

police, given their surveillance of this society, haven't known about what was going on. That is to say that Aum, rather than being a new religion, represents an ultra-nationalist organization, the type of organization which existed in the 1930s. . . .

From a Japanese point of view, so long as the Americans wish to continue to play a rat's-ass Cold War role, there is a huge vested interest in Japan in it.

EIR: All the terrorism in the world won't change that?

Johnson: Well, you would think it would, that's why I said the pressures are very intense! That's why I said Washington is deluding itself with the DOD report. Who could believe the status quo could possibly last till the year 2015? We're lucky if it lasts another year. . . .

Revolutionary situations are hard things to predict. It does begin to lead to the utter de-legitimization of the system. The Asian answer is authoritarian capitalism. I'm afraid that if pushed that hard, it will lead to more authoritarian government, and that the people who'd profit from that are precisely the current police system.

This is what I meant earlier in saying 10-15 years from now Japan will be defending itself as an independent state. It's going to happen, one way or the other. We can either bring it about in a controlled way, or we can ignore the issue until it explodes in our faces. . . .

You either get change in a processional, policymaking way, in which the U.S. tries to control these events, or you drift until some big incident, maybe Aum or terrorism would be it, some people thought the earthquake—brings home to the Japanese, that they finally need a government! This will set the Yomiuri off and all these new proposals to amend the Constitution and come up with a new crisis-management government. *All of which are good.* Our strategy is to encourage these things, because we can't continue to provide the defense of Japan.

Our job is to frame a world with a balance of power, a world which is very complex for them, not simple. . . .

EIR: This idea of creating a new framework to control the global system reminds me of the 1940s debate in the British Foreign Office between the "Keep the Empire" group, and those who realized you have to coopt the naive Americans, to control the future.

Johnson: It is very similar to that; this is precisely the type of dilemma posed by current circumstances.

EIR: So we need to get away from the old imperial attempt to simply keep the old Cold War system?

Johnson: Whatever you may think of [Henry] Kissinger and [Zbigniew] Brzezinski, they were at least grand strategists. There isn't anyone even slightly comparable to either of them in the government now. We need a kind of containment policy for the next 40 years.

Interview: Peter Ferdinand

Regional nuclear wars are possible in Asia

Peter Ferdinand, former Asia director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, was interviewed May 16.

EIR: There's a severe crisis in Japan, yet the U.S. is pressuring Japan, and I'm wondering if the Cold War security relations in Asia might not unravel?

Ferdinand: You're right, that's a possibility. . . . The U.S. seems to be treating Japan in an aggressive way as far as trade relations, and I find it difficult to believe that won't have impact on security relations. America's old cowboy image entering the saloon has certainly come to the fore, and it certainly is having a counterproductive effect in South Korea, as well as Japan.

Taiwan's another thing. There are people in Taiwan and South Korea who feel that the U.S. is not a reliable partner, that the U.S. is prepared to sacrifice the interests of Taiwan and South Korea. . . . There is no U.S. commitment to force on behalf of Taiwan, because there is no longer any treaty between the two. So there are two countries which have been very pro-American, which now can see gaps opening up between themselves and the U.S.

I do think we have reached a turning point in U.S.-East Asian relations, especially Japan relations, over the past year, when leaders of various parties are going to say "enough is enough, we've had enough of being kicked around and it's time that Japan was treated as an equal by the U.S." That's an attractive message for Japanese politicians when the party system is in such chaos. . . .

EIR: If the U.S. keeps on the cowboy routine, will this kick down the Murayama government?

Ferdinand: There's no long-term future for the Murayama government, anyway. . . . If you think the terrorism is going to continue, then clearly you're going to have a population more occupied with security than it was before, and that means domestic as well as international security. Then you have a kind of mood which is more sympathetic to a stronger line internationally, one which says Japan should be allowed to play the place in the world to which their economic might entitles them. . . . There have been a lot of articles in the Japanese press recently about the need for Japan to weigh carefully the extent to which it is an Asiatic state, the extent to which its interests conform to those of other Asian powers, rather than to those of the U.S.

EIR: What do you think of the U.S. revisionists who say, "Fine, we'll pull our troops out"?

Ferdinand: The pressures which the West has been trying to exert on economies of East Asia to conform to free trade norms, to make it easier for foreigners to invest in their economics, are going to evoke a lot more resistance than before from East Asia. They're going to be asking, "Why do we have to conform to primarily U.S.-determined rules?"

This obviously could contribute to a sense that East Asia should stick together more than it has in the past, that it should *set itself against the U.S.*, rather than see itself as a partner. . . . It would probably have the effect of enhancing the need for good relations with mainland China. If they think relations with the U.S. are going to cause a lot of pain and suffering, and that China is not threatening, then states in East Asia would look toward improving their relations with China.

EIR: You're warning of a Sino-Japanese alliance?

Ferdinand: Yes, an alliance in the future. . .

EIR: What do the Japanese and Chinese then say to the Americans, about U.S. troop presence there?

Ferdinand: They say: "We don't need you, because we haven't got a problem anyway. We think that the danger or threat of mainland Chinese expansionism simply is being exaggerated by the U.S. for its own interests."

I'm not sure the Chinese have a strategy over the next 10 years to expand territory. But the *real* problems will come in the year 2010, not the year 2000, when, assuming there has been a smooth succession with no civil war in China, that the Chinese economy has continued to grow, and you have a government in Beijing which is more sympathetic to military national concerns. *Then*, you have China as a power which other states in the region would have reason to fear more than at the moment.

But the trouble is that between now and 2010, the counterbalance that the U.S. offered may have been eroded, because the U.S. has undermined its acceptability.

EIR: Then you think the revisionists will prevail?

Ferdinand: Yes.

EIR: The Asians then say: Yankee Go Home!

Ferdinand: Yes.

EIR: And after Yankee's gone home—

Ferdinand: Then they're all dependent upon China, because it will be the biggest power in the region, with a spreading of Chinese "influence," to put it mildly. By 2010 China will have the means of dominating its neighbors, and that is simply numbers of people, and military might. But by then, it will be difficult for the U.S. to come back in from the cold! Unless something catastrophic happens. . . .

EIR: What about your strategy of breaking up China?

Ferdinand: I think it will happen, but not as a result of anything the outside world does. . . . It may happen as a result of events in the coastal provinces such as Guangdong, those are the ones with a lot of friction with Beijing, but not great movement for full independence. But I could conceive of the minority areas around the periphery to the west and the north remaining a serious problem for Beijing, serious enough that Beijing decides the costs were not worth it, and waves them goodbye. If China did become embroiled in some confrontation with other states in Asia, then its hold over the western and Northern areas would become weaker, and you might find them declaring independence and getting away with it. Tibet, Xinjiang, and so on. You might find Mongols, too, begin to set up their own Mongol state community.

Now China for the next 20-30 years won't be anything other than a regional power. So China can continue to increase its influence in Asia for 20 years. But the impact on Africa will be relatively slight. . . . China may, as it expands, find that it runs into India again to the south—and maybe Russia to the northwest, too.

EIR: If the U.S. removes its nuclear umbrella from East Asia, isn't there the possibility of regional nuclear war?

Ferdinand: Obviously that's the potential. I think that even if the U.S. pulled out troops from East Asia, it would *try* to maintain some kind of nuclear guarantee to Japan . . . unless the U.S. pullout leads to Japan developing nuclear weapons, and the Chinese intervene to prevent that.

EIR: Is there any divergence of U.K. and U.S. policy in Asia?

Ferdinand: The British government at present is happy to see the U.S. presence in Asia as a stabilizing influence. They perhaps don't want to say so quite as overtly as the U.S., to openly say things about Chinese expansionism, because they have too much to worry about in Hongkong.

EIR: That's for between now and 1997, but what are the British elites thinking in the back room?

Ferdinand: Some are developing an alternative policy to the present, of encouraging regional security arrangements. . . . It's at a low level now, but it will get to be more important in the future. We Europeans do tend to feel the U.S. is insufficiently diplomatic, and that more diplomacy and less cowboy tactics might be more successful.

At the moment, there are more forums for cross-Pacific talks about security issues than there were five years ago, and there are now institutions being developed to discuss these things. These do involve the U.S. at the moment, but they do involve European states. If relations between the U.S. and East Asia become more polarized, then, these forums might provide the opportunity for the states in East Asia to talk more fully amongst themselves as to what should be done—and to *other* partners as well.