDR was an unflagging friend of Britain. Renwick adopts as a chapter heading, Churchill's characterization of FDR as "the greatest American friend we have ever known." Insofar as he alludes to Roosevelt's disagreements with Churchill, he either portrays them as pragmatic tactical gimmicks, or patronizingly dismisses Roosevelt's deal with Stalin as based on unfortu-

nate delusions on the part of FDR or his team.

As usual, Sir Robin simply avoids the fundamental philosophical issue that defined FDR's bitter conflicts with Churchill, pertaining both to the conduct of the war and to the shaping of the postwar order. Again, Renwick simply eliminates any inconveniences from the historical record. Despite the facts that he devotes nearly 100 pages to the World War II period, enumerates over 150 bibliographical references for the book as a whole, and acknowledges (in one sentence) the presence of FDR's son Elliot at the Aug. 9, 1941 meeting between Churchill and FDR, he never alludes to Elliot Roosevelt's famous book As He Saw It, where he unambiguously documents the unbridgeable philosophical gap that separated FDR from Churchill; and, that FDR wanted to prevent future wars, and to reconstruct the postwar world by dismantling the British, French, and Dutch empires, and to use classical "American methods" to develop former colonial nations. FDR's son further depicts Churchill biting rugs, while FDR discusses such matters with the Sultan of Morocco and others. As Elliot Roosevelt describes it—and there is much corroborating evidence from other archival material that Renwick ignores—FDR was incessant in his push for independence for India, and sought to work with the Soviet Union (or Russia) and China, to weaken British imperial institutions and power.

Churchill was furious when the younger Roosevelt's book was released, denouncing it as dangerous, and proclaiming that it should never have been published.

The party of treason

Even given his perverse account of the FDR-Churchill relationship, Renwick can barely disguise his relief that, with FDR dead, a new era had begun under Harry Truman, more favorable to British interests. Twice, he highlights the advice of Harry Hopkins, one of FDR's more dubious advisers, who wrote at the end of the war: "If I were to lay down the most cardinal principle of our foreign policy, it would be that we must make absolutely sure that now and forever the United States and Great Britain are going to see eye to eye on major matters of world policy."

The period of 1946-92 is punctuated by four major conflicts: Korea, the Suez crisis, the Malvinas War ("Falklands" to the imperium), and the Persian Gulf War. Whatever useful damage may have been done to Anglo-American relations by Britain's Suez filibuster, has been more than compensated for by the other three, whose common factor is British manipulation of leading figures in the U.S. policy structure, and the disgusting willingness of influential Americans to sell their birthright, and appease the British Empire.

The Gulf War is the most obvious, with George Bush depicted following the dictates of Margaret Thatcher.

With Korea, there is the U.S. State Department position paper, prepared on the eve of the June 1950 initiation of that

conflict, which advised: "No other country had the same qualifications for being our principal ally and partner. . . . The British, and with them the rest of the Commonwealth, particularly the older dominions, are our most reliable and useful Allies, with whom a *special relationship* should exist." By December 1950, while the war was escalating, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the National Security Council that the lesson of the Korean War was that the United States must maintain a close relationship with Britain, "since we can bring U.S. power into play only with the cooperation of the British."

This is an incredible assessment, in view even of the evidence provided by Renwick, that the British sabotaged the Americans on every level, in what Renwick calls, this "first major war to be waged in the nuclear age—an attempt to apply limited force to achieve limited objectives." The British did everything in their power to sabotage U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who understandably detested the Brits. Furthermore, two very senior figures in the official British connection to Washington, Donald Maclean (appointed in November 1950 to be head of the American Department of the Foreign Office) and Guy Burgess (since August 1950, British Washington, D.C. Embassy liaison to the U.S. State Department), were members of the notorious "Cambridge Soviet spy ring," and were sending vital intelligence to the Communist adversary, on American strategy and diplomacy pertaining to the Korean War, up until the spring of 1951, when they fled together to Moscow, just at the point they were being unmasked. After briefly recounting the sordid Maclean-Burgess tale, Renwick comments dismissively, in a footnote, "None of the Cambridge spies was in a position to do much damage to the Western cause after 1951." Indeed, by then, the damage had already been done.

In the case of what the British call the "Falklands" war, there is the role of then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who bent over backwards, to help the British defeat the Argentines. For this "service," he, too, was later knighted by Queen Elizabeth. As Renwick acknowledges, without American support, the British could never have prevailed.

But here, too, Renwick omits the point of fundamental principle. By strict interpretation of the law, the United States was politically and morally obliged to help the Argentines, in line with one of the more sacred doctrines of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine enunciated by President Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, in the 1820s. But Monroe and Adams join the long list of anti-British American heroes who are treated by Renwick as the lead character in British author George Orwell's 1984 dealt with those individuals and events that his totalitarian masters wanted erased from historical memory: He put all references to them through the shredder.

Needless to say, Lyndon LaRouche, the one American figure who insisted, rigorously, on the application of the Monroe Doctrine, and on the justice of the Argentine case respect-

ing the Malvinas Islands, also receives nary a mention. Yet, at the time, the British were none too happy about LaRouche's activities on behalf of Argentina, and in defense of natural law. Given Sir Robin's key role in those 1982 events, one can only wonder what he would truthfully say about his role in helping set in motion the 1980s political-legal witchhunt of LaRouche.

Kissinger spills the beans

It was in August 1982, that Henry Kissinger launched the illicit operations against LaRouche. And the story could not be complete, without some mention of Kissinger, Exactly as the "Falklands" adventure was escalating, Kissinger gave his notorious May 10, 1982 speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Foreign Office think-tank, in which he confessed his loyalty to Her Majesty's Empire, even while he served as national security adviser and secretary of state. (See article, p. 28.) While Renwick omits to mention the speech, he does allude to the central point, writing: "As national security adviser, [Kissinger] claimed to have kept the British better informed and more closely engaged than he did the State Department." He further quotes from Kissinger's 1982 book, Years of Upheaval: "For generations, successive administrations had synchronized their moves with London, especially over the Atlantic Alliance. The British had fought for this tenaciously. Their way of retaining great-power status, was to be so integral a part of American decision-making, that the idea of not consulting them seemed a violation of the natural order of things. So able and selfassured were our British counterparts, that they managed to convey the notion that it was they who were conferring a boon on us by sharing the experience of centuries. Nor were they quite wrong in this estimate."

How does a Kissinger get away with it, or for that matter, how can the British get away with such subversive interference into U.S. life? How could a former British ambassador to Washington feel so emboldened, as to write such a lying and misleading book? None of this could occur, were it not tolerated by the American population. Toward the end, he proclaims: "Britain continues to be regarded by most Americans as the United States' closest and most dependable ally." It is time for the American population to rise to the challenge he throws out in that sentence and to demonstrate to the British, that "the Spirit of 1776" is still alive.

Notes

- 1. "The Anti-Newtonian Roots of the American Revolution," by Philip Valenti, EIR, Dec. 1, 1995.
- 2. E.g., see "Britain's Pacific Plot against the United States, and War Plan Red," EIR, May 12, 1995.
- 3. The Civil War and the American System: America's Battle with Britain 1860-1876, by W. Allen Salisbury (Washington, D.C.: EIR, 1992).
- 4. See the pamphlet, "Why the British Kill American Presidents," published by *The New Federalist*, December 1994.