

This was the principal aim of the war.

But the war did not come instantly; it was well planned a long time ago. And I will tell you how it was planned.

### A long-term Serbian strategy

The federal Yugoslav Army, in its strategic plans, developed a so-called defensive line of very strong military facilities—barracks, underground storage facilities—and accumulated huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, and anything else that would be needed for a huge war, against anybody, exactly on this line. The principal barracks of the federal Yugoslav Army were lined up at Virovitica, Bjelovar, Petrinja, Karlovac, and Knin, of course. This area was covered with military facilities of the federal Yugoslav Army, on the pretext that this would be the main defensive line against a presupposed attack from the *Austrian* side! Very interesting. Very clever. The name of the game was to create a Serbian stronghold, for when the time would become ripe for a general Serbian attack on Croatia. . . .

Now, when it was obvious that the war was imminent, the war was spreading against Croatia, the Croatian government was still hesitating, because strong pressure, parallel political activity from abroad, came along with the Serbian attacks. That is, the stronger the Serbian attacks were, the stronger were the British and French accusations against Croatia for its fascism, Ustasha crimes, and so on, in order to politically disarm Croatia, to deny it the right to defend itself. And when Croatia started to organize its defense, it was said, "No, Croatia is going to commit genocide against the Serbs; they are right, because you are Ustasas, you are connected to the Nazis," and so on. And so all these Serbian moves went on without any moves from the Croatian side.

The Serbs saw that they had in fact a free hand from the international community, from the British and French. They decided to hit very hard. So an organized attack started from Vojvodina, previously annexed to Serbia, over the Danube River.

This general attack on Croatia in eastern Slavonia, which

## LaRouche: Define a policy to win peace in Bosnia

The following are excerpts from a Feb. 8, 1993 "EIR Talks" radio interview with Lyndon LaRouche, who was then a political prisoner. LaRouche was asked whether U.S. military intervention would be necessary in the Balkans.



Lyndon LaRouche

A military policy pure and simple is always a piece of idiocy, because when you

go out to shoot somebody, you say, what are you shooting him for? "Well, we have our objections to what he is doing, and that's a good enough reason for us to shoot him."

But we should know, by studying history—those of us who have: Never get into a war, unless you have first studied very carefully the issue of justified warfare as posed by St. Augustine in his writings on the subject.

Don't go so quickly into warfare. First of all, you have to define what your *peace objectives* are, and what the problems standing in the way of peace are, and your commitment to conduct war if at all for the purpose of furthering those peace objectives. Then you must state clearly

what those peace objectives are, because your object of warfare is to bring about peace, when peace in fact no longer exists.

Peace in fact no longer exists in the Balkans. The first thing to be done, which neither Cyrus Vance nor Lord David Owen have done, is to state, from the standpoint of *morality*, what is immoral in the situation in the Balkans and what are the moral conditions which must be satisfied to bring about peace.

Then, if you have to go to warfare, you say that we may have to go warfare. If we do so, it will be for the following *peaceful objectives*. And as soon as somebody accepts these peaceful objectives, the war is ended. And only under those conditions, is war a moral alternative. Even in desperate situations, you must not go to war, even to save your own life, unless you have met those conditions.

So, that's our situation in the Balkans. We have war criminals who are worse than the Nazis under the command of Milosevic, the leader of the Serbian communist-fascist bloc (not the Serbians as a whole, but these people have dominated Serbians with their machine and they are conducting the war).

It is genocide. We should call it *genocide*. It is aggressive war—we should call it that. We should state that we will not tolerate that. We should stop this nonsense about the Croats "provoking" the Serbs. We should send into something like Coventry [an insane asylum in Britain], people like Douglas Hurd, particularly Nicholas Ridley or Conor Cruise O'Brien, who say this war was started by

was followed by the famous battle of Vukovar, could have been very simply prevented, if only the Croatian government had had some courage to do this. The Danube River is very wide here, very hard to cross—for an untrained federal army, almost impossible to cross. There are only two bridges here; these bridges could be mined; they could be blown up without any problem. In fact, the local people knew what was going to happen, and they made all the preparations, got explosives, everything was there on the spot, and they got on the telephone to Zagreb and said, “We have prepared everything, we can stop them, just give us a nod to blow these bridges up.” Zagreb gave the strictest orders *not* to do this, because it could *provoke* the Serbs to attack.

Finally, when the government started to contemplate the possibility of blowing the bridges up, the Serbs already had five divisions on the Croatian side. The battle of Vukovar had begun. . . .

Serbs suffered terrible losses in the battle for Vukovar. My estimation then was that they were on the edge of complete

Germany or said that there was a threat that Germany would become a Fourth Reich—a lot of nonsense. People who mouth that stuff, should be treated with contempt.

In other words, the first thing to do, is to organize political-moral force for the right peace objectives, and then, if there is no other way to do that but military means, and military means are capable of doing that, then do it. Because you have to. We should prepare for that contingency. But, what I fear is that some slopheads will get us into a shooting war with no clear workable peace objectives, and that would make a worse mess than we already have.

**EIR:** Is there anything in terms of the immediate situation that can be done? The Vance-Owen plan talks about a cantonization policy for Bosnia and there is opposition in Bosnia to that, and yet the Bosnians are facing a life and death situation. Should the embargo be lifted?

**LaRouche:** The United States government and the Europeans should simply say, that whatever Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his crew in the United Nations, along with Vance, think they are doing, in setting up a United Nations world empire, that we are not going to tolerate it.

We should say clearly what is the truth, that Vance and Owen, and Carrington before Owen, are worse criminals than Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier at Munich in 1938. This is a far worse crime that Owen and Vance are doing—continuing the policy of Carrington—than was done by Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier at Munich in 1938. We should treat that with contempt and give no moral support to it whatsoever: It stinks.

defeat—not technically, but psychologically. I thought, “They’re losing tanks, vehicles, artillery, weapons, people. They’re losing everything, yet they’re attacking on and on. They’re losing generals, the most important officers. They’re developing the Gallipoli syndrome! Regardless of losses, they have to take this town.” It was something stronger than reason. I said to myself, “If we manage to break them here, they will never psychologically recover from it; they will never get the psychological strength to go on with the war.” This thinking you could note also in the Croatian Army, which had managed to establish itself by then.

That was the end of October and the beginning of November 1991. A major breakthrough operation from the Croatian side started toward Vukovar from Vinkovci, in order to break the Serbian encirclement. The operation was a successful one. Croatian forces managed in a rather short time to get to the suburbs of Vukovar, to the point named Marinci, a small village near Vukovar. That was basically the Serbian defeat. When they got to Marinci, the Serbs knew they were losing, they were finished. We needed perhaps one day or two to get into Vukovar—the major Croatian forces—and in Vukovar, to connect with the defending forces there, and it would all be over. The Serbian losses of 10,000 people, a couple of hundred tanks, and big airplanes, and so forth, would have been in vain.

### **Betrayal by the West**

What happened there? An interesting thing. A telephone call from [European Community negotiator Lord] Carrington to Mr. Tudjman. He demanded an immediate interruption of this breakthrough operation. He said, “No! You are expanding the war. We want *peace*. We want a peaceful solution. You should let the Red Cross convoy enter Vukovar, not your army. Let the Red Cross convoy evacuate the wounded from the Vukovar hospital.” It took some time, but basically Mr. Tudjman obeyed the demand of Mr. Carrington and Mr. Vance, and he ordered that the operation be interrupted. Croatian forces stopped on the road to Vukovar. The Serbs relaxed. They started to joke around. They wouldn’t let the Red Cross convoy in. But after the fifth try, after the convoy evacuated 400 people from the Vukovar hospital and returned to Zagreb, in the process of allowing the Red Cross convoy into Vukovar, Serbian forces—there was a strict cease-fire then—went in immediately after it, and quickly linked up with the military headquarters in Vukovar. That was basically the fall of Vukovar.

There was another time that Serbia was facing complete defeat, and was saved only by intervention from outside. Croatsians, without an army, without anything, had started spontaneously to attack Serbian military facilities in Croatia. It was amazing how quickly these barracks were taken. The Serbs did not have any organized defense of these barracks. This was in summer 1991. A general attack on Serbian military